Generative Mechanisms for Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution by Staykova, Kalina S.
GENERATIVE MECHANISMS FOR 
DIGITAL PLATFORM ECOSYSTEM 
EVOLUTION
Kalina S. Staykova
Doctoral School of Business and Management PhD Series 4.2019
PhD Series 4-2019
GEN
ERATIVE M
ECHAN
ISM
S FOR DIGITAL PLATFORM
 ECOSYSTEM
 EVOLUTION
COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL
SOLBJERG PLADS 3
DK-2000 FREDERIKSBERG
DANMARK
WWW.CBS.DK
ISSN 0906-6934
Print ISBN:  978-87-93744-50-9
Online ISBN: 978-87-93744-51-6
GENERATIVE MECHANISMS FOR       
DIGITAL PLATFORM ECOSYSTEM 
EVOLUTION 
Kalina S. Staykova 
Primary Supervisor: Prof. Jan Damsgaard 
Secondary Supervisor: Prof. Chee-Wee Tan 
   Doctoral School of Business and Management 
    Copenhagen Business School 
2Sammenfatning
Afhandlingen beskæftiger sig med risikostyringskonceptet Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), der fra
omkring årtusindeskiftet er advokeret som en ledelsesteknologi, der kan bidrage til 
erhvervsvirksomheders værdiskabelse. Tanken om at kunne kontrollere eller styre risiko er ikke ny.
Statistikkens og sandsynlighedsregningens udvikling ligger flere århundreder tilbage, og på store
homogene populationer har man kunnet tilknytte sandsynligheder for at givne hændelser vil indtræffe i
fremtiden. Når sandsynligheden tilknyttes konsekvens, har vi i den klassiske risikostyrings tankesæt
omformet usikkerhed til en forudsigelig risiko. Den kobling udnyttes mange steder, f.eks. er det selve
grundlaget for et forsikringsselskabs forretningsmodel. I den konceptuelle tankegang bag ERM forlades
det rationelle og objektspecifikke fundament, der kendetegner ovennævnte klassiske risikostyring. 
ERM-paradigmets grundtanke er, at en virksomheds samlede risikoeksponering kan anskues og
håndteres som en portefølje i en kontinuerlig proces, der integreres i virksomhedens strategiske
beslutninger. Den strategiske kobling betyder, at vi bevæger os ind i unikke relationer, hvortil der ikke
eksisterer historisk evidens for udfaldsrummet. 
Det konceptuelle spring og de praksisrelaterede konsekvenser, der kendetegner forskellene mellem
klassisk risikostyring og ERM, er afhandlingens fokus. Forskningsprojektet har strakt sig over mere end
12 år, og det har givet en sjælden mulighed for at følge en moderne ledelsesteknologis livscyklus fra
konceptualisering over praksisimplikationer frem til evaluering af konceptets værdi og fremtid. 
Afhandlingens kerne er 4 artikler, der hver især søger at belyse et af projektets 3 forskningsspørgsmål,
der 1) undersøger koncepternes ledelsesmæssige og organisatoriske orientering, 2) undersøger 
drivkræfter og motiver for virksomheders adoption af ERM som ledelsesteknologi, og 3) søger indsigt i
udfordringer og problematikker, som virksomheder støder på i anvendelsen af ERM-konceptet.
Artiklerne er udarbejdet successivt gennem projektets langstrakte forløb, og afspejler derfor
progressionen i konceptuel udvikling og praksisudfordringer, men også i min egen erkendelse.  
Den første artikel er en komparativ analyse af fire ERM-rammeværker, der var fremherskende i
projektets indledende fase. De er efterfølgende sammensmeltet til to, som til gengæld er blevet nutidens
helt dominerende standarder.  Analysens primære konklusion er, at rammeværkerne ikke bidrager til at 
etablere en kobling til de strategiske processer, idet deres indlejrede fokus er rettet mod strategi-
eksekvering, men ikke mod selve strategidannelsen. Det medfører, i modsætning til det konceptuelle
paradigme, at risikostyringsarbejdet begrænses til en negativ risikoopfattelse. Analysen indikerer
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English Abstract 
Despite their growing economic importance and rapid proliferation across various industries, 
successful digital platform ecosystems remain difficult to build and sustain over time. Facing 
challenges stemming from the turbulent and uncertain environment, in which they operate, and from 
the accumulated over time internal inefficiencies, digital platform ecosystems need to evolve and 
adapt rapidly. Despite the importance of understanding how and why this evolutionary process 
occurs, research on this topic has remained elusive. Building upon the notion of generative 
mechanisms, this PhD dissertation seeks to unravel the various mechanisms, which contingently 
shape the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. To this end, this research investigates the 
evolutionary process from three theoretical perspectives – Punctuated Equilibrium, Dialectical and 
Teleological, and by adopting multi-method approach. As a result, the PhD dissertation puts forward 
three process theories, each characterized by distinctive generative mechanisms, which collectively 
provide in-depth insights how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time in response to internal 
and external challenges.  
 
Dansk Abstrakt 
På trods af kraftig vækst i både markedsandele og antal er succesfulde digitale platforme fortsat svære 
at udvikle, og det er svært at vedligeholde deres succes. Platforme udfordres af både interne og 
eksterne faktorer og ophobning af interne uhensigtsmæssigheder og må derfor videreudvikles og 
tilpasses hurtigt. Hvordan og hvorfor denne udviklingsproces foregår har hidtil været underbelyst i 
den videnskabelige litteratur. Ud fra idéen om generative mekanismer (generative mechanisms) tager 
denne ph.d.-afhandling fat på at udrede de forskellige forhold, der betinger den evolutionære proces 
for digitale platforme. Processen undersøges fra tre teoretiske perspektiver: Evolutionær Afbrudt 
Ligevægt (Punctuated Equilibrium), Dialektik og Teleologik. Afhandlingen anvender en 
multimetodisk tilgang. Udbyttet af undersøgelserne er tre procesteorier, der hver især karakteriseres 
ved særlige generative mekanismer, hvilket til sammen bidrager med dybere indsigt i hvordan, 
digitale platforme udvikler sig over tid. 
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I Introduction 
This opening chapter introduces the main phenomenon of investigation in this PhD dissertation and 
demonstrates its importance to researchers and practitioners alike. It further presents the goals of this research 
and outlines the structure of the PhD dissertation.   
1. Motivation and Initial Research Focus   
Digital platform ecosystems, which function as complex socio-technical systems that facilitate interactions 
between various actors through developing and managing an IT architecture and appropriate governance 
regime, have emerged as some of the most prominent economic phenomena in the past couple of years (de 
Reuver et al., 2017; Hagiu and Wright 2011, 2013; Parker et al., 2016; Tiwana, 2014). For example, some of 
the most successful companies, in terms of number of users, brand value and profitability, operate as digital 
platform ecosystems (e.g., Airbnb, Alibaba, eBay, Uber, WeChat, and more). Just consider that fourteen out 
of the thirty most valuable brands for 2018, as pronounced by Forbes, function as digital platform ecosystems. 
The list comprises diverse companies such as Amazon, Samsung, Visa, Intel, and Facebook, connecting 
different types of actors, offering wide range of products and services, relying on different revenue streams 
and spreading across various industries. The credit card company Visa, for example, traditionally facilitates 
the interactions between cardholders and merchants (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016); while, Facebook, which 
started as one-sided platform (enabling the interactions between private users), has formed a robust ecosystem 
of actors around its platform (users, advertisers and third-party developers).  
Despite the observed heterogeneity, researchers point out that all these diverse companies share a number of 
similarities. In particular, they orchestrate the interactions occurring among vibrant ecosystem of actors (van 
Alstyne et al., 2016) by providing underlying IT architecture (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Yoo et al., 2012) 
and by imposing emergent governance regime (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). Thus, digital platform ecosystems 
consist of diverse combinations of actors, architecture and governance, which also alter throughout the course 
of the ecosystem evolution (see e.g., Evans, 2009, Hagiu, 2006, Parker et al., 2016).  
Digital platform ecosystems differ from existing businesses such as resellers and suppliers (Hagiu and Wright, 
2011; 2013; Parker et al., 2016). Collectively referred to as pipelines (see Parker et al., 2016), these traditional 
companies are losing their competitive advantages as digital platform ecosystems are transforming established 
business areas (e.g., music, finance, transportation, publishing) and, as a result, redefining competition 
(Tiwana, 2014). Researchers argue that digital platform ecosystems manage to defeat pipelines due to their 
inherent digital properties (see below) and due to their ability to coordinate the exchange of third-party 
resources (rather than owning them) in an efficient way (van Alstyne et al., 2016). In addition, digital platform 
ecosystems also utilize the innovation potential of a large number of external innovators rather than relying 
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solely on their own innovation efforts (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014, Hagiu and Wright, 2011; Parker et al., 
2016; Tiwana, 2014).  
As many traditional companies venture into creating digital platform ecosystems in an attempt to adapt to their 
changing environment (Hagiu and Wright, 2013, Parker et al., 2016; Zhu and Furr, 2016), the distinction 
between traditional product-oriented companies and platform ecosystems has blurred. In particular, as some 
companies provide a wide range of offerings, they often operate under a hybrid model (Hagiu, 2006; Hagiu 
and Wright, 2011). For example, Amazon functions as a reseller when it offers products directly to consumers 
and as a digital platform ecosystem when it offers to its users products by other sellers (Hagiu, 2014). Thus, 
most companies adopt business models situated in-between full-scale platform ecosystems and traditional 
retail businesses (Hagiu and Wright, 2011). Contrary to the popular belief that every business should 
orchestrate an ecosystem of actors around a digital platform, researchers caution against adopting the platform 
model without fully understanding the requirements it takes to build a successful digital platform ecosystem 
(Hagiu and Wright, 2013; Parker et al., 2016). Depending on the companies’ competitive advantages, it may 
pay off to operate as a reseller rather than venturing into building a digital platform ecosystem (e.g., the online 
retailer Zappos envisioned to operate as platform ecosystem, but later re-organized its business and become a 
reseller) (for more, see Hagiu and Wright, 2011).  
Surprisingly, although platforms and their ecosystems have become more notable in the last decade, they, in 
fact, have existed for centuries (e.g., town markets in the Middle Ages) (de Reuver et al., 2017; Hagiu, 2014; 
Tiwana, 2014; van Alstyne et al., 2016). The rapid proliferation of novel digital technologies (e.g., cloud 
computing, smartphones, Internet of Things, Near Field Communication (NFC), and more), which became the 
“invisible engines” (see Evans et al., 2006) at the center of digital platform ecosystems, have significantly 
changed the nature of platforms and their ecosystems. In particular, digital technologies, collectively defined 
as “combinations of information, computing, communication, and connectivity technologies” (Bharadwaj et 
al., 2013, p. 471) allow for easy communication across devices, services, and networks, supported by 
increasing and inexpensive computational power and growing capacity to store large amount of data (Bakos, 
1998; Bharadwaj et al., 2013; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001; Yoo et al., 2012).  
The ongoing adoption of digital technologies has led to the convergence of standalone technology devices and 
to the emergence of new services and business models, blurring the boundaries between industries (Hagiu, 
2006; Tilson et al., 2010). Just consider how the smartphone incorporated latest technology developments and 
engulfed a number of standalone devices, such as music players, car navigation systems, computers, cameras, 
payment cards, and more, which subsequently enabled the creation of a myriad of new services offered as 
software applications (e.g., iTunes, online map services, Instagram) (Hagiu, 2006; Kazan et al., 2018).  
As a result, digital platform ecosystems can integrate previously dispersed services and thus reduce the costs 
associated with their production, distribution and exchange (Bakos, 1998; Hagiu, 2006; Hagiu and Wright, 
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2011). In addition, they can increase the efficiency of matching and transacting in terms of speed and quality, 
thus improving the performance of digital platform ecosystems in comparison to non-digital ones (e.g., 
compare online marketplace vs physical shopping mall) (Bakos, 1998; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001; Hagiu and 
Wright, 2011; Parker et al., 2016; Yoo et al., 2012). 
As the underlying digital technologies are edible, reprogrammable, communicable, and extensible (Yoo et al., 
2010; Kallinikos et al., 2013), digital platforms1 are relatively easy to build, with high, but fixed initial 
development costs, which as digital platform ecosystems scale can spread across a growing user base 
(Eisenmannn, 2002; Kohler, 2018; Rysman, 2009; van Alstyne et al., 2016). Due to the use of digital 
technologies, platforms possess modular and layered IT architecture (Yoo et al., 2012), which, due the 
availability of boundary resources such as Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and Software 
Development Kits (SDKs), allow for interconnectivity towards other digital platform ecosystems (Eisenmann 
et al., 2009) and towards third-party complementors (Tiwana et al., 2010). In particular, using boundary 
resources, external complementors can access core platform services to generate and distribute more 
innovative services (Tilson et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2012).  
Digital infrastructures (such as the Internet, open standards, consumer devices, and more) provide the 
foundation upon which digital platforms operate by delivering “the necessary computing and networking 
resources” (Constantinides et al., 2018, p. 382) to support their functioning (Lyytinen and Yoo, 2002; Tilson 
et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2010). In particular, digital infrastructures function as “shared, open (and unbounded), 
heterogeneous and evolving socio-technical system (which we call installed base) consisting of a set of IT 
capabilities and their user, operations and design communities” (Hansenth and Lyytinen, 2010, p. 4). Thus, 
researchers view digital platforms in close relation to digital infrastructures (de Reuver et al., 2017) and further, 
point out that, in comparison, digital platforms and their ecosystems possess different control levels (e.g., 
different levels of centralization) than digital infrastructures, which constitute the main difference between the 
two phenomena (de Reuver et al., 2017; Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010).  
While the relationship between digital platform ecosystems and digital infrastructures is outside the scope of 
this PhD dissertation, it is important to take into account the interdependencies between them, which for long 
time were unaccounted for (Tilson et al., 2010). In particular, researchers have observed new forms of interplay 
between digital platform ecosystems and digital infrastructures. For example, due to the communicability and 
extensibility of digital platforms, there is a widespread connectivity among digital platform ecosystems (e.g., 
Facebook being used as user verification tool across many third-party platforms), which, as a result, entangle 
as to form a wider digital infrastructure (de Reuver et al., 2017). The difference between digital platform 
ecosystems and digital infrastructures also blurs, with researchers finding evidence for “infrastructuring” of 
                                                            
1 For the purposes of this research, digital platforms refer to the underlying architecture around which an ecosystem of actors 
emerges. Thus, digital platforms are at the center of digital platform ecosystems (Tiwana, 2014).  
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the digital platform and “platformization” of digital infrastructure, which have various implications for their 
design and governance (de Reuver et al., 2017; Constantinides et al., 2018).  
Due to their digitalization, digital platform ecosystems have become an important subject in the Information 
Systems (IS) field (along with digital infrastructures) (Constandinides et al., 2018; de Reuver et al., 2017; 
Tilson et al., 2010; Tiwana et al., 2010). De Reuver et al. (2017), for example, point out that due to their 
pervasiveness, digital platform ecosystems alter the nature of important IS phenomena, such as user relations, 
the architecture of IS artefacts and the relations among multiple organizations. Although the increased interest 
in this socio-technical phenomenon has resulted in a growing number of publications and a number of special 
issues, researchers still pinpoint that key questions around digital platform ecosystems remain unanswered (for 
overview, see e.g., Constantinides et al., 2018; de Reuver et al., 2017).  
2. Problem Statement 
Observing the shift towards platform thinking and the fast erosion of the competitive advantages within 
traditional industries, many companies, both incumbents and start-ups, try to launch digital platforms and 
create robust ecosystems around them (either from scratch or by turning products into platforms). More often 
than not, however, their attempts fail (Hagiu, 2014; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016). Indeed, as Hagiu (2014) points 
out, digital platform ecosystems that manage to become sustainable over long term are rather rare. Lack of 
optimal initial platform design (Hagiu, 2006), inappropriate adoption strategies (Evans, 2009) and emphasis 
on profitability rather than growth (Hagiu and Rothman, 2016; van Alstyne et al., 2016) are some of the main 
reasons, causing platform ecosystems to fail. However, even though a digital platform ecosystem can 
successfully ignite and move beyond the initial launch phase, its sustainability can come under threat due to 
its inability to evolve and adapt to the rapid and unexpected changes, which the platform ecosystem encounters 
throughout its evolutionary path (see e.g., Ozer and Anderson, 2015, Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014).  
A myriad of internal and external challenges can pose threat to the successful existence of a digital platform 
ecosystem (e.g. Gawer, 2015). In particular, various internal obstacles challenge the optimal functioning of a 
digital platform ecosystem and constitute a source of uncertainty. For example, after launch, platform owners 
face demand uncertainty, as there is no guarantee that various actors will join the ecosystem (Evans, 2009). 
Subsequently, internally accumulated inefficiencies resulting from initial design choices, conflicting interests 
or uncertain business model (see, Gawer, 2009; 2015; Muezellec et al., 2015) can inhibit the successful 
performance of a digital platform ecosystem. In addition, unexpected changes in the preferences of various 
ecosystem actors can also lead to modifications within the digital platform ecosystem (e.g., unmet demands 
can prompt certain actors to leave the ecosystem) (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Ruutu et al., 2017; Wareham 
et al., 2014). Facing uncertainty concerning the use of boundary resources by third-party complementors, 
platform owners can also postpone deciding on a concrete long-term evolutionary path, thus increasing the 
overall level of uncertainty within the ecosystem (Dattee et al., 2017).  
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Simultaneously, as digital platform ecosystems operate in an uncertain environment (e.g., competitive 
uncertainty, regulatory uncertainty, technology uncertainty), they face a number of external obstacles (see, 
e.g., Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009, Gawer and Cusumano 2014, Ojala and Lyytinen, 2017; Ozer and Anderson 
2015, Tan et al., 2015). Digital platform ecosystems, for example, have to fend off new rivals (Smedlund and 
Faghankhani 2015), adapt to shifts in the behaviour of existing competitors (Eisenmann et al. 2011; Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2007; Ozer and Anderson 2015) and accommodate regulatory changes (Hagiu and Rothman, 
2016). Furthermore, while the adoption of new digital technologies made it easy to build and scale digital 
platforms due to relatively low operational and distribution costs (see above), it also lowered barriers to entry, 
with competitors easily imitating the services offered by the first mover. This has prompted digital platform 
ecosystems to evolve rapidly (“compressed evolution”; see Tiwana, 2014) in an attempt to outcompete their 
contenders and to avoid stalemate, which may render them irrelevant to existing ecosystem actors. 
When faced with both internal and external challenges, the ability of digital platform ecosystems to evolve 
over time is of vital importance for ensuring their long-term sustainability (see Gawer 2015, Han and Cho 
2015, Ojala and Lyytinen, 2017; Smedlund and Faghankhani 2015¸ Tan et al. 2015). To address properly these 
challenges, stemming from both the turbulent nature of the environment and from the presence of internal 
inefficiencies, a digital platform ecosystem needs to maintain, develop and invest further in its ability to evolve 
in order to detect on time the upcoming changes and to adapt to them in a swift and accurate manner. 
Despite the importance of understanding how and why digital platform ecosystems evolve, this topic, however, 
has remained elusive in the platform literature (for more details, see Chapter III). For example, as platform 
ecosystems operate in volatile external environment (Dattee et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018), it is 
important to understand how the evolving context affects the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem 
(Tiwana, 2014). Current research, however, has largely disregarded the context in which digital platform 
ecosystems operate (de Reuver et al., 2017) and the various internal and external events, which trigger the 
ecosystem to evolve (Gawer, 2015). While a few studies have investigated how several events can trigger the 
evolutionary process (see, Dattee et al., 2017; Eaton et al., 2015; Gawer, 2009; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018; Tan 
et al., 2015; Tiwana et al., 2010), they fail to explain the mechanisms through which these events lead to 
changes in the evolutionary trajectory.  
Understanding the mechanisms, which contingently drive the evolution of digital platform ecosystems, 
however, is of paramount importance for two reasons. First, as the evolutionary path of digital platform 
ecosystems is difficult to predict (Dattee et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018), platform owner(s) cannot rely 
on descriptive models (which dominate the current research) to guide the development of their ecosystems. 
Instead, they need to obtain a better grasp of the nature of the various internal and external triggers, which, as 
they appear, can challenge and alter unexpectedly the evolutionary trajectory of a digital platform ecosystem. 
Second, understanding how various triggering events lead to certain evolutionary outcomes can help platform 
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owners to respond better to the emerging opportunities and threats, thus increasing the potential of a digital 
platform ecosystem to sustain over time.  
3. Research Goals  
While gaining a better understanding of the evolutionary process of digital platform ecosystems is of increasing 
importance for ensuring their sustainability, this topic remains underresearched. To address this shortcoming, 
the purpose of this PhD dissertation is to offer in-depth insights into how, when faced with multiple challenges 
and opportunities, digital platform ecosystems evolve in order to survive and thrive. Thus, the core research 
question (RQ) of this dissertation is: 
How does a digital platform ecosystem evolve in response to external and internal challenges and 
opportunities? 
In order to investigate further the core RQ, I put forward two sub-research questions (SRQs): 
SRQ1: How do generative mechanisms contingently prompt a digital platform ecosystem to evolve over 
time? 
By answering this SRQ, I aim to identify the mechanisms, which drive the ecosystem evolution, and to outline 
the process through which they appear and affect the evolutionary trajectory. In particular, I build upon the 
notion of generative mechanisms as suitable lens to study how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time 
(see Chapter IV). 
SRQ2: How can a platform owner manage the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem? 
The evolution of a digital platform ecosystem is seldom a self-driving and self-sustained process; instead, it 
requires deliberate and timely management (Eaton et al., 2015; Tiwana, 2014). Thus, platform owners should 
manage diligently the evolutionary process by identifying and addressing opportunities and threats in due time. 
Subsequently, to answer this SRQ, I look into the strategies a platform owner can adopt in order to manage 
efficiently the evolution of the ecosystem over time. 
Addressing the above posed RQ and SRQs, I, together with my co-authors, develop three process theories, 
each of which characterized by specific generative mechanisms, and investigating the digital platform 
ecosystem evolution from different theoretical perspectives. Adopting a critical realism stance (see Chapter 
V), in particular, I try to identify the generative mechanisms, which contingently drive the evolutionary process 
of digital platform ecosystems as complex socio-technical phenomena (see also Henfridsson and Bygstad, 
2013). Subsequently, I combine the separate process theories in one model (Figure 16), which explains 
comprehensively how and why digital platform ecosystems evolve over time (see Chapter VII).  
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4. Outline of the PhD Dissertation 
This PhD dissertation constitutes a collection of a wrapper (Chapter I-Chapter X) and six standalone research 
papers. The purpose of the wrapper is two-fold. On one hand, in the wrapper, I summarize the conducted 
research in the separate studies, and, on the other hand, I combine the findings from each of them to propose 
a model, which advances our understanding about why and how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time.  
The wrapper (or cover) consists of a number of interconnected chapters. In Chapter I, I introduce the main 
phenomenon of this research (digital platform ecosystem evolution) and outline its importance and relevance 
for both academics and practitioners. I further present the main RQ and the subsequent SRQs, which guide the 
overall direction of this research. In Chapter II, I define the investigated phenomenon, while in Chapter III, I 
summarize the existing research on digital platform ecosystem evolution and outline research gaps.  
Subsequently, in Chapter IV, I conceptualize the notion of generative mechanisms and outline how I plan to 
apply it to study digital platform ecosystem evolution from multiple perspectives. In Chapter V, I outline the 
methodological approach to this research and provide details about the collected data and about the techniques 
applied for analysing the data. Next, in Chapter VI, I present the findings from the six separate studies 
conducted to answer the RQ and the SRQs and propose a multi-motor explanation of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution in Chapter VII. Finally, in Chapter VIII, I outline the contributions, which this research 
delivers to both academics and practitioners, the limitations and promising avenues for future research. 
II Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystems  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the main phenomenon of investigation, namely digital platform 
ecosystems. After reviewing carefully the existing conceptualizations in the platform literature, I propose an 
encompassing definition of digital platform ecosystems and outline their main characteristics.  
1. Digital Platform Ecosystems 
In their work on platform leadership, anchored in the engineering stream of the platform literature (see Gawer, 
2014; also Appendix), Gawer and Cusumano (2002) first accounted for an ecosystem of external 
complementors, coordinated by a platform owner, which emerges around a digital platform. In later studies, 
other scholars adopted this conceptualization of platform ecosystems (Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Parker 
and Van Alstyne, 2008). At the same time, in parallel, researchers from the economic stream of the platform 
literature (see Gawer, 2014; see also Appendix) investigated multi-sided platforms as facilitating the 
interactions occurring between various groups of actors (Hagiu and Wright, 2011)2. Thus, while the 
engineering stream of platform research emphasizes on the architecture and technical capabilities of a digital 
platform around which an ecosystem of third-party developers forms, the economic stream focuses on 
                                                            
2 An overview of the economic and engineering streams within the platform literature is provided in the Appendix.  
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investigating the nature of interactions occurring through the digital platform (Gawer, 2014; see also 
Appendix). 
Although the findings stemming from the two research streams do not contradict each other, the dispersed 
knowledge across various disciplines and outlets challenges our overall understanding of the phenomenon as 
researchers face the perils to overlook certain aspects by subscribing to just one of the research views.  To 
overcome this shortcoming, researchers have called for merging the economic and technological perspectives 
within the platform literature (de Reuver et al., 2017; Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014).  
Unifying the two perspectives, Gawer (2014), for example, proposes a third view that defines digital platform 
ecosystems as dynamic organizational arrangements that regulate the activities of their actors and help extend 
the innovation potential of the platform. Such conceptualization allows scholars to take into account the 
characteristics of both streams of research and recognize the complexity of this phenomenon. Similarly, 
Thomas et al. (2014) propose a synthesis between the economic and engineering streams of platform literature 
by urging researchers to focus on (digital) platform ecosystems as socio-technical systems with inherent 
characteristics stemming from both perspectives (e.g., modular architecture from the engineering and market 
facilitation from the economic). Thus, they view digital platform ecosystems as encompassing concept, which 
can bridge the fragmented platform research.  
Consequently, increased amount of recent studies (e.g., Altham and Tushman, 2017, Dattee et al., 2017; 
Constantinides et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2017; Wessel et al., 2017) have adopted digital platform 
ecosystems as key phenomenon and have indicated, to a certain degree, for synthesis between the two research 
streams. Following the recent developments in the platform literature, this PhD dissertation focuses on digital 
platform ecosystems as encompassing concept, which integrates the characteristics of both engineering and 
economic streams.  
Despite the proliferation of studies focusing on digital platform ecosystems, however, researchers have failed 
to introduce a common conceptualization, introducing instead a number of fragmented definitions (see Table 
1). The majority of the identified studies adopt the initial conceptualization of platform ecosystems as 
consisting of a digital platform around which a number of external complementors operate (see Altman and 
Tushman, 2017; Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Isckia and Lescop, 2013; Tiwana et al., 2010; Scholten and Scholten, 
2012; Wareham et al., 2014; West and Wood, 2014; Yonatany, 2013). Recent studies, however, have extended 
the concept of platform ecosystem as to incorporate various other actors. Apart from the previously identified 
third-party complementors, the platform ecosystem, for example, also encompasses consumers and producers 
(not necessarily third-party complementors), reflecting the economic stream of the platform literature 
(Constantinides et al., 2018; Inoue and Tsujimoto, 2017; van Alstyne et al., 2016; Wessel et al., 2017). In 
addition, a number of researchers have also conceptualized digital platform ecosystems in relation to the set of 
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governance rules the platform owner imposes on various actors in connection to their participation in the 
ecosystem (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Huber et al., 2017; Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017). 
While recent research aims at expanding the concept of digital platform ecosystem beyond the initial narrow 
conceptualization by acknowledging that it encompasses various actors, elaborated IT architecture and 
governance rules, there is still lack of studies embracing comprehensively the complexity of this concept. In 
particular, scholars tend to investigate thoroughly only one particular aspect of digital platform ecosystems 
(e.g., governance; see Huber et al., 2017) or combination of two aspects (e.g., governance and architecture; 
see Tiwana et al., 2010). In cases, where researchers analyse several aspects (actors, architecture, governance), 
they tend to adopt limited view on these constructs (e.g., Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013) view governance 
solely in terms of control and actors solely in terms of third-party complementors), thus not reflecting the 
complexity of the phenomenon. 
Table 1. Overview of the Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem 
Authors Term Definition Main focus 
Altman and 
Tushman 
(2017) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
“Ecosystems organize and leverage 
external entities, which are frequently 
complementors and have 
interdependencies between them” (p. 7). 
Technology, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Ceccagnoli et 
al. (2012) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
“The network of innovation to produce 
complements that make 
a platform more valuable” (p. 263) 
Technology, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Constantinides 
et al. (2018) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
“A platform ecosystem model that 
emphasizes core interactions between 
platform participants, including 
consumers, producers, and third-party 
actors” (p. 381) 
Actors (consumers, 
producers, and third-
party actors) 
Gawer and 
Cusumano 
(2002) 
Industry 
Platforms 
Industry platforms include platform 
leaders and external complementors 
Technology, Actors 
(platform leaders, 
external 
complementors) 
Gawer and 
Henderson 
(2007) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Industrial ecosystem, where platform 
owner orchestrates the innovation efforts 
of complementors 
Technology, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Ghazawneh 
and 
Henfridsson 
(2013) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Platform ecosystem encompasses actors 
coordinated around a platform through 
boundary resources 
Technology, Actors 
(complementors, 
platform owners), 
governance (control) 
Huber et al. 
(2017) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Platform owner orchestrating a number of 
external complementors through 
governance regime 
Governance, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Inoue and 
Tsujimoto 
(2017) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Platform ecosystem encompasses third-
party complementors and consumers 
Actors (third-party 
complementors and 
consumers) 
Jacobides et al. 
(2018) 
Ecosystem “An ecosystem is a set of actors with 
varying degrees of multi-lateral, non-
Actors, Technology 
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generic complementarities that are not 
fully hierarchically controlled” (p. 16). 
Kapoor and 
Agarwal 
(2017) 
Platform-
based 
business 
Ecosystem 
“Platform firms orchestrate the 
functioning of ecosystems by providing 
platforms and setting the rules for 
participation by complementor firms” (p. 
531) 
Technology, 
Governance (rules for 
participation), Actors 
(complementors) 
Parker and 
Van Alstyne 
(2008) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
“Platform sponsors often embrace 
modular technologies and encourage 
partners to supply downstream 
complements” (p. 2). 
Technology, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Scholten and 
Scholten 
(2012) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Platform “provides leverage for its 
multiple complementors within the 
platform ecosystem” (p. 6) 
Technology, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Tiwana et al. 
(2010) 
Platform-
based 
ecosystem 
“Collection of the platform and the 
modules specific to that platform” (p. 2) 
Technology 
Isckia and 
Lescop (2013) 
Platform-
based 
ecosystem 
“Platform-based ecosystems are a new 
way of managing a portfolio of 
contributions from varied and independent 
players” (p. 98) 
Technology, Actors 
(third-party 
complementors) 
Thomas et al. 
(2014) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
“Platform is a set of shared core 
technologies and technology standards 
underlying an organizational field that 
support value co-creation through 
specialization and complementary 
offerings” (p. 4) 
Technology 
Wareham et al. 
(2014) 
Technology 
platform 
ecosystem 
“Many independent actors who form an 
ecosystem of heterogeneous 
complementors around a stable platform 
core” (p. 3) 
Technology, Actors ( 
third-party 
complementors) 
Wessel et al. 
(2017) 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Platform ecosystem encompasses 
producers and consumers 
Actors (producers and 
consumers) 
West and 
Wood (2014) 
Open 
Ecosystem 
Platform ecosystem consists of platform 
sponsor and its complementors 
Actors (platform 
sponsor and third-
party complementors) 
Yonatany 
(2013) 
Platform 
ecosystem 
Platforms “has a business ecosystem: 
hundreds of thousands of affiliates or 
third-party developers that provide 
complementary components and 
applications” (p. 54) 
Actors (third-party 
complementors) 
 
Addressing this shortcoming, this PhD dissertation adopts a comprehensive definition of digital platform 
ecosystems, which reflects their complexity. Thus, I define digital platform ecosystems as socio-technical 
systems facilitating the interactions between various ecosystem actors through an underlying IT architecture 
and emerging set of governance rules (Hagiu and Wright, 2011; Tiwana, 2014). 
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2. Characteristics of Digital Platform Ecosystems 
The overview of the various definitions of digital platform ecosystems (see Table 1) demonstrates that the lack 
of conceptual clarity stems from the different emphasis researchers put on the elements of which the ecosystem 
comprises (see Table 1, last column). Thus, identifying the key constructing elements of a digital platform 
ecosystem is vital for crafting an overarching definition of this phenomenon (Jacobides et al., 2018). Although 
the proposed above definition reflects the socio-technical nature of a digital platform ecosystem by identifying 
actors, architecture and governance as its constructive elements, it does not capture the complexity of these 
elements, which is one of the major criticisms towards existing definitions.  
To address this shortcoming, I unfold further the three main constructive elements of digital platform 
ecosystems, namely actors, architecture and governance (Figure 1). To identify their sub-constructs, I review 
and synthetize the relevant platform literature. The following detailed conceptualization of the three constructs 
is included in Paper II (Analytical Framing) and Paper III.  
Actors  
Digital platform ecosystems consist of a number of actors, each assuming different roles. Platform users can 
be demand-side actors that consume services, which are offered by supply-side actors through the platform 
(Eisenman et al., 2009; Evans, 2012; Hagiu, 2016; Ondrus et al., 2015). As a focal actor, platform owner(s) 
hold the property rights, guide the development of the digital platform and govern the participation in the 
ecosystem (Eisenmann et al., 2009; Parker et al., 2016). Platform providers participate in the production (e.g., 
technology providers) or distribution (e.g., distribution partners) of the digital platform (Eisenmann et al., 
2009; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Ondrus et al., 2015, Tiwana, 2014). While platform owners often initially 
act as platform providers, several platform owners and platform providers can co-exist from the onset 
(Eisenmann et al., 2009; Ondrus et al., 2015; Parker et al., 2016). 
Architecture 
The underlying IT architecture of a digital platform ecosystem encompasses the platform core, the periphery 
around it and the boundary resources, which connect the core and the periphery (Baldwin and Woodward, 
2009; Gawer, 2014; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). The platform core 
consists of the main functionalities offered by the platform owner (Olleros, 2008; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 
2014). A number of external service modules, connected to the platform core, offer additional functionalities 
as part of the periphery (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). The platform owner 
ensures the connectivity between the core and the periphery through the provision of boundary resources, such 
as APIs and SDKs (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Um and Yoo, 2016). 
Governance 
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The governance regime consists of various rules that regulate access, participation, and value appropriation in 
a digital platform ecosystem. Access rules define which actors and under what conditions can become part of 
the ecosystem (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). Through the participation rules, the platform owner determines 
the behavioural patterns of which actors to permit and which to sanction (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Parker 
et al., 2016). Appropriation rules refer to the agreements between platform owner and other actors about the 
distribution of the created value within the ecosystem (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Jacobides et al., 2018). These 
rules are usually contained in revenue sharing agreements, ownership agreements (including of intellectual 
property rights), agreements about division of responsibilities, and more (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016; 
Hagiu, 2014; Parker et al., 2016; Tiwana, 2014).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                     Figure 1. Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem 
III Summary of the Research on Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution  
The evolution of digital platform ecosystems remains elusive topic in the early platform literature (see, Gawer, 
2014; also Appendix). For example, although researchers recognize that the architecture of a digital platform 
is evolvable (Baldwin and Woodward (2009) from the engineering perspective) and that the number of 
ecosystem actors also grows over time (Evans (2009) from the economic perspective), there is lack of 
systematic approach towards studying digital platform ecosystem evolution. Instead, most of the studies focus 
on fixed period(s) of time (de Reuver et al., 2017), thus presenting digital platforms and their ecosystems 
largely as static (Gawer, 2015), without taking into account their overall evolutionary journey.  
1. Summary of Papers with Focus on Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Recent work, however, has begun to acknowledge that digital platform ecosystems are dynamic (e.g., de 
Reuver et al., 2017; Gawer, 2015; Um and Yoo, 2016). To summarize existing insights, I conduct an extensive 
literature review, which incorporates both the economic and engineering research streams in the platform 
Digital Platform Ecosystem 
Actors Architecture Governance 
Platform Users 
Platform Providers 
Platform Owners 
Platform Core 
Platform Periphery 
Boundary Resources 
Access Rules 
Participation Rules 
Appropriation Rules 
22 
 
literature. The purpose of this literature review, which builds upon Paper I, is to identify relevant studies, 
organize them in systematic manner and outline research gaps.  
As a result, I identify and review 32 papers, which focus on digital platform ecosystem evolution either 
explicitly or implicitly. I further analyze the selected studies based on their main research focus and their key 
findings (see Table 2). Through identification of the repeating themes across the different studies, I systematize 
the literature on digital platform ecosystem evolution in four different perspectives, namely growth, co-
evolution, strategic and life cycle. 
Growth Perspective 
Early studies investigating explicitly the evolution of digital platform ecosystems focus on both their formation 
(e.g., launch) and subsequent development by investigating the growth patterns of the distinct groups of actors, 
taking part in the ecosystem (e.g., Evans, 2009; Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; Cennamo and Santaló, 2015; 
Hagiu, 2006). Under this growth perspective, the evolutionary journey of a digital platform ecosystem 
commences with the launch of the digital platform and the acquisition of its initial participants, who can belong 
to one or more distinct types of actors (Evans, 2009; Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; Hagiu, 2006). To ensure 
the ignition of the digital platform ecosystem, platform owners need to obtain a critical mass of actors (Evans, 
2009). 
As platform owners often try to convince two distinct types of actors to join the ecosystem in parallel, digital 
platform ecosystems can struggle to ignite (Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2014). To overcome this challenge, platform 
owners rely on various strategies (e.g., sequential entry, introduction of marquee users, subsidizing demand-
side users, and more) (Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2006). Platform owners can also alter the degree of ecosystem 
openness by allowing various types of actors to participate (e.g., demand-side and supply-side users, platform 
providers) in order to foster adoption (Ondrus et al., 2015). By increasing the level of openness, platform 
owners can strengthen the cross-side network effects between distinct types of actors and, as a result, accelerate 
the process of acquiring sufficient number of actors (Ruutu et al., 2017).  
After a digital platform ecosystem reaches a critical mass of actors and ignites, it enters a phase of self-
sustained growth, which can be either rapid or relatively slow (Evans and Pirchio, 2015). Various enablers and 
constraints, however, can affect the growth patterns. While the presence of strong cross-side network effects 
enables growth that is sustainable over time (e.g., Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; Casey and Toyli, 2012; 
Vogelsang, 2010), researchers began to recognize that several constraints (e.g., ill-designed pricing and 
revenue sharing strategies (Casey and Toyli, 2012, Volelsang, 2010) or inadequate alliance strategy (Casey 
and Toyli, 2012)) can inhibit sustainable growth patterns.  
When a digital platform ecosystem manages to achieve an optimal growth rate, it reaches a market equilibrium 
(Zhu and Mitzenmacher, 2008). After enjoying a self-sustained growth over time, the ecosystem eventually 
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reaches a point of saturation, or maturity, where the growth rate of its participants decreases (Cennamo and 
Santaló, 2015). Further, as digital platform ecosystems can acquire the majority of an existing market or most 
of it (that is, “winner-takes-all” or “winner-takes-most” market scenarios; see Eisenmann, 2002), this gives 
rise to monopolistic rents, which the platform owner can capitalize on (Vogelsang, 2010). 
Co-Evolution Perspective 
While the growth perspective is primarily rooted in the economic stream of the platform literature, the 
engineering stream of the literature focuses on the ability of the digital platform (as an underlying IT 
architecture) to evolve over time (see Baldwin and Woodward, 2009). Although early work discusses solely 
the ability to evolve by encouraging the introduction of boundary resources (or interfaces) enabling the creation 
of platform periphery, without actually outlining in details this process, it served as a foundation for future 
studies on digital platform ecosystem evolution.  
While recognizing the importance of understanding the IT architecture as underlying part of the digital 
platform ecosystem, researchers have also acknowledged the interdependencies between architecture and 
governance, leading to the emergence of the co-evolution perspective (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; 
Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). In particular, the mutual adjustment of architecture and governance drives 
(or “accelerates”; see Tiwana, 2014) the evolution of digital platform ecosystems (Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana, 2014). Early conceptual research deconstructs the architecture (decomposition, 
modularity, design rules) and governance (decision rights, control, and ownership) of digital platform 
ecosystems to a number of constructs, which all together co-evolve (Tiwana et al., 2010). 
Adopting this perspective, scholars further investigate the co-evolution as an attempt to balance between 
control (governance) and generativity (architecture) (Eaton et al., 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). 
To encourage participation from third-party complementors, platform owners need to develop the generativity 
of the architecture by introducing new boundary resources (e.g., APIs) through a process of ‘resourcing’ 
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). While this improves the overall generativity and facilitates the 
development of a robust ecosystem around the digital platform, it also leads to increased heterogeneity of 
actors, which calls for better (often tighter) control regime, established through a process of ‘securing’ 
(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). The increased level of control over the access and use of boundary 
resources, however, may face resistance from third-party complementors, who can refuse the new terms 
imposed by the platform owner (Eaton et al., 2015). Subsequently, this resistance can lead to a process of 
adjustment, where, under pressure, the platform owner modifies the newly introduced boundary resources 
(Eaton et al., 2015). Referred to as ‘distributed tuning’ (Eaton et al., 2015), this process of ‘resistance and 
accommodating’, which shapes the evolution of boundary resources, constitutes a particular manifestation of 
the co-evolution between architecture and governance.  
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Apart from connecting generativity to governance (in terms of control), researchers also state that the evolution 
of architecture’s generativity through the provision of boundary resources also affects the variety of third-party 
complements (Tiwana, 2014). In particular, building upon early work in the engineering stream of the platform 
literature, where digital platform enables the emergence of variety of external complements due to the offering 
of stable and versatile interfaces (or boundary resources) (see, e.g., Baldwing and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana, 
2014), researchers began to analyze closely the evolutionary patterns exhibited by these external complements. 
This shift has led to the establishment of co-evolution link between generativity (platform core) and variety 
(platform periphery).  
The co-evolution between generativity and variety is a process, which is difficult to predict and guide. While 
the generativity of the architecture spurs variety of complements, the latter usually evolve on their own with 
no detailed guidelines from the platform owner (Woodward and Clemons, 2014). Furthermore, while most 
researchers assume that an increase in the level of generativity (that is increased number of boundary resources, 
such as APIs and SDKs) would lead to increase in the number of third-party complements (Baldwing and 
Woodward, 2009; Tiwana, 2014), recent empirical research challenges this assumption (Um and Yoo, 2016).  
By investigating the evolutionary patterns of various third-party complements over time, researchers also 
found evidence that the presence of more complementors, enabled by generativity, do not always lead to more 
variety. Boudreau (2012), for example, demonstrates that initially present complementors offer more 
innovative complements in comparison to late comers, who often provide complements similar to the already 
existing ones. Similarly, Inoue and Tsujimoto (2017) demonstrate that even though there is high variety of 
complements, this variety can be significantly reduced when a platform owner ventures into new markets. 
Thus, the variety can decrease in later stages of digital platform ecosystem evolution, and, as a result, diminish 
the value which demand-side users receive from participating in a particular ecosystem, which, in turn, 
jeopardizes the sustainability of the digital platform ecosystem (Inoue and Tsujimoto, 2017). 
Increased variety of complements, however, is not always advantageous for a platform owner as it can be a 
source of various tensions between actors within the digital platform ecosystem (including the owner) 
(Wareham et al., 2014). In particular, third-party complementors often compete with one another (intra-
platform competition) to attract demand-side users by upgrading their complements (Tiwana, 2015). In some 
cases, they also compete with the platform owner by imitating some of the main platform functionalities, or 
even complements, offered by the owner (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer and Henderson, 2007).  
Broadening this perspective beyond the co-evolution of architecture and governance, recent studies have 
pointed out that various other aspects also interplay to drive together the evolution of a digital platform 
ecosystem. Researchers, for example, have accounted for the co-evolution between architecture and actors 
(West and Wood, 2014), IS capabilities and strategies (Tan et al., 2015) and between digital platform 
ecosystem and its environment (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018; Tan et al., 2016; Tiwana et al., 2010).  
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While the generativity-variety as a certain manifestation of the early co-evolution research implies for co-
evolution between architecture and third-party complementors as certain type of ecosystem actors, researchers 
also started to explicitly outline such interdependency by including wider set of ecosystem actors. Kim et al. 
(2013), for example, investigate the evolutionary path of online social networks, which function as digital 
platform ecosystems, as a configuration of three dimensions (technology, suppliers, and users), thus proposing 
that architecture and actors co-evolve. Similarly, West and Wood (2014) in their study on the development of 
the Symbian ecosystem briefly outline the co-evolution between architecture and ecosystem actors. Jha et al. 
(2016) also found in their research that architecture and a broad range of ecosystem actors (that is, 
intermediaries, community, institutions, partners, etc.) co-evolve.  
Researchers have also acknowledged the co-evolution between two distinct groups of actors (e.g., users and 
complementors) as each of these groups adapts to the changes in the other (Song et al., 2018). While such 
interdependency has been recognized by scholars in the growth perspective (e.g., cross-side network effects; 
see, Casey and Toyli, 2012; Ruutu et al., 2017), Song et al. (2018) outline the impact of governance on the co-
evolution between distinct groups of actors through the presence of asymmetric influence mechanism. 
Various evolutionary stage models, which trace the simultaneous changes across several elements, also adopt 
a co-evolution perspective. Tan et al. (2015), for example, propose a three-stage model tracing the evolution 
of digital platform ecosystem through the co-evolution of Information Systems (IS) capabilities and their 
corresponding strategies in each evolutionary stage (nascent, formative and mature). In particular, they state 
that drivers for evolution can be both opportunities and problems, identified through ‘market responsiveness 
IS capability’. After a driver appears, a platform owner needs to find suitable response by relying on IS 
capabilities that translate “detection of the triggers of MSP development into action” (p. 265). In general, the 
evolution of digital platform ecosystem develops from formation, where various actors are encouraged to 
participate, to balancing control and generativity in the later stage, and towards encouraging more openness 
and providing collective identity (ibid). 
Apart from observing solely the co-evolution of actors, architecture and governance, as well as the capabilities 
and strategies within the digital platform ecosystem, researchers have also pointed out that ecosystems co-
evolve together with their environment (Tiwana et al., 2010). Tan et al (2016), for example, propose a three-
stage model to trace the co-evolution of competitive environment, IT affordances, and the platform 
configuration, which evolve from a closed platform to open platform and later community platform. They 
show that as the competitive environment in which digital platform ecosystems operate changes, platform 
owners can actualize various IT affordances in order to attract distinct actors (users and third-party 
complementors alike), thus driving the ecosystem towards more openness. Similarly, Ojala and Lyytinen 
(2018) argue that actions in response to changing competitive environment lead to changes in the architecture 
and the corresponding ‘control points’ (governance), which regulate the access to the architecture. The 
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introduced changes in the architecture affect the number of affiliated to the platform ecosystem actors and their 
interactions. Thus, Ojala and Lyytinen (2018) present the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem as 
influenced by the exchange between its environment, architecture, governance and actors.  
Strategic Perspective 
A number of scholars investigate the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem from strategic perspective. 
Researchers initially focused on identifying strategies for achieving critical mass of users (see, Evans, 2009), 
which are also rooted in the growth perspective. Later, however, the focus shifted towards initial platform 
design and subsequent development, which usually resulted in proposing two-stage evolutionary models 
(Hagiu, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Gawer, 2009).  
Hagiu (2006), for example, outlines strategies for design (that is, upon formation) and subsequent development 
of a digital platform ecosystem. While his work remains largely conceptual although supported by illustrative 
examples, he concludes that platform ecosystems need to put forward a compelling value proposition and keep 
maintaining it over time. In particular, he argues that platform owners need to leverage carefully the depth and 
breadth of the platform ecosystem. Platform depth refers to the addition of more functionalities to satisfy the 
preferences of existing groups of actors (e.g., users), while platform breadth includes the offering of new 
functionalities in order to attract additional distinct groups of actors (e.g., merchants).  
Similarly, Constantiou et al. (2016) propose a two-stage evolutionary model based on their study of Airbnb. 
They found that during the first stage after launch, Airbnb followed a zig-zag strategy by introducing various 
features and functionalities in order to attract users and hosts sequentially. In the second (augmentation) phase, 
the owner adopted exploration strategy (e.g., introducing new features and functionalities, acquisitions, 
geographical expansion, community building) in order to enhance the value which participants derived from 
its services. 
In another study, Gawer and Cusumano (2007) outline two strategies for platform entry and subsequent 
development, namely coring and tipping. While coring refers to creating a standalone value proposition upon 
the formation of a platform, tipping allows a platform owner to gain prevalence over its competitors through 
bundling, envelopment and offering unique features. Thus, at later stages of their development, digital platform 
ecosystems aim at becoming market leaders in order to survive in an intensified competitive environment. To 
achieve this, Eisenmann et al. (2006) recommend that platform owner should either launch innovative features 
or expand into rival markets (envelopment). A platform owner, for example, can include similar, loosely 
related or altogether unrelated complements provided by rivals into its portfolio of offerings (Eisenman et al. 
2011).   
Life-Cycle Perspective 
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As some digital platform ecosystems have managed to sustain for more than a decade, researchers began to 
outline the evolutionary paths of a number of mature platform ecosystems mainly through developing life-
cycle models. While these studies provide detailed accounts of the evolutionary journeys of successful digital 
platform ecosystems, they remain largely descriptive and case-specific.  
Lihua et al. (2010), for example, propose an evolutionary life-cycle model for ecosystem development 
consisting of four stages: birth, expansion, coordination/maturity stage and evolution or death. During the birth 
stage of the ecosystem, the platform owner focuses on diversifying its offerings and growing number of users. 
During the next phase of expansion, various external actors join the platform ecosystem, prompting the 
platform owner to establish and maintain an array of coordination mechanisms to ensure the vitality of its 
ecosystem in the subsequent maturity stage. The evolution stage is associated with the platform’s ability to 
reshuffle its existing ecosystem by abandoning some its key functionalities in favour to new technologies, 
features, and actors. 
In a similar fashion, Muezellec et al. (2015) propose a life-cycle evolutionary model, consisting of four stages. 
In contrast to Lihua et al. (2010), however, they organize their research around the business model of the 
platform ecosystem. During the first embryonic stage, platform owners emphasize on offering innovative 
features and gradually change their attention towards ensuring user adoption during the following emerging 
stage. Once sufficient numbers of users join, the platform owner concentrates on catering to these platform 
participants, usually business customers, who generate revenue. After identifying a viable business model, the 
ecosystem then moves to the final stage of maturity, where the platform owner caters to all existing actors (that 
is, private users and business customers alike). 
In another study, Han and Cho (2015) trace the evolution of the most popular messaging platform in South 
Korea, KakaoTalk and present it as consisting of three phases, namely preparation, spread and evolution. The 
preparation phase encompasses the launch of the digital platform and the expansion of its user base. During 
the spread phase the platform owner offers unique content, bundles services and does not raise prices in order 
to achieve market penetration. When a digital platform ecosystem reaches the evolution phase, it has achieved 
market dominance (ibid). 
Table 2. Overview of the Perspectives on Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Perspective Views on Evolution Key Assumptions 
 
Growth 
 
Evolution through changes in 
the growth patterns of 
ecosystem actors 
 Critical mass of users to ignite (Evans, 
2009; Hagiu, 2006; Ondrus et al., 2015) 
 Slow or rapid self-sustained growth (Evans 
and Pirchio, 2014) 
 Optimal growth rate and maturity 
(Cennamo and Santalo, 2015) 
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Co-Evolution 
Evolution as simultaneous  
changes within the digital 
platform ecosystem and in 
parallel with its environment 
 Co-evolution between platform architecture 
and platform governance (Tiwana et al., 
2010) 
 Co-evolution between control and 
generativity (Eaton et al., 2015; Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson, 2013) 
 Co-evolution between generativity and 
variety (Boudreau, 2012; Inoue and 
Tsujimoto, 2018; Tiwana, 2015; Um and 
Yoo., 2016) 
 Co-evolution between architecture and 
actors (Jha et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2013; 
West and Wood, 2014) 
 Co-evolution between actors (Song et al., 
2018) 
 Co-evolution between IS capabilities and 
strategies (Tan et al., 2015) 
 Co-evolution of digital platform ecosystem 
and its environment (Ojala and Lyytinen, 
2018; Tan et al., 2016; Tiwana et al., 2010) 
Strategic 
Strategies adopted for 
stirring digital platform 
ecosystem evolution  
 Strategies for ignition (Eisenmann et al., 
2006; Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2006) 
 Strategies for initial platform design and 
subsequent development (Constantinou et 
al., 2016; Gawer and Cusumano, 2008; 
Hagiu, 2006) 
 Strategies for competition and market 
dominance (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Ozer 
and Anderson, 2015) 
Life-Cycle 
Evolution as a life-cycle 
model with a number of 
stages 
 Life-cycle model consisting of four stages: 
birth, expansion, coordination/maturity 
stage and evolution or death (Lihua et al., 
2016) 
 Life-cycle model consisting of four stages: 
embryonic, emerging, identifying business 
model, maturity (Muezellec et al., 2015) 
 Life-cycle model consisting of three stages: 
preparation, spread and evolution (Han and 
Cho, 2015) 
 
2. Shifting Towards New Topics and Outlining Research Gaps 
While early work (Growth perspective) focuses on identifying criteria for ensuring initial success and 
subsequent growth of a digital platform ecosystem, later research puts emphasis on the process of evolution 
by stating that various elements of the ecosystem (e.g., architecture and governance) co-evolve over time (Co-
evolution Perspective). Simultaneously, researchers have also studied the evolution of digital platform 
ecosystems from Strategic perspective, but rather than focusing on providing comprehensive overview of the 
strategic issues arising during the evolutionary process, they have proposed limited in scope evolutionary 
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models or have examined specific, standalone issues (e.g., envelopment). Scholars have also put forward life-
cycle models, thus partitioning the evolutionary path into a number of stages (Life-Cycle Perspective), but 
these studies remain largely descriptive.  
Researchers from all perspectives rely on variety of methods and theoretical lenses to examine the evolution 
of digital platform ecosystems. System dynamics (Caysey and Toyli, 2012), IS capabilities and affordances 
(Tan et al., 2015), dialectics (Wareham et al., 2014) are among the theories applied to study the evolutionary 
process. Researchers largely utilize case studies to conduct their empirical investigation, which include both 
primary (e.g., Tan et al., 2015) and secondary (e.g., Constantinou et al., 2016) sources of information and 
various analytical techniques (narrative analysis (e.g., Eaton et al., 2015), open coding (Constantinou et al., 
2016), etc.). Some studies also utilize quantitative methods, such as simulations (Ozer and Anderson, 2015), 
survival analysis (Um and Yoo, 2016), and time-series analysis (Song et al., 2018).  
Despite the growing number of studies, which investigate explicitly or inexplicitly the evolution of digital 
platform ecosystems, scholars have called for more thorough research as several important topics remain 
understudied (Figure 2). A number of researchers, for example, point out that there is still lack of sufficient 
knowledge about how digital platform ecosystems form and evolve over time (Casey and Toyli, 2012; Gawer, 
2015; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018; Tan et al., 2015; Tiwana et al., 2010; Um and Yoo, 2016). This somehow 
paradoxical statement stems from the fact that most of the outlined above studies present the evolution of a 
digital platform ecosystem in predominantly descriptive manner, which provides accounts of “what happened” 
rather than how and why. 
Researchers further state that there is limited research with regards to the context in which digital platform 
ecosystems operate (de Reuver et al., 2017) and the situated in it events, which trigger changes in the 
evolutionary path of an ecosystem (Gawer, 2015). Addressing this gap, researchers have begun to recognize 
that ecosystems exist in a highly volatile and uncertain environment, which is difficult to predict (Dattee et al., 
2017; de Reuver et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018; Tan et al., 2015; Tan et al., 2016). Dattee et al. (2017), 
for example, state that most of the existing research presents the evolution of digital platform ecosystems as 
linear models, thus neglecting the fact that this process occurs in a context of uncertainty. To address this 
shortcoming, they embark on a study investigating the formation and the subsequent development of a platform 
ecosystem under uncertainty. In particular, they state that given the uncertainty, platform owners initially tend 
to postpone deciding which direction to take, instead preferring to wait until ecosystem actors indicate which 
opportunity they prefer to embrace.  
Similarly, researchers have shifted their attention towards identifying internal and external events, which 
trigger changes in the evolutionary path of a digital platform ecosystem. A number of scholars, for example, 
have observed that various opportunities and obstacles emerging both internally and externally can trigger the 
platform ecosystem to evolve (e.g., Hagiu, 2006; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Tan et al., 2015), 
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without, however, delving into more details. For example, platform ecosystems evolve in response to internal 
triggers such as fear of losing control over key technology and desire to protect intellectual property rights 
(Gawer, 2009), changes in the expectations of ecosystem actors (West and Wood, 2014), the emergence of 
opportunities to collaborate with various partners (Lihua et al., 2016), pursuit of viable business model 
(Muezellec et al., 2015). External triggers, such as threat from envelopment or imitation (Eisenmann et al., 
2011), regulatory requirements (Evans, 2012; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016), and new technology developments 
(West and Wood, 2014), can also prompt digital platform ecosystems to evolve.  
Although scholars have identified a number of triggering events, they have remained dispersed across various 
studies, with their impact on the ecosystem evolution largely understudied. To drive further this research, 
Gawer (2015) proposes three major types of triggers, deducted from the organizational boundary literature. In 
particular, she argues that platform ecosystems evolve in their quest for efficiency, improved innovative 
capabilities and pursuit of power. Despite its merits, this classification, however, remains largely conceptual, 
with no empirical data to demonstrate the emergence of these triggers over time and the process through which 
they lead to changes in the evolutionary path of a digital platform ecosystem. 
While various internal and external events can serve as change triggers, prompting the ecosystem to evolve 
(note that not all events constitute change triggers; for conceptualization see Paper II, Analytical Framing), 
there is limited knowledge about the mechanisms, which translate the effect of these contextual triggers into 
specific evolutionary outcomes (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). The few studies, which mention mechanisms in 
one way or another, do not offer detailed conceptualization and do not focus explicitly on studying them. In 
their study of the role of IS affordances for the development of Alibaba’s ecosystem, Tan et al. (2016), for 
example, present IS affordances as ‘sub-sets’ of generative mechanisms, but do not develop this view in detail. 
Other researchers also identify specific mechanisms, such as distributed tuning (Eaton et al., 2015) and 
asymmetric influence mechanism (Song et al., 2018), but these findings remain largely fragmented. Thus, 
current research does not explain how various mechanisms set in motion by a number of triggers drive the 
evolution of a digital platform ecosystem.  
While existing studies investigate important issues about the process of digital platform ecosystem evolution 
(Figure 2) (that is, what evolves (co-evolution perspective) towards what outcome (growth perspective) and 
through what strategies (the strategic perspective)), they provide rather descriptive overview of this process, 
with limited explanatory power. To address this shortcoming, scholars have recently drawn their attention 
towards exploring triggers and mechanisms for digital platform ecosystem evolution, but research remains 
scant. Thus, to further advance existing research, this PhD dissertation seeks to provide explanation about why 
and how digital platform ecosystems evolve by investigating how various mechanisms, when triggered by 
certain events, drive the evolutionary process and what strategies platform owners can adopt to manage it (see 
above, Introduction, Section 3, Research Goals). 
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Figure 2. Overview of the Current Research on Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution3 
IV Generative Mechanisms as Meta-Theory  
To answer the research question why and how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time in response to the 
various challenges they face, this PhD dissertation adopts the notion of generative mechanisms as meta-theory, 
which serves to provide an overall guidance for conducting the separate research studies and combining their 
findings (for the role of meta-theory, see Bostrom et al., 2009). In this chapter, I first introduce the notion of 
generative mechanisms and present them as “motors of change” (see Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), which 
drive the digital platform ecosystem evolution. I then outline how generative mechanisms serve as foundation 
for subsequent research (Figure 3).  
1. Overview of Generative Mechanisms  
For the purposes of this research, I present generative mechanisms as a form of meta-theory, which helps me 
outline key concepts and the relationship among them, in order to guide further the development of context 
specific theories (namely three process theories) (Bostrom et al., 2009; Lewis and Smith, 2014). In particular, 
                                                            
3 An early version of this model appeared in Paper I  
 
Triggering Events in Context 
(e.g., opportunities, problems, 
inefficiencies) 
Outcome 
(e.g., optimal growth;  
market saturation) 
Process 
 
What evolves? 
Co-evolution 
How does it evolve? 
Mechanisms 
 
 
! 
! 
How to manage evolution? 
Strategy 
! 
32 
a meta-theory “links across theory-domains” (Bostrom et al., 2009, p. 19) to help researchers establish a 
comprehensive overview of an investigated phenomenon. To this end, I present generative mechanisms as 
foundation around which I subsequently develop three process theories (see below, Section 4).  
A key construct in critical realism (for more, see Chapter V), generative mechanisms provide causal 
explanations why and how certain events occur (Bhaskar, 1972; Mingers et al., 2013). While researchers have 
largely relied on statistically derived correlations to study the relations between two observed phenomena 
(Bygstad et al., 2016; Wyn et al., 2013), scholars have pointed out that to understand fully the causal 
relationship between them, we need to identify and explain the generative mechanisms, which link them 
(Bhaskar, 1975; Bygstad et al., 2016; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Volkoff and Strong, 2013). Due to their 
ability to account for causality, generative mechanisms allow researchers to ‘open up the black box’, which 
often masks the process through which certain outcomes come into being (Archer, 2015; Dalkin et al., 2015).  
Generative mechanisms constitute structures (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), with vested in them causal 
powers (Elster, 2007), stemming from the interplay between the related objects of which the structure consists 
(Sayer, 1992). Bunge (2004) further presents them as “one of the processes in a concrete system that makes it 
what it is” (p. 182). Thus, generative mechanisms due to the inherent interplay between their structures, objects 
and events are “capable of bringing about or preventing some change in all or part of the system” (McGrath, 
2013, p. 6).  
While generative mechanisms serve as “theoretical cogs and wheels” (Hernes, 1998, p. 74) that help explain 
how certain observable outcomes occur, due to their context proximity, generative mechanisms do not 
engage with grand theories (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; McGrath, 2013). Rather, they are suitable for 
developing middle-range theories (Elster, 2007; McGrath, 2013), which provide generalizable, yet 
empirically grounded explanations about observed phenomena, thus avoiding offering overly abstract 
accounts (Hassan and Lowry, 2015).  
While researchers draw upon the above definitions when investigating generative mechanisms in their studies, 
they portray them differently depending on the analyzed phenomenon, the adopted theoretical lens and the 
applied methods (Wyn et al., 2013). Researchers, for example, investigate mechanisms in various contexts – 
social mechanisms (Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998), organizational mechanisms (Pajunen, 2008), socio-
technical mechanisms (Bygstad et al., 2016; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; McGrath, 2013; Volkoff and 
Strong, 2013).  
In the Information Systems field, for example, Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) pinpoint three generative 
mechanisms (innovation, adoption and scaling), which build upon one another and collectively drive the 
evolution of digital infrastructures. Through the innovation mechanism, new products and services emerge due 
to the ability to integrate dispersed resources. As the number of offerings expands, more users join the 
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infrastructure, a process driven by the adoption mechanism (ibid). Finally, the increased number of users leads 
to the inclusion of new actors, which allows the digital infrastructure to develop further through a scaling 
mechanism (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013).  
Seeking to explain the various coordination efforts associated with the governance of federated IT 
organizations, Williams and Karahanna (2013) outline two generative mechanisms– a ‘consensus making’ and 
a ‘unit-aligning’. In particular, they use these mechanisms to explain the process of coordination and the 
various outcomes observed as result of this process. Unlike the generative mechanisms identified by 
Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013), which are of socio-technical nature, the consensus-making and unit-aligning 
mechanisms emphasize the interplay between various actors engaged in coordinating the governance of 
federated IT organizations.  
Similarly, when studying the various degrees of digitalization across three hospital units, Mihalescu et al. 
(2015) propose three generative mechanisms, namely standardization, alignment, and convergence, to explain 
the different levels of digitalization in the three units. While the standardization mechanism leads to the 
recording of all relevant work practices in digital form, the alignment mechanism stirs a process, which allows 
for more personalized services that can also interconnect through a convergence mechanism (ibid). Although 
all these mechanisms are set in motion within the specific hospital units, they lead to various degrees of 
digitalization (that is various outcomes).  
2. Operationalization of Generative Mechanisms for Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Regardless of the numerous applications, most scholars provide overlapping conceptualizations of generative 
mechanisms, which I synthetize in Table 3. Building upon previous work, I further define generative 
mechanisms for the purposes of studying digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 3) (for further 
conceptualization of generative mechanisms, see Paper II, Analytical Framing).  
Initially, generative mechanisms are non-observable and situated in a given context (Dalkin et al., 2015), in 
which a specific digital platform ecosystem operates until various events, both internal and external, or other 
mechanisms activate them (Bhaskar, 1975, Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011; McGrath, 2013; Pawson, 2000) 
(Figure 3). As a digital platform ecosystem constitutes a configuration of actors, architecture and governance 
(see, Chapter II), at any given point in time, it is characterized by certain dormant properties (e.g., malleability, 
increased usefulness; see Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), rendered to it by the existing configuration. As a 
result, the existing configuration of the digital platform ecosystem in terms of actors, architecture and 
governance facilitate or restricts the functioning of the activated generative mechanism (Henfridsson and 
Bygstad, 2013). 
The generative mechanism consists of various activated components (or objects) (actors, organizations, IT 
systems, and more), which interact to form an interconnected structure with causal powers (Bygstad and 
34 
 
Munkvold, 2011; Pujanen, 2008). The particular composition of an activated generative mechanism depends 
on which part of the digital platform ecosystem it affects. For example, in the process of introducing new types 
of ecosystem actors, such as third-party developers, there are multiple socio-technical components involved 
(e.g., platform owner, platform providers, demand-side users, boundary resources, various rules for access, 
participation and appropriation). Through the interactions between the activated socio-technical components, 
a change process occurs leading to certain evolutionary outcomes (e.g., openness towards third-party 
complementors; see Paper II for details), which we can observe empirically (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011; 
Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013).  
Table 3. Key Constructs of Generative Mechanisms  
Context A particular situation in which latent mechanisms 
exist and various internal and external events appear 
(Dalkin et al., 2015; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013) 
Activation Various events and other mechanisms can activate a 
dormant mechanism (Bhaskar, 1979) 
Structural components of a mechanism  Mechanisms consist of activated components (actors, 
systems), which come together to form a network 
structure (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011) 
Socio-technical interplay of components A process through which the activated socio-technical 
components of a mechanism interplay to produce an 
outcome (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011; Pujanen, 
2008) 
Outcome An observable pattern of events resulting from 
activated mechanism (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011) 
 
Generative mechanisms do not exist in isolation. Rather, they build upon one another and jointly drive the 
evolutionary process (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Henfridsson and 
Bygstad, 2013). Thus, multiple generative mechanisms activated by different triggers and producing various 
outcomes co-exist and interact throughout the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem (for more, see Paper 
II, Discussion). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Change 
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Figure 3. Operation of Generative Mechanisms (Adapted from Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013) 
 
3. Generative Mechanisms as Motors of Change 
Generative mechanisms are the “motors”4, which produce a string of events, leading to specific changes (Van 
de Ven and Poole, 1995). As such, they are at the heart of theories, which explain change in various contexts 
(Archer, 2015; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, Volkoff and Strong, 2013). 
Observing the multiplicity of theories and their corresponding generative mechanisms within the 
organizational studies, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) synthetize four ideal types of change process theories - 
life-cycle, dialectical, teleological, and evolutionary. Each of these change theories emphasize on specific 
generative mechanism, thus providing different explanations of how changes appear and progress over time.  
Life-cycle theory presents the change process as consisting of a number of stages, which trace the development 
of a phenomenon from its birth to its growth, maturity and eventual decline (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995; 
Poole and Van de Ven, 2004). A phenomenon evolves from one stage to another by following a determined 
sequence of events, with each stage influencing the following stage (ibid). The motor driving the change 
process in life-cycle theory stems either from the inherent characteristics of a phenomenon formed during the 
initial phase, or from external requirements (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004). 
Teleology theory views the change process as a “repetitive sequence of goal formulation, implementation, 
evaluation, and modification of goals” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995, p. 516). Thus, the achievement of specific 
set of goals serves as the generative mechanism driving the change process. As managers respond to specific 
problem or opportunity as they emerge over time, they set, execute and learn from various goals, without 
predefined pattern (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004). 
Dialectic theory presents the change process as consisting of various tensions, stemming from different goals. 
According to this theory of change, a specific phenomenon can exist in status quo (thesis), characterized by 
certain degree of stability, as the conflicting tensions are latent. When triggered, these unreconciled tensions 
became salient (anti-thesis) and seek to change the status quo. If successful, a transformation of the status-quo 
(synthesis) occurs. Thus, salient conflict constitutes the generative mechanism driving the change process in 
this theoretical perspective. 
Evolutionary theory, as adopted by Van de Ven and Poole (1995), provides an explanation of the change 
process on industry level rather than on organizational level. In particular, evolution theory investigates the 
“cumulative changes in structural forms of populations of organizational entities across communities, 
industries, or society at large” (ibid, p. 517-518). Thus, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) present a specific view 
                                                            
4 For the purposes of this research, Generative Mechanisms and motors are synonymous. 
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of evolutionary theory, which mirrors the evolutionary economics’ process of variation, selection and 
retention, where competition serves as generative mechanism driving the change. 
Although Van de Ven and Poole (1995) put forward four types of theories, they recognize that the majority of 
the change theories, in fact, incorporate two or more of the identified generative mechanisms. To portray 
comprehensively the complexity of the change process, Poole and Van de Ven (2004) urge scholars to combine 
a number of generative mechanisms from different theoretical perspectives when constructing their own 
theories. Failure to do so, they argue, often leads to fragmented explanations, which may overlook important 
aspects of the change process (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004).  
In contrast, multi-motor explanation brings together interrelated, yet separate views of the change process 
approached through different theoretical lenses, which allows for in-depth theory development (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). Thus, the four basic types of theories and their corresponding generative mechanisms serve 
as foundational components, which scholars can combine to strengthen the theoretical explanations they put 
forward when investigating change processes in a particular context (ibid). 
4. Framing Multi-Motor Understanding of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
The main goal of this PhD dissertation is to provide comprehensive understanding of how and why digital 
platform ecosystems evolve over time by outlining the relevant generative mechanisms (see, Introduction, 
Section 3, Research Goals). To explain this complex process in-depth, I seek to investigate different aspects 
of the phenomenon in question (digital platform ecosystem evolution) by applying different theoretical 
perspectives. Subsequently, I adopt the typology of change process theories proposed by Van de Ven and Poole 
(1995) as an overarching theoretical framework first to inform the design of the separate studies conducted to 
address the above posed Research Questions, and then to guide the final integration of the findings outlined in 
each study. The proposed classification is appropriate for the purposes of this research as it facilitates the 
building of theories, which collectively provide ‘multi-motor’ explanation of the change process (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995).  
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) deduct their typology of four change process theories from the field of 
organization studies. When transposing it to investigate a socio-technical phenomenon such as digital platform 
ecosystems, it is appropriate to introduce some modifications to the main assumptions of the framework in 
order to account for the different nature of the phenomenon. This is not unusual practice as scholars in the IS 
field often borrow theoretical frameworks and methods from other fields and introduce adjustments if needed 
(Gregor, 2006). Thus, in the next paragraphs, I clarify some of the assumptions stemming from the four types 
of theories, namely evolutionary, dialectics, teleology, and life-cycle, and outline how I intend to use them to 
drive in-depth theorizing (Figure 4). 
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Van de Ven and Poole (1995) adopt a specific view on evolutionary theory in relation to the variation-selection-
retention mechanism, which operates on industry level as it focuses on population of organizations (see above). 
As such level of analysis presupposes to study the dynamics occurring between several digital platform 
ecosystems, which falls outside the scope of this research, such view is inapplicable for the purposes of this 
dissertation. Furthermore, the proposed evolutionary theory identifies competition as a generative mechanism, 
driving the change process (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). While competition can be a trigger of digital 
platform ecosystem evolution (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018), it is one of the many existing drivers of change as 
identified by relevant studies in the platform literature (see Chapter III). Thus, the adoption of the evolutionary 
theory as proposed in the Van de Ven and Poole framework, with emphasis on competition, would lead to 
omission of a myriad of other external and internal triggers, which collectively drive the evolution of a digital 
platform ecosystem.   
A starting point in the quest for identifying suitable evolutionary theoretical lens is to look at the IS domain 
for outlining studies which investigate change in socio-technical systems. Lyytinen and Newman (2008), for 
example, taking into account the punctuated nature of IS change, propose a Punctuated Equilibrium model to 
study the change process in complex socio-technical systems. Punctuated Equilibrium is an evolutionary 
theory, which presents the evolutionary process as consisting of stable periods, which are suddenly disrupted 
by rapid instances of instability (Gersick, 1991). It further emphasises the role of triggering events for 
producing change (Gersick, 1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) and as such is appropriate for addressing the 
research gap in the existing literature on digital platform ecosystem evolution (see Chapter III).  
Van de Ven and Poole (1995), for example, view Punctuated Equilibrium as a theory, which investigates the 
change process as determined by the interplay between two separate generative mechanisms, namely 
evolutionary and teleological. Their analysis, however, builds upon the theory as applied to study 
organizational evolution (see Tushman and Romanelli, 1985). Consequently, to identify generative 
mechanisms, I adopt Punctuated Equilibrium theory as theoretical lens drawing upon the work by Lyytinen 
and Newman (2008), which is suitable to study change in socio-technical systems. Although utilizing 
Punctuated Equilibrium theory, they, however, do not conceptualize and identify any generative mechanisms. 
To address this shortcoming, I, together with my co-authors, conceptualize the notion of generative 
mechanisms (Figure 3) (such conceptualization is missing from the work by Van de Ven and Poole (1995)) 
and combine it with Punctuated Equilibrium theory (for more details, see Paper II, Analytical Framing). 
While the previous study (Paper II) aims at identifying a number of generative mechanisms, which drive the 
evolution of a digital platform ecosystem, in the next study (Paper III) I adopt a dialectics lens to look at how 
tensions emerging within the ecosystem drive its evolution. Observing that digital platform ecosystems as 
socio-technical systems are full of tensions (see, e.g., Jarvenpaa and Lanham, 2013; Wareham et al., 2014), 
researchers have applied dialectics to investigate various aspects of digital platform ecosystems. Wareham et 
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al. (2014), for example, list a number of tensions mainly related to the technology aspects of the platform 
ecosystem, while Eaton et al. (2015) investigate the tensions around the evolution of boundary resources. Their 
studies, however, offer incomplete conceptualization of the dialectics theory (for more details, see Paper III). 
To address this shortcoming and to offer an additional theoretical perspective to the investigated phenomenon, 
in Paper III, I, together with my co-authors, seek to propose a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem 
evolution.  
Teleology theory presents the change process as a number of defined goals, which actors pursue actively (Van 
de Ven and Poole, 1995). Most researchers recognize the teleological nature of socio-technical systems (e.g., 
Ralph and Wand, 2008; Richard and Simon, 2006), although Lyytinen and Newman (2008) explicitly state 
that “systems do not possess teleology” (p. 593). Although not explicitly defined, researchers acknowledge 
that digital platform ecosystems as socio-technical systems are teleological. For example, Evans (2009) points 
out that after launch, the goal of the platform owner is to ensure a critical mass of users (see, Chapter III, 
Growth Perspective). Scholars from the Strategic Perspective also demonstrate the goal-seeking behaviour 
within digital platform ecosystems (ibid).  There is a lack, however, of a comprehensive study, which portrays 
the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem from a teleological perspective (a notable exception is the study 
by Tan et al., 2015).   
The adoption of teleology perspective to study the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem requires the 
clarification of a number of considerations. Digital platform ecosystems comprise a myriad of actors (see, 
Chapter II, Section 2, Characteristics of Digital Platform Ecosystems), who may have complementary or 
conflicting goals throughout the course of the ecosystem evolution (see above). The majority of the platform 
literature, however, focuses mainly on the goals of the platform owner as a key ecosystem actor (see, Eaton et 
al., 2015; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Cecaggnoli et al., 2012 as exceptions), thus failing to recognize the 
impact which the goals of other ecosystem actors can have on the evolutionary trajectory of the platform 
ecosystem. As teleology puts emphasis on setting and achievement of goals as motors of change, a key question 
is the goals of which actors drive the evolution of digital platform ecosystem (for more, see Chapter VII). 
Digital platform ecosystems also operate in a highly turbulent and uncertain environment (Dattee et al., 2017, 
Parker et al., 2016), which makes setting and pursuing long-term goals problematic. Rather than planned (as 
per Van de Ven and Poole (1995)), the change in the platform ecosystems seems to be emergent, with platform 
owners not being able to predict the future evolutionary trajectory as they have to make constant adjustments 
(Dattee et al., 2017; Ojaha and Lyytinen, 2018). Although Van de Ven and Poole (1995) state that managers 
can change their goals based on changes in the environment, this is a rather reactive position in relation to 
previous goal target. Subsequently, I take these considerations in mind when I investigate the evolution of a 
digital platform ecosystem from a teleological perspective (Paper IV, Paper V, and Paper VI). 
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                                                     Figure 4. Overview of the Separate Studies 
Life-cycle theory views the change process as a number of stages through which digital platform ecosystem 
evolves (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). As demonstrated in the above literature review (Chapter III), existing 
studies have already presented the evolution of digital platform ecosystems as life-cycle models. Given the 
presence of a number of studies, I do not find it useful to direct my research efforts on investigating platform 
ecosystem evolution from a life-cycle perspective. Rather, I utilize the findings from the identified studies (see 
Chapter III) when discussing and integrating the findings from the five separate studies (Paper II, Paper III, 
Paper IV, Paper V and Paper VI) in order to put forward a multi-motor understanding of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution.  
V Method  
In this chapter, I outline the main principles of engaged scholarship as research approach and critical realism 
as research paradigm guiding my scientific endeavours. Next, I introduce the research setting and the methods 
used for conducting the separate studies, part of this PhD dissertation. Then, I present the techniques used for 
data collection, provide an overview of the gathered data, and demonstrate the techniques used for data 
analysis.    
1. Engaged Scholarship 
Perspective Study Main Focus 
Generative Mechanisms 
Driving Evolution  
Tensions as Generative 
Mechanisms 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory 
Dialectics 
 
Teleology 
Paper I 
Paper II 
Paper III 
Paper IV 
Conceptualization 
 
Management of 
Evolution 
Paper V 
Paper VI 
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Conceived in close collaboration with industry, this PhD dissertation is rooted in the practices of Engaged 
Scholarship research, which aims at reducing the separation between research and practice by advancing 
theoretical knowledge, while also sharing insights with practitioners and trying to influence their work 
(Mathiassen and Nielsen, 2008; Ven de Ven, 2007). The aim is to conduct research, which is relevant to both 
academics and practitioners, while also remaining scientifically rigorous (Van de Ven, 2007).  
In particular, I have carried out this project as collaborative basic research, one of the four forms of Engaged 
Scholarship, where the researcher creates knowledge in order to explain a particular phenomenon while 
participating actively in the research setting and collaborating closely with relevant stakeholders (Ven de Ven, 
2007). After identifying a research problem of mutual interest for me as a PhD fellow and for the case company, 
MobilePay, through continuous engagement and collaboration with practitioners (see below), I have gained 
in-depth understanding of the investigated phenomenon and have derived insights, which I have exchanged 
with practitioners. As a result, they have benefited from obtaining a different perspective of the investigated 
phenomenon, which has helped them reflect on their journey so far, discover new learning points and prepare 
better for future challenges (for more details, see Chapter VIII, Implications for Practice).   
2. Critical Realism as Research Paradigm 
This research adopts critical realism as a research paradigm (Bygstad and Henfridsson, 2013; McGrath, 2013; 
Mingers et al., 2013; Smith, 2010), which constitutes an alternative to the interpretative and positive 
paradigms, historically dominating the field of Information Systems (Easton, 2010; Wyn and Williams, 2012). 
Due to its stronger explanatory apparatus, critical realism can overcome the ‘theory-practice inconsistency’, 
which characterizes both positivism and interpretivism (Smith, 2006, p. 191). In particular, it can strengthen 
the understanding of non-deterministic causality, which is largely unaddressed in the other two dominant 
perspectives in IS (Smith, 2006).  
The main principle of critical realism is that there is a world, which exists independently from our knowledge 
of it (Mingers et al., 2013). Although rooted in the research paradigm of realism, critical realisms advances 
our understanding of reality and advocates for the adoption of transcendental realist ontology (Mingers, 2004). 
As a result, it perceives the world as reality, divided in three distinct levels; real, actual and empirical (see 
Figure 5) (Bhaskar, 1993). Underlying objects forming structures and their causal powers characterize the real 
world, but tend to be unobservable (Sayer, 1992). Generative mechanisms operating in the real world produce 
patterns of events in the actual world, some of which we can experience in the empirical world (Bhaskar, 1993; 
Mingers, 2004; Smith, 2006). Reality, thus, consists not only of the events we observe, but also of the events 
that we could not observe and the mechanisms, which produce them.   
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Figure 5. Layered Ontology of Critical Realism (Sayer, 1992) 
Understanding causality under the form of a generative mechanism is a central topic in critical realism 
(Bygstad et al., 2016; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Sayer, 2000; Smith, 2010). Zachariadis et al. (2013) 
argue that “observable events that are being causally generated from the complex interactions of mechanisms 
can give some information on the existence of these unobservable entities” (p. xxx). Critical realists reject the 
view on causality as a pattern of events based on a number of regularities (see Figure 6) (Sayer, 2000). Rather 
they advocate for identifying the generative mechanisms, which explain what caused (trigger) a particular 
phenomenon (outcome) and how the latter came into being (mechanism) (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; 
Mingers et al., 2013; Sayer, 2000). In particular, the existing structures in the real domain enable certain 
generative mechanisms, which operate in specific context, to lead to events observable in the empirical domain 
(Smith, 2006; 2010). Due to the contingent nature of causality, there is no regularity between triggering events, 
the generative mechanisms and the various outcomes (Sayer, 2002). Instead, different triggers set in motion 
various generative mechanisms, which can account for different outcomes (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; 
Sayer, 2000).  
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Figure 6. Critical Realism’s View on Causality (Sayer, 2000) 
Critical realism advocates for “epistemic relativity” (Mingers et al., 2013, p. 797). Thus, critical realists 
recognize that knowledge is context dependent, socially constructed (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013) and 
incomplete (Smith, 2006). Wyn and Williams (2012) further argue that our knowledge is not isolated, but 
rather mediated by the values, beliefs and perceptions of the researchers. 
Critical realists tell apart between transitive (our knowledge of the world) and intransitive (independent of our 
knowledge) knowledge (Bhaskar, 1977). Thus, while our knowledge of the reality is transitive, the world itself 
is intransitive (Smith, 2006). In particular, although researchers observe events in the empirical layer, they, in 
fact, operate in the actual layers and may be unobservable or different researchers can observe them in different 
ways (Easton, 2010). Thus, no knowledge is certain and most of the observations are erroneous, as they cannot 
guarantee complete consistency between reality and theory (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 1992; Wyn and Williams, 
2012).  
For critical realists, the goal of a theory is to generate as accurate as feasible explanations about the intransitive 
world rather than putting forward predictions about it (Hunt, 2005; Wyn and Williams, 2012). To ensure that 
the acquired knowledge about the real world is valid, researchers need to assess it critically by adopting 
different theoretical perspectives and methods to investigate the same data (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 2000). Thus, 
researchers often put forward multiple possible explanations of a particular phenomenon (Wyn and Williams, 
2012).   
As critical realism initially emphasized on ontology and later on epistemology, the guidelines on methodology 
remained largely absent in early work (Bhaskar, 1975; Sayer, 2000). In later contributions, critical realists 
recommend that to derive explanations of the observed events and the generative mechanisms producing them, 
researchers should rely on retroduction (Sayer, 2000), which is a specific form of abductive reasoning. When 
engaging in retroduction, researchers begin by concentrating on a particular phenomenon they wish to explain 
and trace back the mechanisms and events, which shape it (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 2000; Volkoff and Strong, 
2013). Extending further this view, Mingers et al. (2013) summarize this approach as consisting of several 
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phases, namely describing the phenomenon, deriving possible generative mechanisms, evaluating the 
explanatory power of the proposed mechanisms and selecting the correct ones.   
Due to the non-deterministic (contingent) causality, critical realism advocates for the adoption of multiple 
methods (Mingers, 2004; Mingers et al., 2013; Sayer, 2000). Sayer (2000) distinguishes between extensive 
(largely quantitative) and intensive (qualitative) methods of inquiry, where the former have less explanatory 
power than the latter (see Easton, 2010). Aiming to overcome the historical separation between quantitative 
and qualitative research, Zachariadis et al., (2013) further apply the ontological and epistemological principles 
of critical realism to advocate for mixed-methods research.  
Despite these attempts, however, most IS scholars, when engaging in critical realism research, consider case 
studies as one of the most appropriate methods due to their ability to provide in-depth explanations (Easton, 
2010; Mingers, 2004; Wyn and Williams, 2012). Initially, scholars have focused on providing detailed 
guidance how to conduct case study research from critical realism perspective in order to identify the relevant 
generative mechanisms (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011; Easton, 2010; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Wyn 
and Williams, 2012). Wyn and Williams (2012), for example, outline five different principles – explication of 
events, explication of structure and context, retroduction, empirical corroboration, triangulation. Later, 
researchers also sought to extend these principles by proposing to identify generative mechanisms through 
affordances (Bygstad et al., 2016; Tan et al., 2015) or grounded theory (Vintzce, 2013). 
3. Research Setting 
Digital Platform Ecosystems 
Digital platform ecosystems are at the centre of inquiry in this PhD dissertation. Due to their unique properties, 
such as scalability and ability to achieve market dominance, traditional companies and start-ups alike seek to 
orchestrate digital platform ecosystems. As a result, many digital platform ecosystems have emerged and have 
spread across a number of industries - from social media (e.g., Facebook, WeChat, YouTube) and online 
marketplaces (e.g., eBay, Alibaba, Amazon) to accommodation (e.g., Airbnb), music (e.g., iTunes, Spotify), 
transportation (e. g., Uber) and payments (e.g., ApplePay, Venmo). Due to the novelty of their services and 
the more efficient ways of operating, digital platform ecosystems tend to disrupt the traditional industries they 
enter (e.g., Uber and traditional taxi industry), which makes them an interesting topic to investigate. As a 
starting point, I commenced this research by looking into how digital platform ecosystems across various 
industries tend to evolve over time in order to identify commonalities and differences, which would inform 
my subsequent studies (Paper I and Paper III). In particular, as digital platform ecosystems are heterogeneous 
(see Chapter I), I was initially intrigued to investigate whether they would evolve following similar or different 
trajectories (Paper I).   
Digital Payment Platform Ecosystems 
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Subsequently, I narrowed down the scope of the research to the payment industry (see Figure 7), which has 
found itself into a state of flux, facing changing consumer preferences, new competitors, rapid adoption of 
technologies, and changing regulatory environment. For a number of decades, the payment industry remained 
stable, characterized by established players (acquirers, issuers, card scheme owners, infrastructure providers) 
operating around agreed dominant design (card schemes) and having stable revenue streams. In the recent 
years, however, numerous digital payment platform ecosystems (e.g., ApplePay, SamsungPay, Venmo), 
offered by non-traditional financial actors, have emerged, prompting incumbents to offer their own compelling 
digital payment platforms and to orchestrate ecosystems around them (e.g., Pingit by Barclays, MobilePay by 
Danske Bank, etc.). Thus, after disrupting a number of well-established industries (publishing, music, 
accommodation and more) (Parker et al., 2016), digital platform ecosystems have also begun to disrupt the 
traditional financial sector (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016).  
Utilizing novel technologies (e.g, NFC, Bluetooth, tokens, etc.), these digital payment platform ecosystems 
facilitate peer-to-peer and consumer-to-business interactions by coordinating the activities occurring between 
consumers and merchants (Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; 2016; Kazan et al., 2018; Ondrus et al., 2015, de 
Reuver et al., 2017). A distinct characteristic of digital payment platform ecosystems is that they orchestrate 
the activities of a myriad of actors (e.g., technology providers, infrastructure providers, consumers, merchants, 
and more) (Ondrus et al., 2015). As such, they constitute exemplary cases of digital platform ecosystems and 
serve as an appropriate context of investigation. Furthermore, as digital payment platform ecosystems operate 
in a highly turbulent and dynamic environment due to the ongoing digital transformation of the payment 
industry, they have evolved rapidly (Kazan et al., 2018; Ondrus et al., 2015), resulting in eventful evolutionary 
trajectories, which are suitable for identifying various triggers and generative mechanisms.  
Although digital payment platforms and the ecosystems around them emerged in Asia in early 2000s (Ondrus 
et al., 2015), the majority of them failed to ignite and stopped operating soon after launch (Ondrus and 
Lyytinen, 2011). Researchers have observed similar trends in Europe explaining the failed ignition with 
unrecognized behavioural patterns of consumers, poor technology solutions, and lack of standardization 
(Ondrus et al., 2009). Thus, initially, due to their relatively short life span, researchers mainly investigated the 
initial design and ignition strategies of digital payment platforms and their surrounding ecosystems (Evans, 
2009; Evans and Schmalensee, 2006), while not delving into studying the evolutionary path of such ecosystems 
over longer period of time due to lack of successful cases. 
The maturity of the technology, combined with the rapid spread of mobile devices, changing consumer 
preferences (on-demand services) and favourable regulation (Hedman and Hennfridsson, 2015; Kazan et al., 
2018) led to the launch of a number of successful digital payment platforms which orchestrated a vibrant 
ecosystem around them (e.g., Pingit in United Kingdom, iZettle in Sweden, MobilePay in Denmark). As these 
payment platform ecosystems have managed to overcome the critical early stages and to evolve further by 
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solving various challenges, investigating their evolutionary journeys can provide rich accounts of why and 
how they have evolved over time.  
MobilePay and the Payment Market in Denmark 
Of particular interest for this research is the payment industry in Denmark, as a country characterized by a 
high level of digitalization (European Payments Council, 2017). Denmark has historically been at the frontier 
of payment innovation, with Danes adopting relatively fast new payment technology solutions (ibid). For 
example, after the introduction of the national payment card, the Dankort, in 1984, which connected Dankort 
cardholders to merchants accepting it, Danes rapidly adopted this new means of payment, abandoning cash. 
As a result, in the beginning of 2000s, Danes used payments cards more than cash to pay in retails stores 
(Danish Payments Council, 2016). Similarly, Denmark was among the first countries in the world to introduce 
online banking in 1999, with three million Danes (out of five million Danish population) adopting it within 
approximately seven years after the launch of the service (Danish National Bank, 2016).  
Not all innovation attempts in the Danish market, however, were successful. Embracing the latest technology 
innovation, in 1990, Nets, the owner of the Dankort and one of the leading Nordic payment service providers, 
decided to launch a pre-paid card (Danmønt) utilizing NFC chip (Hjelholt and Damsgaard, 2013). After its 
introduction, the Danmønt managed to obtain support from all the relevant actors involved and, as a result, 
vast majority of the Danes adopted it (ibid). The situation, however, changed in 1997 with the rapid spread of 
mobile phones, leading to one of the main supporters of the Danmønt, a telecom company, to exit the 
collaboration. Furthermore, the Dankort also competed with the Danmønt, leaving both consumers and 
merchants dissatisfied with the overlap between the two solutions as the former had to carry two cards and the 
latter had to install two separate payment terminals at the counter. As a result, Nets terminated the operation 
of Danmønt in 2005 (Hjelholt and Damsgaard, 2013).  
Around 2010, however, the payment landscape in Denmark began to transform once again due to a 
combination of various technical, regulatory, consumer behavioural and competition changes (see Paper V). 
With the launch of the iPhone in 2007, new generation of mobile phones with vastly improved capabilities 
emerged and incorporated services offered previously on multiple physical devices (e.g., camera, music 
players, navigation devices), with payment cards being the next target (Kazan et al., 2018). The new devices 
gained rapid adoption with approximately 59 % of the Danes using a smartphone in 2013 (Statista, 2016). At 
the same time, in 2014, approximately 88 % of the Danish population used Internet, with 79% of the Danes 
using it to make online transactions in 2015 (Ecommerce News, 2016). The rapid penetration and use of 
smartphones and the Internet led to consumers requesting on-demand, innovative services.  
As an aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the regulatory framework in the financial sector in the European 
Union, of which Denmark is part, was also changing significantly (Hedman and Hennfridsson, 2015; Kazan 
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et al., 2018). While the regulators introduced stricter requirements for traditional financial institutions, they 
also encouraged the entry of new actors (e.g., fintech start-ups) with the introduction of the Payment Service 
Directive (PSD) in 2007, which aimed at granting new entrants non-discriminatory access to the traditionally 
closed payment infrastructure owned and operated by incumbents (European Commission, 2013). Because of 
the emerging opportunities, new contenders challenging the dominant positions of established financial 
institutions announced plans to enter the Danish market. For example, the Swedish-based start-up, iZettle, 
which provides Point-of Sale solutions to small and medium-sized businesses, entered the Danish market in 
the end of 2011 (Hedman and Hennfridsson, 2015). 
Observing closely these trends, in the summer 2011, the four major Danish telecommunication operators, Telia 
Denmark, TDC, Telenor and Hi3G (3), announced their plans to work on a common mobile payment solution 
and entered in negotiations with some of the major banks in Denmark. Soon, however, the negotiations stalled 
and the banks left the initiative, leading to the telecom operators establishing, in November 2012, a joint 
company, 4T, which was to develop independently a mobile payment solution.  
Despite failing to reach a common agreement with the telecom operators, the Danish banks acknowledged the 
changing landscape and decided to venture together into the mobile payment area. The talks to launch a joint 
mobile payment solution, however, stalled, as the banks could not agree on a common vision and technical 
standard for the new solution. As a result, Danske Bank, the leading bank in Denmark, left the joint initiative 
in December 2012 and announced that it was going to launch its own mobile payment solution (see also Paper 
II and Paper V). The rest of the Danish banks continued to cooperate with the goal of launching a common 
initiative. With many actors competing to introduce first a mobile payment solution, the competitive 
environment in Denmark intensified.  
To outpace competitors, Danske Bank formed a small team, whose task was to create an innovative mobile 
payment solution as fast as possible, adopting agile methods (see Paper V). In May 2013, Danske Bank 
launched its own mobile payment application, MobilePay, which initially allowed both Danske bank and non-
Danske bank private customers to transfer money to their friends and split the bill in various situations. The 
digital payment platform, which utilizes the existing card infrastructure operated by Nets, the owner of the 
Dankort, allows its users to transfer money from their debit cards to the bank accounts of their peers via a 
mobile phone number.  
MobilePay is an exemplary case of digital payment platform ecosystem and as such is suitable for the purposes 
of this research. In particular, MobilePay functions as a digital platform by providing an underlying IT 
architecture enabling the direct and regulated interactions between affiliated to its ecosystem actors (e.g., 
initially private customers and later, commercial customers, third-party complementors, and more; see Paper 
II). MobilePay also evolved rapidly in response to both internal and external events, and thus its evolutionary 
path provides a rich account of various developments (in terms of actors, architecture and governance) 
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occurring from the launch of the digital platform ecosystem (May 2013) until it reached market dominance 
(September 2017). Furthermore, due to the nature of the PhD dissertation, conceived as a close collaboration 
with practice, I received unique access to MobilePay, which allowed me to study its evolutionary path from 
first hand observations (see below, Data Collection).  
After its launch, MobilePay quickly reached critical mass of users, with the initial goal of attracting 250,000 
private customers (6 % of the Danish market) in one year surpassed in just two months after its introduction 
(June 2013). The rapid adoption among private customers led to requests from commercial customers, both 
small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) and large retail chains, to join the MobilePay ecosystem. 
Subsequently, MobilePay enabled consumer-to-business transactions in February 2014, initially to SMEs, and 
later to large supermarkets. In 2015, the digital payment platform also opened to third-party developers, who 
could incorporate MobilePay as a payment option in their own applications. As a result, the MobilePay 
ecosystem evolved as to incorporate diverse actors - private customers, various commercial customers such as 
SMEs, large retailers, third-party developers, NGOs, and municipalities, and platform technology providers 
who act as distributors (e.g., payment service providers enabling online payments via MobilePay) or 
technology integrators (e.g., Point-of-Sale (PoS) vendors for in-store payments with large retailers) (see also 
Paper II). MobilePay also evolved by elaborating its underlying architecture (e.g., introduction of boundary 
resources, that is APIs and SDKs) and through the emergence of a governance regime (e.g., new rules for 
access, participation and appropriation), which respectively enable and regulate the interactions among the 
heterogeneous actors, whom MobilePay connects.  
Despite its significant adoption rate, MobilePay continued to face multiple challenges stemming from both 
internal inefficiencies and frequent changes in the environment in which it was operating (Paper II and Paper 
V). For example, MobilePay utilized card-based infrastructure, and, as a result, the platform owner incurred 
operational costs for every transaction as they were subsidized. Although the owner collected revenue from 
commercial customers, it was not sufficient to establish a viable business model. In addition, the growing 
complexity of the underlying IT architecture and the tight coupling with existing Danske Bank’s IT systems 
led to the accumulation of technology debt, which increased the instances when MobilePay malfunctioned.  
The consolidation of MobilePay’s market dominance also came under threat due to the changing competitive 
environment. Pushing forward with the common bank sector initiative, 81 Danish banks launched a 
competitive mobile payment solution, Swipp, in late 2013, with the goal of challenging the popularity of 
MobilePay. Integrated in the mobile banking apps of the respective banks, Swipp allowed its users to execute 
initially peer-to-peer transactions and later consumer-to-business transactions. Due to the lack of coordination 
around the Swipp launch, with banks entering the market separately, and the cumbersome registration process, 
the initial adoption by private customers was limited. Learning from this process, Swipp later launched a 
separate mobile payment application, with simpler and more easy-to-use design in late 2015. The contender 
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also continued evolving by enabling in-store and online mobile payments, thus mirroring the evolutionary 
trajectory of MobilePay. In addition, in February 2014, the four telecommunication operators jointly launched 
their online payment solution, Paii, which allowed its users to execute both P2P and C2B transactions. Thus, 
Paii was competing directly with MobilePay and Swipp to reach to both private and commercial customers in 
Denmark.  
Addressing the intensified competitive environment, the platform owner developed MobilePay further by 
introducing it in various payment contexts (in-store, in-app, online) and among multiple heterogeneous actors 
(private customers, SMEs, large retailers, online stores, vending machines providers, etc.). As both private and 
commercial customers of MobilePay, however, could multi-home to competitive solutions (Swipp, Paii, 
iZettle, PayPal) due to relatively low switching costs and lack of lock-in effects, MobilePay had to continue 
evolving. As the competition in the payment sector had shifted from executing payments (payments as 
transactions) to offering services around payments (payments adding value to other services), the platform 
owner incorporated various value-added services (VAS), such as its own loyalty scheme (Bonus) and third-
party loyalty programmes, in 2015-2016.  
While MobilePay kept evolving, its main competitors on the Danish market struggled to match its growing 
user base. After Paii failed to ignite, Swipp acquired the solution in November 2014 in order to appropriate its 
technological set-up for enabling its own online payments. Despite this acquisition, in 2016, Swipp, had only 
900 000 registered private customers and approximately 16 000 commercial customers (Finans, 2016; 
Skjærlund, 2016). In comparison, in 2016, approximately 3 million Danes used MobilePay to transact with 
their peers and to pay to approximately 25 000 commercial customers and 3,700 webshops (MobilePay, 2017).  
While MobilePay managed to consolidate its position in the Danish market, new global and domestic 
contenders, both financial and non-financial actors, utilizing novel technologies, emerged. Technology 
companies such as Apple and Samsung launched their own mobile payment platforms (ApplePay and 
SamsungPay) and signalled their intention to enter the Nordics in 2016 due to the wide-spread use of 
smartphones in the region. On domestic level, in 2015, Nets turned the Dankort into a contactless card, thus 
allowing consumers to pay in-store up to certain amount without having to provide a PIN. In 2016, only one 
year after its introduction, Danes used the contactless Dankort in 25 percent of all registered card transactions 
in Denmark (European Payments Council, 2017). The fast adoption of contactless payments among the Danes, 
however, challenged the use of MobilePay for in-store transactions at large retails chains.  
To respond to the new challenges, the platform owner decided to undertake a significant strategic shift by 
collaborating with other Nordic banks, which would serve as financial and distribution partners. The partner 
banks would invest in MobilePay in order to get access to its significant user base (app. 90 % of the Danish 
population used MobilePay in 2017) and would distribute MobilePay’s business solutions to their own 
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commercial customers. If their efforts would lead to an increase in the number of commercial customers using 
MobilePay, the partner banks would receive part of the generated revenue.  
After prolonged negotiation, in September 2016, Nordea, a major Nordic bank and the main supporter of 
Swipp, joined MobilePay, thus leaving the common bank consortium. After Nordea’s exit, the other banks part 
of Swipp also decided to join MobilePay and, as a result, Swipp closed down in February 2017. Thus, 
MobilePay remained the leading mobile payment solution on the Danish market, a position, which contenders, 
however, continued to challenge. In 2017, for example, Nets launched a digitized version of the Dankort 
(Mobil Dankort) under the form of a digital wallet, which private customers could use to pay in-store when 
shopping at some of the large retailers.  
The inclusion of partner banks in the MobilePay ecosystem required a change in ownership due to competition 
concerns. Thus, while Danske Bank as the platform owner initially formed an autonomous unit within the bank 
to develop and operate MobilePay, the new strategic shift required further autonomy. Thus, a separate legal 
entity, acting as an owner of MobilePay, was formed, with Danske Bank becoming a financial partner. After 
a year-long preparation, in September 2017, the new legal entity, MobilePay A/S was established, which 
operates under e-money licence in accordance to EU payment legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Layered Research Setting 
4. Multi-Method Approach 
Apart from using different theoretical perspectives, the separate studies also adopt different methods of inquiry. 
This multi-method approach further strengthens the in-depth theorizing as it aims to investigate the main 
phenomenon by looking at several cases and by adopting different techniques. In particular, the separate studies 
MobilePay 
Digital platform ecosystems 
Digital payment platform ecosystems 
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adopt methods such as concept reconstruction (Paper I), longitudinal case study (Paper II, Paper V, and Paper 
VI), Review and Theory Development approach (Paper III) and multi-case study (Paper IV). 
Concept Reconstruction  
To conceptualize the main phenomenon of investigation, digital platform ecosystem evolution, Paper I adopts 
a concept reconstruction approach, proposed by Welch et al. (2016). This method consists of two parts. First, 
it requires the conduct of literature review (in this case, hermeneutic literature review, see Paper I) whose 
purpose is to identify and group the various attributes, which collectively construct the investigated concept. 
Second, the method proceeds with the empirical investigation of the identified attributes, where the goal is to 
inquire about the accuracy with which they portray the complex nature of digital platform ecosystem evolution 
(Welch et al., 2016). 
Longitudinal Single Case Study 
The core RQ and the SRQs are exploratory in nature as they seek to provide an explanation about the 
emergence and the unfolding of understudied phenomenon. Such inquiries give rise to theories of explaining, 
which are categorized as Type II Theory in Information Systems (Gregor, 2006). As Gregor (2006, p. 8) points 
out: “The theory developed, or conjectures, need to be new and interesting, or explain something that was 
poorly or imperfectly understood beforehand.”  
Case studies constitute a research approach that can be used to develop this type of theory (Gregor, 2006). In 
particular, case study research allows for thorough investigation of the context in which complex phenomena 
operate (Baxter and Jack, 2008), based on collection and detailed analysis of various data sources (Yin, 2003).  
The methodology adopted for Paper II, Paper V and Paper VI is a longitudinal single case study, which 
provides basis for in-depth analysis in order to capture “the knowledge of practitioners and developing theories 
from it” (Benbasat et al., 1987, p. 370) (see, also Pettigrew, 1990). Furthermore, current research on digital 
platform ecosystem evolution suffers from lack of longitudinal studies based on primary data (de Reuver et 
al., 2017). Thus, by adopting this method, this PhD dissertation aims to address an important research gap in 
the platform literature.  
Multi-Case Study  
Paper IV adopts a multi-case study approach to investigate the different adoption and expansion strategies used 
by a platform owner when faced with strategic challenges. By utilizing this method, we derive different 
strategies from several cases, and subsequently compare and contrast them against one another (Baxter and 
Jack, 2008; Yin, 2003).  
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To this end, Paper IV investigates three cases of exemplary digital payment platform ecosystems operating in 
different markets. Two of the cases are similar, which help to account for similarities between the cases. 
Validating further the findings, Paper IV also investigates a unique case (Pettigrew, 1990), which is dissimilar 
to the other two selected cases. To purpose is to check whether the findings can be extended to explain different 
cases and to further enrich the proposed framework by incorporating new insights. 
Review and Theory Development 
Paper III adopts a Review and Theory Development approach (Leidner, 2018), which encompasses two 
separate stages of analysis. While the method requires researchers to conduct a literature review on specific 
topic, the purpose is to go beyond systemizing the relevant literature and outlining a research gap. Instead, the 
ultimate goal is to construct a novel theoretical framework, which builds upon existing research, but also adopts 
an additional theoretical lens (see e.g., Krogh et al., 2012). Thus, Paper III presents a literature review on the 
various tensions within the digital platform ecosystem and combines the insights from it with Dialectics to 
derive a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution.   
5. Data Collection 
This PhD dissertation relies largely on primary data collected in the organizational setting of the investigated 
digital payment platform ecosystem, MobilePay (Paper II, Paper V, and Paper VI). As Industrial PhD fellow, 
employed by Danske Bank for the duration of the PhD project (October 2015-September 2018), I entered the 
unit developing and managing MobilePay in October 2015 as part of the team, responsible for the proposing, 
conceptualizing and developing novel ideas (the Concepts team), and which determined to a large extent the 
future evolution of MobilePay. During the first two years of the project, I spent three days per week at 
MobilePay and were active member of the Concepts team. In September 2017, I embarked on a four-month 
research visit to the Center for Process Innovation (CEPRIN), part of Georgia State University, USA, where I 
collaborated with Prof. Lars Mathiassen and Prof. Arun Rai on Paper II and with Prof. Jonny Holmstrom on 
Paper III.   
In October 2015, when I joined the company, MobilePay had operated for two and a half years and had 
successfully attracted significant number of both private and commercial customers (see above). As I was 
interested to gain insights into the initial success of MobilePay and to observe the next steps on its path toward 
maturity, the Concepts team constituted a suitable place to obtain first-hand knowledge. The team initially 
consisted of five people, each having different competences and being responsible for various projects. During 
the time I spent with them, some members left the team in pursuit of other employment, while other people 
joined. As part of an organizational restructuring in September 2017, part of the team members joined a 
different team, while, I, together with three other colleagues, remained part of a new team (The Venture team). 
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To collect data about the evolutionary journey of MobilePay, I used participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews and unofficial conversations with employees, supplemented with secondary data such as archival 
documents (presentations, memos, meeting notes, analysis, emails, posters, etc.) (Paper II, Paper IV, Paper VI) 
(Table 4). The preferred approach for data collection was participant observation as “a process enabling 
researchers to learn about the activities of the people under study in the natural setting through observing and 
participating in those activities” (Kawulich 2005, p. xxx). Although studies, which rely on participant 
observations, are rather scant in the IS field, such approach “can enhance our understanding of IS phenomena” 
(Moore and Yager 2011, p. 127). Participant observation is used when a researcher seeks to acquire profound 
knowledge about the events and actions, rooted in specific context, that shape a particular phenomenon (Iacono 
et al., 2009).  
For the duration of my employment, the Head of the Concepts team supervised my work and helped me 
navigate through the organizational structure of both MobilePay and Danske Bank. In particular, I had one-to-
one bi-weekly meetings with him discussing ongoing issues around MobilePay and receiving feedback on a 
number of tasks, in which I have been involved, together with the other members of the team, in my attempts 
to gain better insights into their work. I also participated in the bi-weekly team meetings, where the team 
members discussed current affairs, the tasks they were working on and future projects. As the MobilePay unit 
was relatively small (between 30-40 people), I also had frequent encounters with members of the other teams 
during weekly status meetings and bi-weekly, later monthly, department meetings, where the Head of 
MobilePay discussed key issues with all employees, semi-structured interviews, lunch breaks, breakout 
sessions, and more.    
In my role as participant observer, I also contributed selectively to a number of projects, meetings and tasks 
during my stay at the company. The purpose was to obtain in-depth insights about events as they unfolded and 
to gain credibility from my colleagues, who would be more willing to share information if they perceived me 
as an active team member (Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven and Hubert, 1990). I engaged in variety of tasks, from 
initial development of innovation ideas and conducting research on latest developments in the domestic, 
regional and international payment sectors, to developing competitors’ analysis, presentations for legal 
authorities, and governance policies for working with third-party developers.  
As result of my engagement in the company, I managed to collect vast amount of primary data (see Table 4). 
Throughout the duration of the participant observation (October 2015-September 2017), I kept a research diary, 
where I noted down on daily basis my observations (for a sample, see Figure 8).  
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                                               Figure 8. Sample of the Research Diary 
As a result, I documented the main events taking place within the company (launch of new features, 
competitors shift, new partnerships, change in strategic goals, working processes, organizational changes, and 
more) in the form of narrative spanning across 61 pages. In the research diary, I also captured the discourse 
around various events (opinions, comments, challenges, and developments) as they unfolded. Furthermore, I 
took extensive notes during the team meetings, department meetings, status meetings, workshops, and breakout 
sessions, which I attended. Collectively, these notes amount to 145 pages.  
Participant observation as an approach to data collection, however, is not without limitations and thus, 
researchers advise for its combination with other techniques such as interviews and archival data (see e.g., 
Kawulich 2005). To complement the data gathered through empirical observations, I further conducted 16 
semi-structured interviews with selected MobilePay employees in order to obtain additional insights. I 
conducted the interviews in English, with the duration of the interviews varying from thirty minutes to an hour 
and twenty minutes. As the obtained information from the interviews often overlapped with already 
documented insights (from meeting notes and informal conversations), I decided to engage primarily in 
observations and informal conversations with colleagues at MobilePay as my main method for collecting data 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
To supplement my data collection, I gathered large amount of archival data (presentations, strategic documents, 
emails, etc.). In particular, I archived 83 emails, which contained information about important events during 
the evolutionary journey of MobilePay (e.g., announcement of new product launches, strategic decisions, 
organizational changes, etc.). I also archived 60 presentations and 55 documents such as press releases, product 
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guidelines, strategic analysis, and release notes. The collected archived data, together with insights from semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations, were the main source of information, which helped me 
restore the evolutionary path of MobilePay from its launch in May 2013 until I joined the unit in October 2015.  
Table 4. Overview of MobilePay Data Sources 
Type of Data Data Points Description 
 
Primary 
Research diary 61 pages 
Notes from meetings 145 pages 
Semi-structured interviews 16 (between 30 minutes to 1 hour 
and 20 minutes) 
 
Secondary 
Emails 83 
Presentations 60 
Documents 55 
 
As Paper I and Paper III aim at reviewing relevant literature, the data collection for these papers encompasses 
identifying and reviewing of a number of studies (for more details, see respective studies). Paper I seeks to 
identify the various manners in which researchers conceptualized digital platform ecosystem evolution. As 
part of the adopted concept reconstruction method, I conducted a hermeneutic literature review by iterating 
between data collection and data analysis (see Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic 2014). Utilizing extensive 
keyword strategy, I identified 98 articles across various fields (information systems, organizational studies, 
product management, innovation studies, etc.), which dealt with digital platform ecosystem evolution either 
explicitly or implicitly. 
Although Paper III also utilizes extensive literature review to advance further our understanding of digital 
platform ecosystem evolution from dialectical perspective, the data collection process differed. The preferred 
approach for collecting data was snowballing, where the researcher selects a key article and uses its references 
to identify additional articles to include in the literature review (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). By looking at the 
references of a key article in the platform literature (Gawer (2014) on bridging the two streams in the platform 
literature – economic and engineering), we selected 29 out of the 91 references after reading the abstracts. To 
identify the final pool of articles, we used two criteria: 1) articles that investigate digital platform ecosystems, 
2) articles, which focus on tensions and conflicts.  
In order to capture relevant platform research after 2014 (after the publication of Gawer’s article), we identified 
all the articles citing Gawer (2014) in their references by using Scopus. We initially selected 38 articles. After 
identifying the articles, we went through their references and identified additional relevant articles to add to 
the final sampling. We then went through their respective references until we could not identify any new 
relevant articles. In the final sampling, we ended up with 65 articles from various fields of research. 
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Paper IV utilizes multi-case study informed by both primary and secondary data. To present the strategic 
challenges MobilePay faced and the strategies it used, we relied on primary data (see above). As we were not 
able to collect primary data for the other cases, the research utilized a significant amount of secondary data: 
press releases, annual reports, online news and interviews.  
6. Data Analysis 
Depending on the concrete method in each study, the separate papers adopt different analytical techniques (for 
more details, see Papers). In general, this research constitutes an iterative process of data collection, data 
analysis and data comparison in order to detect the most relevant data for studying the observed phenomenon 
(Jones and Alony, 2011).  
To analyse the gathered data for Paper I, Paper III, Paper IV, Paper V5, we used an open or axial coding 
schemes suitable for the selected method. For example, in Paper I, we followed a coding scheme proposed by 
Welch et al. (2016), who recommend to code the selected articles based on three criteria: use of the concept 
(platform evolution), identifying its attributes, and capturing the main theoretical assumptions made by the 
researchers (for more, see Paper I) (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Example of Data Analysis from Paper I 
Author View on Evolution Attributes Theoretical 
Assumptions 
 
Gawer (2015) 
 
Shift of platform 
boundary 
 
Change in the MSP 
scope and MSP openness 
MSPs’ boundary shifts 
in relation to 
competition and 
innovation  
Inoue and Tsujimoto 
(2017) 
PE as developing a 
platform-based 
ecosystem 
Adding third-party 
complementors 
Self-reinforcing loop 
between users and 
complementors 
 
Paper II aimed at identifying generative mechanisms triggered by certain events and producing various 
outcomes. For the data analysis, we adopted the approach proposed by Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) due 
to the similarity in the observed phenomena. Based on our theoretical conceptualization, we distinguished 
between transformative and reinforcing generative mechanisms (see Paper II). To identify the transformative 
generative mechanisms, we first outlined various significant outcomes in the evolutionary path of MobilePay 
(corresponding to changes in deep structure, see Table 6) and traced back its triggers and interplay between 
various socio-technical components in order to identify a mechanism (see Table 6).  
 
                                                            
5 Paper VI is a research in progress and has no data analysis. 
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Table 6. Example of Identification of Transformative Generative Mechanisms 
Change in deep 
structure 
Trigger Interplay between socio-technical 
elements 
Mechanism 
 
Actors: Inclusion of 
commercial customers 
 
Architecture: The 
platform core expands 
with a configurable 
functionalities for C2B 
payments  
 
Governance: Only Danske 
Bank’s commercial 
customers can freely 
access and only for in-
store trade (no online) 
 
 
Reaching 
critical mass 
of private 
customers 
spurs 
demand for 
C2B solution  
 
(June 2013) 
 
 
Demand for C2B solution; 
MobilePay investigates how to 
technically enable C2B and which 
merchants to include; 
Incorporation of novel technologies 
(Near-Field Communication, 
Bluetooth, etc.) requires lots of 
development time; 
Competitors announce market entry; 
Decision to develop a business app 
similar to private app; 
Creating an admin portal for merchant 
access; 
Decision to target only small 
merchants; 
Pilot test with small merchants; 
Commercial Launch of MobilePay 
Business app 
 
 
 
Expansion to 
include C2B 
transactions 
 
(Architecture-
Dominant 
Mechanism) 
 
(February 
2014) 
 
After identifying a number of transformative mechanisms across the evolutionary path of MobilePay, we 
focused on explaining the incremental changes occurring in between two major transformations of the deep 
structure (e.g., in the period from the launch of the private app in May 2013 to the next transformation, the 
expansion to incorporate consumer-to-business payments in February 2014; see Paper II). We then identified 
the triggers of these changes and the reinforcing generative mechanisms, which produce them in a similar 
manner to Table 6. 
VI Summary of the Findings 
This PhD dissertation constitutes a collection of six separate papers, addressing the above posed Research 
Questions (see, Chapter I). In this chapter, I introduce the separate studies, conducted as part of this research. 
For each paper, I first pinpoint the research question guiding the specific study, present the concrete 
methodology and outline the main findings.  
1. Paper I 
Staykova, K. S. and Damsgaard, J. 2017. “Toward an Integrated View of Multi-Sided Platform Evolution”. 
In: Proceedings of the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) 2017, Seoul, South Korea. 
This exploratory paper seeks to review the existing platform literature in order to understand how researchers 
portray the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. The initial assumption is that the lack of clear 
conceptualization of digital platform ecosystems (see de Reuver et al., 2017) spills over to studies on evolution. 
57 
 
Thus, we embarke on a study to unravel the existing conceptualizations of digital platform ecosystem evolution 
by identifying how scholars view and portray this process.  
To conduct our investigation, we adopt a concept reconstruction method (Welch et al., 2016), which consists 
of reviewing the usage of the digital platform ecosystem evolution as a concept in the existing literature and 
supplementing this analysis with empirical exploration of the evolutionary process of several digital platform 
ecosystems. The purpose of the hermeneutic literature review, which encompassed 98 different studies across 
various fields of research reflecting the different views within the platform literature, is also to deduct a number 
of attributes, which collectively construct the concept in question (namely, digital platform ecosystem 
evolution). To check the accuracy with which the identified attributes capture the evolutionary process, we 
further conduct an empirical investigation by reconstructing the evolutionary path of three exemplary digital 
platform ecosystems.  
Based on the conducted literature review, we confirm our initial assumption that there is a lack of common 
understanding about what constitutes digital platform ecosystem evolution. Rather, various scholars 
conceptualize this phenomenon in various manners (we identify twelve different views), which instead of 
informing our knowledge about the phenomenon, fragment even further our understanding of this complex 
process. Further, when investigating whether the existing views capture accurately the evolution of the selected 
digital platform ecosystems, we found that none of the identified views (and its corresponding attributes) could 
explain the evolutionary process in its entirety as they rather focus on investigating separate, often 
disconnected topics.  
To amend this, we integrate the different views and propose a new conceptualization of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution as co-evolution of platform constituencies, infrastructure, functionalities and governance 
regime, which we synthetize from the existing literature (Figure 9)6. Thus, we argue that all digital platform 
ecosystems consist of certain attributes (constructive elements), which co-evolve during the evolution of the 
ecosystem. We further propose, based on the hermeneutic literature review, that various drivers propel the co-
evolution of constituencies, infrastructure, functionalities and governance regime towards certain evolutionary 
outcomes (Figure 9). Drivers and evolutionary outcomes, however, remain under researched topics within the 
literature on digital platform ecosystem evolution (for more details, see Paper II). 
In subsequent studies, I largely build on this initial conceptualization of digital platform ecosystem evolution. 
As my research advanced, I have further clarified the nature of the digital platform ecosystem (see Chapter II) 
and have improved the conceptualization of the evolutionary process (see Paper II; also Chapter VII).  
 
                                                            
6 An improved version of this conceptualization is presented in Paper II (also in chapter III; Figure 2).  
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Figure 9. Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
2. Paper II 
Staykova, K., S., Mathiassen, L., Rai, A., and Damsgaard, J. (2018). “Generative Mechanisms for Digital 
Platform Ecosystems Ecosystem: A Punctuated Equilibrium Theory”. Paper re-submitted (revise and 
resubmit) to Research Policy’s special issue on Digitization of Innovation and Entrepreneurship. 
The purpose of this paper is to advance the existing literature on digital platform ecosystem evolution by 
addressing an important, yet under researched question, namely how generative mechanisms lead to certain 
evolutionary outcomes when triggered in response to various internal and external challenges. To this end, the 
paper combines the notion of generative mechanisms with Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to theorize how and 
why digital platform ecosystems evolve over time.  
Based on extensive literature review, we first group existing studies on evolution in three different perspectives 
(growth, co-evolution and competition)7 and outline research gap. Despite the merits of current research, 
scholars have overlooked two important aspects: the triggers, in response to which a digital platform ecosystem 
evolves, and the generative mechanisms, which shape the evolutionary process. Thus, this paper investigates 
the following research question: How do triggering events and generative mechanisms drive the evolution of 
digital platform ecosystems?  
                                                            
7 The categorization of the different perspectives follows loosely the categorization of the literature in Chapter III.  
PE Process 
Platform Attributes 
 
Constituencies Functionalities 
Infrastructure Governance 
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
New types of constituencies 
Size growth of constituencies (initial 
growth, critical mass, optimal growth 
rate, entry in geographical markets) 
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
Capabilities, technical boundary 
resources, new channels, acquisitions, 
suppliers 
 
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
Type of features: core, complementary, 
spin-off products 
Feature providers: MSP owner, 
complementors 
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
Pricing (business model evolution) 
Non-pricing (communities, affiliation, social 
boundary resources, etc.) 
PE Drivers (e. g.) 
Environment Change 
Internal Optimization 
 
PE Outcome 
Platform Maturity (e.g.) 
Market Size, Optimal Growth Rate 
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To this end, we combine the notion of generative mechanisms with Punctuated Equilibrium theory to offer a 
conceptualization of the digital platform ecosystem evolution, which later we use to guide the empirical 
analysis of the selected case study (see Table 7). Building upon Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, we present 
the existing configuration of actors, architecture and governance as the deep structure of a digital platform 
ecosystem, which maintains its composition during periods of stability. Various external and internal events, 
which appear during the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem, challenge the established configuration, 
thus prompting it to alter. Not all occurring events, however, constitute change triggers. For an event to qualify 
as a change trigger, it needs to create a misfit within the digital platform ecosystem or between the ecosystem 
and its environment, which undermines the overall performance of the ecosystem (see Table 7). 
The change triggers can set in motion one or more generative mechanisms, which are rooted in the latent 
properties of the deep structure and thus relate to one or more of the ecosystem’s actors, architecture and 
governance. When triggered, the generative mechanisms, through the interplay of the activated components 
(e.g., actors and architecture or architecture and governance) lead to a change outcome, which affects the 
existing composition of the deep structure. We further distinguish between two types of generative 
mechanisms, depending on their impact on the digital platform ecosystem. While transformative generative 
mechanisms lead to radical change in the deep structure of a digital platform ecosystem, reinforcing generative 
mechanisms introduce incremental adjustments to the existing composition. Subsequently, we conceptualize 
the evolution of digital platform ecosystems as the ongoing changes (transformative or reinforcing) in relation 
to its actors, architecture and governance (see Table 7). 
Table 7. Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Platform 
Evolution 
The ongoing changes in a digital platform ecosystem in relation to its actors, 
architecture and governance  
Deep  
Structure 
A sustained configuration of actors, architecture and governance during a stable 
period of ecosystem evolution 
Change  
Trigger 
An external event that challenges the current configuration of the ecosystem or 
an internal event that creates a misfit between the configuration of the 
ecosystem and the environment, thereby challenging the performance of the 
ecosystem 
Generative 
Mechanism 
Latent deep structure properties (related to one or more of a platform 
ecosystem’s actors, architecture and governance) that can be activated to change 
the ecosystem.  
Transforming 
Mechanism 
Mechanism that leads to radical change in the deep structure of a digital 
platform ecosystem  
Reinforcing 
Mechanism 
Mechanism that leads to incremental adjustment of a digital platform ecosystem 
without affecting its deep structure 
Change 
Outcome  
A change in the properties of a digital platform ecosystem (related to one or 
more of its actors, architecture and governance) in response to a change trigger 
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Next, we applied the above conceptualization to investigate empirically the evolution of a prominent digital 
payment platform ecosystem, MobilePay (four years in total). Relying on a longitudinal single case study (see 
Paper II and Chapter V), we validate the suitability of the proposed theoretical framework and derive a number 
of insights. 
To develop further a Punctuated Equilibrium Theory about digital platform ecosystem evolution, we combine 
the theoretical framework (Table 7), the insights from our empirical analysis and extant theory. As a result, we 
argue that digital platform ecosystems evolve through a network of distributed and concurrent generative 
mechanisms, which transform and reinforce the deep structure of the ecosystem in response to internal and 
external events and other mechanisms.  
We attribute the triggering of digital platform ecosystem evolution to both internal and external events 
(consistently with existing platform literature, see Chapter III). While we identify additional triggers to 
complement the existing ones, we also discover that both internal and external events trigger transformative 
mechanisms, while mainly internal events set reinforcing mechanisms in motion. We also establish that already 
activated generative mechanisms can serve as a trigger to subsequent transformative and reinforcing generative 
mechanisms. Transforming mechanisms can trigger one or more subsequent reinforcing mechanisms, while 
reinforcing mechanisms can also trigger other reinforcing mechanisms. We also found that reinforcing 
mechanisms can indirectly trigger transforming mechanisms (for examples, see Paper II, Discussion). 
We further illustrate the context dependency of the generative mechanisms by emphasizing on their anchoring 
in the latent properties of the existing deep structure, which itself is a result of previously activated generative 
mechanisms, and on their triggering events. When a change trigger appears, it activates certain latent properties 
of the existing deep structure configuration, which also manifest into a generative mechanism. For example, 
as MobilePay opened for third-party complementors (transforming mechanism) through the release of 
boundary resources, the platform became more malleable as a latent property of the ecosystem architecture 
(Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). This malleability subsequently resulted in adoption of the platform by other 
third-party complementors (reinforcing mechanism). 
We also propose a typology of generative mechanisms based on two aspects: their dominance and their impact 
(see Table 8). The dominance of a generative mechanism signals for their different change focus in terms of 
actors, architecture and governance. Regardless of their dominance, the change outcomes brought by 
generative mechanisms can have transforming or reinforcing impact on the existing deep structure of the 
ecosystem. Based on our empirical analysis, we identify a number of generative mechanisms, which we present 
in an abstracted form in Table 8.   
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Table 8. The Dominance and Impact of Generative Mechanisms 
 Impact 
Transforming Reinforcing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dominance 
 
Actor  Changing actor types 
 Shifting owners 
 Changing actor populations* 
 Changing the role of platform 
owner 
 
 
 
Architecture 
 Extending platform 
core  
 Including boundary 
resources 
 Developing platform 
periphery 
 Renewing platform 
core 
 Leveraging existing IT 
solutions* 
 Introducing incremental 
innovation in platform core* 
 Optimizing functionalities in 
platform core* 
 Improving platform 
connectivity for actors* 
 
 
 
Governance 
 Developing 
governance regime 
 Customizing rules for actor 
types 
 Improving affiliation process 
 Tightening and relaxing 
participation rules* 
 Adjusting value appropriation 
rules 
 
Finally, we ponder upon the temporality of generative mechanisms as they appear (and disappear) throughout 
the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem. In particular, we found that multiple transforming and reinforcing 
mechanisms operate simultaneously and interact to drive the evolution of the ecosystem. While transformative 
mechanisms stop operating at some point in time, we found evidence that a number of reinforcing mechanisms 
(market with * in Table 8) continue to operate throughout the digital platform ecosystem evolution.  
Interestingly, and in contradiction to Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, which prescribes clear-cut periods of 
stability and instability, we observe that the transforming mechanisms could span across considerable periods, 
thus overlapping with other generative mechanisms. We attribute this difference to the socio-technical nature 
of generative mechanisms, with various actors and artifacts involved in their activation and operation, to the 
complexity of change brought by transforming mechanisms, and to the fact that independently of 
transformative mechanisms, reinforcing mechanisms continue to operate, as digital platform ecosystems 
evolve not only discontinuously but also cumulatively along multiple dimensions.  
3. Paper III 
Staykova, K. S., Mathiasen, L., and Holmstrom, J. (2018). “The Dialectics of the Digital Platform Ecosystem 
Evolution”. Paper under development. 
In this paper, we investigate digital platform ecosystems evolution by adopting Dialectics as theoretical lens 
(Figure 10). As multiple tensions occurring, for example, between platform owner and other actors or between 
62 
 
ecosystem growth and the need to maintain its efficiency characterize digital platform ecosystems (see Hagiu, 
2014; Eaton et al., 2015; Wareham et al., 2014), we investigate how their appearance and resolution drive the 
ecosystem evolution. Subsequently, the main research question of this paper is:  How do tensions within the 
digital platform ecosystem drive its evolution? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
Figure 10. Dialectical Model of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
To this end, we build upon Dialectics theory (Figure 10, outer circle) and combine its key constructs with 
insights we obtain from reviewing the relevant platform literature (Figure 10, inner circle). As a result, we 
propose a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 10). In particular, we present the 
digital platform ecosystem as interconnected totality consisting of certain configuration of actors, architecture 
and governance8. We further argue that various inherent contradictions, characterize a particular configuration 
of ecosystems actors, architecture and governance as part of its latent properties (see Paper III). After reviewing 
the existing platform literature, we summarize these inherent contradictions in four categories, namely 
performance, architecture, governance, and development, with each contradiction consisting of identity and 
two opposites (see Table 9). 
                                                            
8 Consistent with the conceptualization of digital platform ecosystems as deep structure in the Punctuated Equilibrium theory of 
digital platform ecosystem evolution (Paper II). 
Digital Platform 
Ecosystem 
Actors 
Architecture 
Governance 
Latent Tensions 
Performance 
Architecture 
Governance 
Development 
 
Salient Tensions 
Managerial Response 
Accommodating  
Splitting 
Synthesis 
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Table 9. Inherent Contradictions in Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Contradiction Identity Opposites 
Performance 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
direct resources to ensure 
appropriate contributions to its 
participants 
Opposite: Efficiency forces seek to 
improve performance through fine 
tuning of the existing ecosystem 
configuration 
Opposite: Growth forces seek to 
improve performance through 
strengthening network effects from 
new ecosystem participants 
Architecture 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
design and maintain the platform to 
serve current and future needs of its 
participants 
Opposite: Reliability forces seek to 
improve the capability of the 
platform architecture to serve the 
current needs of ecosystem 
participants 
Opposite: Evolvability forces seek to 
improve the capability of the 
platform architecture to serve the 
future needs of existing and new 
ecosystem participants 
Governance 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
enable the access and support the 
practices of its participants 
Opposite: Control forces seek to 
introduce mechanisms that drive 
alignment of platform ecosystem 
participants and their practices  
Opposite: Openness forces seek to 
introduce mechanisms that drive 
platform ecosystem renewal 
through new participants and 
emerging practices 
Development 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
respond to internal and external 
events that challenge its status quo 
Opposite: Consolidation forces seek to 
respond by reinforcing the current 
trajectory of the digital platform 
ecosystem 
Opposite: Adaptation forces seek to 
respond by transforming the current 
trajectory of the digital platform 
ecosystem 
 
When triggered by various factors of plurality, change and scarcity (see, Smith and Lewis, 2011), these 
inherent contradictions transform into salient as various ecosystem actors become largely aware of them. As a 
result of their activation, the platform owner, as a key ecosystem actor with asymmetrical power (Boudreau 
and Hagiu, 2009), aims at addressing the tensions often by engaging with other ecosystem actors, who may 
also react to drive or resolve the tension (praxis) (see e.g., Eaton et al., 2015). 
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Depending on the nature of the tensions, a platform owner can choose from three different types of responses, 
namely accommodating, splitting, or synthesis (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). While accommodating implies 
that the platform owner tries to manage simultaneously the two opposites of a contradiction, the splitting occurs 
when the owner separates the two opposites in time and space (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). When the two 
opposites cannot co-exist, the platform owner transforms the contradiction through synthesis. Our empirical 
investigation of the relevant platform literature demonstrates that the platform owner can adopt a combination 
of these three response strategies when addressing various salient tensions (for more details, see Paper III). 
Subsequently, the resolution of salient tensions can lead to reconstruction of the existing ecosystem 
configuration (see Figure 10). 
4. Paper IV  
Staykova, K. S.  and Damsgaard, J. 2016. “Adoption of Mobile Payment Platforms: Managing Reach and 
Range”, Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research, 11(3), pp. 65-84. 
This paper aims at investigating specific strategies adopted by the platform owner as part of the evolution of a 
digital platform ecosystem. In combination with Paper V and Paper VI, it provides additional insights into how 
a platform owner can manage the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem. In particular, this paper asks the 
following research question: What strategies do platform owners adopt to drive the adoption and expansion 
of digital platform ecosystems? 
After reviewing the platform literature, we found that different strategic challenges appear at different stages 
of the evolutionary process. While initially platform owners are preoccupied with the task of achieving critical 
mass of participants, new challenges arise as the platform ecosystem evolves, such as ensuring continuous 
growth and use, establishing viable business model, creating and maintaining generativity, and more. To cope 
with these challenges, which in this research relate mainly to ecosystem actors, we propose that platform 
owners should manage carefully the reach and range of their platform ecosystems. To this end, we construct 
the Reach and Range framework, which can serve as a strategic tool for platform owners to address a number 
of strategic challenges they face throughout the evolution of their platform ecosystems. 
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Figure 11. Overview of Reach and Range for Two-Sided Platforms 
In particular, we argue that each of the distinct groups of actors is characterized by reach, which refers to 
number of participants, and range, which refers to the functionalities associated with particular group of actors 
(Figure 11). As additional distinct groups of actors (e.g., developers) join the ecosystem, the platform owner 
also needs to manage the interside reach and range occurring between the distinct groups of actors under the 
influence of cross-side network effects. Thus, managing ecosystem actors requires the careful balance between 
the reach and range of each distinct group and the interside reach and range between distinct groups of actors.  
To identify specific strategies used by platform owners when addressing emerging challenges, we apply the 
Reach and Range framework to three selected digital payment platform ecosystems. Based on our empirical 
investigation, we prescribe a number of strategic recommendations that can assist platform owners in their 
quest to spur adoption and subsequent evolution (see Table 10). In particular, we demonstrate how platform 
owners can leverage the Reach and Range framework to design specific strategies addressing various 
challenges as they occur during the evolutionary path of their digital platform ecosystems. 
Table 10. Reach and Range Framework for Strategic Challenges 
 
Platform 
Type 
 
Strategic 
Challenge 
 
Reach and Range 
Framework 
Examples 
 
MobilePay 
 
Pingit 
 
Swish 
 
One-Sided 
 
Achieve 
critical mass 
of users 
 
Build Reach 
All banks’ 
customers 
All above 16- 
years old 
All participating 
banks’ 
customers 
Limit Range P2P P2P P2P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-Sided 
 
 
Adoption on 
the second 
group of 
participants 
 
Build Reach 
 
SMEs 
Large 
merchants 
Webshops 
Sole traders 
Large merchants 
SMEs 
Charities 
Webshops 
 
Diversify Range 
NFC 
Bluetooth 
Business 
Online 
Buy It button 
Pay now with 
Pingit button 
Swish number 
for merchants 
Swish API 
 
User 
Stickiness 
(lock-in 
effects on the 
user base) 
 
 
Strengthen User Range 
 
 
Increased 
daily 
payment 
limit 
 
 
Twitter 
Payments 
 
 
New app design 
 
Grow User Reach 
 
 
Windows 
Phone app 
 
Windows Phone 
app 
 
Windows Phone 
app 
Enable Interside Range C2B 
transactions 
C2B transactions 
B2C transactions 
C2B 
transactions 
Recurrence 
(high volume 
of cross-side 
transactions 
between the 
Manage Interside Range Bonus Buy It button Pay with Swish 
button 
Scale Reach on second 
group of participants 
Third-party 
apps 
Insurance 
companies 
Third-party apps 
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affiliated 
sides) 
 
5. Paper V 
Staykova, K. S. and Damsgaard, J. (2018). “Dual-track’s strategy for incumbent’s transformation: The case 
of Danske Bank adopting a platform business model”, Book Chapter, Accepted for publication in “Digitization 
Cases”.  
This case-based research investigates the digital transformation process, which a traditional financial 
institution undergoes. In particular, Paper V presents a case study of MobilePay as exemplary digital payment 
platform ecosystem developed and owned by an incumbent financial institution, Danske Bank.  
Grounded empirically, this case study provides a detailed account of the MobilePay’s evolution, from its 
launch in May 2013 to its market dominance in September 20179. In particular, it divides the evolutionary 
trajectory into a number of strategic episodes, each characterized by a challenge (situation faced), the actions 
taken to address it, the achieved results and the learning points, which platform owners and managers can refer 
to when managing the evolution of a digital payment platform ecosystem.  
The case provides rare glimpse inside the organizational structure of a successful digital payment platform 
ecosystem. It also outlines the tension occurring between, on one hand, establishing synergies between the 
incumbent organization and the newly formed platform ecosystem, and, on the other hand, the need to obtain 
a degree of autonomy. It further offers recommendations how to manage this tension in order for a digital 
payment platform ecosystem to evolve at optimal speed by leveraging the competencies of the incumbent, 
while also overcoming inefficient dependencies.  
6. Paper VI (solo-authored) 
Staykova, K.S. (2018) “Managing Platform Ecosystem Evolution through the Emergence of Micro-strategies 
and Microstructures”. Short Paper accepted to the Thirty Ninth International Conference on Information 
Systems (ICIS) 2018, San Francisco, USA.  
This short paper investigates digital platform ecosystem evolution from strategic perspective. In particular, the 
purpose of this study is to investigate evolution as purposeful process, resulting from the goal-seeking 
behaviour of a platform owner, rather than unsupervised process. In addition, I present the evolution of a digital 
platform ecosystem not as a stable and predictable pattern of events, but rather as meandering through a number 
of obstacles and new opportunities. Thus, while a platform owner needs to manage the evolutionary process; 
deliberate, long-term strategies may not be suitable for surviving the uncertain environment in which 
                                                            
9 I present a concise summary of the case in Chapter V, Research Setting. 
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ecosystems operate. The main research question of this study is: How do platform owners manage the process 
of digital platform ecosystem evolution? 
In addition, existing studies present platform owners as collective and faceless actor, without mentioning the 
organizational structure, which supports their work (e.g., units, division of labor, control systems, etc.). Thus, 
this research also aims at providing insights into the organizational structure of a digital platform ecosystem 
by acknowledging the diversity of practitioners and activities in which they engage in order to stir the evolution 
of the platform ecosystem.  
To this end, building upon the strategy-structure interplay in the organization studies (Chandler, 1962), I seek 
to investigate the strategies and the organizational structures, on which platform owner relies in order to 
manage the evolutionary path. I further propose the adoption of a micro perspective, which is more suitable 
for investigating strategizing in dynamic and uncertain environment than traditional macro level perspective 
(Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). Following a micro perspective, I shift my focus towards studying micro-strategies 
and microstructures by adopting Strategy-as-Practice lens, on one hand, and micro approach to organizational 
design, on the other hand. 
By combining these two theoretical lenses, I propose a preliminary model for managing the digital platform 
ecosystem evolution (Figure 12) to guide the empirical analysis. In particular, the model presents the evolution 
as a series of combinations of micro-strategies and corresponding to them microstructures, which platform 
owners adopts in connection to emerging threats and opportunities.  
 
Figure 12. Model for Managing Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Rather than being deliberate and long-term, platform strategy instead comprises of a number of micro-
strategies emerging from the micro-activities (praxis) of strategic practitioners (indicated as A, B, C, D), 
governed by established practices (see Figure 12). Simultaneously, the execution of micro-strategies is 
supported by the emergence of relevant microstructures, rooted in the praxis of the practitioners.  
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Utilizing learning loops, practitioners can evaluate whether specific micro-strategies and their corresponding 
microstructures are suitable for tackling given challenges. Subsequently, practitioners can decide to keep, 
modify or altogether reject existing micro-strategies and microstructures or to introduce new ones. Thus, the 
micro-strategies and their corresponding microstructures form a pattern over time, which indicates how digital 
platform ecosystem evolve from strategic perspective. 
As next step, I intend to apply the model to analyze first-hand data, collected during a four-year longitudinal 
study of a prominent digital payment platform ecosystem. As I spent significant amount observing the work 
and practices of the employees, I rely on my insights to identify specific micro-strategies and microstructures 
and to study how they form a specific pattern over time. At this stage, this paper remains research in progress 
and does not provide in-depth preliminary findings. The initial analysis, however, support the suitability of the 
proposed model (Figure 12).   
7. Overview of the Papers in Relation to Research Question(s) 
The separate papers outlined above delve into distinct topics, and investigate the evolution of a digital platform 
ecosystem from different perspectives and by applying different methods (see Table 11). The findings from 
the conducted studies collectively inform and advance our understanding of the evolutionary process of this 
complex socio-technical phenomenon (for more, see Chapter VII).  
Table 11. Overview of Papers 
Paper Title Main focus Perspective Method Findings Authors 
Toward an 
Integrated 
View of Multi-
Sided Platform 
Evolution 
 
Paper I 
 
Existing 
conceptualizati
ons of digital 
platform 
ecosystem 
evolution 
 
 
Conceptual 
 
Concept 
Reconstruction 
Multiple views on 
evolution 
Integrated model 
of digital platform 
ecosystem 
evolution 
Staykova, K.S. 
Damsgaard, J. 
 
Generative 
Mechanisms 
for Digital 
Platform 
Ecosystems 
Evolution: A 
Punctuated 
Equilibrium 
Model 
 
Paper II 
 
 
 
Generative 
mechanism for 
digital 
platform 
ecosystems 
evolution 
 
 
 
Punctuated 
Equilibrium 
 
 
 
Longitudinal 
Case Study 
A Punctured 
Equilibrium 
model for digital 
platform 
ecosystem 
evolution 
Transforming and 
reinforcing 
generative 
mechanisms 
Staykova, K.S. 
Mathiassen, L. 
Rai, A. 
Damsgaard, J. 
 
The Dialectics 
of the Digital 
Platform 
 
Tensions 
driving the 
digital 
 
 
Dialectics 
 
 
Theory and 
Review 
 
A dialectical 
model for digital 
platform 
Staykova, K.S. 
Holmstrom, J. 
Mathiassen, L 
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Ecosystem 
Evolution 
 
Paper III 
 
platform 
ecosystems 
evolution 
ecosystems 
evolution 
Adoption of 
Mobile 
Payment 
Platforms: 
Managing 
Reach and 
Range 
 
Paper IV 
 
Strategies for 
adoption and 
expansion 
 
 
Teleology 
Multiple Case 
Studies 
 
Reach and Range 
framework for 
addressing 
various strategic 
challenges 
 
 
Staykova, K.S. 
Damsgaard, J 
Dual-track’s 
strategy for 
incumbent’s 
transformation
: The case of 
Danske Bank 
adopting a 
platform 
business 
model 
 
Paper V 
 
Incumbent 
launching and 
evolving a 
digital 
payment 
platform 
ecosystem 
 
 
 
Teleology 
 
 
Longitutidanl 
Case Study 
Practical 
Recommendation
s for managing 
digital platform 
ecosystem 
evolution 
 
 
Staykova, K.S. 
Damsgaard, J 
Managing 
Platform 
Ecosystem 
Evolution 
through the 
Emergence of 
Micro-
strategies and 
Microstructure
s 
 
Paper VI 
 
 
Managing 
digital 
platform 
ecosystems 
evolution 
 
 
 
Teleology 
 
 
Longtitudinal 
Case Study 
A model for 
managing digital 
platform 
ecosystem 
evolution 
 
Staykova, K.S. 
(solo-
authored) 
 
The six distinct studies refer to the specific sub-research questions (for more, see Chapter I) and collectively 
provide insights to the overall research question (Figure 13). While Paper I aims at understanding existing 
conceptualizations within the platform literature, Paper II and Paper III look at identifying generative 
mechanisms which drive the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. Paper II, for example, seeks to 
empirically identify various generative mechanisms and outline how they drive a Punctuated Equilibrium 
model for digital platform ecosystem evolution, while Paper III looks into tensions as generative mechanisms 
and outlines how they drive the evolutionary process. Addressing RQ2, Paper IV, Paper V and Paper VI 
investigate the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem from teleological perspective by analysing how 
platform owner can manage the evolutionary process.  
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Figure 13. Research Papers in Relation to Research Questions 
VII Towards Multi-Motor Explanation of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
In this chapter, I revisit the main phenomenon investigated in this PhD dissertation and reflect upon its 
characteristics based on the findings from the conducted studies. In particular, I combine the different process 
theories (Punctuated Equilibrium (Paper II), Dialectical (Paper III) and Teleological (Paper IV, Paper V and 
Paper VI) deducted from the separate studies and put forward a multi-motor explanation of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution (Figure 16). 
The conducted review of the platform literature (see Chapter III) revealed that, while there is a burgeoning 
research on digital platform ecosystem evolution, our understanding about how and why this complex process 
occurs remains limited (main RQ) as existing studies provide multiple, uncoordinated conceptualizations of 
this phenomenon and fragmented, dispersed insights, without integrating them. In particular, there is lack of 
knowledge about the generative mechanisms, which produce certain evolutionary outcomes (SRQ1) or about 
the different strategies, platform owners can adhere to when managing the complex and uncertain evolutionary 
process (SRQ2). To address these important yet overlooked topics, this PhD dissertation relies on six separate 
studies, the findings from which collectively provide multi-faceted understanding of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution. 
1. Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
As a starting point of this research, I concentrated my initial efforts on clarifying the main phenomenon of this 
study, namely digital platform ecosystem evolution. This requires defining the two key concepts at the center 
RQ: How does a digital platform ecosystem evolve when facing external and internal 
challenges and opportunities? 
SRQ1: How do generative mechanisms 
contingently prompt a digital platform 
ecosystem to evolve over time? 
SRQ2: How can a platform owner manage the 
evolution of a digital platform ecosystem? 
 
Paper I 
Paper II and Paper III 
Paper IV, Paper V, Paper VI 
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of this investigation – digital platform ecosystems and evolution of digital platform ecosystems, which current 
research does not conceptualize consistently.  
Throughout the separate studies, we define digital platform ecosystems as complex socio-technical systems 
enabling the interactions between various distinct types of actors through an underlying IT architecture and a 
set of governance rules. We view this as encompassing definition, which recognizes the multi-faceted nature 
of digital platform ecosystems. We explain the presence of multiple definitions of this phenomenon in the 
existing literature (see Chapter II) with the heterogeneity of digital platform ecosystems, which operate in 
various contexts (de Reuver et al., 2017), and with the different perspectives (that is economic and engineering; 
see Gawer, 2014; also Appendix) applied for studying them. Thus, by proposing this inclusive 
conceptualization, we address calls to integrate the different perspectives across the platform literature (see 
Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014).   
Subsequently, the multiplicity of views concerning digital platform ecosystems spills over to the existing 
conceptualizations of their evolutionary process (see Paper I). To address this lack of common definition, we 
propose a novel conceptualization of digital platform ecosystem evolution. In particular, we define evolution 
as the changes occurring in the constructive elements of a digital platform ecosystem, namely actors, 
architecture and governance as they co-evolve to address various external and internal triggers (see Paper I 
and Paper II). This definition reflects the multi-faceted nature of digital platform ecosystems, while 
acknowledging the complexity of their evolutionary process.  
2. Generative Mechanisms for Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
To answer SRQ1, we conduct five separate studies to identify various generative mechanisms, which shape 
the digital platform ecosystem evolution. Subsequently, we build three different theories, which explain the 
evolutionary process from different theoretical perspectives and based on different methodological approaches. 
As each of these theories relies on specific type of generative mechanisms, or ‘motors’ (see Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995), we identify a number of generative mechanisms, which collectively explain why and how digital 
platform ecosystems evolve over time. In this section, I outline the identified generative mechanisms and 
discuss their characteristics and modus operandi.   
In our conceptualization, generative mechanisms operate in a specific context, and when activated by triggers, 
they produce certain change outcomes (see Chapter IV for conceptualization). Thus, they contingently drive 
the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem. In addition, generative mechanisms are rooted in the digital 
platform ecosystem, presented as a specific configuration of actors, architecture and governance, whose latent 
properties (e.g. malleability, congestion of actors, incurred technology debt, etc.) determine the dominance and 
nature of the generative mechanism when activated (see Chapter IV). Subsequently, the activation of a 
generative mechanism leads to changes in the existing configuration of the digital platform ecosystem. To 
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derive the theories of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Punctuated Equilibrium, Dialectical and 
Teleological), I, together with my co-authors, build upon this initial conceptualization of generative 
mechanisms (see also Figure 3). 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
By proposing a Punctuated Equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Paper II), we argue 
that digital platform ecosystems evolve through a network of distributed and concurrent generative 
mechanisms, which transform and reinforce the deep structure of the ecosystem (that is, its existing 
configuration of actors, architecture and governance) in response to internal and external triggers and other 
mechanisms (Paper II). As such, multiple generative mechanisms operate simultaneously and interact across 
the ecosystem’s actors, architecture and governance to drive its evolution. 
We further propose a typology of generative mechanisms, which categorizes them based on their dominance 
and their impact. In particular, the transforming generative mechanisms (such as change in actor types, 
developing platform periphery, see Table 8) account for radical changes in the existing configuration of actors, 
architecture and governance, while reinforcing generative mechanisms sustain the existing configuration by 
introducing incremental changes. Apart from their impact, we further distinguish between their dominance, 
indicating which element of the digital platform ecosystem (actors, architecture or governance) they mainly 
affect. For example, change in actor types is an actor-dominant mechanism with transforming impact, while 
introducing incremental innovation in platform core is an architecture-dominant mechanism with reinforcing 
impact on the existing deep structure of the ecosystem (see Table 8). For full overview of the empirically 
identified generative mechanisms, see Chapter VI, Table 8. 
Dialectical Theory of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution  
The existing configuration of actors, architecture and governance, which is a result of initial choice or of the 
impact of previously activated generative mechanisms (see Chapter VI or Paper II), contains certain latent 
properties. These latent properties can enable further the evolution of the digital platform ecosystem (e.g., 
malleability, increased platform attractiveness due to growing user base) or they can constrain its ability to 
evolve (e.g. accumulated technology debt and unresolved governance issues) (for more details, see Paper II). 
While the former are opportunities to grasp, the latter are problems, which the platform owner needs to address 
in due time. 
Looking closely into the latent properties of the existing deep structure, which can constrain its further 
evolution, we present some of them as inherent contradictions, which remain latent until they are triggered 
(Paper III). These inherent contradictions came into being as result of the regulated interactions between actors 
on one hand, and actors and architecture, on the other hand, within a certain configuration of the deep structure. 
As they can escalate over time into intensified conflicts, which can jeoperdize the sustainability of the 
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ecosystem if not addressed properly, we view them as part of the constraining latent properties of the existing 
ecosystem configuration.  
In Paper III, based on extensive literature review, we identify four types of inherent contradictions, namely 
performance, architecture, governance and development, each characterized by two opposites, which compete 
with each other (see Table 9). While these contradictions are present as properties of the existing configuration 
of the digital platform ecosystem, they are latent until activated by triggers, operating in specific context. These 
triggers stem from the presence of various competing goals (plurality), change in the environment or within 
the ecosystem (change) or limited number of resources (scarcity) (for more, see Smith and Lewis, 2011). The 
activated inherent contradictions manifest into salient tensions within the digital platform ecosystem and draw 
the attention of the platform owner and other ecosystem actors. Depending on their intensity, the platform 
owner adopts various strategies to manage them. The resolution of the salient tension then has an impact 
(reinforcing or transforming) on the existing configuration of actors, architecture and governance of the 
ecosystem.  
We argue that the emerging tensions and the way they unfold over time until they are resolved (or contained) 
through the action of various ecosystem actors (praxis) and the adoption of managerial responses constitute 
the generative mechanisms, which drive the evolution from dialectical perspective. This view is similar to Van 
de Ven and Poole (1995), who state that conflicts can serve as generative mechanisms driving change.  
Further, this conceptualization of generative mechanisms is consistent with the one applied in the Punctuated 
Equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (see Paper II). In the Dialectical theory, we argue 
that specific generative mechanisms are rooted in the latent properties of the digital platform ecosystem and 
influenced by certain triggers, which activate them (similarly to the conceptualization in Paper II). The 
generative mechanisms in the Dialectical theory also have dominance as they relate to the constructive 
elements of the digital platform ecosystem (namely actors10, architecture and governance) and an impact on 
the existing deep structure of the ecosystem depending on the adopted managerial responses.  
In contrast to the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution, the Dialectical 
theory underlines the role of the managerial responses in the operation of generative mechanisms. In particular, 
we view the role of the platform owner as mediating the tensions and their impact on the digital platform 
ecosystem evolution. Thus, depending on the adopted managerial response, the resolution of the salient 
tensions can reinforce or transform the existing configuration of actors, architecture and governance.  
Teleological Theory of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
                                                            
10 Performance relates to actors; for details see Paper III. 
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As the Dialectical Theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution reveals the importance of the platform 
owner(s) for the operation of generative mechanisms, I turn to investigate the evolutionary process from 
strategic perspective. The resulting Teleological theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 14), 
based on Paper IV, Paper V and Paper VI, follows the initial conceptualization of generative mechanisms and 
further aims at understanding the role of platform owner for managing the evolutionary process. In particular, 
I focus on explaining how the goals set by platform owners and their execution drive the evolution of a digital 
platform ecosystem (see also Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).  
Recognizing that digital platform ecosystems operate in volatile and uncertain environment (Dattee et al., 
2017), which makes it difficult to predict their evolutionary path (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018), I argue that 
instead of relying on long-term goals and deliberate strategies to achieve them, platform owners rather focus 
on short-term goals and micro-strategies addressing pressing issues as they appear (Paper VI). By adopting a 
micro approach, this Teleological theory, when completed and supplemented with additional empirical 
evidence, also aims at moving away from presenting the platform owner as a collective and faceless actor. 
Instead, it sheds light into the actions of various strategic practitioners, collectively referred to as platform 
owner in the literature, who design micro-strategies and participate in the microstructures supporting them. 
When various strategic issues capture the attention of platform owners, triggered by internal and external 
events (see Paper IV and Paper V), owners respond by formulating specific short-term goals (Van de Ven and 
Poole, 1995), which require the design of micro-strategies and corresponding microstructures to support their 
execution (Figure 14). Thus, the cycle of setting a goal and pursuing its execution, triggered by specific 
external or internal events, constitutes the generative mechanism from teleological perspective (Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). The execution of the formulated goals leads to various outcomes, which impact the existing 
configuration of the digital platform ecosystem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Digital Platform Ecosystem 
 
Change Trigger 
Learning loop 
Management Response   
Goal 
Formulation 
Goal Execution 
Micro-strategy 
Microstructure 
Goal Outcome 
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Figure 14. Teleological Theory of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
When next challenge arises, the platform owner can respond by either adopting the same dyad of micro-
strategy and microstructure, or a new one. Due to existing learning loops, the platform owner can evaluate 
whether a specific dyad is suitable for achieving a given goal and to decide whether to retain the dyad when 
addressing subsequent strategic challenges (Paper VI).  For example, the inclusion of new distinct type of 
actors (e.g., merchants) in the ecosystem, as a result of previous transformative and actor-dominant generative 
mechanism (that is, change in actors types, see Table 8), serves as a trigger for the activation of an actor-
dominant and reinforcing generative mechanism (that is, change in actor population, ibid). While Punctuated 
Equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem states that, the change in actor population (e.g., adoption 
among merchants) as a generative mechanism reinforces the existing configuration of actors, architecture and 
governance and operates through various socio-technical interactions among the activated constructive 
elements of the ecosystem (Table 6), it does not fully demonstrate how this mechanism operates from 
teleological perspective.  
Thus, in contrast to the Punctuated Equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (see Paper II), 
which focuses on the overall socio-technical interactions within the ecosystem (see Table 6 above), the 
Teleological theory puts emphasis on the actions of the platform owner when it comes to strategizing, while 
also, of course, acknowledging the overall interactions within the ecosystem. For example, presenting the 
above generative mechanism from teleological perspective requires focusing on the platform owner’s 
aspirations to achieve fast adoption among the newly introduced type of actors (that is, more merchants joining 
the ecosystem) (goal formulation) (see Paper IV and Paper V). To achieve this goal, a platform owner, for 
example, can design a number of micro-strategies and corresponding microstructures. In particular, to stir 
initial adoption, platform owner can attract key merchants (that is marquee users), the inclusion of whom 
signals other merchants for the usefulness of the digital platform ecosystem (see Evans, 2009).  
3. Evolution of Digital Platform Ecosystem as Multi-Motor Process  
This PhD dissertation focuses on studying the evolution of digital platform ecosystems as complex, multi-
faceted and dynamic process. To this end, I, together with my co-authors, study this phenomenon from 
different theoretical perspectives, with different methods, and in different contexts. As a result, this research 
aims to propose three process theories, each outlining different generative mechanisms (or motors), which 
collectively explain how and why digital platform ecosystems evolve over time.  
While the Punctuated Equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution helps us portray the 
evolutionary path as constructed based on a network of concurrent and distributed generative mechanisms, 
which either reinforce or transform the deep structure of the ecosystem, the Dialectical theory presents the 
evolutionary process as being shaped by the appearance and resolution of tensions as generative mechanisms. 
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In addition, the Teleological theory views evolution as a cycle of goal setting and execution through micro-
strategies and corresponding microstructures (generative mechanisms), set in motion in response to various 
strategic challenges.  
While each theory advances our understanding of the evolutionary process on its own, they investigate separate 
aspects of the evolution, without providing comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon. Relying on 
single explanation, however, leads to “oversimplification and selective attention” (Van de Ven and Poole, 
1995, p. 526). To avoid potential oversimplification, I combine the findings of these three process theories, at 
the current stage of their development, and put forward a multi-motor explanation of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004).  
To develop such explanation, I revisit the initial conceptualization of generative mechanisms (see Figure 3) 
and, following the guidance provided by Van de Ven and Poole (1995), use the findings from the three process 
theories as building blocks to derive a multi-motor model of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 16). 
In addition, I also consult studies, which put forward dual-motor explanation of change in various research 
fields (see Cule and Robey, 2004; Lichtenstein et al., 2006).  
I consider a multi-motor explanation of digital platform ecosystem evolution to consist of two things. First, it 
needs to demonstrate how the identified generative mechanisms (or motors) collectively drive the evolutionary 
process through their interplay. Such an explanation is prescribed by the existing literature (see Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995), where scholars identify various motors (e.g., teleological and dialectical; see Cule and 
Robey, 2004) and demonstrate the interdependencies between them. As the different theories put emphasis on 
different aspects (e.g., Punctuated Equilibrium on triggers and on the impact on the existing deep structure, 
Dialectical on contradictions as constraining latent properties and their resolution through managerial 
responses, Teleological on goal setting and execution), each of them provides insights about specific aspects 
of the evolutionary process. Thus, a multi-motor explanation needs to address the inderdependencies between 
the various generative mechanisms. Second, to construct the multi-motor explanation (Figure 16), I build upon 
the interplay of generative mechanisms and combine it with other findings from the different process theories 
to demonstrate how generative mechanisms collectively drive the digital platform ecosystem evolution. 
Interplay between Multiple Generative Mechanisms 
Based on an empirical investigation in Paper II, we have provided a detailed account of a number of generative 
mechanisms as they occur during the evolution of a prominent digital platform ecosystem (see above, Table 
8). While, in Paper II, we focus mainly on outlining the dominance and impact of generative mechanisms, the 
subsequent investigation of generative mechanisms from dialectical and teleological perspective reveals 
certain overlapping.  
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Existing studies found that generative mechanisms of dialectical and teleological nature characterize 
Punctuated Equilibrium theory (see Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Similarly, by taking a closer look at the 
empirically identified generative mechanisms in Paper II (Table 8), I establish that some of them, depending 
on their contextualization, are of dialectical and teleological nature. Some of the identified generative 
mechanisms, for example, stem from inherent contradictions (e.g., renewal of platform core, which 
corresponds to performance contradiction in Paper III). Further, I found evidence that some of the actor-
dominant and transformative generative mechanisms, such as change in actor types, are of teleological nature. 
For example, the top management within Danske Bank decided to engage with other banks as financial 
partners, which transformed the existing deep structure of MobilePay ecosystem (see Paper II, Empirical 
Analysis). Thus, the platform owner played a significant role in initiating the change (goal formulation in the 
Teleological theory, see Figure 14), which indicates for a generative mechanism of teleological nature 
(Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).  
As generative mechanisms are rooted in the latent properties of the deep structure and contextualized further 
by the triggers, which set them in motion, I argue that whether a generative mechanism is of dialectic or 
teleological nature depends on its contextualization. Dialectical generative mechanisms, for example, stem 
from accumulated inherent contradictions, which constitute constraining latent properties of the deep structure 
(see Paper III). Teleological generative mechanisms, on the other hand, account for the role of the platform 
owner, as a key actor within the ecosystem, in initiating intentional change (Lichtenstein et al., 2006; Poole 
and Van de Ven, 2004) in response to internal and external events (e.g., resolving accumulated governance 
issues; see also Tan et al., 2015).  
Investigating further the empirically identified generative mechanisms (Table 8), I, however, have come across 
certain generative mechanisms, which are neither dialectical, nor teleological in nature. For example, although 
the development of platform periphery, which we categorize as architecture-dominant and transforming 
generative mechanism in Paper II, may seem to be initiated by the platform owner through its decision to 
introduce boundary resources (see Eaton et al., 2015), the subsequent reinforcing mechanism, related to the 
further development of the periphery, does not exhibit entirely teleological nature. For example, the 
development of the platform periphery usually follows no pre-established plan as third-party complementors 
may decide not to join the ecosystem regardless of the presence of boundary resources (West and Woodard, 
2014; Um and Yoo, 2016). We have also observed that the platform owner introduced boundary resources ad 
hoc, in response to demands from various ecosystem actors, rather than following a deliberate plan, which 
signals for lack of intention. Thus, while the platform owner can initiate the formation of a platform periphery, 
its subsequent development depends on the actions of third-party developers (see also West and Woodward, 
2014). Furthermore, the introduction of boundary resources may lead to dialectical tensions between platform 
owners and third-party developers (see, Eaton et al., 2015). It follows then that the development of platform 
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periphery as a generative mechanism may be of dialectical nature as well. In contrast to Eaton et al., (2015), 
however, we do not observe dialectical tensions or significant teleological drive in the activation and the 
operation of this particular generative mechanism. Thus, in the case we have empirically observed and 
analysed, the development of the periphery as a generative mechanism is neither of dialectical nor of 
teleological nature11.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
                                       
                                           
                                   Figure 15. Typology of Generative Mechanisms 
Regardless of their nature (dialectical, teleological or other), however, all generative mechanisms have a 
dominance (that is they are related to actors, architecture and governance of digital platform ecosystem) and 
impact (reinforcing or transforming) on the existing ecosystem configuration. Thus, by integrating the findings 
of the three theories, I further extend the proposed typology of generative mechanisms in Paper II, to include 
nature as another dimension, together with dominance and impact, which characterize generative mechanisms 
(see Figure 15). 
To tackle the interactions between the various generative mechanisms, Van de Ven and Poole (1995) 
recommend researchers to consider the cross-level relationship between them (nested, entangled and 
aggregated, see also Poole and Van de Ven, 2004), the forms of relations between them (e.g., direct, indirect 
or cyclical (ibid)), and the timing of their appearance and disappearance. Poole and Van de Ven (2004) argue 
                                                            
11 It is beyond the scope of this PhD dissertation to define further the nature of the generative mechanisms. It might seem intuitive to 
refer to them as evolutionary similar to Van de Ven and Poole (1995), however, that implies that these generative mechanisms are 
related to competition, which is not the case in that particular case.  
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that the cross-level relationship12 between the different generative mechanisms can be entangled, nested or 
aggregated. Nested relationship presupposes that generative mechanisms of high and low level interconnect 
strongly, while, in contrast, entangled mechanisms are those that influence each other (regardless of their 
level), but does not require strong interdependency (ibid). On the other hand, aggregated relationship 
presupposes the emergence of a high-level generative mechanism by aggregating several generative 
mechanisms of low level (ibid).  
As the digital platform ecosystem consists of specific configuration of actors, architecture and governance, 
which mutually influence each other (see Paper II), I define the relationship between actor-dominant, 
architecture- dominant and governance-dominant generative mechanisms (see Paper II) as entangled 
(consistent with the idea of generative mechanisms being distributed). As demonstrated in the Punctuated 
Equilibrium theory, actor-dominant generative mechanisms with transformative impact (e.g., change in actor 
types) also alter the ecosystem architecture and governance and may result in architecture-dominant generative 
mechanism with reinforcing impact (see Paper II, Empirical Analysis). Similarly, actor-dominant, reinforcing 
mechanisms (e.g., change in actor population) can also indirectly trigger architecture-dominant, transformative 
generative mechanisms (e.g., renewal of platform core). In addition, the same actor-dominant, reinforcing 
mechanisms (e.g., change in actor population) can also indirectly affect the activation of a governance-
dominant, reinforcing mechanism (e.g., customizing rules for actor types) (see also, Paper II, Empirical 
Analysis). Thus, while generative mechanisms operate independently, they can interact with other mechanisms 
(Poole and Van de Ven, 2004). 
The generative mechanisms also entangle to reinforce or transform the existing configuration of the deep 
structure. For example, a number of reinforcing mechanisms continue to operate in parallel with a 
transformation mechanism (see Paper II). For example, even though the platform owner decides to transform 
the existing deep structure of the ecosystem by renewing the platform core (architecture-dominant), both 
private and commercial customers continue to join the ecosystem (that is, change in actor population, which 
is an actor-dominant, reinforcing mechanism). Thus, while transformation mechanism may impact certain 
parts of the deep structure (e.g., architecture), other mechanisms continue to operate generating other aspects 
of it (e.g., actor).  
Pondering upon their nature, I also view generative mechanisms of teleological and dialectical nature as 
entangled given the fact that these mechanisms also have dominance and impact. For example, the inclusion 
of financial partners as part of the MobilePay ecosystem constitutes a generative mechanism (actor-dominant 
and transforming) of teleological nature, which also creates a dialectical tension with regards to the ownership 
                                                            
12 I do not view Digital Platform Ecosystems as multi-level phenomenon. Rather, they consists of actors, architecture and governance 
as separate, entangled constructive elements. Thus, in contrast to Poole and Van de Ven (2004), I do not adopt the idea of cross-level 
relationship between the generative mechanisms. I, however, view the generative mechanisms as entangled.  
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of MobilePay (Danske Bank vs other banks). To resolve this tension, Danske Bank transferred its ownership 
to MobilePay, which became a separate legal entity, a process we identify as an actor-dominant, reinforcing 
generative mechanism (that is, changing the role of the platform owner; see Table 8).  
Various relations between the generative mechanisms exist. The majority of the mechanisms relate directly to 
one another. For example, the inclusion of new types of actors (transformation mechanism, see Paper II) leads 
the platform owner to design and execute various adoption strategies (teleological mechanism, see Paper IV), 
which result in increase in the number of ecosystem actors (reinforcing mechanism, see Paper II). At the same 
time, this evolutionary outcome seeds inherent contradiction in the ecosystem configuration (e.g., 
performance), which, when combined with the presence of trigger (e.g. scarcity), may indirectly activate 
certain tension (conflict) as generative mechanism (e.g., renewal of platform core). The relations between 
mechanisms can also be cyclical. For example, in the Punctuated Equilibrium theory of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution, mechanisms with transformative impact precede those with reinforcing impact, which 
later other transformative mechanisms alter (see Paper II). 
Generative mechanisms also operate within certain temporal space (Poole and Van de Ven, 2004; see also 
Paper II). Transformative mechanisms, for example, disappear once they alter fundamentally the existing 
configuration of actors, architecture and governance, giving rise to reinforcing mechanisms. Reinforcing 
mechanisms, on the other hand, can operate in shorter span (e.g., standardization of boundary resources to 
foster the development of platform periphery, see Paper II) or can re-appear sporadically (e.g., improvement 
of functionalities) in alternated form (see Paper II, Discussion). Thus, some of the reinforcing mechanisms can 
continue operating in modified version over longer span. Furthermore, we found evidence that reinforcing and 
transformative mechanisms may overlap (for explanation, see Paper II, Discussion).  
There is no defined order in which transformative or reinforcing mechanisms with various dominance (actor, 
architecture, governance) appear during the evolutionary path of a digital platform ecosystem. For example, 
transformative mechanisms occurred with stable frequency during the evolutionary journey (see Paper II, 
Empirical Analysis). Furthermore, actor-dominant, architecture-dominant and governance-dominant 
mechanisms also appeared throughout the evolution of the selected case, following no distinct order (both 
initially and at later stages).  
Focusing on their nature, generative mechanisms of dialectical nature seem to appear at later stages of the 
evolution of the investigated digital payment platform ecosystem. For example, performance as inherent 
contradiction appeared after a substantial number of actors have joined the ecosystem and their populations 
had grown (ibid). Similarly, the resolution of accumulated governance issues, which is also dialectical in 
nature, occur at later stages of MobilePay evolution. It also seems that generative mechanisms of teleological 
nature appear throughout the evolutionary path of a digital platform ecosystem.  
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A Multi-Motor Explanation of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
While the separate theories outline the different generative mechanisms in play, they also focus on explaining 
particular aspects of the evolutionary process. For example, the Punctuated Equilibrium theory provides 
insights with regards to the dominance and impact of the mechanisms on the existing deep structure. Following 
the same logic, the Dialectical theory sheds light into the responses, which platform owner can rely on to 
manage salient tensions. Similarly, the Teleological theory not only tries to explain the evolution as a goal-
seeking behaviour, but also provides insights into the strategies and organizational structure undertaken by the 
platform owner when addressing a specific trigger. Thus, to strengthen further the multi-motor explanation of 
digital platform ecosystem evolution, I combine the main assumptions from the three theories in a 
comprehensive model (Figure 16).  
At any point in time, digital platform ecosystem consists of a particular configuration of actors, architecture 
and governance. This specific configuration determines the latent properties of the digital platform ecosystem 
(e.g., malleability, accumulated technology debt, increased usefulness to actors, and more), which can enable 
or constrain its ability to evolve and determine the nature and operation of the generative mechanisms.  
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                    Figure 16. Multi-motor Explanation of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution13 
During its evolutionary path, the digital platform ecosystem accumulates numerous incremental and 
transformative changes brought by various generative mechanisms (e.g. inclusion of new distinct types of 
actors; increase in the number of external complementors, etc.) which also alter the latent properties of the 
ecosystem. Although some changes aim at simplifying the existing configuration in an attempt to improve its 
functioning (e.g., removing underperforming functions, see Paper II), the complexity of the digital platform 
ecosystem increases as it matures.  
While some of the newly created latent properties act as enablers of digital platform ecosystem evolution (e.g., 
malleability), other properties act as constrainers (e.g., accumulated technology debt). With the increased 
complexity, various inherent contradictions, related to the actors, architecture and governance of the 
ecosystem, appear as part of the constraining latent properties of the existing ecosystem configuration (see 
Paper III). For example, while the inclusion of new types of actors increases the attractiveness to the ecosystem 
to other actors and thus improves the overall performance of the ecosystem, it also creates tensions, as the 
existing architecture may not be able to support the growth of actors, thus challenging the overall performance 
of the ecosystem. 
The existing configuration of actors, architecture and governance remains stable until various disruptive events 
challenge its current composition (Paper II). These events constitute change triggers, which activate certain 
generative mechanisms14. Throughout the separate studies, we outline a number of external and internal change 
triggers, which can activate different mechanisms. For example, external events, such as entry of new 
competitor or technology developments (Paper II), or internal events, such as performance issues (Paper II), 
conflicting heterogeneous interests (plurality) (Paper III) and the need to address specific strategic challenges 
(Paper IV and Paper V).  
Previously activated generative mechanisms can also trigger subsequent generative mechanisms (Bhaskar, 
1975; Poole and Van de Ven, 2004). For example, as the digital platform includes new distinct type of actors 
and thus transforms the existing configuration of the digital platform ecosystem (actor-dominant and 
transforming generative mechanism, Paper II), the introduction of new heterogeneous actors increases the 
possibility of conflicts with exiting actors (new latent property). If their interests diverge significantly, the 
tension between them become salient, which triggers the activation of new generative mechanism of dialectical 
nature (Paper III). Similarly, the inclusion of new actors can also lead to performance issues, as the initial 
composition of the architecture cannot support the increased volume of interactions. This leads to frequent 
architecture failures (internal events), which activate a transforming generative mechanism (Paper II).  
                                                            
13 The concurrent and distributed generative mechanism in the model are illustrative 
14 Not all events, however, constitute triggers as the platform owner can choose to neglect some of them and not respond. 
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We could not establish empirically a pattern between certain change triggers and the activation of specific 
generative mechanisms. Rather various internal and external events and generative mechanisms can set in 
motion different generative mechanisms (for more details; see Paper II, Discussion, The triggering of 
generative mechanisms). 
As digital platform ecosystems are complex phenomena consisting of various actors, modular IT architecture 
and complex governance regime, multiple change triggers compete for the attention of the platform owner all 
the time. As a result, multiple activated generative mechanisms are in play simultaneously affecting various 
aspects of the digital platform ecosystem (see also Poole and Van de Ven, 2004). Furthermore, the activated 
mechanisms can differ in terms of their dominance, impact and nature (see Figure 16). 
For illustrative purposes, in Figure 16, I have demonstrated the activated generative mechanisms in play during 
certain period, part of the evolutionary journey of a prominent digital payment platform ecosystem (June  2014 
- January 2015) (see also Paper II, Empirical Analysis, Table 5). During that period, the platform owner 
collaborated with platform technology providers, who wanted to join the growing platform ecosystem - a 
process, which constituted a transformative and actor-dominant mechanism. While this mechanism was in play 
(note that this mechanism resulted in transformation of the deep structure in January 2015), a number of 
reinforcing generative mechanisms with different dominance and of different nature were also present 
(between June 2014 – January2014), reinforcing previously introduced changes. For example, the platform 
owner needed to optimize the process through which commercial customers become part of the ecosystem, 
which is governance-dominant and reinforcing mechanism. Furthermore, it is also of dialectic nature as it 
stems from the inability of the existing processes to sustain the increased number of commercial customers 
wanting to join the ecosystem (salient tensions in connection to performance; see Paper III). The platform 
owner also improved the connectivity for third-party complementors, which is architecture-dominant and 
reinforcing, but has no dialectical or explicit teleological nature. Another reinforcing mechanism, 
customization of offerings for commercial customers, which is governance-dominant, was also active during 
this period. As its operation is a result of the goal-seeking behaviour of the platform owner (that is, improving 
adoption among commercial customers and securing revenue), this mechanism is of teleological nature.  
The reinforcing mechanisms in relation to commercial customers interact with a previously triggered 
reinforcing mechanism, namely adoption of commercial customers (for more, see Paper II, Empirical 
Analysis). Thus, as result of their activation and operation, it become easier for commercial customers to join 
the platform ecosystem. Some of the identified generative mechanisms, however, do not seem to interact 
directly with each other (e.g., customization of offerings for commercial customers and improved connectivity 
towards third-party complementors).  
As demonstrated in the findings of the Dialectical theory and Teleological theory, activated generative 
mechanisms often include involvement of the platform owner who manages and resolves salient tensions 
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(Dialectical) or directs the execution of a particular goal-seeking behaviour (Teleological). I further argue that 
all of the generative mechanisms (independent of their dominance, impact and nature) (see also Table 8) 
require active management from the platform owner, regardless of whether they were set in motion as a result 
of a goal-seeking behaviour. While generative mechanisms operate through the various socio-technical 
interactions between the activated constructive elements of a digital platform ecosystem, the platform owner 
plays a significant role, as a particular type of actor, in stirring and shaping these interactions (see Chapter II). 
Subsequently, throughout the operation of a particular generative mechanism, the platform owner formulates 
and designs specific micro-strategies and their corresponding microstructures to manage the operation of the 
mechanism itself (Figure 16). In cases where the activated generative mechanism is of dialectic nature, the 
platform owner can deploy specific responses, such as splitting, accommodating, synthesis, which I view as 
micro-strategies.  
The generative mechanisms, activated by triggers, characterized by dominance, impact and nature, and shaped 
by the platform owner, lead to certain evolutionary outcomes (that is, changes in the existing configuration of 
actors, architecture and governance) (see Figure 16). Depending on the nature of the introduced changes, 
generative mechanisms can have transformative or reinforcing impact on the existing ecosystem configuration. 
Thus, digital platform ecosystems evolve over time by continuous re-configuration of its actors, architecture 
and governance driven by a network of concurrent and distributed generative mechanisms.  
VIII Conclusion 
In this chapter, I outline the main theoretical contributions of this PhD dissertation and discuss implications 
for practitioners, which platform owners and managers can take into account during the evolutionary path of 
their digital platform ecosystems. In addition, I also outline the limitations of this research and propose possible 
avenues for future exploration, which can address the current shortcomings.  
This PhD dissertation focuses on explaining why and how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time. To 
this end, this research proposes the use of generative mechanisms as meta-theory, which allows for studying 
this phenomenon from different theoretical perspectives and through different methods. As a result, I, together 
with my co-authors, seek to propose three process theories (Punctuated Equilibrium, Dialectical and 
Teleological), which collectively explain the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. 
1. Theoretical Contribution 
Due to their inherent digital properties, which make them extensible, reprogrammable, edible (Tiwana, 2014) 
and which reduce the costs for their production, distribution and maintenance (Bakos, 1998, Hagiu and Wright, 
2011), digital platform ecosystems can evolve rapidly, in “compressed” manner (Tiwana, 2014). Furthermore 
by operating in dynamic and uncertain environment (Dattee et al., 2017), digital platform ecosystems also face 
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various internal and external challenges and opportunities on ongoing basis (Gawer, 2015; Tan et al., 2015). 
While existing research has advanced our understanding about this important process by addressing it from 
four different perspectives (see Chapter III), there is lack of sufficient knowledge about the triggers and 
mechanisms shaping the evolutionary process (de Reuver et al., 2017; Gawer, 2015; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). 
By investigating this important question, the PhD dissertation contributes to both the platform literature and to 
the application of generative mechanisms to socio-technical systems (see Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). 
Based on the findings from the six separate studies, this research advances the current platform literature, 
which comprises of studies dispersed across various fields, in several manners. First, it proposes an 
encompassing definition of digital platform ecosystems, which reflects their heterogeneity and takes into 
account the various perspectives through which scholars investigate this phenomenon. By doing so, we address 
the call by several researchers (de Reuver et al., 2018; Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014) to merge the existing 
fragmented perspectives and thus, clarify further the conceptualization of this phenomenon.  
Second, it contributes to an important, but currently under researched topic within the platform literature, 
namely the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. Apart from conceptualizing this process, we also go 
beyond the existing descriptive, fragmented findings in the platform literature by investigating the generative 
mechanisms, which drive digital platform ecosystems to evolve over time. In particular, we manage to address 
the concerns of researchers who state that existing research does not identify the mechanisms explaining why 
and how platform ecosystems evolve (de Reuver et al., 2018; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). In addition, we also 
answer calls for more research in connection to the triggers of platform ecosystem evolution (see de Reuver et 
al., 2018; Gawer, 2015).  
Answering the main RQ, I, together with my co-authors, argue that digital platform ecosystems evolve through 
the simultaneous operation of a number of generative mechanisms, characterized by different nature, 
dominance and impact, and triggered in response to various external and internal events. In addition, we further 
propose a typology of generative mechanisms (Figure 15) and a list of empirically identified generative 
mechanisms (Table 8). I further offer a multi-motor explanation of digital platform ecosystem evolution 
(Figure 16), which explains how the various identified generative mechanisms interplay to drive the digital 
platform ecosystem evolution (SQR1) and what role the platform owner has in managing the evolutionary 
process (SQR2). 
Addressing SQR1, I, together with my co-authors, offer three theories, each characterized by generative 
mechanism, which collectively explain the evolution of digital platform ecosystems (Figure 16). In particular, 
by taking into account the impact of internal and external events on the evolutionary path, we propose a 
Punctuated Equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution, which demonstrates how ecosystems 
evolve through a distributed and concurrent network of generative mechanisms, transforming or reinforcing 
the existing ecosystem configuration.  
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We further investigate how the appearance of tensions and their resolution as a form of generative mechanisms 
also drives the evolution of the digital platform ecosystem from dialectical perspective. Although digital 
platform ecosystems are ripe with tensions, few researchers have applied dialectics as a lens to study digital 
platform ecosystems (see Eaton et al., 2015; Wareham et al., 2014 as exceptions). Thus, by proposing a 
Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution, we aim to extend the current knowledge about the 
various tensions occurring within the ecosystem and their impact on the ecosystem evolution. 
Similarly, by drafting an initial version of Teleological theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (SRQ2), 
we look further into the role of the platform owner to formulate and execute strategies in response to internal 
and external events. In particular, we advocate for the adoption of a micro-perspective towards strategizing 
and organizational design through the development of micro-strategies and their corresponding 
microstructures, which platform owners can rely on when faced with various challenges and opportunities. 
Thus, we further advance research on strategizing within digital platform ecosystems, which is also nascent 
(Dattee et al., 2017; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2011; de Reuver et al., 2017). In particular, we also portray 
the platform owner beyond its usual presentation as a faceless actor. Instead, by adopting Strategy-as-Practice 
perspective, we recognize the role of various strategy practitioners, collectively referred to as platform owner, 
and the way they organize their activities to support emerging micro-strategies. 
Lastly, this PhD dissertation also develops further the conceptualization of generative mechanisms when 
applied to complex socio-technical systems. While Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) first adopt generative 
mechanisms to study the evolution of digital infrastructure as complex socio-technical systems, we further 
improve their conceptualization by focusing on their contextualization and by proposing a typology of 
mechanisms based on their dominance, impact on the evolutionary process, and nature (Figure 15). 
2. Implications for Practice 
Due to the nature of the PhD dissertation, conceived in close collaboration with practice, this research offers a 
number of implications for practitioners. First, we help platform owners grasp the complexity of the digital 
platform ecosystem evolution by providing a comprehensive account of the evolutionary process. In addition, 
we emphasize on its volatile and uncertain nature, which makes it difficult to predict the evolutionary 
trajectory. 
After spending three days per week for about two years at the case company, I witnessed that multiple issues 
concerning actors, architecture and governance demand the attention of the employees simultaneously. To be 
able to estimate the impact of various events on the evolutionary journey (transformative or reinforcing), 
platform owners (and employees) need to understand how these events can trigger various generative 
mechanisms, which produce certain evolutionary outcomes. Thus, this research draws the attention of the 
platform owner to the various generative mechanisms, activated by different triggers, which impact the existing 
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configuration of actors, architecture and governance. The findings of this research also caution platform 
owners against prioritizing one constructive element over the other (that is, actors, architecture and 
governance). As actors, architecture and governance entangle, changes in each one of them often affect the 
other two.  
Furthermore, by proposing Teleological theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution, this research 
demonstrates how platform owner can manage the evolutionary process and thus shape the final evolutionary 
outcome. In particular, we state that platform owners should rely on micro-strategies and their corresponding 
microstructures to manage the evolutionary process (Paper VI). We also propose the Reach and Range 
framework (Paper IV), which platform owners can use when facing various strategic issues as part of their 
evolutionary journey. We further identify potential tensions, which the platform owner needs to be aware of 
and propose a number of response strategies for managing the conflicts when they escalate (see Paper III).  
In addition, as I followed the principles of engaged scholarship (see Chapter V), I immersed myself in the day-
to-day work of the case company (MobilePay). As an active member of the Concepts team, I participated in 
the delivery of several tasks (see Chapter V) and provided input for a number of other tasks and projects based 
on my knowledge and expertise. I also shared insights from my research work with relevant stakeholders 
within the company. As a result of this exchange, the Concepts team developed and launched a new 
application, WeShare, in June 2016, which allows private customers of MobilePay to create and settle group 
expenses. The application, which connects tightly to the MobilePay platform core, constitutes an internal 
complement, offered by the platform owner, as part of the platform periphery.  
3. Limitations 
This research is not without limitations. While we concentrate on explaining digital platform ecosystem 
evolution, we mostly focus on one particular context (exception Paper I and Paper III), namely that of digital 
payment platform ecosystems (see Chapter V, Research Setting). Digital platform ecosystems, however, are 
heterogeneous and operate in various contexts (see Chapter I, Introduction), which we did not take into 
account. Furthermore, we rely on one longitudinal single case study, rooted in the digital payment context 
(Paper II), to identify various generative mechanisms. We, however, try to generalize the findings (see Table 
8) and claim that they are applicable to other research settings. We urge other researchers to identify and 
compare generative mechanisms for digital platform ecosystem evolution across various contexts.  
In addition, despite outlining a Teleological theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution, which is currently 
not completed, we do not provide enough empirical evidence to support it further (Paper VI is research in 
progress). In particular, while we demonstrate empirically the suitability of the proposed model in Paper VI, 
at this stage, we do not identify micro-strategies and microstructures in relation to it based on empirical 
analysis. 
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4. Future Research   
While the findings of this PhD dissertation advance the existing research by addressing important research 
gaps (see above), it also opens avenues for future research. In particular, researchers can try to apply our 
conceptualization of generative mechanisms in other contexts in order to compare and contrast our findings. 
Due to the heterogeneity of the digital platform ecosystems and the contextualization of generative 
mechanisms, we expect the evolution of various platform ecosystems to consist of different generative 
mechanisms. We also urge researchers to try to identify additional generative mechanisms, which complement 
the set of already identified ones. 
Furthermore, researchers should also investigate cases where digital platform ecosystems fail to evolve (de 
Reuver et al., 2017). Explaining such failure may include lack of ability to activate generative mechanisms, or 
inadequate managerial responses to various strategic issues. By outlining how and why ecosystems fail to 
evolve in the right direction or at the right speed (Tiwana, 2014), future research can shed light on the nature 
of activated but unrealized generative mechanisms, which can enrich further our understanding of their role as 
drivers of digital platform ecosystem evolution.  
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X Appendix 
 
Overview of the Platform Literature  
Researchers have studied digital platforms and their ecosystems from two different theoretical perspectives, 
namely economic and engineering (Gawer, 2014; Thomas et al., 2014). Both the economic and engineering 
research streams emerged in the early 2000s and have developed over the years in parallel. While the economic 
stream has its roots in network economics (Rochet and Tirole, 2003), the engineering stream stems from 
product innovation research (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Almost two decades after the initial publications, 
platform research remains dispersed across various fields - from economics, innovation, and organization 
studies to strategic management and information systems (Wan et al., 2017). The isolated and fragmented 
development of the research streams has led to different definitions, with emphasis on different characteristics 
and the investigation of different topics (see, de Reuver et al., 2017).  
1. Economic Perspective  
From economic view, researchers investigate platforms as two-sided (or multi-sided) markets (see, e.g., Bakos, 
1998; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001; Evans 2009; Hagiu 2006, 2014; Rochet and Tirole 2003). While two-sided 
markets have existed for centuries (Evans and Schamalensee, 2010; Hagiu, 2006), in late 1990s researchers 
from three different fields (payments, information economy and media studies) began to note down the 
characteristics of this important economic phenomenon (Roson, 2005). The emergence of information 
economy facilitated by new information technologies led to the rise of electronic marketplaces, where various 
actors interact to transfer goods and services (Bakos, 1998; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001).  
Definition 
Building upon early work on markets with network effects (e.g, Shapiro and Varian, 1999), in late 1990s, a 
number of researchers focused on this new form of intermediation (also referred to as informational or cyber 
intermediation; see Caillaud and Jullien, 2001), which utilizes technology to “process, select and use 
information on a population of agents” (ibid, p. 799). In particular, these electronic intermediaries are built 
around “software platforms” (Evans et al., 2006), who support the functioning of a two-sided (or multi-sided) 
market. In parallel to this work, researchers investigating the anti-trust regulation of payment cards (see, e.g., 
Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Wright, 2004) also drew attention to two-sided markets as they concluded that 
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payment cards, as a form of two-sided markets, exhibit different characteristics, which make traditional anti-
trust regulation inapplicable to them (Roson, 2005). Apart from electronic marketplaces or exchanges, 
researchers also identify other forms of two-sided markets, both physical and digital, such as video games, 
payment cards, operating systems, social media, newspapers, shopping malls, crowdfunding, and more (Evans 
et al., 2006; Hagiu, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2000), thus extending the scope of the two-sided 
market literature.  
Early research defines two-sided markets in terms of their ability to mediate (or match) the interactions 
between various types of participants (Bakos, 1998; Caillaud and Jullien, 2001; Kaplan and Sahwney, 2000; 
Rochet and Tirole, 2004; Roson, 2005). Such broad definition presupposes that all markets characterized by 
network effects are also two-sided markets. Observing this, Rochet and Tirole (2003) argue that not all markets 
with network externalities are two-sided and as a result try to narrow the scope of the two-sided market theory. 
Building upon the literature on network externalities and on multi-product pricing, Rochet and Tirole (2004) 
offer a definition, which does not look solely at the presence and nature of network effects, but also 
incorporates pricing structure as key characteristic of two-sided markets. Thus, they define two-sided markets 
in terms of their ability to “affect the volume of transactions by charging more to one side of the market and 
reducing the price paid by the other side by an equal amount” (Rochet and Tirole, 2004, p. 40). As a result, 
when a two-sided market exists, there should be an interdependency between pricing and user participation 
(Roson, 2005; Wright, 2004). 
Although pricing structures are important characteristics of two-sided markets (see, Rochet and Tirole, 2004; 
2006), they are not central in later definitions of this phenomenon. Dismissing the existing definitions as 
characterized by “too excessive specificity, over-inclusiveness, or being too vague to be of use” (p. 4), Hagiu 
and Wright (2011) try to define multi-sided platforms in opposition to existing business models, such as 
resellers and suppliers. Considering the presence of network effects and pricing as not sufficiently distinct 
characteristics of multi-sided platforms, they propose direct interaction and affiliation as two key aspects of 
multi-sided platforms. Thus, Hagiu and Wright (2011) define multi-sided platforms as facilitating the ‘direct 
interactions among the affiliated to the platform various groups of actors’.  
The purpose of multi-sided platforms is to enable the matching between the platform participants (e.g., buyers 
and sellers), to facilitate the transactions between them in terms of logistics, settlement and curation, and to 
provide the relevant infrastructure, which includes the rules governing the interactions (Bakos, 1998; Hagiu, 
2006; Parker et al., 2016).  
Topics 
The economic stream of the platform literature deals with a wide variety of topics - from platform pricing and 
competition to platform design and efficiency, launch and growth strategies and regulation.  
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Platform Pricing 
Building upon network economics, researchers initially focused on studying optimal pricing (Caillaud and 
Jullien, 2001; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Weyl, 2006). Establishing suitable pricing model is essential as pricing 
affects usage (Roson, 2005) and constitutes an important mechanism for addressing inter-platform competition 
(Armstrong, 2006; Roson, 2005; Weyl, 2006). Due to the two-sided (or multi-sided) nature, establishing a 
pricing strategy for platforms prove to be a difficult task as the pricing model needs to take into account the 
interdependencies between the platform participants (Hagiu, 2014; Roson, 2005). Platform owners, for 
example, need to determine carefully which group of participants to subsidize and from which to receive 
revenue (Evans, 2012; Hagiu, 2014; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Pricing decisions also require choosing which 
pricing mechanisms (membership and usage fees) to use given the specific context (e.g., Caillaud and Jullien, 
2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2004).  
Platform Competition 
The economic stream of platform literature also focuses on different forms of competition, such as inter-
platform competition (between two or more platforms), intra-platform competition (or competition within 
platform participants) and competition between platform participants and platform owner (see, e.g. Caillaud 
and Jullien, 2003; Cennamo and Santalo, 2013; Parker and van Alstyne, 2008; Rochet and Tirole, 2003). 
Unlike traditional firms, competition in platform context is multidimensional as platform owners can compete 
with any distinct type of participants (e.g. users and merchants) (Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006; Roson, 2005; 
Seamans and Zhu, 2017). In addition, platform owners can rely on a number of responses when facing 
competition – from aggressive and defensive moves, which intensify competition, to fostering collaboration 
(Gawer and Henderson, 2007).  
Launch and Adoption 
Researchers from the economic stream also discuss at large the launch of two-sided markets and their 
subsequent adoption. To successfully evolve, platform owner needs to achieve a critical mass of participants 
(Evans, 2009; Evans and Schmalensee, 2010). Depending on the initial platform design, platform owners need 
to attract either one distinct group of participants (one-sided platforms) or two groups (two-sided platforms) 
from the onset. In the latter case, the platform owner needs to solve the famous chicken-and-egg problem by 
getting simultaneously on board all relevant platform actors (e.g., Evans, 2009; Rochet and Tirole, 2003), 
which proves to be a challenging task. In general, platform adoption is a cumbersome process, influenced by 
a number of factors, such as network effects, and behaviour and preferences of platform participants (Evans 
and Schmalensee, 2010). 
To encourage initial adoption, platform owners can rely on a number of strategies. For example, instead of 
trying to coordinate simultaneously two distinct groups of actors, owners can adopt a zig-zag strategy (see, 
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Evans, 2009), with emphasis on sequential entry of the different groups of participants (Hagiu, 2006). Platform 
owners can also subsidize platform participants, who provide value for other participants by offering free 
functionalities and even paying them (Hagiu, 2006; Rochet and Tirole, 2004). Providing information or 
technical support can also constitute a form of subsidy (Parker and van Alstyne, 2008). Platform owners can 
also initially develop their platforms by providing their own services until the achievement of critical mass and 
later let external complementors to innovate (Hagiu and Eisenmann, 2007).  
Platform Design, Efficiency and Governance 
The economic stream of platform literature investigates the design of two-sided platforms, which is vital for 
determining the platform’s optimal efficiency. Platform design, which purpose is to facilitate the coordination 
of exchange between platform participants (Evans, 2012), reflects choices about the number and type of 
platform participants and about the functionalities, which they need in order to derive value from using the 
platform (Hagiu, 2014).  
The specific platform design can both promote and inhibit the optimal functioning of a platform either 
voluntarily or involuntarily (Evans, 2012). Inappropriate conduct from platform actors, for example, creates 
negative externalities for other participants and for the platform owner alike by reducing the overall platform 
value (Evans, 2012). Examples of such externalities are congestion, fraud, misrepresentation, information 
asymmetry, reduced quality of complementors - all of which jeopardize efficient platform interaction (Evans, 
2012; Halaburda and Yekehezel, 2013). At the same time, platform owner can also create more benefits for 
one distinct group of participants over another as result of its design decisions (that is, including functionalities, 
which are beneficial only for certain types of platform participants; e.g., layout of shopping mall or magazines) 
(Evans and Schmalensee, 2016). 
While public regulators sanction platform owner’s misbehaviour, the latter can prevent and punish the harmful 
behaviour of the platform participants. Thus, owners can act as ‘licensing authority’ (Rochet and Tirole, 2004) 
or ‘private regulator’ (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Evans, 2012) by setting relevant rules and processes. Apart 
from pricing tools, platform owners rely on a number of other measures (e.g., ‘technical, informational, legal’, 
p. 164) for controlling the access to the platform, the scope of the enabled through it interactions, and the 
conduct of the platform participants (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009).  
Public Regulation 
Researchers point out that due to their specific nature, two-sided markets challenge the boundaries of 
traditional regulation (Evans, 2012; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016). Early work on anti-trust investigation in the 
context of payment cards (e.g., interchange fees) (see, Evans, 2002; Roson, 2005) and information economy 
(e.g., anti-trust investigation against Microsoft) (see, Eisenmann et al., 2006) clearly demonstrates that 
traditional economic models do not apply to two-sided markets (Evans and Scmalensee, 2016; Rochet and 
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Tirole, 2003). Platform pricing as a sign of potential market power abuse constitutes one of the key 
considerations of early anti-trust investigations. Due to the interdependence between distinct groups of actors, 
platform owner identifies subsidy side, where prices are below marginal costs, at zero or sometimes even 
negative, and revenue side, to where costs are allocated (Evans, 2003; Roson, 2005).  
Apart from pricing decisions, regulators also investigate closely other activities of platform owners and 
participants alike. As result of their market-making abilities (Evans, 2003), platforms can create new 
opportunities for certain market actors, while at the same time diminishing the welfare of actors outside the 
platform ecosystem (e.g., Airbnb and Uber) (see, Hagiu, 2006). Certain measures to maintain platform value 
creation (such as restricting access or enveloping external complements) can also constitute anti-competitive 
behaviour (e.g., Parker et al., 2016). Collaborating with external contributors in the form of mergers or in the 
form of partner agreements preventing participants to compete with an ecosystem’s partners may also restrict 
competition (e.g., Eaton et al., 2015; Evans, 2012).  
2. Engineering Perspective 
Early researchers belonging to the engineering perspective focus on studying physical product platforms in the 
1990s (see, e.g., Robertson and Ulrich, 1998; Spagnoletti et al., 2015; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Initially 
rooted in the field of industrial innovation management and product development, scholars investigated the 
process of turning a product into a platform through mainly architectural changes and the opportunities, which 
such transformation enables. Similar to the economic perspective, the introduction of digitization led to a shift 
in platform thinking with researchers studying technology platform as assemblage between hardware and 
software (Boudreau, 2010; 2012) or as software (digital) platforms (see, e.g., de Reuver et al., 2017; 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana, 2014).  
Definitions 
Different definitions exist within the engineering stream of the platform literature (de Reuver et al., 2017; 
Gawer, 2014). Early researchers apply the term “platform” to product development. The origin of the term 
“product platform” traces back to Wheelwright and Clark (1992) who emphasize on the malleable nature of 
new types of physical products that allow for “easy modification into derivatives through the addition, 
substitution, or removal of features” (p. 73). Building upon this initial definition, Baldwin and Woodward 
(2009) define platform as “a set of stable components that supports variety and evolvability in a system by 
constraining the linkages among the other components” (p. 3).  
While these definitions focus on architectural components, some researchers recognize the commonalty with 
other aspects of the platform. Robertson and Ulrich (1998), for example, define product platform as “collection 
of assets that are shared by a set of products”. These assets encompass components, processes, knowledge, and 
people and their relations (ibid). While Gawer and Cusumano (2002) retain to some extent the architectural 
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view as they define platforms as “an evolving system made of interdependent pieces that can each be innovated 
upon” (p. 2–3), they also emphasize on the importance of various social and organizational elements. In 
particular, they argue that for a platform to become a platform leader, it needs to focus not only on the 
architecture of the platform but also on building relations with third-party contributors and on making decisions 
about the scope of the platform and the structure of the internal organization, which supports it.   
Apart from product platforms, Gawer (2009) observes the emergence of different types of platforms. While 
product platforms exist internally within a firm (internal platforms), supply chain platforms allow for partners 
in the supply chain to create their own products derived from shared systems. Industry platforms help external 
firms create their own complementaries by leveraging the core platform provided by one focal firm (Gawer, 
2009). As Gawer (2009) points out firms in the industry platforms, unlike supply chain platforms, do not 
necessarily have any buyer-seller relationship or share ownership. The industry platforms form an ecosystem 
of firms in order to harness the innovation potential of external complementors.  
With the growing importance of digitization, researchers also turned their attention to technology platforms. 
Boudreau (2010), for example, defines technology platform as including “physical components, tools and rules 
to facilitate development, a collection of technical standards to support interoperability, or any combination of 
these things” (p. 1851). Similarly, West and Wood (2013), emphasizing on the role of the technical architecture 
(see also, West 2003), state the platform owners should provide standardized components in order to ensure 
the “vibrant supply of third party complements (‘‘software’’) that makes a product (‘‘hardware’’) more 
valuable” (p. 28).  
The continuous and wide-spread digitization, characterized by convergence of technologies (see, e.g., Yoo et 
al., 2010) however, blurred the boundary between hardware and software platforms. Thus, researchers later on 
focused on studying solely digital platforms (or software platforms). Tiwana et al. (2010) define software-
based (or digital) platforms as “extensible codebase of a software-based system that provides core functionality 
shared by the modules that interoperate with it and the interfaces through which they interoperate” (p. 676). In 
a similar manner, Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010) state that platforms “provide thus a (semi)-closed, and highly 
complex suite of IT capabilities, which, thanks to the original architecting, can be extended” (p. 4).  
Later, researchers building upon the work on industry platforms (see, Gawer, 2009) and software platforms, 
begin to distinguish between digital platforms and digital platform ecosystems (see, e.g., Ceccagnoli et al., 
2012; Eaton et al., 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). Digital 
platform ecosystems, in particular, consist of the digital platform itself designed, offered and controlled by the 
platform owners and by a myriad of external to it complements designed, offered and controlled by external 
complementors (see, e.g., Parker and van Alstyne, 2008; Tiwana, 2014; Yoo et al., 2010). 
Topics 
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Researchers from the engineering perspective concentrate on investigating issues related to platform 
architecture, platform openness and governance, and platform innovation. 
Platform Architecture 
Platform architecture is key topic in the engineering stream of the platform literature, with platform 
architecture being at the centre of all platform definitions (see above). Despite their heterogeneity (internal, 
supply chain and industry platforms; see Gawer, 2009), Baldwin and Woodward (2009) argue that all types of 
platforms possess similar architecture, characterized by certain degree of modularity. In particular, they define 
platform architecture as “a set of stable components that supports variety and evolvability in a system by 
constraining the linkages among the other components” (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009, p. 3). Extending 
further this definition, they point out that platform architecture consists of a stable core, which enables the 
emergence of a large number of complements around it, with the latter forming the platform periphery 
(Baldwin and Woodward, 2009). A specific design hierarchy, influenced by design rules (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000) guides the relations between platform core and periphery. Design rules, for example, prescribe the 
decomposition of the system to a number of interdependent sub-systems (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Baldwin 
and Woodward, 2009). An example of such a design rule is the interface characteristics, which set the interplay 
between given components in the platform core and periphery (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009).  
Yoo et al. (2010), however, state that modular platform architecture largely discards the novel properties 
afforded by the adoption of digital technologies. In particular, they argue that modularity presupposes fixed 
platform design, which only leads to incremental scope of platform innovation (Yoo et al., 2010). Instead, they 
argue for a layered modular architecture, which reflects the design of physical products combined with 
capabilities delivered by digital technologies (Yoo et al., 2010). Thus, layered modular architecture advocates 
for taking into account four distinct layers: ‘devices, networks, services and contents’ (ibid). While modular 
layered architecture is similar to previous modular architecture in terms of loose coupling between platform 
core and platform periphery, it also significantly differs in terms of its undetermined product scope, multiple 
design hierarchies, and universal components utilized by a myriad of heterogeneous firms (ibid). Modular 
layered architecture, which enables generativity, also stays incomplete unlike modular product architecture, 
which is predominantly static (ibid).  
The majority of the research on digital platforms from the engineering perspective, however, builds upon the 
modular product architecture combined with generativity instead of concentrating on the layered modular 
architecture (see, e.g., Gawer, 2014; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tilson et al., 2010; Um and Yoo, 2016). Thus, a 
digital platform allows for an ecosystem of actors to emerge around it. Boundary resources, such as APIs and 
SDKs, grant access to core platform functionalities and allow for the building of third-party applications by 
extending the initial use of the platform core (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). 
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Platform Openness and Governance  
Another central topic in the engineering stream of platform literature is platform openness and the implications 
it has for governance. As discussed below, openness, for example, fosters platform generativity, and thus 
innovation (see, e.g. Boudreau, 2010; 2012). Similar to platform architecture, platform openness as a concept 
has transformed over time. Initially researchers refer to platform openness as a general term, which is often 
defined in opposition to platform closeness (see, e.g., Boudreau, 2010). Later, platform openness became a 
nuanced and encompassing term (Boudreau, 2010; Parker et al., 2016). West (2003), for example, presents 
platform openness as a ‘continuum’ and argues that a platform can never be fully open, or fully closed. Building 
upon this, Boudreau (2010) proposes that platforms remain partially open as the platform owner retains its 
ownership and control over key platform components even if the platform is open. He further distinguishes 
between two types of platform openness, namely allowing access to the platform core and providing access to 
complements in the platform periphery (ibid). Thus, researchers discuss platform openness in terms of degree 
or continuum (see also, Benlian et al., 2015; Ondrus et al., 2015). Recently, researchers also try to define 
platform openness in relation to the interpretaton of external complementors about the level of platform 
openness. Benlian et al. (2015), for example, treat platform openness as a complex construct consisting of 
third-party developers’ perception about, on one hand, transparency of and accessibility to the platform’s core 
resources, and development and distribution of complements, on the other.  
Various governance issues arise as result of the platform owner’s decision to open the platform for external 
participation. Often these issues intensify and turn into conflicts due to the inherent power asymmetry between 
the platform owner and various platform participants (e.g., third-party complementors, marquee users, etc.). 
Platform owner, for example, retains ownership over the platform and as result determines the rules of access 
and participation (Boudreau, 2010; Evans, 2012). This can put other platform participants in less favourable 
position and jeopardize their own interests (see, e.g., Gawer and Henderson, 2007). Such tensions require the 
platform owner to carefully manage certain trade-offs. One of the major trade-offs, which platform owner 
faces, is between nurturing diverse platform participation while retaining sufficient levels of control 
(Boudreau, 2010). This trade-off is framed in several manners – for example, diversity vs control (Bodreaux, 
2010), control vs autonomy (Tiwana, 2014), and control vs generativity (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013).  
Openness presupposes that a platform owner relaxes its tight grip over the platform and share control with 
other platform participants at different levels (see, Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann et al., 2009), but this also leads 
to change in the power asymmetry and also affects the returns for the platform owner (Boudreau, 2010). Apart 
from jeopardizing the interests of the platform owner, decentralized control can also influence the level of 
external contribution and hence platform adoption (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana et al., 2010). 
High level of control can stifle generativity, while lack of any control spurs disproportionate variety and 
fragmentation (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Yoo et al., 2010). Thus, a platform owner needs to achieve “just-
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right” level of control (Tiwana et al., 2010, p. 679; see, also Wareham et al., 2014). On the other hand, Tiwana 
et al. (2010) study control in opposition to autonomy. They argue that while the platform owner should retain 
certain level of control, it should also grant autonomy to platform participants by sharing decision rights with 
them about relevant functionalities and their actual implementation. Thus, platform control becomes 
distributed across a myriad of platform participants (Tilson et al., 2010). Eisenman et al. (2009), for example, 
recommend a combined governance regime where the platform owner retains decision rights over the core 
platform technology, while allows other providers to establish relations with the demand-side and supply-side 
participants.  
Platform Innovation  
Platforms serves as “stable nexus or foundation” (Boudreau, 2010, p. 1851) around which external 
complements emerge, thus fostering platform innovation. The formation of such ecosystem is contingent upon 
the properties of the platform architecture. A number of researchers point out the differences between 
innovations enabled by modular architecture and architecture that supports generativity (see, e.g., Yoo, 2013; 
Um and Yoo, 2016). The difference is mainly in the way architecture is constructed. Both modularity and 
generativity facilitate innovation through recombination of components (Yoo, 2013). Modularity, however, 
allows for decomposition of an already completed system, while generativity extends an existing system in an 
unexpected ways, thus making it incomplete (Yoo, 2013; Yoo et al., 2010).   
Instead of innovating on its own, however, platform owners rely on the innovation potential of a myriad of 
external actors (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). Thus, innovation is distributed (Selander et al., 2013; 
Yoo et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2012) among actors with heterogeneous knowledge such as third-party content 
creators and complementors, who may form specific online communities (Yoo et al., 2010). Further, external 
developers are not one group, but rather encompass various types (heterogeneity) – from freelancers and 
entrepreneurs to enterprise developers (see, e.g., Selander et al., 2013; West and Wood, 2014). The variety of 
developers, who have their own interests and capabilities, which can diverge (Almirall and Casadesus-
Masanell, 2010; Selander et al., 2013), influences differently their level of participation (Benlian et al., 2015).  
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Abstract 
How do Multi-Sided Platforms (MSPs) evolve over time? Although MSPs are perceived as 
highly evolvable socio-technical systems, Platform Evolution remains an elusive topic in the 
MSP literature with many unanswered questions. In particular, Platform Evolution (PE) as a 
concept has not been explicitly defined in the MSP literature. Rather, there is multiplicity of 
views, which contributes to the lack of conceptual clarity. In order to address this shortcoming, 
we put forward a new, integrated conceptualization of PE as a complex, multi-faceted and 
dynamic process. Rather than proposing yet another view on PE, we adopt a “concept 
reconstruction” approach, which allows us to integrate the existing work on PE in a coherent 
manner, and to propose a comprehensive conceptualization of PE. 
 
Keywords:  Multi-Sided Platforms, Platform Evolution, Hermeneutic Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
 
Multi-Sided Platforms (MSPs), which function as complex socio-technical systems that enable interactions 
between various affiliated constituencies through developing and managing an underlying infrastructure, have 
emerged as some of the most powerful and valuable business models around (Hagiu and Wright 2011, 2013). 
Just consider that sixteen out of the twenty-five most valuable brands for 2014, as pronounced by BrandZ Top 
100, function as MSPs (Taube 2014). Yet, despite their increased importance, our knowledge of this 
phenomenon remains scant as the existing literature on MSPs fails to capture its complexity, with many 
important problems being understudied (Thomas et al. 2014; Sriram et al. 2014). 
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Platform Evolution (PE), for example, has remained an elusive topic in the MSP research, with only few 
models and prescriptions guiding the platform throughout its evolution (Gawer 2014). Although early work on 
MSPs view platforms as being static, a growing number of researchers recognize MSPs as evolving entities 
(Eck et al. 2015; Gawer 2014; Smedlund and Faghankhani 2015; Tiwana 2014). Understanding the 
evolutionary path of MSPs, and the changes, which such a journey brings is of importance in order to ensure 
the long-term success and survival of MSPs (see, e.g., Han and Cho 2015; Smedlund and Faghankhani 2015; 
Tan et al. 2016). Indeed, as Hagiu (2014) points out MSPs that manage to become successful in the long term 
are rather a rare phenomenon. Although this is partially attributed to failures in the initial design of MSPs and 
ill-planned ignition strategies (see, Evans 2009), the platform’s inability to evolve over time also influences 
its vitality (Tiwana 2014). 
Despite the importance of this topic, researchers have failed to capture the complexity of PE (Gawer and 
Cusumano 2007). In particular, PE as a concept has never been explicitly defined in the MSP literature. Rather, 
scholars have investigated the phenomenon under different terms (e.g., platform development (Ruutu et al. 
2017; Watanabe et al. 2017), platform expansion (Hagiu 2006), platform evolution (Tiwana 2014), etc.). They 
have also studied various aspects of PE in fragmented manner, without providing a comprehensive 
understanding of MSPs’ evolutionary paths. Thus, we formulate the following research question (RQ): 
How do MSPs evolve over time? 
To address this RQ, we propose a new, integrated conceptualization of PE as a complex, multi-faceted and 
dynamic process. Rather than introducing yet another view and thus, diluting the concept of PE even further, 
we aim to “reconstruct” it by limiting the present concept stretching (Welch et al. 2016). To do that, we review 
the existing research in order to identify the various views on PE and further test empirically whether these 
perspectives can fully capture the evolutionary path of a MSP. Based on our exhaustive literature review and 
empirical investigation of exemplary MSPs, we put forward a general model, which, in our view, depicts the 
essence of PE. 
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we outline the theoretical foundations of this paper. We, then, present 
the methodology we use to carry out our study. As a next step, we introduce the results of the conducted 
exhaustive literature review and the subsequent empirical investigation of the selected case studies. In the final 
sections of the paper, we discuss our findings, offer some conclusions and suggest promising areas for further 
research.  
Multi-Sided Platforms  
 
The literature on MSPs has studied platforms from two different theoretical perspectives. Under the economic 
perspective, MSPs are investigated as two-sided markets (Evans 2009; Hagiu 2006, 2014; Rochet and Tirole 
2003). Most of the researchers’ efforts in this stream are focused on designing pricing strategies (Rochet and 
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Tirole 2003, Weyl 2006) and investigating strategies for achieving same-side and cross-side network effect, 
platform envelopment and platform design (Eisenmann et al. 2011, Evans 2009; Hagiu 2006, 2014). Platforms 
are also studied as technological architectures (Gawer and Cusumano 2007), which can be modular (Baldwin 
and Woodard 2009) or layered (Yoo et al. 2012). The technological view on MSPs puts emphasis on 
investigating the platforms’ architecture as consisting of core and periphery (Gawer 2014; Staykova and 
Damsgaard 2015), the recombination of which facilitates platform innovation (Gawer and Cusumano 2007; 
Tiwana et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2012). Researchers belonging to either of the two MSP streams have also delved 
into common topics such as platform-based ecosystems (Ceccagnoli et al. 2011, Cennamo and Santalo 2013, 
Isckia and Lescop 2013, Tiwana et al. 2010), platform business models (Eisenmann et al. 2011, Evans 2013, 
Hagiu 2014, Tiwana 2014) and platform governance (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009; Hagiu 2014; Tiwana 2014). 
Bridging the economic and technological perspectives on MSPs, Gawer (2014) proposes a new 
conceptualization of MSPs as evolving organizations or meta-organizations that coordinate multiple agents 
and are characterized by modular architecture. Building upon this, we investigate MSPs as socio-technical 
entities, which facilitate the interactions between various affiliated constituencies through developing and 
managing of an underlying infrastructure (Eaton et al. 2015, Hagiu and Wright 2011).  
Method 
 
Concepts are foundational elements of theory creation (Welch et al. 2016) and constitute the “basic unit of 
thinking” (Sartori 1984, p. 74). They are characterized by certain level of abstraction and thus observable only 
through set of shared attributes or characteristics (Gerring 1999, Posdakoff et al. 2016, Sartori  1984; Welch 
et al. 2016). To conceptualize Platform Evolution, we adopt pragmatist-interactionist approach to concept 
reconstruction, proposed by Welch et al. (2016), which incorporates investigation of the usage of the PE 
concept in the existing literature and empirical exploration of the manner in which MSPs evolve. While the 
conducted literature review is used for identifying and clustering the attributes (or characteristics) related to 
PE, the subsequent empirical investigation is to inquire about the suitability and accuracy with which these 
attributes portray the complex nature of PE. We also utilize some of the prescriptions put forward from 
Podsakoff et al. (2016) for identification and analysis of the related to the concept attributes. As a final step, 
we propose a new definition of the PE concept.  
Hermeneutic Literature Review 
 
To identify the existing views on PE, we conduct a hermeneutic literature review, which presents an interactive 
process consisting of two intertwined phases - “search and acquisition circle” and “analysis and interpretation 
circle” (Boell and Cecez-Kecmanovic 2014, p. 258). Thus, the analysis of the initially selected articles leads 
to the identification of new search criteria, which expand the scope of the literature review. Unlike other 
111 
 
approaches (e.g., systematic literature review, see, Levy and Ellis 2006), this approach allows for continuous 
enrichment of our understanding of the investigated phenomenon though the discovery of new insights (Boell 
and Cecez-Kecmanovic 2014). Thus, we deem the hermeneutic approach more appropriate due to the 
multiplicity of views in the MSP literature and due to the complex, multi-faced nature of the PE.  
Our initial search strategy consisted of identifying all the relevant articles discussing “platform evolution” in 
the AIS Library. The analysis of the initially selected articles helped us expand our search strategy by including 
new keywords (e.g., “platform formation”, “platform development”, “platform growth”, platform expansion”, 
etc.). As the literature on MSPs is spread across various disciplines other than Information Systems (see, 
Section Multi-Sided Platforms), we also expanded our search by including multiple other databases (ACM 
Library, EBSCO Host, Emerald Insights, Google Scholar, Oxford, Sage Journals, Science Direct, Scopus, 
Springer, Taylor and Francis, Web of Science, Wiley). Thus, our literature review entered into a hermeneutic 
cycle where new keywords and search databases were identified based on ongoing analysis of the selected 
articles. We terminated our search once we could not identify more articles, which contain different 
information from the ones already gathered. As a result, we identified 98 articles in total, which provide 
insights into how MSPs evolve over time. To the best of our knowledge, we consider this literature review to 
be exhaustive.  
We adopted an inductive approach to analyze the gathered data, thus we “allow research findings to emerge 
from the frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent in raw data, without the restraints imposed by 
structured methodologies” (Thomas 2006, p. 238). We first analysed the selected articles using a coding 
scheme based on the prescriptions set by Welch et al. (2016). As the purpose of the literature review is to 
investigate the manner in which researchers conceptualize a phenomenon, Welch et al. (2016) recommend that 
the analysis should focus on investigating how the concept is used (see, View on Evolution, Table 1), what its 
attributes are (see, Attributes, Table 1), and what theoretical assumptions are made (see, Table 1). Although 
the authors provide a framework to guide analysis, they do not pose constraints on the process of data 
interpretation.  
Author View on Evolution Attributes Theoretical 
Assumptions 
 
Gawer (2015) 
 
Shift of platform boundary 
 
Change in the MSP scope 
and MSP openness 
MSPs’ boundary shifts in 
relation to competition 
and innovation 
Inoue and Tsujimoto 
(2017) 
PE as developing a 
platform-based ecosystem 
Adding third-party 
complementors 
Self-reinforcing loop 
between users and 
complementors 
Table 1. Example of Coding Scheme Adapted from Welch et al. (2016) 
We, then, group the identified attributes in several themes based on the observed commonalities among them 
(Podsakoff et al. 2016). The emerged themes and the associated with them attributes capture the variety of 
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perspectives (or views) on PE among the researchers in the field. We use further the results from the analysis 
as a basis for the subsequent empirical investigation. 
Attributes Themes 
Number of complementors 
Evolution of Platform-Based Ecosystem Evolution of boundary resources 
Growth of user base 
Growth Models Critical mass of users 
Table 2. Example of Organizing Attributes into Themes (adapted from Podsakoff et al., 2016) 
Empirical Investigation Through Case Studies 
Case Study research aims at providing in-depth understanding of complex phenomena by allowing researchers 
to analyze them within their context of emergence and existence (Baxter and Jack 2008), based on collection 
and detailed analysis of rich data sources (Yin 2003). Thus, case study research is suitable method for empirical 
investigation of concepts (see more, Podsakoff et al. 2016; Welch et al. 2016). 
The selection of specific case studies is guided by the findings of the conducted literature review (see more, 
Welch et al. 2016). Based on our initial analysis, we adopt a “most-likely” case design (Welch et al. 2016) as 
we do not find evidence for overlapping of PE with other concepts, but rather for lack of concept clarity, which 
stems from the presence of multiple (not contradicting) views about the essence of PE (see, below). Thus, we 
initially hypothesize that all of the identified attributes constitute composition elements of the PE concept. The 
purpose of the “most-likely” case study is to verify to what extent the outlined attributes capture correctly the 
complex nature of PE.  
Although a single in-depth case study is deemed sufficient (see, Welch et al. 2016), we chose to focus on two 
case studies in order to strengthen the conclusions we draw from our findings. As Welch et al. (2016) argue 
the cases, underlining the empirical investigation, should be exemplary and “provide the richest opportunity 
for questioning existing assumptions about how concepts are constituted” (p. 120). Thus, we select YouTube 
and Twitter as two exemplary cases of MSPs, which have relatively long and diverse evolutionary paths, and 
which are often viewed as prominent cases of MSPs (see, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee 2016; Hagiu 2006, 
etc.). Furthermore, we select YouTube and Twitter as their evolutionary paths cover approximately the same 
time span (YouTube is founded in 2005, while Twitter is founded in 2006) and both operate as social media 
platforms.  
To conduct our investigation, we rely on large set of secondary qualitative data, which we gathered from 
official blog posts from the two MSPs. We collected 424 blog posts for Twitter and 346 blog posts for YouTube 
for the period between their launch and the end of 2016. We construct the evolutionary paths of YouTube and 
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Twitter as a series of events and we code each one of them based on whether they refer to a certain identified 
attribute or not. During the data analysis process, we also adopt an open coding as we also look for previously 
unidentified attributes.  
The Concept of Platform Evolution in the Existing Literature 
Based on the conducted literature review, we identify 12 distinct views, outlining the manner in which MSP 
evolve over time (see Table 3). For clarity reasons, we present them in two groups: PE as stage models, which 
view PE as a continuum, and PE as standalone issues, which focus on studying particular aspects of PE. We 
also present the attributes associated with each of the views summarized in Table 3. When presenting the 
attributes, we aim at connecting given set of attributes to specific view as they are found in the literature, even 
though that may lead to a repetition of some attributes. We reduce this repetition at a later stage for conducting 
the empirical investigation (compare Table 3 and Table 4). We also adopt the labels of the attributes as the 
original authors first introduced them. Although this may lead to lack of clarity, we think it is necessary to 
adhere to the initial wordings, as we do not want to overlook involuntarily a given aspect of PE.  The purpose 
of the literature review and the empirical investigation is to identify the attributes and provide evidence for 
their accuracy, while the final parts of the paper (see, Discussion) concludes whether they are relevant or not 
and in what form.  
Platform Evolution as Stage Models 
A significant part of the MSP literature emphasizes on the nature of PE as a gradual, modular process, which 
consists of several stages (Miguel and Casado 2016). We identify inductively several PE stage models: growth 
models, maturity models, transformation models, wide-ranging models and reconfiguration models.  
Growth Stage Models 
Upholding the evolution-as-growth view, researchers such as Evans (2009), Casey and Töyli (2012), 
Vogelsang (2010), etc., investigate PE as a model, consisting of several interconnected stages. The first phase 
encompasses the launch of a platform (Evans 2009) (also known as market entry (Vogelsang (2010) or 
platform formation (Casey and Töyli 2012)), as well as the initial efforts to attract significant number of 
platform participants. The pre-condition to transitioning to the next phase of rapid growth (or ignition stage 
(Evans 2009)) is the achievement of critical mass of users (Evans 2009, Evans and Schmalensee 2010). In a 
similar manner, Ruutu et al. (2017) argue that until a MSP reaches a critical mass of users, its development is 
fragmented. If a platform survives, it reinforces positive feedback loops between the different constituencies 
affiliated to the platform during its next development cycle.  
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While mostly pre-occupied with investigating the initial growth path of a platform until it reaches a critical 
mass of users, researchers do not elaborate profoundly on the next stages of PE when critical mass of users is 
ensured. In his early work, Evans (2009) states that a MSP ignites after it reaches a critical mass of users and 
eventually achieves a long-term equilibrium. Later, Evans and Pirchio (2014) further refine this model by 
outlining two possible paths for platform growth in the ignition stage – explosive growth or slow growth, 
which are both dependent on the presence of strong cross-side network effects. For Eisenmann (2006) and 
Ruutu et al. (2017), the ultimate goal of any MSP is to establish winner-takes-it-all market by capturing the 
largest market share. Vogelsang (2010) argues that once a critical mass of users is achieved, a platform can 
exploit the monopolistic rents (e.g, transaction fees) it has earned and establish a viable business model in 
order to become profitable. A number of researchers also emphasize on the interdependency between MSP 
growth and MSP profitability (Bhargava 2014, Cuthbertson et al. 2015).  
Maturity Stage Models 
MSP’s evolutionary journey can be presented as a maturity model, where the platform’s main purpose is to 
reach a certain level of maturity. Researchers view maturity in different manners – from optimal user growth 
(Zhu and Mitzenmacher 2008) and business model maturity (Muzellec et al. 2015) to diversification of MSP 
services portfolio through the attraction of third-party complementors (Cennamo and Santaló 2015, Tan et al. 
2015).  
Muzellec et al. (2015), for example, propose a PE stage model consisting of four stages – embryonic stage, 
emergent stage, growth stage and maturity. The different stages are characterized by change in the platform’s 
focus from creating value primarily for users during the early stages to shifting to serving business customers 
in later stages of PE. In the maturity stage, MSP caters to both business customers and users in order to 
maximize the value that is created through their interactions. This value optimization allows for MSP to 
establish a profitable business model, which is business oriented.  
MSP’s maturity can also be measured by the level of achieved user growth. While Zhu and Mitzenmacher 
(2008) view maturity as market equilibrium where a platform is established as a dominant firm based on its 
ability to achieve optimal growth rate, Cennamo and Santaló (2015) argue that MSP reaches a maturity level 
when the growth of its user base decreases. At the same time, Cennamo and Santaló (2015), who distinguish 
between stages of early and late platform maturity, also argue that the user growth rate is driven by availability 
of high quality external complementors.  
To a certain degree, maturity models can be seen as extension (or spin-off) of the above described growth 
models. Thus, platforms tend to develop constantly until they reach a certain mature stage of their evolution. 
Not all platforms, however, can reach maturity as there are numerous examples of platforms, which fail at the 
initial stages of their development (see, Evans 2016; Hagiu 2014). 
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Transformation Stage Models 
PE is seen as a process of transformation, which changes the nature of the MSP through attracting new types 
of platform participants (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano 2015, Tan et al. 2015, Yang et al. 2015). Tan et al. (2015) 
propose a PE stage model, which traces the MSP development from “hub and spoke MSP”, to network 
platform, and finally to symbiotic platform (service providers, buyers, sellers) (more like MSPs). This 
transformation journey is marked by three separate stages – nascent stage, where a platform is characterized 
as being two-sided, formative stage and a maturity stage, which is characterized with the introduction of new 
services offered by complementors. Gawer and Cusumano (2013) argue that internal platforms (platform 
targeting key users) can evolve to supply-chains (number of suppliers) and then gradually to industry 
platforms, leveraging a huge network of external complementors.  
Wide-Ranging Stage Models 
Researchers often deduct a platform evolutionary model based on their investigation of particular cases. The 
proposed models reflect the characteristics of the specific cases and signal for the diversity of evolutionary 
paths, which a platform owner can undertake. Thus, rather than focusing on investigating one particular 
element of PE, these models reconstruct PE as a sum of multiple varied attributes. For example, Leong et al. 
(2013), who investigate the development of the largest Chinese online ticketing firm, argue that MSP evolves 
through the introduction of various elements - new features (group-buy feature), website re-organization, 
introduction of a forum, feedback, polling (community-building), building a distribution system.  
Zhu et al. (2016) investigate the evolutionary path of a Chinese online shopping mall, which consist of 
establishing of logistics and distribution system, geographical expansion to multiple cities, and the establishing 
of a supply chain for offering of finance service. Han and Cho (2015) view the evolution of the most popular 
messaging app in South Korea, KakaoTalk as consisting of several phases: expanding to new business domains 
(service diversification), bundling services, becoming distribution platform and engaging in open innovation 
(building an ecosystem of actors). Wang et al. (2015) study E-Commerce Platforms suggest that PE 
encompasses continuous launch of products, multi-channel expansion, multi-brand expansion, and 
geographical expansion. Constantiou et al. (2016) propose a two-stage evolutionary model based on their study 
of Airbnb’s evolution. During the first stage after the platform launch, Airbnb followed a zig-zag strategy by 
introducing various features and functionalities in order to attract users and host. In the second phase 
(augmentation phase), the platform engages in active exploration phase (e.g., introducing new feature and 
functionalities, horizontal acquisitions, geographical expansion, community building) in order to augment its 
services.  
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Reconfiguration Stage Models 
PE is also investigated as a continuous change across (or re-configuration of) multiple platform dimensions 
related to the platform itself (e.g., Gawer 2014), its ecosystem of external partners (Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson 2011), the technology that supports the platform’s offerings (e.g., Tan et al. 2016), and the 
environment, in which a platform operates (e.g., Tiwana et al. 2010). Gawer (2014), for example, view PE as 
reconfiguration of various platform elements – organizational forms, capabilities, access to innovative actors, 
types of governance, degree of interface openness. Kim et al. (2013) investigate the evolutionary path of online 
social networks as a configuration of three dimensions (technology, suppliers, and users) that change 
throughout the span of PE. Tiwana et al. (2010) see PE as a co-evolution of platform governance (decision 
rights, control, and ownership), platform architecture (decomposition, modularity, design rules) and 
environmental dynamics. Wang et al. (2015) also view PE as co-evolution of various elements - firm 
entrepreneurial action, organizational agility, digital options, and IT competence.  
A significant part of the reconfiguration models put emphasis on the reconfiguration (or evolution) of the 
technology (or IT) which supports the services enabled through the platform (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010, 
Sedera et al. 2016, Tan et al. 2016b, Yang et al. 2015). Tan et al. (2016b), for example, argue that during the 
initial stages of platform development, developing IT capabilities is not in focus, as platform owner needs to 
solve issues such as user adoption and achievement of viable business models. As the platform’s user base 
grows in size (and as they face scaling issues, see Furstenau and Auschra 2016), the platform needs to optimize 
its IT capabilities to support that growth. The establishment of ecosystem of external developers also puts 
restraints onto the IT resources and requires their further optimization to correspond to the business 
development of the platform. They argue that during the evolutionary path of the platform, IS capabilities are 
transformed and sometimes replaced (Tan et al. 2015). Tan et al. (2016a) view PE as a three-stage model, 
where the MSP and the infrastructure, which supports it, co-evolve: : 1) reinforcing digital platforms – 
reinforcing digital infrastructure, 2) organizing business ecosystems – reciprocating digital infrastructure, 3) 
establishing networked community – reproducing digital infrastructure. 
Platform Evolution as Standalone Issues 
A number of researchers also delve into the topic of platform evolution by investigating standalone issues. 
Thus, they focus on providing in-depth insights into diverse topics from growth of platform constituencies and 
the establishment and evolution of platform-based ecosystem to platform entry into geographical markets. 
Platform Evolution as the Ability to Grow the MSP’s Constituencies 
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Several researchers, adopting predominantly the economic perspective of MSPs, view PE as the ability of the 
platform owner to grow the size of its constituencies over time (e.g. see, Casey and Töyli 2012, Chu and 
Manchanda 2016, Garcia- Swartza and Garcia-Vicente 2015, Ting et al. 2014). The difference between this 
view and the growth stage model is that the former does not view the MSP growth as a stage-based process, 
but rather as undetermined process that is dependent on several conditions. 
Eisenmann (2006) and Kumar et al. (2010), for example, stress out the importance of achieving rapid growth 
through the execution of user acquisition strategies. The process of platform growth, which is also referred to 
as platform diffusion (see, Casey and Töyli 2012), however, requires to grow the size of all of the distinct types 
of participants affiliated to the platform. Thus, for example, Chu and Manchanda (2016) argue that a MSP 
grows as it manages to attract increased numbers of both buyers and sellers, while Cennamo and Santalo (2013) 
argue that platforms evolve through the growth of their installed base (users) and the growth of the external 
complementors. MSP’s growth is driven by the presence of strong same-side (within one group of platform 
participants) and cross-side (between two or more distinct groups of platform participants) network effects, 
which create positive feedback loops (Chu and Manchanda 2016, Garcia- Swartza and Garcia-Vicente 2015).  
The growth of the MSP’s constituencies is also investigated in connection to the establishment and further 
development of platform-based communities around the different distinct types of platform participants (e.g., 
users, developers, advertisers, etc.). For example, Leong et al. (2013) and Kyprianou (2015) argue that building 
a platform-based community constitutes an important part of the platform’s evolution path. The establishment 
of these communities is usually associated with the achievement of a certain level of growth of the platform 
constituencies. Yang et al. (2015), for example, view the establishment of platform-based community as one 
of the stages of PE, which occurs when a platform reaches a certain level of maturity. The communities around 
the various platform constituencies serve the purpose of strengthening the value proposition towards the 
platform participants. In particular, Constantiou et al. (2016) in their investigation of the evolution of Airbnb 
identify the building of community as one of the manners in which a platform owner augments its services. 
Platform Evolution as a Shift in the Platform Boundary 
A number of researchers view PE as a shift of the platform boundary (Gawer 2015, Eisenmann et al. 2011, 
Um and Yoo 2016). From economic perspective, platform boundary encompasses all the functionalities 
offered by and through the platform (Eisenmann et al. 2011). Thus, a change in platform boundary is associated 
with the introduction of new functionalities and features. The stream of platform literature, which views MSPs 
as modular system, considers the interface as marking the platform boundaries (Gawer 2015). From the 
technological perspective, the shift in the platform boundary means a change in the degree of platform 
openness, which is realized through the availability of various APIs and SDKs (Gawer 2015). Thus, for 
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example, Um and Yoo (2016) view platform boundary as not only encompassing the platform, but also its 
ever-growing ecosystem of external complementors. 
Platform Evolution as Introducing New Features and Functionalities 
A number of authors associate PE with introduction of new features and functionalities, which enrich the 
platform offerings and thus, increase its value proposition to both present and future participants (Edelman 
2015, Eisenmann et al. 2011, Evans 2013, Cuthbertson et al. 2015, Davis and Murphy 2002, Leong et al. 2013, 
Miguel and Casado 2016, Ozer and Anderson 2015, Saarikko 2014, Sen et al. 2011, Scholten 2011, Smedlund 
and Faghankhani 2015, Song and Wildman 2012). The novel features can be offered by the platform owner 
itself (see, Ozer and Anderson 2015), or by third-party complementors (see, Smedlund and Faghankhani 
2015)).  
This view of PE implies that the platforms commence with relatively few core functionalities, which constitute 
the MSP’s main value proposition (Bhargava 2014, Olleros 2008, Gawer and Cusumano 2007, Sen et al. 2011, 
Staykova and Damsgaard 2015). This minimalistic platform core, hosting relatively few functionalities, 
gradually expands over time to incorporate variety of novel offerings. Ozer and Anderson (2015), for example, 
discuss the platform’s ability to offer new exploratory features, novel complementary functionalities and a 
bundle of these features. The new features are introduced to support each of the affiliated to the platform 
constituencies (see, platform depth (Hagiu 2006); platform range (Staykova and Damsgaard 2016)). MSP can 
also expand by offering spin-off functionalities, or standalone (additional) platforms in addition to the main 
platform (e.g., UberEats) (Staykova and Damsgaard 2016, Watanabe et al. 2017).  
Ozer and Anderson (2015) argue that platforms cannot survive by solely offering innovative features. Rather, 
through a process of platform envelopment, a platform can bundle functionalities offered by other platforms 
operating in adjacent markets into its initial value proposition (Eisenman et al. 2011).  A platform can envelop 
complements, weak substitutes and unrelated platforms (Edelman 2015, Eisenmann et al. 2011, Schiborr 
2016), or enter into rival markets in order to attract rivals’ users (Bar-Gill 2014, Ozer and Anderson 2015). 
Similarly, Dietl et al. (2009) discuss “tying of a service supplied in a primary market with another service 
supplied in a secondary market” (p. 9) as a type of defensive move a platform can adopt if it is simultaneously 
present in more than one market. In connection to this, Smedlund and Faghankhani (2015) discuss MSP’s 
ability to establish interconnectivity to other MSPs.  
Platform Evolution as Development of an Ecosystem of External Complementors 
A number of researchers view the emergence, establishment and development of an ecosystem of third-party 
complementors as stage of the MSPs’ evolution (see, e.g., Boudreau and Jeppesen 2015, Gawer and Cusumano 
2015). In particuliar, Kim (2016) states that “after building a two-sided market, a business is required to 
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complete its ecosystem to enable itself to continue its platform business in the market”. Smedlund and 
Faghankhani (2015) upheld the same view by arguing that platform’s growth patterns change over time as 
platform evolves from being focused exclusively on creating and executing platform-centered strategies to 
developing a robust ecosystem of external complementors.  
The development of a robust ecosystem is based on the MSP’s ability to attract external complementors (e.g., 
Ceccagnoli et al. 2012, Inoue and Tsujimoto 2017, Manner et al. 2013, Tiwana et al.  2010, Zhu et al. 2016), 
which is dependent upon the establishment of generative capabilities (Eck et al. 2015, Holmström 2013). An 
example of such generative capabilities are technical boundary resources such as APIs and SDKs (e.g., Gawer 
2015) and social boundary resources, such as intellectual property rights (IPR) and agreements with third-party 
complementors (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2011). Furthermore, Gawer and Cusumano (2015) argue that 
the development of robust ecosystem is facilitated by the degree of platform openness (which is connected to 
APIs) and the modular nature of its architecture, which allows numerous third-party developers to join the 
platform.  
Platform Evolution as Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
After a platform-based ecosystem (PBE) is established, the platform and its ecosystem continue to co-evolve 
(Gawer and Cusumano 2015). Similarly, Isckia and Lescop (2015) also view PE as continuous innovation, 
which can be provided by both the platform owner and external complementors. Thus, a number of researchers 
focus on studying the evolution of the platform-based ecosystem itself (e.g., Lee and Hwang 2016, which is 
primarily associated with the dynamics in the number and quality of external complementors (Inoue and 
Tsujimoto 2017, Lee and Hwang 2016, Cennamo and Santaló 2015). Studies investigate platform-based 
ecosystems’ emergence, growth and contraction over time in response to various events. Scholten and Scholten 
(2012) argue that a platform-based ecosystem develops through continuous innovation, renewal and service 
portfolio optimization, while Lee and Hwang (2016) view the formation of PBE as a process of variance 
(introducing large number of complementors) and selection (reducing the overall number of external 
complementors by keeping only those preferred by users). Similarly, Cennamo (2017) argues that although 
platform owner can benefit from attracting and leveraging a huge network of external complementors during 
the initial stages of platform evolution, this may lead to market saturation prematurely. As a result, the diversity 
and the number of third-party complementors can significantly diminish at later stages and this can jeopardize 
the sustainability of the platform over time.  
The development of PBE is dependent upon the degree of platform openness, which also changes over time 
(Parker and van Alstyne 2008). In particular, the evolution (or change) of the degree of platform openness 
impacts (West 2003) the evolution of the PBE as it influences the number of complementors, affiliated to the 
platform (Ondrus et al. 2015). West (2003), for example, argues that platforms can start as being relatively 
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closed (or proprietary) and later, open up to various degrees. As platform openness is achieved mainly through 
the availability of boundary resources (e.g., APIs, SDKs), Eaton et al. (2015) investigate the development of 
PBE through the evolution of boundary resources (e.g., APIs). Um and Yoo (2016) further develop this view 
in a study, which investigates the PBE evolution through the introduction of external and internal APIs and 
the interconnectivity among them.  
The growth of the PBE is also seen as co-evolution between the platform owner and external developers 
(Scholten and Scholten 2012). Uphelding that view, Lindgren et al. (2015) study the change in the organization 
identity caused by the transformation of the relationships between the platform owner and the various actors, 
who take part of the PBE.  
Apart from investigating platform ecosystems as consisting of third-party developers, researchers also view 
the platform ecosystem in broader terms as encompassing various business partners (that is, not only external 
complementors). Thus, PBE is also associated with the development of an overall ecosystem of multiple 
stakeholders around the platform.  
Tan et al. (2013), for example, study platform development from the perspective of collaboration with various 
external partners (e.g., customers, partners, stakeholder, etc.). Based on their empirical-based model, they 
argue that during the early stages of platform development a MSP is focused in building a critical mass of 
users and engages in low levels of external collaboration. During the next development stage, a platform owner 
integrates services by partners to help platform constituencies develop their business (e.g, advisory services 
offered by third-party experts). The level of collaboration with external partners increases when the platform 
commences to build capabilities by collaborating with various actors (e.g, offering financial services) and by 
engaging in value-adding collaborations, which expand the initial value proposition of the platform.  
Lihua et al. (2010) also propose an evolutionary model for business ecosystem development consisting of four 
stages: birth, expansion, coordination/maturity stage and evolution or death. During the birth stage of the 
business ecosystem, the platform focuses on diversifying its offerings to growing number of users. Thus, the 
ecosystem consists of the platform, its customers, and various players who supports the functioning of the 
ecosystem. During the next phase of expansion, various external players join the platform business ecosystem. 
As the number of partners grows, MSP needs to establish and maintain an array of coordination mechanisms 
to ensure the vitality of its ecosystem. The evolution stage is associated with the platform’s ability to reshuffle 
its existing ecosystem by abandoning some its key elements in favour to new technologies, products, partners. 
Platform Evolution as Entry into Geographical Markets 
Entry into geographical markets (or global expansion) constitutes a significantly less researched aspect of PE. 
Watanabe et al. (2017), for example, investigate Uber’s global expansion strategy. They argue that the success 
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of platform’s global expansion strategy is dependent upon “balance of timing, pace, and selection of the host 
suitable enough to constructing a co-evolutionary acclimatization” (p. 45). Seamans and Zhu (2014) study the 
Craigslist’s entry into several U.S. markets and the impact of this move on the local newspapers industry. 
Although Seamans and Zhu (2014) do not study PE, their study shows that a platform can evolve by entering 
various geographical markets. 
Platform Evolution as Mergers and Acquisitions 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between two or more platforms can also occur throughout the PE 
(Beschorner 2008; Chandra and Collard-Wexler 2008; Eisenmann, 2006; Evans 2013; Evans and Noel 2008; 
Miguel and Casado 2016).  Although M&A among platforms are primarily investigated from anti-trust 
perspective (e.g., Evans 2013; Evans and Noel 2008), they also represent the platform’s owner efforts to 
diversify its service portfolio (Beschorner 2008) and strengthen its technological capabilities (Toppenberg et 
al. 2016). Miguel and Casado (2016), who investigate the evolutionary paths of the GAFA companies (Google, 
Amazon, Facebook and Apple) also view acquisitions as complementary to the innovation efforts undertaken 
by the platform owner. Thus, M&A are related to the perspective that platforms evolve through addition of 
functionalities.  
Platform Evolution 
Views 
Attributes Authors (e.g.) 
PE as Stage Models 
Growth Models 
Initial growth 
Critical mass of users 
Post growth (slow, explosive) 
Profitability 
Evans (2009), Evans and 
Schmalensee, (2010), Casey 
and Töyli (2012), 
Vogelsang (2010), Ruutu et al. 
(2017)  
Maturity Models 
Business Model Evolution 
User growth rate 
Portfolio optimization by 
complementors 
Cennamo and Santaló (2015), 
Muzellec et al., (2015), Tan et 
al. (2015), Zhu and 
Mitzenmacher (2008) 
Transformation Models Attracting new types of platform 
participants 
Gawer and Cusumano (2015), 
Tan et al. (2015), Yang et al. 
(2015) 
Wide- Ranging Models 
New features, bundling features, 
building a logistics and distribution 
system, multi-channel expansion, 
community-building, geographical 
expansion, acquisitions, ecosystem 
Constantiou et al. (2016), Han 
and Cho (2015), Leong et al. 
(2013), Wang et al. (2015) 
Reconfiguration Models 
Evolution of platform architecture 
Participants Evolution 
Ecosystem Evolution 
Environment Dynamics Evolution 
Governance Mechanisms Evolution 
Gawer (2014), Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson (2011),  
Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010), 
Sedera et al. (2016), Tan et al. 
(2016b), Yang et al. (2016).  
PE as Standalone Issues 
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PE as the ability to grow 
MSP’s user base 
Growth of number of MSP 
participants based on same-side and 
cross-side effects 
Building communities around users, 
developers, partners 
Chu and Manchanda (2016), 
Garcia- Swartza and Garcia-
Vicente (2015), Ting et al. 
(2014), Kyprianou, 2015, 
Leong et al. (2013), Yang et al. 
(2015) 
PE as a shift in the 
platform boundary 
Introducing new features 
Degree of platform openness 
Gawer (2015), Eisenmann et 
al. (2011), Um and Yoo (2016) 
PE  as introducing new 
features 
Core features 
Complementory features 
Exploratory features 
Spin Off products 
Bundling of features 
Tying of features 
Integrating features to third-parties 
Features for all platform participants 
Features offered by platform owner 
Features offered by third-parties 
Edelman (2015); Eisenmann et 
al., (2011), Evans (2013), 
Cuthbertson et al. (2015), 
Davis and Murphy (2002), 
Leong et al. (2013), Miguel 
and Casado (2016), Ozer and 
Anderson (2015), Saarikko 
(2014), Sen et al. (2011), 
Scholten (2011), Smedlund and 
Faghankhani (2015), Song and 
Wildman (2012) 
PE as development of an 
ecosystem 
Adding third-party complementors 
Tech boundary resources (API, 
SDK) 
Social boundary resources (IPR, 
agreements) 
Boudreau and Jeppesen (2015), 
Gawer and Cusumano (2015), 
Kim (2016), 
Sen et al. (2011) 
PE as Platform 
Ecosystem Evolution 
Quantity of complementors 
Quality of complementors 
(governance) 
Evolution of boundary resources 
Relationship between MSP owner 
and complementors 
External partners (e.g., suppliers, 
stakeholders, distribution partners, 
etc.) 
Cennamo and Santaló (2015), 
Inoue and Tsujimoto (2017), 
Isckia and Lescop (2015), Lee 
and Hwang (2016),  
Parker and van Alstyne (2008) 
Lihua et al. (2010), Tan et al. 
(2013) 
PE as geographical 
expansion 
Entry into new geographical 
markets 
Seamans and Zhu (2014), 
Watanabe et al. (2017) 
PE as mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) 
M&A  of new features 
M&A of new tech capabilities 
Beschorner (2008), Eisenmann 
(2006), Evans (2013), Evans 
and Noel (2008), Miguel and 
Casado (2016) 
Table 3. Overview of the Views on PE and Their Attributes 
General Notes on Platform Evolution 
The analysis of the selected articles confirms the lack of unified, comprehensive view of platform evolution. 
Rather, researchers tend to label the journey, which MSP undergoes as part of its development (from launch 
to demise), with various terms: shift of platform boundaries (Gawer 2015), platform maturity (Cennamo and 
Santalo 2015), platform development (Ruutu et al. 2017, Watanabe et al. 2017), platform expansion (Hagiu 
2006), platform evolution (Tiwana 2014), etc. Apart from the existence of multiple labels to denote this 
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phenomenon, there is also a variety of views on what platform evolution constitutes. Some researchers (see, 
e.g., Evans 2016) associate it with growing the size of the affiliated to the platform participants and adding
new types of platform participants. Other researchers (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano 2014) view platform 
evolution in terms of adding external complementors who increase the value proposition of the platform. 
Studies demonstrate that platform evolution is also concerned with the development of the platform itself (e.g., 
adding new functionalities (e.g., Hagiu 2006), increasing platform openness through the evolution of its 
boundary resources (e.g., Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2011), or the development of specific IT capabilities 
(e.g., Tan et al. 2016b) and the possibilities of M&A (e.g., Beschorner 2008). Different studies emphasize on 
one or several of these views when discussing platform evolution, but, in reality, platform evolution 
encompasses to a certain aspect almost all of them (for further discussion, see Empirical Investigation of 
Exemplary MSPs). 
Researchers also outline different reasons, which prompt a MSP to evolve. Variety of factors, either imposed 
externally, or stemming from internal considerations, drive the evolution of MSPs. The main reason why MSPs 
evolve is to ensure that they survive, when facing internal and/or external challenges (Han and Cho 2015, 
Tiwana 2014). Platform’s successful existence can come under threat due to environmental changes (Tan et 
al. 2015) such as imitation of rivals (Smedlund and Faghankhani 2015) or competitors shifts (Eisenmann et al. 
2011). Platform owners also engage in subsequent development of their business in order to address internal 
inefficiencies. In particular, they focus on improving the capabilities of a platform to innovate and strengthen 
the governance mechanisms needed to operate an ecosystem of external complementors (Gawer 2015).  
While MSP evolution is rarely a matter of choice (that is, platforms tend to evolve to one degree or another 
rather than remain static), a number of authors point out that the decision to evolve or not in a particular 
direction (e.g., enter complimentary market) is a strategic one (see, Bar-Gill 2014; Bhargava 2014; Gawer 
2015; Sen et al. 2011). Thus, platform owners face numerous evolutionary options, which they can choose 
either to pursue or not to pursue. A number of researchers, however, view PE as being path dependent 
(Dobusch and Sydow 2011, Song and Wildman 2012, Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010).  For example, Dobusch 
and Sydow (2011) view PE as path dependent phenomenon, characterized by three distinct phases  -  
preformation (path emergence), formation, and lock- in to a specific path. Thus, the emergence of certain path 
is determined (enabled and restricted) by the strategic choices taken during the earlier stages of platform 
evolution (see, e.g., Dobush and Sydow 2011; Wang et al. 2015). Path dependency, however, locks the 
platform to a certain path, which can reduce significantly the number of option available for further evolution 
(Dobush and Sydow 2011). 
The timing of platform evolution (e.g., early or delayed expansion, see Bhargava 2014), is also an important 
strategic consideration. As MSPs can choose to evolve in multiple ways (Evans 2009, Gawer 2014, Hanseth 
and Lyytinen 2010), their evolutionary paths will not follow a uniform pattern, but rather they evolve in a 
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diverse manner. For example, even though Evans (2009) sees platform evolution as a stage model with several 
distinct phases (see above, Growth Stage Models), he argues that different platforms do not exhibit the same 
evolutionary path as they adhere to different strategies to achieve critical mass of users (Evans, 2009) and to 
sustain growth once they manage to ignite (Evans and Pirchio 2015). Thus, different strategies are applied to 
different stages of the evolutionary path of a particular platform. We argue that platform evolution is a distinct 
concept from platform strategy as while platform evolution deals with the nature of platform development, 
platform strategy prescribes how such a development is to be carried out. For example, MSPs tend to evolve 
as to add external complementors (e.g., Gawer and Cusumano 2014), which constitute a specific instance of 
platform evolution. This process is associated with a number of strategic decisions such as prescriptions for 
degree of platform openness (how open a platform should be) and recommendations for exerting the right level 
of control over the activities of the external complementors. Despite being distinct, the two concepts are clearly 
interrelated as evident from the example above.  
Although the topic of PE has a recent uptake, there are a number of significant gaps in the literature on platform 
evolution, which needs to be addressed further. Few of the selected studies have PE as their specific subject of 
investigation, with majority of them focusing on separate issues and processes associated with PE (e.g, 
acquisitions (see, Toppenberg et al. 2016)). Thus, there is a lack of comprehensive view of what platform 
evolution constitutes. Few authors also recognize the diversity of evolutionary trajectories, which a MSP can 
choose to undertake (Gawer 2014), as most of the work focuses on investigating separate modes of evolution 
in isolated manner (e.g., introducing innovative features, diffusion of innovation, etc.). There is also a lack of 
research investigating under which conditions certain evolutionary paths emerge and unfold. Topics such as 
platform evolution through entry into geographical markets and through M&A remain largely under-
researched with only few studies addressing limited number of issues. There is also a lack of thorough 
integration of the two distinct streams in the platform literature (economic and technical) concerning platform 
evolution. 
Empirical Investigation of Exemplary MSPs 
The purpose of the empirical investigation is to validate the accuracy with which the above-identified attributes 
(see Table 3) capture the nature of PE. To do that, we conduct in-depth case studies of two exemplary MSPs 
– YouTube and Twitter. Our findings, summarized in Table 4, demonstrate that the majority of the identified
PE attributes are present throughout the evolutionary paths of the two MSPs (see, YouTube and Twitter). This 
conclusion illustrates the complex and multi-faceted nature of PE as encompassing numerous, diverse 
attributes. Thus, none of the identified views on PE (and its attributes) captures in its entirety the actual 
evolutionary path of a MSP. Rather, the evolutionary path is constructed from a combination of multiple 
attributes, which span across all the identified views on PE.  
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While conducting the empirical investigation, we notice that while some of the identified attributes (e.g., 
acquisitions, introduction of spin off products, etc.) can be observed as events, others, such as critical mass of 
users, optimal user growth rate, etc., need to be further operationalized. While we argue that they are important 
for the PE, we could not provide more information about them due to the nature of the data we gathered. We 
also identify an attribute “building a logistics and distribution system”, which although was mentioned by 
several researchers (e.g, Han and Cho, 2015; Leong et al. (2013)) was not part of the evolutionary paths of 
both YouTube and Twitter. This does not imply that this attribute is incorrect, but rather that not all MSPs tend 
to include all identified attributes as part of their evolutionary paths (see below for more details). Thus, we 
argue that all of the identified attributes are relevant for the conceptualization of PE. We, however, also identify 
a number of attributes, which are not mentioned in the MSP literature (see, Table 4, section Unidentified). We 
do not claim that our list of unidentified attributes is exhaustive or representative; rather, we want to point out 
that despite the existing knowledge, there are still under researched aspects concerning PE. We refer to this 
point again in the Discussion (see, below).  
As PE is a dynamic phenomenon, we also investigate the distribution of attributes across the MSPs’ 
evolutionary paths. For clarity, we choose to present the evolutionary paths of YouTube and Twitter as 
consisting of three stages of equal time span. This approach is undertaken in order to provide evidence for the 
presence or absence of various attributes during the different phases of PE as well as to allow for comparison 
between the evolutionary paths of the two MSPs. The MSP evolutionary path can be characterized as dynamic 
process throughout which novel attributes are introduced, as existing ones continue to evolve. For example, 
YouTube launched a spin off products (e.g., Vevo) four years after its inception (see, Table 4), thus adding a 
new attribute to its PE. At the same time, attributes, introduced during previous stages of PE, continue to 
evolve over time. Both YouTube and Twitter, for example, continue adding new core and complementary 
features to their initial value propositions as well as to develop the capabilities of their underlying 
infrastructures (see, Table 5, Technology Evolution). Thus, different attributes co-evolve and shape together 
the evolutionary paths of a MSP.   
The comparison between the evolutionary paths of YouTube and Twitter indicates that these paths are 
constructed of similar attributes as the majority of the identified and the unidentified attributes are present (see, 
Table 5). Some of the attributes, however, are configured differently during the separate stages of PE. For 
example, after its launch YouTube added advertisers as a third distinct group of MSP participants (after users 
and developers) during the first phase of its development, while Twitter added advertisers during the second 
stage of its evolutionary path. The launch of spin-off products in different stages (YouTube in second phase, 
Twitter in third phase) also confirms this observation. 
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Attributes YouTube Twitter AirBnb 
Identified 2005
-
2008 
200
9-
201
2 
201
3-
201
6 
2005
-
2008 
2009
-
2012 
2013
-
2016 
2008 
– 
2011 
2011- 
2014 
Growth of participants X X X X X X X X 
Optimal Growth Rate N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Initial growth X - - X - - X - 
Critical mass of users X - - X - - X - 
Post growth - X X X X X X X 
Business Model 
Evolution 
X X X - X - - - 
Profitability - - - - - - - - 
New types of MSP 
participants (other than 
complementors) 
X - - - X - - - 
Building a logistics and 
distribution system 
- - - - - - - - 
Multi-channel 
expansion 
X X X X X X X X 
Evolution of platform 
architecture 
(infrastructure) 
X X X X X X X X 
Environment Dynamics 
Evolution 
N/A N/A N/A X X X 
Governance 
Mechanisms Evolution 
X X X X X X X X 
Core features X X X X X X X X 
Complementory features X X X X X X X X 
Exploratory features X X X - - X X X 
Spin Off products - X X - - X - - 
Envelopment - X X - - X - X 
Bundling of features - - X - - X - - 
Integrating features to 
third-parties 
X X X X X X - - 
Features for all platform 
participants 
X X X X X X X X 
Features offered by 
platform owner 
X X X X X X X X 
Features offered by 
third-parties 
- - - X X X - - 
Adding third-party 
complementors 
X - - X X X - - 
Tech boundary 
resources (API, SDK) 
X X X X X X - - 
Social boundary 
resources (IPR, 
agreements) 
X X X - X X - - 
Growth of 
complementors 
X X X X X X - - 
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Table 4. Overview of the Evolutionary Paths of YouTube, Twitter and Airbnb 
Despite these differences, the evolutionary paths of YouTube and Twitter exhibit a high level of similarity. To 
further investigate the presence or absence of similarity across MSP’s evolutionary paths, we decide to 
construct the evolutionary path of another exemplary MSP – Airbnb (see, Table 5). To this end, we utilize 
exclusively the study conducted by Constantinou et al. (2016), which provides a rich historical account of the 
Airbnb’s evolutionary path from its launch until 2014. As the authors divide Airbnb’s evolutionary path in two 
stages, we adopt this approach for consistency with their data. Furthermore, as we use the case of Airbnb to 
compare across evolutionary paths rather than across stages of evolutionary paths, the difference between the 
time span of the stages in comparison to YouTube and Twitters are of no significance. 
AirBnb’s evolutionary path differs from the evolutionary paths of YouTube and Twitter as it is composed of 
different configuration of attributes (see, Table 5). In particular, unlike YouTube and Twitter, which initially 
targeted specifically users, Airbnb was launched as a two-sided platform catering to two distinct types of 
platform participants (hosts and dwellers). Thus, Airbnb’s efforts were concentrated on catering to these two 
sides from the onset, while YouTube and Twitter both catered initially to their users and gradually added 
advertisers as new types of platform participants. Airbnb also does not operate an ecosystem of external 
complementors and does not offer spin-off products. Thus, we find evidence about the presence of various 
MSP’s evolutionary paths, which is consistent with the views of a number of researchers (e.g. Evans, 2009; 
Gawer, 2014; Hanseth and Lyytinen, 2010). The purpose of this study, however, is not to investigate the 
Governance 
Mechanisms for 
complementors 
X X X X X X - - 
Boundary Resources 
Evolution 
X X X X X X - - 
Business Ecosystem X X X X X X X X 
Building community X X X X X X X 
Entry in geographical 
markets 
X X X X X X - X 
M&A for new features X X - X X X X 
M&A for tech 
capabilities 
X X X X X X - - 
Unidentified 
Optimization of features X X X X X X X X 
Optimization of 
channels 
X X X X X X - X 
Evolution of participants 
affiliation 
- X - X - X X X 
Evolution of spin-off 
products 
- X X - - X - - 
Connectivity between 
spin-off product and 
main product 
- X X - - X - - 
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existing types of evolutionary paths, their stages and the attributes, which belong to them. Due to the limited 
empirical evidence and the lack of comprehensive insights from previous work, we abstain from assigning 
given attributes to specific evolutionary phases and leave the investigation of this matter for future studies. 
We, however, used the observed heterogeneity of evolutionary paths to put forward our proposal of PE concept. 
Discussion 
As none of the identified views on PE captures in its entirety the nature of PE (see Table 5), we deem it 
necessary to propose an integrated view of MSP evolution as a complex, multi-faceted and dynamic process. 
The need for conceptualization of PE is further evident from the lack of coherence among the identified 
attributes associated with certain PE views (see, Table 3). The unsystematic presentation of these attributes as 
a list, indicating for no correlations among them, combined with the diverse nature of the attributes, cannot 
itself constitute a conceptualization of PE. Rather, building upon the conducted hermeneutic literature review, 
the identified attributes and the subsequent empirical investigation of three exemplary case studies, we propose 
an integrated, comprehensive view on PE. 
      Figure 1. Conceptualization of Platform Evolution 
We conceptualize PE as a process of co-evolution of MSP attributes, which is realized through the introduction 
and subsequent reconfiguration of various Platform Evolution attributes (see, Figure 1). In order to construct 
this conceptualization, we first draw a distinction between platform attributes (MSP attributes) and Platform 
Evolution attributes (PE attributes). We base this distinction on the analysis of the evolutionary paths of 
YouTube, Twitter and Airbnb, which indicates that MSP constituencies, infrastructure, functionalities and 
PE Process 
Platform Attributes 
Constituencies Functionalities 
Infrastructure Governance 
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
New types of constituencies 
Size growth of constituencies (initial 
growth, critical mass, optimal growth 
rate, entry in geographical markets)
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
Capabilities, technical boundary 
resources, new channels, acquisitions, 
suppliers 
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
Type of features: core, complementary, 
spin-off products 
Feature providers: MSP owner, 
complementors
PE Attributes (e.g.) 
Pricing (business model evolution) 
Non-pricing (communities, affiliation, social 
boundary resources, etc.) 
PE Drivers (e. g.) 
Environment Change 
Internal Optimization 
PE Outcome 
Platform Maturity (e.g.) 
Market Size, Optimal Growth Rate 
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governance regimes, as core characteristics of MSPs, co-evolve over time. For example, YouTube initially 
catered to one distinct type of platform constituencies (that is, users) and later introduced developers and 
advertisers as additional platform constituencies. Thus, we argue that the MSP constituencies has evolved in a 
particular manner. YouTube has also continued to evolve both its infrastructure and its governance regime 
(see, Table 4). We view these attributes as core characteristics of any MSP rather than PE attributes. That is, 
all MSPs can be characterized by the affiliated to them constituencies, the activities that those constituencies 
can engage in and which are enabled by the underlying infrastructure, and the governance regime, which 
regulates the functioning of the MSP. This conclusion also stems from the definition of MSPs as socio-
technical entities (see, Section Multi-Sided Platforms). Researchers have already argued that PE can be 
presented as co-evolution of various attributes (see, Reconfiguration Model), but there is a lack of a model, 
which provides comprehensive account of such co-evolution. To address this, we present PE as a process of 
co-evolution of the core characteristics of MSP (MSP attributes), namely constituencies, infrastructure, 
functionalities and governance regime. It is important to note that as MSPs attributes co-evolve, there is a 
certain level of interdependency between them. For example, the introduction of new types of platform 
participants, such as third-party complementors, which form an ecosystem around the platform, requires a 
change in its underlying infrastructure and in its governance regime.   
Such a general presentation of PE as a co-evolution of MSP attributes, however, does not take into account the 
observed heterogeneity of MSP evolutionary paths (see, Empirical Investigation of Exemplary MSPs). 
Furthermore, this approach “black boxes” the evolutionary process and hides the multi-faceted nature of PE 
(e.g., YouTube’s evolutionary paths consists of multiple attributes -  change in infrastructure, addition of core, 
complementary, exploratory features, spin-off products, acquisitions, entry into geographical markets, etc.). 
While all MSPs are characterized by the presence of MSP attributes, their evolutionary paths vary due to the 
different configurations of PE attributes (compare YouTube and Airbnb, Table 4). While it is appropriate to 
view, on a general level, PE as a process of co-evolution of MSP attributes, we argue that the manner, in which 
these co-evolution is realized is though PE attributes, such as addition or removal of functionalities, opening 
to third-party complementors, building a community around each of the MSP constituencies, etc. For example, 
the affiliated to YouTube constituencies (MSP attribute) have evolved through the introduction of new types 
of platform participants, such as advertisers (PE attribute). In another example, the number of guests on Airbnb 
grew from 800.000 in 2011 to 3 million in 2012 (Constantinou et al., 2016), thus leading to an increase in the 
size of each of the platform constituencies (or user growth, which constitutes a PE attribute). Twitter, for 
example, extended the technical capabilities of its infrastructure (MSP attribute) by acquiring various start-ups 
(acquisition, which is a PE attribute). Thus, while the MSP attributes point to what changes during the PE, the 
PE attributes identify how this change is carried out. Due to the limited empirical evidence, identifying an 
exhaustive list of PE attributes is beyond the scope of this study. The main goal of this paper is to present a 
general conceptualization of PE, whose operationalization, based on various empirical instances (from which 
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various PE attributes are identified) is a subject of future studies. We, however, try to demonstrate how some 
of the identified attributes (see, Table 4) relate to the MSP attributes (see, Figure 1) based on the literature 
review and empirical investigation. A more thorough revision and classification of the list of identified 
attributes in Table 4, however, is needed once more empirical data are collected. 
We also present PE as a process influenced by certain drivers (PE drivers) and leading towards a certain 
outcome (PE maturity) (Figure 1). For example, due to the “undeniable need to search and filter” (Twitter, 
2008, para 6) (PE driver - internal optimization), Twitter strengthened the technical capabilities of Twitter’s 
infrastructure (Evolution of Infrastructure as Platform Attribute) through the acquisition of Summize (PE – 
acquisition). Such a representation of PE also stems from the conducted literature review (see, section 4, 
Platform Evolution as a shift in platform boundary and Maturity Stage Models). Similar to the PE attributes, 
we do not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the PE drivers. Rather, we categorize some of the 
identified attributes as PE drivers. For example, a change in the environment (see, Tiwana, 2014) and the need 
for internal optimization of the MSPs’ capabilities (Gawer, 2015) constitutes such PE drivers rather than PE 
attributes (see, Table 3, Reconfiguration Models). We apply the same logic to categorize PE outcome. We 
further argue that PE drivers and PE outcomes as a certain level of maturity remains two understudied topics 
in the MSP literature. 
Conclusion 
 
We contribute to the growing body of literature on MSPs by proposing a comprehensive conceptualization of 
platform evolution as a complex, multi-faceted and dynamic process. To do that, we build upon the existing 
fragmented views on PE and conduct further empirical investigation in order to precise the PE concept. We 
present PE as a process, triggered by various PE drivers and leading towards a certain outcome (Platform 
Maturity). Furthermore, we provide a general view of PE as co-evolution of platform constituencies, 
infrastructure, functionalities and governance regime as attributes, common to all MSPs. In order to account 
for the observed heterogeneity of MSP evolutionary paths, we introduce the notion of PE attributes, which 
MSPs introduce and re-configure differently. We argue that the evolutionary path of particular MSP is 
determined by the presence (or absence) of particular PE attributes and their re-configuration throughout the 
different evolutionary stages.  
Our research is not without limitations. We focus on conceptualizing PE, but, although our proposal is based 
on empirical evidence, we did not verify the validity of the concept more thoroughly. We have also based our 
empirical investigation on three case studies relying exclusively on secondary data, which can restrict the 
generalizability of the model and diminish its explanatory powers when it comes to capturing the evolution 
occurring on all types of MSPs. Thus, although we have selected representative platforms, future work can 
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focus on studying empirically multiple cases of diverse platforms in order to verify and/or improve the 
proposed conceptual model of platform evolution.  
A fruitful avenue for future research is to adopt Qualitative Comparative Research (QCA) approach, which 
can be used to outline various configurations of PA and PE attributes and thus, outline various types of 
evolutionary paths, which platforms can follow. An in-depth case study, which provides a detailed and 
comprehensive account (that is, including multiple PA and PE attributes) of the evolution of a single platform 
over time can also be used for further developing the model. Furthermore, due to the lack of sufficient empirical 
evidence, we abstain from providing an exhaustive list of PE attributes and PE drivers and from discussing 
them in details. As this is beyond the scope of this study, we leave these issues for future research.  
A possible avenue for future research is the full-fledged integration of the different streams of platform 
literature. Although the proposed model of platform evolution (see, Figure 1) incorporates both perspectives 
on platforms (economic and technological), future research can improve further the integration of the two 
literature streams. In particular, an interesting matter for investigation is the interdependencies between the PA 
elements; for example, how the growth of user base (economic view) poses challenges for the platform 
technology (technology view) in terms of scaling and future development.  
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Abstract 
Previous studies present digital platform ecosystems as highly evolvable socio-technical arrangements that 
need to rapidly develop and adapt to ensure long-term sustainability. However, rather than account for and 
explain the triggers and mechanisms, which shape this complex process, current research provides largely 
descriptive accounts of digital platform ecosystem evolution with findings distributed across studies. Against 
that backdrop, we combine the notion of Generative Mechanism with Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to 
analyze the evolution of a digital payment platform ecosystem from the initial creation of the platform to market 
leadership. As a result, we offer a comprehensive account of the triggering events and generative mechanisms 
that drove the evolutionary path of this ecosystem. Based on these empirical insights and extant literature, we 
advance theory to explain how external and internal events trigger reinforcing and transforming generative 
mechanisms to shape digital platform ecosystem evolution. 
Keywords: Digital platform ecosystem evolution, triggering event, generative mechanism, Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory 
Introduction 
Some of today’s most successful businesses such as Airbnb, Google and Facebook are at the centre of digital 
platform ecosystems with multiple participants that interact enabled by the underlying platform architecture 
(Hagiu and Wright, 2011; Tiwana, 2014; Parker et al., 2016). Despite their growing economic importance and 
significant entrepreneurial attempts to discover successful platform business models, prosperous digital 
platform ecosystems remain a rare find (Hagiu, 2014; van Alstyne et al., 2016). Most ecosystems fail due to 
inappropriate initial platform design (Hagiu, 2006), ill-designed ignition strategies (Evans, 2009), and early 
focus on profitability rather than growth (Hagiu and Rothman, 2016; van Alstyne et al., 2016). Even when 
digital platform ecosystems ignite (Datee et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018), their long-term survival may 
come under threat because of inability to rapidly develop and adapt in response to frequent changes in external 
and internal circumstances (Tiwana, 2014; van Alstyne et al., 2016).  
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Against that backdrop, it is not surprising that there is a growing number of studies on digital platform 
ecosystem evolution. Some studies focus on specific evolutionary outcomes, such as growth (Evans, 2009), 
variety of complementors (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013), or market dominance (Eisenmann et al., 2006); 
others offer descriptive stage models of platform evolution (Evans, 2009; Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; Tan 
et al., 2016); there are also studies that investigate how changes in platform context lead to certain evolutionary 
outcomes (Datee et al., 2017; Eaton et al., 2015; Gawer, 2009; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018; Tan et al., 2015; 
Tiwana et al., 2010). However, extant research is mostly descriptive with findings distributed across individual 
studies, suffering from two major weaknesses. First, it does not fully account for the events that trigger digital 
platform ecosystem evolution (Gawer, 2015; de Reuver et al., 2017). Second, it does not conceptualize the 
generative mechanisms that shape digital platform ecosystem evolution in response to external and internal 
events (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). As such, we lack theory that explains why and how digital platform 
ecosystems follow different evolutionary trajectories that leads to certain outcomes. 
To address this important gap, we ask the following research question: How do triggering events and 
generative mechanisms drive the evolution of digital platform ecosystems? Our goal is to advance theory by 
combining the notion of Generative Mechanism (Bhaskar, 1975; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013) with 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory as expression of the evolutionary change paradigm (Gersick, 1991; Van de 
Ven and Poole, 1995). Empirically, we rely on a four-year longitudinal study of a prominent digital payment 
platform ecosystem to trace its evolutionary path from platform launch to market domination. As a result, we 
integrate and extend current knowledge into a theory, which differentiates between transforming and 
reinforcing generative mechanisms, which collectively drive digital platform ecosystem evolution. The theory 
offers insights into the evolution of digital platform ecosystems, which can help platform owners and other 
actors respond appropriately to the critical external and internal events they face. 
Our argument proceeds as follows. First, we summarize existing perspectives on digital platform ecosystem 
evolution. We then present the theoretical framework we use to guide our empirical analysis and theory 
development. Subsequently, we outline our methodology, introduce the case study, and present the findings 
from the empirical inquiry. Finally, we combine these findings with extant literature to advance theory that 
explains how triggering events and generative mechanisms drive digital platform ecosystem evolution. 
Literature Background 
Digital platform ecosystems constitute a specific research stream within the broad literature on ecosystems 
(Adner, 2017; Datee et al., 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018; Tsujimoto et al., 2017). Tsujimoto et al. (2017) identify 
platform ecosystems as one of four streams, along with industrial ecology, business ecosystems and multi-
actor networks. Like Gawer and Cusumano (2014), they view platform ecosystems as a specific subset of 
business ecosystems that in addition to business organizations involve platform users and platform developers 
as key actors. Similarly, Jacobides et al. (2018) present three research streams that include business 
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ecosystems, innovation ecosystems and platform ecosystems. Adner (2017) identifies overlaps between the 
different streams and points out that it is important to move beyond ecosystem affiliations and instead 
investigate the value-creating activities that various actors perform. 
Digital platform ecosystems have been investigated by scholars from different fields including management, 
strategy, industry economics, information systems, and innovation (Constantinides et al., 2018; Datee et al., 
2017; Gawer, 2009; Jacobides et al., 2018; Parker et al., 2016; Thomas et al., 2014; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham 
et al., 2014). Because of this fragmentation, researchers have emphasized different characteristics, such as 
actors (Constantinides et al., 2018; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2008;), architecture (Datee et al., 2017; Thomas 
et al., 2014; Tiwana et al., 2014; Wareham et al., 2014) and governance (Huber et al., 2017; Kapoor and 
Agarwal, 2017).  
Moreover, as most studies focus on one characteristic (e.g., actors in Constantinides et al., 2018), or 
combinations of two characteristics (e.g., architecture and governance in Tiwana, 2014), there is a lack of 
studies that consider all these major characteristics of digital platform ecosystems (Gawer, 2014; Thomas et 
al., 2014). To address this, we integrate them and present digital platform ecosystems as highly evolvable 
socio-technical arrangements (Constantinides et al., 2018; de Reuver et al., 2017; Gawer, 2014; Tiwana, 2014) 
that orchestrate interactions between various actors (van Alstyne et al., 2016) through modular architectures 
(Baldwin and Woodward, 2009) and emergent governance regimes (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009).  
As foundation for our empirical investigation and theorizing, we have identified three dominant perspectives 
on the evolution of digital platform ecosystems in the literature, namely growth, co-evolution and competition. 
In the following, we elaborate on each of these perspectives. 
Growth Perspective. Early studies focus on the initial formation and subsequent development of digital 
platforms from a growth perspective, typically proposing stage models, in which reaching a critical mass of 
actors is a pre-condition for platform survival (Casey and Töyli, 2012; Evans, 2009; Evans and Schmalensee, 
2010). After initial ignition (Evans, 2009), a digital platform can enter a period of slow growth or continue to 
grow at a rapid pace (Evans and Pirchio, 2014). During this stage, digital platform ecosystems expand by 
including not only more actors but also new types of actors (Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2006). 
Extending this perspective, scholars identify enablers and constraints of sustainable growth. While strong 
cross-side network effects enable sustained growth (Evans and Schmalensee, 2010), various constraints, such 
as ill-designed pricing and revenue sharing strategies (Casey and Toyli, 2010, Volelsang, 2010), under-
developed alliance strategy (Casey and Toyli, 2010) and limited platform access (Ondrus et al., 2015, Ruutu 
et al., 2017), can inhibit growth. Overall, platform owners seek growth rates that help establish a winner-takes-
all or winner-takes-most market (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Ruutu et al., 2017), after which growth rates typically 
decrease (Cennamo and Santaló, 2015). Although research into this mature stage of growth is limited, digital 
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platform ecosystems usually experience fluctuations in the number of actors as choices of end-users and 
platform owners may lead to reduction in external complementors (Boudreau and Jespersen, 2015; Inoue and 
Tsujimoto, 2017).  
Co-evolution Perspective. Building upon early research on evolvability of digital platforms (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2009), Tiwana et al. (2010) argue that digital platform ecosystems develop through co-evolution 
of architecture and governance in response to environmental dynamics. Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2013) 
adopt a similar view to study co-evolution of platform generativity, which spurs variety of complements, and 
platform control. On one hand, they argue that platform owners can increase the generativity of the ecosystem 
by introducing boundary resources (architecture) through a process of resourcing. On the other hand, increased 
openness towards external complementors can undermine the owner’s position and may require the 
introduction of stricter rules for accessing and using boundary resources (governance) through a process of 
controlling. External complementors can then either accommodate or reject the introduced changes through a 
co-creation process of tuning, which in turn affects the evolution of boundary resources (Eaton et al., 2015).  
Elaborating the co-evolution perspective further, researchers investigate platform generativity and the variety 
of external complements it spurs. Woodward and Clemons (2014), for example, argue that generativity results 
in variety of complements, which evolve in an endogenous manner with no specific interference from platform 
owners. Similarly, Um et al. (2016) argue that changes in boundary resources such as APIs drive platform 
generativity, although such interventions may not always result in increased variety of external complements.  
Other researchers investigate variations of external complements in relation to governance. Tiwana (2015), for 
example, studies the evolution of third-party complements, arguing that platform owners can accelerate 
platform evolution (through variety) by leveraging input control and modularizing architecture. Along the 
same lines, Wareham et al. (2014) suggest that platform owners can rely on variety-increasing mechanisms, 
which promote different complements and nurture autonomy of third-party complementors, and on variety-
decreasing mechanisms, which ensure standardization and thus, strengthen platform owner control.  
Moving beyond architecture and governance, researchers have pointed out that actors evolve when architecture 
changes (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018; West and Wood, 2014) and that groups of actors (e.g., users and 
complementors) may co-evolve and adapt to each other over time (Song et al., 2018). Further, Tan et al. (2015), 
propose a three-stage co-evolutionary model of information systems capabilities and business strategies across 
the nascent, formative and mature stages of platform ecosystem evolution; Tan et al. (2016) trace the co-
evolution of IT affordances, platform configuration and competitive strategies; and recently, Ojala and 
Lyytinen (2018) focus on the interactions between architecture, governance, actors and environment during 
the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem.  
141 
 
Competition Perspective. Moving to a competition perspective, researchers have started to outline strategies 
that platform owners can follow during ecosystem formation and expansion to gain a favourable market 
position. During the initial formation stage, researchers recommend creating a strong value proposition (Hagiu, 
2006; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014) while postponing decisions about which specific direction to pursue 
because of high environmental uncertainty (Datee et al., 2017). At later stages, as the digital platform expands, 
Hagiu (2006) advises owners to balance carefully platform depth (addition of new functionalities) and breadth 
(inclusion of new types of actors). Gawer and Cusumano (2014) argue that ecosystem evolution eventually 
becomes a matter of competitive survival. At this stage, platform owners should strive to become market 
leaders by adopting a tipping strategy that encompasses bundling of features, offering unique features and 
expanding into rival markets (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Eisenman et al. 2011). Ozer and Anderson (2015) argue 
that, to succeed, such strategies require combination with other innovation initiatives.  
Despite these different perspectives and the growing number of studies on digital platform ecosystem 
evolution, current research is limited in two important ways. First, it focuses mainly on identifying various 
evolutionary outcomes (e.g., growth, variety of complementors, market dominance), while failing to fully 
account for the events that trigger digital platform ecosystem evolution (Gawer, 2015; de Reuver et al., 2017; 
Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). Although current research identifies several triggering events, the findings remain 
dispersed across studies without theoretical explanation of how they lead to various evolutionary outcomes. 
Digital platform ecosystems may, for example, evolve when threatened by external events (Baldwin and 
Woodard, 2009; Tan et al., 2015; Tiwana, 2014), such as imitation moves by rivals (Smedlund and 
Faghankhani, 2015), shifts in competitive dynamics (Eisenmann et al., 2011) and regulatory changes (Evans, 
2012; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016). At the same time, various internal events, such as release of platform 
versions in response to customer needs, architectural modifications that accommodate technological 
innovations, preventing loss of platform control (Gawer, 2009) and alterations in actors’ expectations (West 
and Wood, 2014), may also trigger changes in digital platform ecosystem evolution.  
Second, current research does not conceptually account for the mechanisms that shape digital platform 
ecosystem evolution in response to external and internal triggering events (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). 
Although Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) study generative mechanisms in the general context of digital 
infrastructures, there is a lack of studies that specifically conceptualize such mechanisms in the context of 
digital platform ecosystems. Different researchers have identified several generative mechanisms through 
which platform ecosystems respond to external and internal events, such as information system affordances 
(Tan et al., 2016), distributed tuning (Eaton et al., 2015), asymmetric influence mechanism (Song et al., 2018) 
and value influence mechanisms (Wareham et al., 2014). However, these insights remain largely fragmented 
without conceptual foundation that can help explain how generative mechanisms shape evolutionary 
trajectories. Due to the constantly evolving and disruptive nature of digital platform ecosystems, we expect 
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some mechanisms, such as engaging more actors of similar type or adding platform features to support existing 
actors, will reinforce current evolutionary trajectories, while other mechanisms, such as engaging new types 
of actors or adding new types of platform features to enter new markets, will radically change current 
trajectories. 
In response to these shortcomings in extant literature, we combine Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Gersick, 
1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) with the notion of Generative Mechanism (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 
2013) to advance theory on the triggers and mechanisms that shape digital platform ecosystem evolution. As 
such, we build on two fundamental assumptions: 1) that some generative mechanisms will reinforce while 
others will cause radical changes in the evolutionary trajectory (Gersick, 1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008), 
and 2) that similar generative mechanisms can produce different outcomes depending on the events that trigger 
them and the context in which they unfold (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013).  
Theoretical Framework 
Previous studies, which have conceptualized generative mechanisms for studying the evolution of complex 
socio-technical systems, such as digital infrastructures (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), have not considered 
the punctuated nature of the triggering events, which set these mechanisms in motion. Thus, while we build 
upon this conceptualization of generative mechanisms to study the evolution of digital platform ecosystems as 
another example of complex socio-technical systems, we turn to Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to understand 
the impact of triggering events on the evolutionary trajectory (Gersick, 1991). Moreover, although Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory considers the underlying generative mechanisms (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), studies 
that apply it to investigate changes in socio-technical systems (Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) do not zoom in 
on generative mechanisms as drivers of change. Thus, drawing on the punctuated nature of triggering events 
for causing socio-technical change (Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) and on the role of generative mechanisms 
in shaping such change (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), we combine these two lenses into one theoretical 
framework to investigate and explain evolution of digital platform ecosystems (Table 1 and Table 2).  
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory states that socio-technical systems evolve through relatively long periods of 
stability, followed by shorter periods of rapid and pervasive change, which destabilize the existing deep 
structure (Gersick, 1991; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Street and Denford, 
2012; Street and Meister, 2004). To drive the change process and to produce various change outcomes 
(Liechtenstein et al., 2006; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995), Punctuated 
Equilibrium Theory relies on generative mechanisms as causal structures, which account for the ongoing 
reinforcement and transformation in a system’s deep structure (Bunge, 2004; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).  
The deep structure of complex socio-technical systems is a highly durable configuration of elements from 
various system dimensions (Gersick, 1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008; Wollin, 1999), which remain 
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unchanged during periods of stability (Street and Denford, 2012). Building upon the literature on digital 
platform ecosystems, we define the deep structure of a digital platform ecosystem as a configuration of actors, 
architecture and governance at a specific stage of its evolution. The deep structure reflects the choices made 
by the owner and other participants about the platform and its usage (Gersick, 1991). In Table 1, we 
conceptualize the main dimensions of a digital platform ecosystem, namely actors, architecture, and 
governance, and their corresponding sub-constructs. The deep structure is then a specific configuration of these 
dimensions, which remain unchanged during a stable period of platform ecosystem evolution. 
There are three categories of actors, which play different roles. The platform user role can be mapped into two 
categories: demand-side actors, or those that use platform services, and supply-side actors, or those that provide 
services through the platform (Eisenman et al., 2008; Evans, 2012; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016; Ondrus et al., 
2015). The platform owner role retains ownership of the platform and control over its development and 
participation in its ecosystem (Eisenmann et al., 2008; Parker et al., 2016). The ownership of the digital 
platform can be shared among several actors (Eisenman et al., 2008). While platform owners often initially 
assume the role of platform providers, other providers can join later and possibly obtain ownership over time 
(Eisenmann et al., 2008; Ondrus et al., 2015; Parker et al., 2016). Finally, the platform provider role contributes 
to the production (e.g., technology providers) of the platform and distribution (e.g., distribution partners) of its 
services (Eisenmann et al., 2008; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Ondrus et al., 2015, Tiwana, 2014). 
Table 1. Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem 
 
Concept Definition Construct Definition References 
Actors 
The heterogeneous 
actors involved in a 
digital platform 
ecosystem 
Platform User 
Demand-side actors that use 
services on a digital platform 
and supply-side actors that 
provide services through a 
digital platform 
Eisenmann et 
al., 2008; 
Evans, 2012; 
Gawer and 
Cusumano, 
2014; Hagiu, 
2016; Ondrus 
et al., 2015; 
Parker et al., 
2016; 
Tiwana, 2014 
Platform Owner 
Actors who retain ownership 
of the platform and control 
its development and 
participation in its 
ecosystem 
Platform Provider 
Actors who participate in the 
production of a digital 
platform and distribution of 
its services 
Architecture 
The structuring of a 
digital platform’s 
core, periphery and 
boundary resources 
Platform Core 
Main functionalities of a 
digital platform provided 
through its software and 
hardware 
Baldwin and 
Woddward, 
2009; Eaton 
et al., 2015; 
Gawer and 
Cusumano, 
2014; 
Ghazawneh 
and 
Henfridsson, 
2013; 
Platform Periphery 
Additional functionalities 
related to a digital platform 
provided through modules 
developed by external 
developers 
Boundary Resources 
Software tools that provide 
interconnectivity and 
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interoperability between a 
digital platform’s core and 
periphery 
Tiwana, 
2014;  
Governance 
The rules that 
regulate 
membership, 
conduct, and value 
appropriation in a 
digital platform 
ecosystem 
Access Rules 
Rules defining membership 
of actors in a digital 
platform ecosystem 
Boudreau and 
Hagiu, 2009; 
Evans, 2016; 
Parker et al., 
2016; 
Tiwana, 2014 
Participation Rules 
Rules defining the 
permissible activities by 
heterogeneous actors of a 
digital platform ecosystem 
Appropriation Rules 
Rules governing distribution 
of created value between 
actors in a digital platform 
ecosystem 
 
The architecture represents the structuring of its core, periphery and boundary resources (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2009; Gawer, 2014; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). The 
platform core encompasses the main functionalities provided through software and hardware (Olleros, 2008; 
Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). Initially, the core consists of a limited number of key functionalities, which 
make the platform scalable (Olleros, 2008). External service modules provide additional functionalities around 
the core to form the platform periphery (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). A 
digital platform’s boundary resources are software tools (e.g., APIs) that ensure interconnectivity and 
interoperability between the core and its periphery (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Um and Yoo, 2016). 
The governance refers to the collection of rules that regulate membership, conduct, and value appropriation in 
a digital platform ecosystem. Access rules define membership of actors (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). As 
heterogeneous actors with diverse interests become part of the ecosystem, the platform owner imposes strict 
participation rules that define permissible actions (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Parker et al., 2016). The goal 
is to nurture productive interactions and to minimize undesirable activities that could undermine value creation 
(Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009). Appropriation rules govern distribution of created value between actors in a 
digital platform ecosystem and, as such, regulate the relations between platform owners and other participants. 
These rules usually encompass revenue sharing agreements, ownership agreements including intellectual 
property rights, division of responsibilities, decision rights, and more (Evans and Schmalensee, 2016; Hagiu, 
2014; Parker et al., 2016; Tiwana, 2014). Platform owners rely on “contractual, technical and informational 
instruments” (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009, p. 3) to enforce and maintain the governance regime. 
When an appropriate configuration of actors, architecture and governance is established in relation to its 
environment, the deep structure of a digital platform ecosystem enters a period of stability (Gersick, 1991; 
Street and Denford, 2012). However, various external and internal events may challenge the established 
configuration and trigger transformation towards a new deep structure (Table 2). Accumulated internal 
inefficiencies, such as congestion of supply-side actors, and exogenous shocks, such as entry of new 
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competitors or introduction of a new technology standard, that challenge the current ecosystem’s deep structure 
are examples of such triggering events (Gersick, 1991). Many change triggers may be accommodated within 
the deep structure, thus reinforcing the period of stability (Lyytinen and Newman, 2008; Romanelli and 
Tushman, 1994). Some events, however, can have significant, disruptive impact on the established deep 
structure and as a result throw the digital platform ecosystem in a state of flux (Gersick, 1991; Street and 
Denford, 2012; Wollin, 1999). When facing such disruptive events, the established configuration can no longer 
guarantee the efficient functioning of the digital platform ecosystem (Gersick, 1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 
2008; Street and Denford, 2012; Street and Meister, 2004). As result, the digital platform ecosystem enters a 
period of transformation (Gersick, 1991). 
Table 2. Conceptualization of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Platform Evolution The ongoing changes in a digital platform ecosystem in relation to its actors, 
architecture and governance  
Deep  
Structure 
A sustained configuration of actors, architecture and governance during a stable period 
of ecosystem evolution 
Change  
Trigger 
An external event that challenges the current configuration of the ecosystem or an 
internal event that creates a misfit between the configuration of the ecosystem and the 
environment, thereby challenging the performance of the ecosystem 
Generative 
Mechanism 
Latent deep structure properties (related to one or more of a platform ecosystem’s 
actors, architecture and governance) that can be activated to change the ecosystem.  
Transforming 
Mechanism 
Mechanism that leads to radical change in the deep structure of a digital platform 
ecosystem  
Reinforcing 
Mechanism 
Mechanism that leads to incremental adjustment of a digital platform ecosystem 
without affecting its deep structure 
Change Outcome  A change in the properties of a digital platform ecosystem (related to one or more of its 
actors, architecture and governance) in response to a change trigger 
 
Regardless of whether the digital platform ecosystem transforms or sustains, change triggers can activate one 
or several generative mechanisms as a context-specific response (Bunge, 2004; Pawson and Tilley, 2009) 
(Figure 1). Generative mechanisms are latent deep structure properties related to one or more of an ecosystem’s 
actors, architecture and governance, which, when activated, drive a change process in the digital platform 
ecosystem (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). The latent properties of the 
existing deep structure enable or constrain the socio-technical activities, which interact to produce change 
outcomes (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). These outcomes in turn impact 
the existing constitution of the deep structure. 
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Figure 1. Operation of Generative Mechanisms adapted from Henfridsson and Bygstad (2013) 
We define a change outcome as the change in one or more properties of the deep structure of a digital platform 
ecosystem in response to a change trigger, which may be an external event that challenges the current 
configuration of the ecosystem or an internal event that creates a misfit between the configuration of the 
ecosystem and the environment, thereby challenging the performance of the ecosystem. As the outcomes of 
generative mechanisms depend on the triggering event and the context in which they operate (Henfridsson and 
Bygstad, 2013), similar mechanisms can produce different outcomes. Transforming change requires alterations 
in the existing deep structure of a digital platform ecosystem in response to destabilizing triggering events. 
The subsequent period of instability ends when a new deep structure emerges that is better fitted to ensure 
effective performance of the ecosystem (Gersick, 1991; Romanelli and Tushman, 1994; Wollin, 1999). The 
digital platform ecosystem then enters a period of relative stability (Romanelli and Tushman, 1994), where 
actors can engage in reinforcing changes in response to triggering events that do not challenge the current 
evolutionary trajectory. Reinforcing changes involve incremental adjustments of the platform ecosystem 
without changing the deep structure (Gersick, 1991; Street and Denford, 2012). As new triggering events 
appear, a generative mechanism may be activated leading to a new transformation. 
Building upon this integrated understanding of generative mechanisms and punctuated socio-technical change, 
we define the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem as the ongoing changes of a digital platform ecosystem 
in relation to its actors, architecture and governance (Table 2). We further identify two main characteristics of 
generative mechanisms: dominance, which reflects its change focus in terms of actors, architecture and 
governance, and impact, which reflects whether the change is reinforcing or transforming. As such, we suggest 
that a generative mechanism predominantly affects one component of the deep structure of a digital platform 
ecosystem although it also may cause changes to the other two components, and that a generative mechanism 
can produce change outcomes, which have reinforcing or transforming impact on the existing deep structure. 
Research Method 
Change 
Trigger 
Digital Platform Ecosystem 
Change Outcome 
Activated Generative 
Mechanism(s) 
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To advance theory on why and how triggering events and generative mechanisms drive the evolution of digital 
platform ecosystems, we engage in mid-range theory building by conducting a longitudinal case study guided 
by our theoretical framework (Table 1 and Table 2) and later combining the empirical findings with extent 
literature (Dooley, 2002; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). As longitudinal single case studies 
are suitable for investigating ongoing changes in their context (Menard, 2008; Leonard-Barton, 1990; 
Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990), adopting this research design helped us reveal patterns of 
change in a real-world case of platform ecosystem evolution by tracking all key change events over time and 
how they came into being (Hassett and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013; Menard, 2008). Although such studies 
can provide “holistic, dynamic and multi-faceted information” (Hassett and Paavilainen-Mäntymäki, 2013; p. 
2), longitudinal studies based on primary data sources are largely absent from the platform literature (de Reuver 
et al., 2017), reinforcing fragmentation of findings. 
We studied the evolution of a digital payment platform ecosystem in Denmark, MobilePay, launched in 2013 
by the largest bank in Denmark, Danske Bank, and used by approximately 90 per cent of the Danish population 
in 2017. Various digital payment solutions (e.g., ApplePay, SamsungPay, Venmo) function as digital platforms 
orchestrating an ecosystem of actors around them (Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; Hagiu and Wright, 2011; 
Ondrus et al., 2015; de Reuver et al., 2017). Similarly, MobilePay is a digital payment application, which 
functions as a digital platform by providing an underlying IT architecture enabling the direct and regulated 
interactions between affiliated to its ecosystem actors (e.g., peer-to-peer money transfers and consumer-to-
business transactions) (Hagiu and Wright, 2011). As such, MobilePay constitutes a digital platform ecosystem. 
We choose to study MobilePay for several reasons. First, since its inception, the MobilePay ecosystem has 
evolved rapidly by introducing numerous changes across its actors, architecture and governance (e.g., adding 
new actors, enabling a myriad of services, and continuously adapting its governance regime). Second, 
MobilePay operates in an uncertain and volatile environment, which constantly challenges its evolutionary 
trajectory. Third, we had unique access to this specific case as the first author was employed at MobilePay 
during part of this research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2003). Hence, we had sufficiently rich access 
to relevant documentation and real-time observation of MobilePay’s evolutionary journey to develop a 
comprehensive and detailed account of this process. 
To reconstruct the evolutionary path of MobilePay over the span of four and a half years, we relied on both 
retrospective and real-time methods of data collection (Leonard-Barton, 1990). The first author researched and 
closely followed the evolution of MobilePay since its inception in May 2013, and she entered the company as 
employee from October 2015 until the end of the investigated period. Thus, we triangulated between several 
data sources: interviews, informal conversations, archival presentations, press releases, to help reconstruct 
evolution of the ecosystem from May 2013 until October 2015. Data triangulation was particularly useful as 
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retrospective interviews may suffer from recall bias by emphasizing events that put some actors in a more 
favorable light than others (Pettigrew, 1990).  
After the first author entered the research site, we adopted participant observation as our preferred approach 
for real-time data collection (Leonard-Barton, 1990). This method allows researchers to “learn about the 
activities of the people under study in the natural setting through observing and participating in those activities” 
(Kawulich, 2005, p. 1). Participant observation is a suitable method for theory building and it is particularly 
fruitful when researchers seek to understand the context, in which a phenomenon is situated, and the events 
and actions that shape it (Iacono et al., 2009). During the two years of real-time data collection, from October 
2015 until October 2017, the first author spent three days per week in Danske Bank, the creator and initial 
owner of MobilePay, assuming the role of “participant as observer” (Kawulich, 2005, p. 8). She joined the 
team responsible for proposing and delivering new innovative features and had frequent interactions with 
members of other MobilePay teams. Furthermore, she attended weekly status updates and bi-weekly 
department meetings where the CEO of MobilePay discussed key issues with all employees. As such, she had 
either retrospective access through colleagues and documents or direct access to all key events that shaped the 
evolution of the payment platform and its wider ecosystem. As participant observer, she selectively took part 
in projects, meetings and tasks as part of the team’s day-to-day activities. While the main purpose of her 
participation was to collect data, she occasionally engaged in activities to obtain better understanding of 
ongoing events and to gain the trust and credibility that would prompt colleagues to willingly share information 
(Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven and Hubert, 1990). 
Due to the embeddedness into the field, the “participant as observer” can eventually lose her objectivity 
(Bernard, 1994; Leonard-Barton, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990). It therefore became important for the first author to 
detach herself from the site to support objective interpretation of the observed events. During her employment 
with MobilePay, she met on a regular basis and at a separate location with the fourth author, a leading 
researcher in the field of digital payment platforms in Europe, to discuss observations and to balance her 
interpretations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990). In addition, during the subsequent data analysis, the first 
author removed herself completely from the research site and spent four months in the USA to make sense of 
the rich data and start advancing theory in close collaboration with the second and third author with research 
interests in digital innovation (Bernard, 1994; Kawulich, 2005).  
The first author’s engagement in the field generated vast amounts of primary data. Importantly, she maintained 
a research diary and noted down her detailed observations from meetings, seminars, workshops and informal 
conversations with employees, resulting in a rich narrative. As method for data collection, participant 
observation is not without limitations and researchers are advised to combine it with other techniques such as 
interviews and archival data (Kawulich, 2005). Thus, she complemented the observation notes and archival 
data with 12 semi-structured interviews with key Danske Bank employees (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002). As 
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the information from these interviews often overlapped with already documented insights, the first author 
preferred to engage mainly in observations and informal conversations with colleagues at MobilePay to gather 
data (as discussed by Leonard-Barton, 1990). In addition, we had access to all relevant archival documents 
about the evolution of MobilePay such as news releases, project plans, presentations, emails, meeting minutes, 
and more. 
To identify change events and to trace how they emerged over time, we adopted a step-wise approach to data 
analysis based on recommendations from previous studies (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). We commenced 
by constructing a timeline of all key change events and related outcomes during the evolution of MobilePay 
as they emerged from our data (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). Although we 
could identify a myriad of changes, in the final timeline we included only those that MobilePay employees 
consistently and collectively referred to as important. In the next step, we analysed each identified change 
event based on our theoretical framework (Table 1 and Table 2) (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). Hence, we 
analyzed 1) which event triggered the change; 2) the mechanism leading to the change; 3) the impact of the 
mechanism (transforming or reinforcing) on the existing configuration of the digital payment ecosystem (its 
actors, architecture and governance); and 4) the dominance of the mechanism, i.e., which dimension of the 
configuration predominantly changed and how that impacted the other dimensions. Although there are 
different methods to identify generative mechanisms (through affordances (Bygstad et al., 2016; Tan et al., 
2015) or grounded theory (Vintzce, 2013), we adopted an approach like the one proposed by Henfridsson and 
Bygstad (2013) due to similarity of the observed phenomenon. Hence, we traced the socio-technical activities 
occurring between the triggering event and the observed outcomes to identify the activated generative 
mechanism. In the next step, we organized our analysis results into two separate accounts focused on 
transforming mechanisms (Table 3) and reinforcing mechanisms, respectively (Table 4). This allowed us to 
clearly see how the punctuated equilibrium perspective had materialized and it offered a strong foundation for 
theory building. Hence, in a final activity we engaged in analytical generalization (Yin, 2003) by combining 
our empirical findings, the theoretical framework and extant literature to advance theory about the evolution 
of digital platform ecosystems (Eisenhardt, 1989). Throughout, we iterated between the various steps as 
insights emerged and the theoretical contribution took shape (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
Empirical Analysis 
In the following, we offer a detailed analysis of the triggering events and generative mechanisms that shaped 
the evolution of the MobilePay ecosystem from the launch of the platform in May 2013 until September 2017. 
We apply our theoretical framework (Table 1 and Table 2) to identify transforming and reinforcing 
mechanisms, the triggers that activated them and the consequential change outcomes in actors, architecture 
and governance.  
Transforming Generative Mechanisms 
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We first present the transforming generative mechanisms, which changed the deep structure of the MobilePay 
ecosystem—from the appearance of the triggering event to the establishment of a transformed deep structure 
(period of instability). Table 3 offers a summary of this analysis. 
Table 3 Transforming Generative Mechanisms 
(italicized items indicate dominant change focus)  
Mechanism Trigger Deep Structure Change 
Change of 
ownership 
 
(Actor-
dominant) 
 
December 2012 
Divergence of 
interests between 
Danske Bank and 
other actors in 
original platform 
consortium  
 
Summer 2012 
Actors: One platform owner and technology provider 
 
Architecture: No interoperability between Danske Bank 
and other banks 
 
Governance: Danske Bank retains intellectual property 
rights of platform and has full control over its development 
Launch of app 
for C2C 
payments  
 
(Architecture–
dominant) 
 
May 2013 
Race with 
competitors to 
reach private 
customers 
  
December 2012 
Actors: Private customers of all Danish banks 
 
Architecture: A dedicated app for C2C payments enabled 
by Danske Bank’s existing IT solutions 
 
Governance: Open and free access for Danish private bank 
customers with C2C transactions limited to $3000 per year 
Expansion to 
include C2B 
transactions 
 
(Architecture-
dominant) 
 
February 2014 
Reaching critical 
mass of private 
customers spurs 
demand for C2B 
solution  
 
June 2013 
Actors: Inclusion of commercial customers 
 
Architecture: Platform core expands with configurable 
functionalities for C2B payments  
 
Governance: Only Danske Bank’s commercial customers 
can freely access and only for in-store trade (no online) 
Openness to 
third-party 
complementors 
 
(Actor-
dominant) 
 
June 2014 
Demand for in-
app payments  
 
December 2013 
Actors: Inclusion of third-party complementors 
 
Architecture: An API is added as boundary resource to 
allow integration of third-party complements to platform 
core 
 
Governance: Only access for third-party complementors, 
who offer services and products in non-digital 
environments, based on fee-based agreement with Danske 
Bank 
Partnering with 
platform 
technology 
providers 
 
Developments in 
online and in-
store payment 
markets and 
Actors: Inclusion of Payment Service Providers (PSPs) 
distributing MobilePay Online solution; inclusion of 
hardware platform complementors to enable in-store 
payments; collaboration with ecosystem integrators 
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(Actor-
dominant) 
 
January 2015 
demand from 
large merchants  
 
January 2014 
Architecture: Release of APIs to enable connectivity to 
actors; adding modules offered by platform technology 
providers to platform periphery 
 
Governance: For online payments access through PSPs, 
and for in-store payments access through platform owner; 
rules for participation jointly defined between platform 
owner and platform technology providers with agreements 
for sharing revenue, liability and maintenance costs 
Architectural 
renewal of the 
platform  
 
(Architecture -
dominant) 
 
August 2015 
Frequent 
problems with 
platform 
performance and 
development  
 
March 2014 
Actors: No change 
 
Architecture: Partial decoupling from Danske Bank’s 
systems improves performance; building new core 
capabilities (stand-in procedure) decreases dependencies 
on existing solutions  
 
Governance: No change 
Resolving 
accumulated 
governance 
issues 
 
(Governance-
dominant) 
 
April 2016 
High operating 
costs due to 
increased volume 
of transactions  
 
July 2014 
 
Problems with 
private customer 
verification  
 
August 2014 
Actors: No change 
 
Architecture: Moving Danske Bank customers from card-
based infrastructure to account-to-account infrastructure 
reduces transaction fees; integration of differentiated ID 
verification process for private customers 
 
Governance: Private customer access and use require 
identification; owner renegotiates contracts with 
infrastructure providers to reduce cost; additional sources 
of revenue added 
Engaging 
financial 
partners 
 
(Actor-
dominant) 
 
September 2016 
Platform owner 
lacks resources to 
compete with 
global and 
regional players  
 
Summer 2015 
Actors: New types of platform providers, who also act as 
financial providers (partner banks) 
 
Architecture: Further decoupling from Danske Bank’s IT 
systems towards account-to-account infrastructure between 
partner banks 
 
Governance: Partner banks invest in MobilePay and are 
rewarded for their distribution efforts; business customers 
can access MobilePay through their own bank 
Change of ownership (Summer 2012 – December 2012)  
As an incumbent financial institution in a rapidly changing environment, Danske Bank faced many 
uncertainties in 2012—including shifting consumer preferences due to the rapid adoption of emerging 
technologies, entry of new competitors, and a stricter regulatory environment. To avoid disruption, Danske 
Bank initially joined forces with other major Danish banks to develop a common mobile payment platform. In 
summer 2012, however, interests began to diverge, and the consortium failed to agree on a common vision. 
After the collaboration had stalled for a couple of months, Danske Bank left the consortium in December 2012 
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and announced plans to develop a digital payment platform on its own. The decision to change from joint to 
solo ownership transformed the governance regime, with Danske Bank as the solo platform owner and 
technology provider. As a result, the architecture was not designed to be interoperable with the systems of 
other Danish banks, and Danske Bank retained the intellectual property rights of the platform and full control 
over its subsequent development. 
Launch of app for C2C payments (December 2012 – May 2013)  
The change to solo ownership triggered a first mover race between Danske Bank, its former partners and other 
actors such as the Danish telecom operators. The intensified competitive environment forced Danske Bank to 
accelerate the development of its own mobile payment platform, which resulted in the introduction of a simple 
configuration of actors, architecture and governance. After just six months, in May 2013, Danske Bank, as 
platform owner and provider, launched MobilePay as a dedicated app that allowed Danish private bank 
customers to exchange money using their mobile phones. Thus, MobilePay initially offered consumer-to-
consumer (C2C) payments to one distinct group of demand-side actors. The MobilePay architecture consisted 
of a lean core that only supported C2C payments enabled by the owner’s back office systems and utilizing the 
existent card payment infrastructure. The resulting limited features required a relatively simple governance 
regime to regulate access to and use of the platform. To encourage fast adoption, the platform owner opened 
MobilePay for all Danish bank private account holders. In addition, the owner subsidized the development and 
maintenance costs allowing private customers to use MobilePay free of charge until a critical mass was 
established. Due to regulatory requirements, however, private customers could at most transact $3000 per year.  
Expansion to include C2B transactions (June 2013 – February 2014) 
MobilePay proved to be hugely popular and the initial goal of attracting 250,000 private customers (6 % of the 
Danish market) in one year was surpassed in just two months after the launch (June 2013). The reach of critical 
mass of private customers, together with the widespread use of MobilePay, which went beyond C2C payments 
and included transactions at small businesses such as coffee shops, food stalls and at flea markets, drew the 
attention of businesses customers, who wished to join the ecosystem. As a result, Danske Bank added new 
types of actors, namely commercial customers (initially, only small and medium sized merchants) and opened 
the platform for consumer-to-business transactions (C2B) in February 2014. This transformation of the actors 
with inclusion of new types of participants required corresponding changes in architecture and governance. To 
support the increased number of functionalities, the platform core expanded to include a separate app, Mobile 
Pay Business, which business customers used to receive payments from their customers. To regulate access to 
the platform, Danske Bank decided that only its own commercial customers could join. They also regulated 
the interactions between the new and existing actors by defining the scope of platform use—e.g., commercial 
customers could use the business solution only for in-store trade (e.g., no online) and were not allowed to send 
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marketing material to private customers through the platform. To stimulate adoption, commercial customers 
could initially access and use MobilePay for free. 
Openness to third-party complementors (December 2013 – June 2014) 
Responding to customer demands for various functionalities resulting from the increased adoption of C2C and 
C2B transactions by the end of 2013, Danske Bank extended its portfolio of payment options by enabling in-
app payments in June 2014. This resulted in another transformation of the ecosystem of actors with the 
inclusion of third-party complementors as supply-side actors, who sought to incorporate MobilePay as a 
payment method in their applications. To enable connectivity towards third-party complementors, the owner 
added boundary resources (e.g., APIs) to the platform core, which resulted in the formation of a periphery 
consisting of various external complements. Thus, the ecosystem architecture expanded to include platform 
core, boundary resources and periphery. In addition, the owner introduced rules to govern the access to and 
usage of the platform by these new types of actors. Initially, only select third-party complementors, who had 
business agreements with Danske Bank and MobilePay, could offer in-app payments for services, redeemable 
in a non-digital environment, (e.g., tickets). To cover the development costs, the owner collected a fee from 
third-party complementors.  
Partnering with platform technology providers (January 2014 – January 2015) 
In January 2014, the continuous success of MobilePay drew the attention of large in-store merchants (e.g., 
supermarket chains) and online stores, who wanted to join the ecosystem. Simultaneously, the advancements 
in technology for online and in-store payments, as well as the demand from private customers, encouraged 
Danske Bank to support such types of payments. To enable online and in-store payments, the platform had to 
become part of the already established in-store and online payment ecosystems, prompting the owner to 
collaborate with other platform technology providers. For example, MobilePay partnered with payment service 
providers (PSPs) to distribute its online payment solution to online stores. Similarly, to offer in-store payments, 
the owner relied on hardware complementors (e.g., Point of Sale (PoS) terminal providers), who co-produced 
the MobilePay in-store solution, and on integrators (e.g., PoS vendors) who enabled it technically in-store. To 
establish connectivity towards the platform technology providers, the owner released additional boundary 
resources (APIs). As a result, the platform periphery expanded further by including complements offered by 
platform technology providers (e.g., hardware components). The introduction of platform providers required 
Danske Bank to share some of its control over the platform ecosystem with the new actors by, for example, 
jointly defining the rules for participation of commercial customers (e.g., online stores). To regulate its 
relations with providers, the platform owner also entered individual agreements for revenue sharing, ownership 
of intellectual property rights over software and hardware complements, and division of responsibilities for 
maintenance, continuous innovation, liability, and more. 
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Architectural renewal of the platform (March 2014 – August 2015) 
As the development of the MobilePay platform core was quick and relied heavily on existing back office 
systems, the initial focus was not on long-term architecture scalability and sustainability. However, the 
growing number of C2C and C2B transactions (app. 40 % of the market share in 2014) led to numerous 
instances in early 2014 where the platform did not function optimally, which decreased its value to all actors 
and inhibited further innovation. These frequent performance and development issues triggered Danske Bank 
to redesign and improve the architecture. To avoid low performance spill-overs, the platform owner partially 
disentangled the core from its existing systems. The efforts included building additional core capabilities, such 
as a stand-in procedure, which allowed customers to continue transacting even though the back-end payment 
systems had shut down. The owner also commenced a major IT transformation project to increase the overall 
flexibility of the platform by leveraging cloud-computing capabilities and improving the connectivity with 
third-party providers and supply-side actors through new state-of-the-art APIs. These activities strengthened 
the core and added new boundary resources that increased the platform’s generative capabilities. Although the 
platform owner changed the core and the boundary resources, the actors and platform governance did not 
change at this stage. However, the architectural revisions supported better the activities of the many 
heterogeneous actors that were now operating in the MobilePay ecosystem by removing the inefficiencies 
resulting from the initial configuration of actors, architecture and governance.  
Resolving accumulated governance issues (August 2014 – April 2016) 
Although the architecture performance improved, the rapidly growing number of diversified actors resulted in 
accumulated governance issues. Seeking fast adoption, Danske Bank had afforded access to the platform 
through a simple sign-up process, avoiding strict verification of its private customers because financial 
regulations allowed for relaxed access rules up to two years after the launch. The initial goal of reaching private 
customers as quickly as possible had also given priority to platform adoption over platform profitability with 
users still enjoying free access and usage of MobilePay as the owner subsidized the costs. The rapid adoption, 
however, led to an increase in transaction volume and to higher operational costs, which the revenue collected 
from commercial customers could not cover. Thus, the initial choice of governance led to the accumulation of 
critical governance issues, which the platform owner had to resolve in due time. In April 2015, in close 
cooperation with legal authorities since August 2014, Danske Bank designed a model for private customer 
verification, which included differentiated ID access corresponding to different levels of use. For example, if 
private customers wanted to have a higher yearly transaction limit, they needed to identify themselves with a 
higher level of identification, such as national ID. The platform owner also adopted several measures to reduce 
the costs associated with developing and operating the platform. The high transaction fees due to the initial 
choice to base the platform on card-based infrastructure were the main source of costs. In response, the 
platform owner moved its private customers to an account-to-account infrastructure, which lowered the costs. 
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Thus, to address critical inefficiencies in governance, Danske Bank altered the platform core in a manner that 
mainly affected its own private customers. In addition, the owner renegotiated the contracts with infrastructure 
providers in a bid to reduce operational costs, thus altering the appropriation regime around the platform. To 
balance the high operational costs, Danske Bank also introduced additional sources of revenue collected from 
commercial customers and platform technology providers.  
Engaging financial partners (Summer 2015 – September 2016) 
Early on, Danske Bank had decided to replicate its success with the rapid adoption of MobilePay in Denmark 
by offering the platform to other markets where the bank has significant market positions. As a result, they had 
entered the Finish market in late 2014 and the Norwegian market in 2015, but with limited success. In summer 
2015, the owner sought to reinforce its Nordic ambition and protect itself from upcoming international payment 
platforms such as ApplePay and SamsungPay. To strengthen its market position in the region, the owner 
opened up MobilePay through a partnership model with other Nordic banks. Following prolonged negotiations, 
Nordea, a major Nordic bank, joined MobilePay in September 2016, which triggered a new stage in the 
evolution of the ecosystem. The inclusion of partner banks as distribution and financial partners transformed 
the actors. Apart from distributing MobilePay to their commercial customers, the partner banks also acted as 
financial partners, investing resources in the future development of the platform. As such, their role in the 
ecosystem differed significantly from previous distribution partners (e.g., PSPs for online payments). The 
incorporation of partner banks also changed the architecture significantly and complemented the earlier efforts 
to resolve accumulated governance issues. By plugging into the existing payment systems of partner banks, 
Danske Bank further modified the platform core to complete the migration from card-based infrastructure to 
account-to-account infrastructure. This required development of new boundary resources (APIs) that 
integrated the core with the partner banks’ systems. Rather than implementing a comprehensive governance 
regime, the owner introduced a minimum set of rules to avoid stalling the continued innovation of the platform. 
To access the platform and as an initial investment towards the development of MobilePay, partner banks paid 
an up-front fee. When partner banks invested further in MobilePay, Danske Bank rewarded their distribution 
efforts if they resulted in increased platform usage in terms of volume of transactions or growing number of 
commercial customers. Prioritizing speedy innovation, the platform owner restricted the participation of 
partner banks in the development of the platform. While Danske Bank created a dialogue with them to inquire 
about their innovation ideas, partner banks did not acquire any ownership over the platform despite their 
investments and as a result, had limited influence on MobilePay development. 
Reinforcing Generative Mechanisms 
Next, we outline the reinforcing generative mechanisms, which led to incremental changes in the MobilePay 
ecosystem without affecting the established deep structure. For each reinforcing mechanism, Table 4 identifies 
the triggering event and the changes it caused during a period of stability between two transformations of the 
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deep structure. As we observed that several reinforcing mechanisms, for example, the adoption by private 
customers, continued to be active in the MobilePay ecosystem evolution beyond this initial period, we have 
marked these mechanisms with ‘*’. 
Development of digital platform with limited scope (January 2012 – May 2013) 
In January 2012, the change of ownership further reinforced Danske Bank’s role as technology provider (Table 
4). As former partners turned into competitors racing to enter the market, Danske Bank speeded up the 
development of the digital payment platform by limiting the scope of its functionality. Although initially 
considered for both private and commercial customers, the platform owner decided to focus solely on enabling 
C2C payments. 
Building on existing IT solutions* (December 2012 – February 2013) 
As solo owner, Danske Bank relied on its own competencies to develop the digital payment platform, thus 
retaining control over the architecture. Initially, the owner considered multiple technologies (such as Near 
Field Communication (NFC), QR codes, and dongles), which required more development time and 
collaborating with other technology providers. Facing time constraints, the owner built the platform on the 
existing Danske Bank’s IT solution and the card payment infrastructure. 
Adoption by private customers* (May 2013 – February 2014) 
After the launch of the C2C payment app in May 2013, both Danske Bank and other Danish bank private 
customers adopted swiftly MobilePay—with approximately 250 000 Danes (or 9 % of the Danish population) 
in two months after launch—due to its ease of use based on the lean architecture of the platform core. The 
inclusion of private customers from all Danish banks, combined with functionalities encouraging further 
adoption (e.g., sending payments to peers who did not have MobilePay, prompting them to download the 
solution) created strong same-side network effects among private customers. Consequently, in February 2014, 
approximately one million Danes had adopted the platform.  
Innovation for private customers* (May 2013 – September 2013) 
The race to launch MobilePay before competitors forced Danske Bank to initially offer few core 
functionalities. Hence, after the launch in May 2013 the owner continued developing the platform by releasing 
additional functionalities to the core. In September 2013, the MobilePay architecture extended to include 
incremental innovations for private customers (e.g., functionalities such as split the bill, request money from 
peers) with the purpose of driving adoption and usage.  
Adoption by commercial customers* (February 2014 – June 2014) 
In early 2014, in addition to continuous adoption by private customers, commercial customers started to join 
MobilePay ecosystem. Initially, a few select owners of coffee shops and street food stalls participated in a pilot 
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launch, which proved to be successful, with private consumers readily engaging in C2B transactions. In 
addition, the presence of strong cross-side network effects prompted other commercial customers to adopt 
MobilePay. As result, approximately 2,900 SMEs had joined MobilePay ecosystem by June 2014. 
Innovation for commercial customers* (March 2014 – April 2014) 
With commercial customers adopting MobilePay at steady pace, in the end of March 2014 Danske Bank 
initiated ongoing dialogue to collect feedback and suggestions for further development. These inquiries led to 
the identification of new functionalities, some of which the platform owner decided to include in the platform 
core (e.g., donations). By doing so, the owner aimed at creating new interactions between private and 
commercial customers, thus driving further the adoption and usage of MobilePay.  
 
Table 4 Reinforcing Generative Mechanisms 
Transforming 
Mechanism 
Reinforcing  
Mechanism 
Trigger 
Ecosystem 
Change 
Change of 
Ownership 
 
 
(December 
2012) 
Development of digital 
platform with limited scope 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(January 2012 – May 2013) 
 
Change of 
Ownership 
 
Initially considered for both 
private and commercial 
customers, but developed 
solution focused on C2C 
payments due to time constraints 
Building on existing IT 
solutions* 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(December 2012 – 
February 2013) 
 
Change of 
Ownership 
 
Considered multiple 
technological options but built 
on Danske Bank’s existing IT 
solutions due to time constraints 
Launch of app 
for C2C 
payments  
 
 
(May 2013) 
Adoption by private 
customers* 
(Actor-dominant) 
 
(May 2013 – February 
2014) 
Launch of app 
for C2C 
payments 
Fast initial adoption of private 
customers with one million 
private customers by February 
2014 
Innovation for private 
customers* 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(September 2013) 
Launch of app 
for C2C 
payments  
 
Implementation of new 
functionalities for private 
customers to platform core 
Expansion to 
include C2B 
transactions 
 
(February 
2014) 
Adoption by commercial 
customers*  
(Actor-dominant) 
 
(February 2014 – June 
2014) 
Adoption by 
private 
customers 
Fast initial adoption of 
commercial customers with 
2,900 SMEs by June 2014 
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Innovation for commercial 
customers* 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(March 2014 – April 2014) 
Commercial 
customer 
demands for 
functionality  
Implementation of new 
functionalities for commercial 
customers to platform core 
Openness to 
third-party 
complementors 
 
(June 2014) 
Optimization of adoption 
by commercial customers  
(Governance-dominant) 
 
(September 2014) 
Adoption of 
commercial 
customers 
Incremental improvement of 
functionalities to platform core 
 
Improvement of 
connectivity for third-party 
complementors* 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(December 2014) 
Openness to 
third-party 
complementors 
Release of new boundary 
resources (APIs) to improve 
integration of third-party 
complementors to platform core 
Customization of offerings 
for commercial customers 
(Governance-dominant) 
 
(November 2014) 
Adoption of 
commercial 
customers 
Introduction of new customized 
prices adjusting the value 
appropriation  
Partnering with 
platform 
technology 
providers 
 
(January 2015) 
Standardization of 
boundary resources to 
foster platform periphery 
development 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(June 2015) 
Demand to 
extend scope of 
in-app payments 
to all relevant 
commercial 
customers 
Standardization of APIs and 
removal of customized 
functionalities 
Architectural 
renewal of the 
platform  
 
(August 2015) 
Adoption by platform 
technology providers* 
(Actor-dominant) 
 
(August 2015 – April 2016) 
Adoption of 
commercial 
customers 
More platform technology 
providers adopt platform 
Introduction of third-party 
services to platform 
offerings*  
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(September 2015 – 
November 2015) 
Encouraging 
adoption of C2B 
payments 
Implementation of third-party 
service modules in platform 
periphery 
Relaxing participation rules 
for private customers*  
(Governance-dominant) 
 
(September 2015) 
Adoption of 
private 
customers  
Increase of daily spending limit 
for private customers 
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Resolving 
accumulated 
governance 
issues 
 
(April 2016) 
Improvement of 
connectivity for technology 
providers* 
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(September 2016) 
Commercial 
customer 
demands to 
improve 
functionalities 
Release of new boundary 
resources (APIs) to connect to 
third-party hardware 
components 
Removing functionalities 
from platform core  
(Architecture-dominant) 
 
(June 2016)  
Low adoption of 
functionalities 
by private 
customers  
Removing functionalities from 
the platform core as a separate 
internal module connected to 
platform core 
Engaging 
financial 
partners 
 
(October 2016) 
Adoption by financial 
partners* 
(Actor-dominant) 
 
(October 2016 – September 
2017) 
Main competitor 
Swipp loses its 
key supporter, 
Nordea 
More financial partners adopt 
platform with70 financial 
partners by August 2017 
Tightening participation 
rules for commercial 
customers  
(Governance-dominant) 
 
(March 2017) 
Non-regulated 
use of platform 
by commercial 
customers 
Stricter participation rules for 
commercial customers 
Adjustment of value 
appropriation 
(Governance-dominant) 
 
(April 2017) 
Introduction of 
new competitive 
solution  
Lowering prices for commercial 
customers using in-store solution  
 
Change in MobilePay 
ownership model  
(Actor-dominant) 
 
(September 2017) 
Partner banks 
want legal 
separation 
between Danske 
Bank and 
MobilePay  
MobilePay as separate legal 
entity with platform ownership 
 
Optimization of adoption by commercial customers (June 2014 – September 2014) 
While an increasing number of commercial customers wanted to join MobilePay ecosystem in June 2014, they 
often ended up waiting for weeks before getting access to the platform. The reason for the delay was the slow 
and mostly manual affiliation process, which relied heavily on existing Danske Bank systems and processes 
(e.g., requiring physical copies of documents). To address these inefficiencies, the platform owner automated 
the process, which required an incremental innovation to the platform core.  
Improvement of connectivity for third-party complementors* (June 2014 – December 2014) 
160 
 
After opening MobilePay to third-party complements in June 2014, the platform owner received request for 
additional functionalities to extend platform usage. To improve third-party complementors’ access to a wider 
range of functionalities in the platform core, the owner released new boundary resources (APIs). For example, 
apart from solely receiving payments in their apps, third-party complementors could refund their customers 
for in-app purchases using a new API. 
Customization of offerings for commercial customers (June 2014 – November 2014) 
As commercial customers with divergent needs and requirements kept adopting MobilePay, Danske Bank 
realized it had to customize its offerings. Subsequently, the owner introduced different packages (i.e., bundles 
of functionalities) targeting specific commercial customer segments. Thus, commercial customers could 
choose to pay different fees to either adopt limited functionalities on one mobile device or include more 
functionalities on multiple devices. In addition, to reflect the actual use of MobilePay, the owner also adjusted 
the value appropriation regime by introducing corresponding customized prices for commercial customers. 
Standardization of boundary resources to foster platform periphery (December 2014 – June 2015) 
Initially, Danske Bank released customized boundary resources to a few select third-party complementors. 
After the successful pilot, however, other external complementors wished to join the ecosystem. To enable 
wider access to its platform, the owner needed to standardize the existing boundary resources and remove all 
customizations (e.g., customized screen colours and user interaction flows). By introducing standardized APIs 
utilized by a growing number of complementors, the platform owner aimed to foster further development of 
the platform periphery. 
Adoption by platform technology providers* (August 2015 – April 2016) 
In August 2015, the demand from commercial customers to enable online and in-store payments triggered 
several platform technology providers to join the MobilePay ecosystem as distributors or integrators. Various 
PSPs offering online payments brought MobilePay to more than 3500 online stores across the Nordic countries. 
Simultaneously, more than 80 PoS vendors enabling in-store payments and two hardware providers 
distributing MobilePay-branded payment terminals had joined the MobilePay ecosystem by April 2016. 
Introduction of third-party services to platform offerings* (September 2015 – November 2015) 
In late 2015, Danske Bank included value-added services (VAS) to nurture the growth of C2B transactions 
and unlock new sources of revenue. Initially, the owner decided to develop its own loyalty solution, Bonus, 
but the uptake was slow. After struggling to ignite Bonus, Danske Bank concluded it lacked the necessary 
knowledge and resources to offer VAS. As a result, it collaborated with third-party complementors by 
integrating their services (e.g., receipts, invoices, and loyalty programmes) as part of the platform offerings. 
The third-party services were implemented as modules in the platform periphery, from which commercial 
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customers could choose to plug and play while private customers could access VAS as part of the MobilePay 
portfolio of functionalities. 
Relaxing participation rules for private customers* (August 2014 – September 2015) 
As more private and commercial customers adopted MobilePay, the volume of C2C and C2B transactions had 
significantly increased by August 2014. As result, the daily and yearly spending limits imposed on private 
customers when paying with MobilePay mismatched the actual use of the platform. To accommodate this, 
Danske Bank relaxed the existing rules by twice increasing the daily spending limit for private customers.  
Improvement of connectivity for technology providers* (April 2016 – September 2016) 
The existing MobilePay in-store solution required use of a dongle, provided by external hardware 
complementors and constituted yet another payment terminal, which large merchants needed to display to their 
customers at the cashier. Responding to a demand to display only one payment terminal, Danske Bank 
collaborated with payment terminal providers (e.g., Verifone and Bambora), who incorporated MobilePay as 
a payment option in their terminals, already in use by a number of large merchants. This required the release 
of additional boundary resources to connect to the new platform technology providers. 
Removing functionalities from platform core (November 2015 – June 2016) 
In late 2015, Danske Bank observed that private customers did not use on a regular basis some of the 
functionalities within the MobilePay private app (e.g., request payments). After considering different options, 
the owner removed the unpopular functionality from the platform core in June 2016 and instead offered it as a 
separate app, WeShare, which allowed private customers to keep track and settle group payments. The owner 
introduced WeShare as a separate internal complement, part of the MobilePay periphery and connected tightly 
to the platform core.  
Adoption by financial partners* (October 2016 – September 2017) 
After its biggest supporter, Nordea, left the common bank digital payment initiative, Swipp, to join MobilePay, 
other Danish banks followed suite and abandoned the consortium. As result, more than 70 local Danish banks 
joined the MobilePay ecosystem, thus cementing its dominance in the Danish market (approximately 90 % 
market share).  
Tightening participation rules for commercial customers (January 2017 – March 2017) 
Although Danske Bank had introduced a set of rules regulating the use of the platform, certain actors began to 
utilize MobilePay in ways, which put the owner in disadvantageous positions. For example, some commercial 
customers aggregated payments from private customers and settled them as a single transaction through 
MobilePay, thus reducing the amount of fees they had to pay. As the existing governance regime did not 
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sanction this use pattern, the owner tightened the participation rules for commercial customers and prohibited 
such behaviour.  
Adjustment of value appropriation (March 2017 – April 2017) 
The introduction of new competitive solutions on the Danish market (e.g., mobile Dankort by Nets), which 
competed with the MobilePay in-store solution, triggered Danske Bank to adjust the governance regime in 
March 2017 towards in-store commercial customers. As result, the value appropriation rules changed so in-
store commercial customers paid lower prices for using MobilePay. 
Change in MobilePay ownership model (September 2016 – September 2017) 
The inclusion of partner banks in late 2016 redefined Danske Bank’s role as platform owner. As the other 
partner banks competed with the owner in areas other than mobile payments, they agreed to join if MobilePay 
became a separate company, thereby reduce the influence of Danske Bank on future developments. 
Subsequently, MobilePay applied for a license as e-money institution, which, after a lengthy regulatory 
approval process, resulted in establishment of MobilePay as a separate legal entity that acquired the platform 
ownership from Danske Bank. The new legal entity (MobilePay Inc.) became the owner in September 2017, 
with Danske Bank acting as the only investor taking every seat in its board of directors. 
Discussion 
To ensure their long-term survival, digital platform ecosystems need to evolve in response to internal and 
external challenges (Gawer, 2015; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). However, operating in uncertain 
environments with increasing complexity of actors, architecture and governance, digital platform ecosystems 
need to be able evolve in unpredictable ways, without necessarily following predefined patterns and scripts 
(Datee et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). As many challenges compete simultaneously for attention, the 
platform owner and other key actors need to carefully evaluate the impact such challenges can have on the 
evolutionary trajectory of the ecosystem and dedicate resources accordingly.  
Despite the importance of knowing why and how digital platform ecosystems evolve, extant research offers 
limited insights into the complex nature of the evolutionary process that leads to impactful outcomes. The 
growth, co-evolution and competitive perspectives that dominate extant research have advanced our 
knowledge about digital platform ecosystem evolution, but studies focus predominantly on identifying 
evolutionary outcomes, either as standalone topics or as part of descriptive stage models. As such, our 
knowledge about the various events, which trigger the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem, and the 
generative mechanisms, which lead to certain evolutionary outcomes in response to these events, remains 
limited (Gawer, 2015; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018).  
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Against this backdrop, we have combined concepts about the punctuated nature of triggering events (Gersick, 
1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008) and about the causal nature of generative mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1975; 
Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), to develop a theoretical framework (Table 1 and Table 2) aimed at explaining 
why and how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time. Moreover, we have demonstrated the utility of the 
framework by offering a comprehensive and detailed account of the evolution of a prominent digital payment 
platform ecosystem, MobilePay, from the launch of the platform to market dominance. In the following, we 
draw on the theoretical framework, the insights from our empirical analysis and extant theory to further 
advance theory on why and how digital platform ecosystems evolve over time.  
The triggering of platform ecosystem evolution 
While the path of a digital platform ecosystem is paved with a myriad of events, only some of them trigger the 
generative mechanisms that shape ecosystem evolution. Such change triggers may constitute as external events 
that challenge the current configuration of the ecosystem, or as internal events that create misfits between the 
established configuration of the ecosystem and its environment, thereby challenging the performance of the 
ecosystem (Table 2).  
Consistent with extant literature (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Gawer, 2015; Tan et al., 2015), we found that external 
events, such as changes in the competitive environment (e.g., divergent interests with competitors, competition 
to enter the market and introduction of new competitors), regulatory requirements (e.g., stricter ID verification) 
and technology advancements (e.g., new technology for online payments), triggered generative mechanisms 
that shaped the evolution of the MobilePay ecosystem. We found similar triggering of generative mechanisms 
by internal events, such as demands from actors (e.g., release of new functionalities, extending access to 
boundary resources), performance issues (e.g., downtime), mounting operating costs and non-regulated use of 
the platform. Interestingly, it was a combination of internal and external events that triggered disruptive 
changes (Table 3), while reinforcement of the ecosystem configuration was predominantly triggered by 
internal events (Table 4).  For example, high operating costs (internal event) and regulatory requirements 
(external event) triggered a change in the existing governance regime (disruptive change); whereas, low 
adoption of functionalities (internal event) triggered incremental changes in the platform core (reinforcement 
of the ecosystem configuration).    
Building on the general notion that generative mechanisms can act as change triggers of other generative 
mechanisms (Bhaskar, 1975; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), we found that various combinations of 
transforming and reinforcing mechanisms fed upon one another. Most typically, transforming mechanisms 
triggered one or more subsequent reinforcing mechanisms, e.g., the transformation when MobilePay opened 
to third-party complementors triggered the platform owner to reinforce this move by improving the 
connectivity for third-party complementors (Table 4). We attribute this to the fact that transformation of the 
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ecosystem deep structure often requires or causes subsequent revisions in the ecosystem’s actors, architecture 
and governance. As another example, the launch of the C2C app (transformation) triggered two reinforcing 
mechanisms—one related to the actors (adoption by private customers), and one related to the platform 
architecture (innovation for private customers) (Table 4). Reinforcing mechanisms can also trigger other 
reinforcing mechanisms as when adoption of MobilePay by private customers triggered continuous adoption 
by commercial customers through strong cross-side network effects (Table 4). Further, we found that 
reinforcing mechanisms can indirectly trigger transforming mechanisms. For example, the ongoing adoption 
by private users in combination with the continuous building upon existing IT systems led to frequent instances 
of problematic platform performance (Table 3 and Table 4). To address these problems, the platform owner 
initiated architectural renewal, which transformed the ecosystem’s deep structure.  
The contextual configuration of generative mechanisms 
Combining different perspectives in extant literature, we propose that digital platform ecosystems represent 
context-dependent evolving configurations of actors, architecture and governance (Table 1). The deep structure 
of the ecosystem is then a configuration, which remains unchanged during a stable period of evolution 
(Lyytinen and Newman, 2008), and which influences the evolution of the ecosystem both during and after this 
stable period (Gersick, 1991). For example, the initial choice to build upon existing Danske Bank’s IT solutions 
allowed for a quick launch and ignition of MobilePay, but it also led to performance and development issues 
over time, which eventually required transformation of the deep structure (Table 3).  
The empirical findings support our conceptualization that generative mechanisms are anchored in latent 
properties of the deep structure, which can be activated to shape ecosystem evolution (Table 2). Hence, a 
specific configuration of actors, architecture and governance, resulting from previous activation of generative 
mechanisms, renders certain latent properties, which can be activated as subsequent mechanisms. For example, 
during its initial launch the MobilePay ecosystem consisted of a limited number of actors, namely Danske 
Bank as platform owner and private customers as demand-side actors. Over time, strong same-side network 
effects led to rapid adoption of the platform by private customers (reinforcing mechanism). This resulted in a 
considerable user base, which made the platform attractive to other types of actors as a latent property of the 
actor dimension of the ecosystem. This led to demands from commercial customers to join the ecosystem and 
eventually to expansion of the ecosystem to include C2B transactions (transforming mechanism) (Table 3 and 
Table 4). Similarly, as MobilePay opened for third-party complementors (transforming mechanism) through 
the release of boundary resources, the platform became more malleable as a latent property of the architecture 
dimension of the ecosystem (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). This malleability subsequently resulted in 
adoption of the platform by other third-party complementors (reinforcing mechanism) (Table 3 and Table 4). 
Hence, generative mechanisms are activated in a specific context (Bhaskar, 1975; Henfridsson and Bygstad, 
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2013), characterized by a triggering event as well as current latent properties of the deep structure, which stem 
from previous deep structure choices (Gersick, 1991) and the impacts of preceding generative mechanisms 
(Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013).  
The dominance and impact of generative mechanisms 
The generative mechanisms in the evolution of the MobilePay ecosystem had different change focus in terms 
of actors, architecture and governance as detailed in Table 3 and Table 4. Actor-dominant mechanisms changed 
the actor types within the ecosystem (e.g., private customers, commercial customers, platform technology 
providers) or they changed the actor population within a specific type (e.g., increased adoption by private 
customers). Architecture-dominant mechanisms introduced new components to the platform core, boundary 
resources and platform periphery (e.g., new APIs or introduction of external and internal complements) or they 
adjusted existing architecture over time (e.g., renewal of platform core, removal of functionalities). The 
governance-dominant generative mechanisms added new rules to the governance regime (e.g., ID verification 
process) or they modified existing governance rules (e.g., relaxing participation rules). Although the observed 
mechanisms exhibited a dominant change focus, changes in one dimension of the ecosystem configuration 
during transformation typically led to changes in the other dimensions as a reflection of the intrinsic 
interdependencies between the constitutive dimensions of platform ecosystems. For example, introduction of 
third-party complementors into the MobilePay ecosystem was clearly actor-dominant, but it also led to changes 
in architecture (an API is added as boundary resource to allow for integration of third-party complements to 
platform core) and platform governance (only access for third-party complementors, who offered services and 
products in non-digital environments) (Table 3).   
Regardless of their dominance, the change outcomes of generative mechanisms can have transforming or 
reinforcing impact on the existing deep structure of the ecosystem (Gersick, 1991). Transforming mechanisms 
produce change outcomes, which significantly alter the configuration of actors, architecture and governance, 
while reinforcing mechanisms lead to incremental changes, which elaborate on the existing configuration 
(Lyytinen and Newman, 2008). During the evolution of MobilePay ecosystem, transforming mechanisms 
focused on introducing new actor types (e.g., third-party complementors) and shifts in owners (e.g., from co-
owners to single owners); on extending the platform core (e.g., expansion to include C2B transactions), 
including boundary resources to facilitate the creation of the platform periphery (e.g., release of APIs towards 
external complementors) and renewing the platform core (e.g., utilizing cloud-based infrastructure); and, on 
fixing critical governance issues (e.g., decreasing operating costs). After the establishment of a new 
configuration of actors, architecture and governance, various generative mechanisms were set in motion, 
reinforcing the new deep structure of the ecosystem. For example, after including a new actor types (e.g., 
technology providers), subsequent changes in these populations (e.g., adoption by technology providers) acted 
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as reinforcing mechanisms. Similarly, after introducing new elements to the architecture and renewing its core, 
the new deep structure was reinforced through mechanisms such as leveraging existing IT solutions, 
introducing incremental innovations to the platform core, optimizing functionalities in platform core and 
improving platform connectivity for actors through release of boundary resources and their standardization.  
In Table 5, we have summarized these empirical findings on generative mechanisms based on the proposed 
conceptualization that differentiates generative mechanisms based on their dominance and impact. The 
mechanisms included in the table represent, in slightly generalized form, the multiplicity of mechanisms we 
identified during the evolution of the MobilePay ecosystem (Table 3 and Table 4). As such, Table 5 
demonstrates the utility of the proposed concepts and it provides evidence of how the dominance and impact 
of the observed generative mechanisms manifested during the evolution of the MobilePay ecosystem.  
Table 5 The Dominance and Impact of Generative Mechanisms 
 Impact 
Transforming Reinforcing 
Dominance 
 
Actor 
 Changing actor types 
 Shifting owners 
 Changing actor populations* 
 Changing the role of platform 
owner 
Architecture 
 Extending platform core  
 Including boundary 
resources 
 Developing platform 
periphery 
 Renewing platform core 
 Leveraging existing IT solutions* 
 Introducing incremental 
innovation in platform core* 
 Optimizing functionalities in 
platform core* 
 Improving platform connectivity 
for actors* 
Governance 
 Developing governance 
regime 
 Customizing rules for actor types 
 Improving affiliation process 
 Tightening and relaxing 
participation rules* 
 Adjusting value appropriation 
rules 
The temporality of generative mechanisms 
Consistent with existing theory (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013), we found that multiple transforming and 
reinforcing mechanisms were activated simultaneously and interacted to drive the evolution of the MobilePay 
ecosystem. Thus, considering the temporality of when the generative mechanisms were active and how they 
unfolded, our findings confirm that digital platform ecosystems evolve in unpredictable ways, without 
necessarily following a predefined pattern (Datee et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). As exceptions, we 
observed that some mechanisms were more likely to appear at early or late stages of ecosystem evolution. 
Certain transforming mechanisms, such as renewal of platform core and resolving accumulated governance 
issues, were triggered by internal inefficiencies, and certain reinforcing mechanisms, such as tightening and 
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relaxing of participation rules, were triggered by accumulated governance issues, and as such they appeared at 
later stages of the MobilePay ecosystem evolution (Table 3 and Table 4). Similarly, there were mechanisms 
such as development and launch of platform that naturally appeared at the very early stages of platform 
evolution. Beside these exceptions, most changes in actors, architecture and governance did not follow pre-
defined order. For example, changes in ecosystem actors, which constitute a transforming mechanism, 
occurred throughout the evolution of the MobilePay ecosystem, even in the latest stage with engagement of 
financial partners (Table 3). Similarly, incremental changes to the platform core took place at early as well as 
later stages of ecosystem evolution (Table 4).  
Interestingly, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory presents evolution as a sequential process consisting of long 
periods, during which the deep structure remains relatively stable, followed by shorter periods of rapid, 
reinforcing change of the deep structure (Gersick, 1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008). However, we observed 
that the transforming mechanisms, which changed the existing deep structure of the MobilePay ecosystem, 
could span across considerable periods of time and overlap with other generative mechanisms (Table 3 and 
Table 4). For example, the transforming mechanisms that expanded the platform to include C2B transactions 
became active in June 2013, with the transformation of the deep structure occurring in February 2014. 
Surprisingly, the trigger for the next transforming mechanism (openness to third-party complementors), 
appeared in December 2013, months before the inclusion of C2B transactions. Furthermore, during the 
activation of this transforming mechanism, other reinforcing mechanisms were set in motion related to the 
previous deep structure (e.g., adoption by private customers, innovation for private customers) (Table 4). There 
are several explanations for this inconsistency between the theoretical sequentially and the observed temporal 
complexity.  
First, generative mechanisms are socio-technical in nature, with various actors taking part of their activation 
and operation (Henfridsson and Bygstad, 2013). Hence, different actors are involved in specific mechanisms, 
such as partnering with platform technology providers (large commercial customers, PoS vendors, PSPs, and 
more) (Table 3). As these different actors participate in a transforming mechanism, they need to align their 
interests and introduce required technical changes in their own systems to integrate with the digital platform. 
The operation of the mechanism can therefore take considerable time. This explanation is consistent with 
Njihia and Merali’s (2013) observation that the duration of generative mechanisms depends on the 
interventions made by the different participating actors. As most studies applying Punctuated Equilibrium 
Theory do not have an ecosystem focus (Gersick, 1991; Lyytinen and Newman, 2008; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985), they do not consider changes that take longer time to accommodate due to differences and 
interdependencies between actors. 
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Second, the complexity of change brought by transforming mechanisms may vary. For example, compare the 
incorporation of financial partners and the expansion to include external complementors, two MobilePay 
transforming mechanisms with different duration (Table 3). The incorporation of financial partners involved 
other Danish banks, which were already part of a competitive digital payment ecosystem. As this mechanism 
therefore had significant consequences for the Danish digital payment market, the negotiations with the first 
new partner bank, Nordea, took a long time. Furthermore, incorporation of financial partners led to changes in 
the platform ownership model and to changes in the relationships with commercial customers. In contrast, the 
incorporation of third-party complementors required Danske Bank to develop new boundary resources for a 
handful of select developers with limited impact on the overall ecosystem. Thus, transforming mechanisms 
with complex discontinuous ecosystem impacts are likely to cover large time span.  
Third, when transforming mechanisms are set in motion, reinforcing mechanisms continue to operate, because 
digital platform ecosystems evolve not only discontinuously but also cumulatively along multiple dimensions. 
A transformation is discontinuous with respect to the existing deep structure of actors, architecture and 
governance and establishes a new deep structure, as when the introduction of third-party developers in the 
MobilePay ecosystem transformed the configuration of actors, architecture and governance (Table 4). 
However, while this transformative mechanism added a new type of actors and changed the relationships 
between actors, it continued to evolve by expanding the populations of other types of actors from the previous 
deep structure such as private customers. Hence, while transforming mechanisms operate and eventually 
terminate, many reinforcing mechanisms operate concurrently and some of them may continue be active 
throughout subsequent transformations (marked with * in Table 5).  
In summary then, we answer our research question as follows: digital platform ecosystems evolve through 
networks of distributed and concurrent generative mechanisms, which transform and reinforce the deep 
structure of the ecosystem triggered by internal and external events and other mechanisms. While transforming 
mechanisms fundamentally change the existing deep structure of actors, architecture and governance, the 
reinforcing mechanisms sustain it. The dominant focus of mechanisms is distributed across the constituting 
dimensions of the ecosystem’s deep structure. As such, they operate concurrently and interact across actors, 
architecture and governance to stimulate or slow down ecosystem evolution, depending on whether the 
implicated mechanisms are convergent or divergent.  
The complex interactions between the timing of triggering events and the distributed and concurrent nature of 
generative mechanisms highlight the unpredictable ways in which digital platform ecosystems evolve (Datee 
et al., 2017; Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018). As a result, it is difficult for platform owners and other key actors to 
plan in detail how to push the ecosystem in specific directions. However, these actors can evaluate the likely 
impact of various triggering events by carefully assessing the dominance and impacts of the generative 
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mechanisms these triggers can set in motion. Further, they can consider the effects generative mechanisms 
may have by acting as triggers for subsequent mechanisms. Such continuous assessments can help owners and 
other key actors make deliberate decisions that increase the likelihood of preferred ecosystem trajectories and 
reduce the likelihood of problematic misfits between the ecosystem deep structure and platform performance.  
Conclusion 
We propose a punctuated equilibrium theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution and support it by a 
longitudinal study of the evolution of a Danish mobile payment ecosystem from its inception in 2013 until it 
had penetrated approximately 90 % of the market in 2017. We suggest that the evolution of a digital platform 
ecosystem can be understood as a network of distributed and concurrent generative mechanisms, with 
dominance of mechanisms distributed across deep structure dimensions and with concurrent activation of 
mechanisms collectively achieving both transforming and reinforcing impacts. As our theorizing relies on a 
single case study, it is not without limitations. Although we build on rich data, our empirical inquiry is set 
within the Scandinavian financial industry. Researchers and practitioners are therefore advised to carefully 
consider and adapt the proposed punctuated equilibrium theory to the specific and different circumstances in 
which other digital platform ecosystems may operate. 
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Abstract 
Throughout their evolution, digital platform ecosystems encounter multiple tensions, for example, between 
actors with conflicting interests or between short-term profitability and long-term sustainability. While current 
studies acknowledge the existence of such tensions, there are no comprehensive frameworks that integrate 
them and theorize how their emergence and resolution drive digital platform ecosystem evolution. Against that 
backdrop, we offer a dialectic theory that articulates the inherent, latent contradictions within the ecosystem, 
how the involved actors experience these contradictions over time through manifestation of specific, salient 
tensions, and how the actors address the tensions they face through various responses. Specifically, we suggest 
four contradictions with regards to performance, architecture, governance and development as the underlying 
logic that drives digital platform ecosystem evolution and articulate three types of responses, accommodating, 
splitting and synthesis, through which actors can address the salient tensions they face. 
1. The Opportunity to Theorize Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
Digital platform ecosystems facilitate direct and regulated interactions among multiple actors by providing an 
underlying IT architecture and a set of rules (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Constantinides et al., 2018; Huber et 
al., 2017; Parker et al., 2016; Tiwana, 2014). Thus, digital platform ecosystems refer to the digital platform 
itself (IT architecture) and all actors (e.g., demand-side users, third-party developers, and more) that interact 
through it by following specific rules.  
In the past couple of years, digital platform ecosystems have become important economic phenomena due to 
the high complexity and interconnectivity of market products and services that drive organizations to 
collaborate and combine their knowledge, skills and technological systems to achieve common goals 
(Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; Jacobides et al. 2018). Due to their inherent digital properties, such as edibility, 
reprogrammability, communicability and extensibility (Yoo et al., 2010; Kallinikos et al., 2013), digital 
platform ecosystems are easy to build and scale and they allow for aggregation of previously dispersed services 
(Bakos, 1998; Hagiu, 2006; Hagiu and Wright, 2011). Digitization, however, comes with certain drawbacks, 
such as increases in the risk of imitation as competitors can easily replicate successful digital platforms (Gawer, 
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2014), the introduction of more competitors due to lower barriers to entry (Eisenmann et al., 2009) and 
compressed evolutionary process (Tiwana, 2014).  
In addition, a variety of contradictions characterizes digital platform ecosystems (Eaton et al., 2015; Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014). For instance, the contradictions between the 
platform owner seeking to secure control and the requests for autonomy among independent developers (Eaton 
et al., 2015; Tiwana et al., 2010) or between growth and efficiency (Hagiu, 2006; 2014) emerge and manifest 
in different ways during the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. When these contradictions become 
salient, they require attention and responses from the involved actors as they seek to shape to future trajectory 
of the ecosystem. Failure to attend to salient tensions may jeopardize the sustainability of the ecosystem and 
trigger its demise.  
While researchers have identified tensions and even outlined specific recommendations to resolve them (.g., 
Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014), these tensions remain isolated and 
dispersed across studies, without providing a comprehensive overview or theoretical anchoring that can help 
us understand and explain the role of contradictory forces across different ecosystems. Furthermore, few 
studies (see Eaton et al., 2015; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014) have focused on investigating the role of 
tensions in the evolution of digital platform ecosystems. To address this gap, we seek to theorize about the 
process through which the emergence and resolution of tensions drive digital platform ecosystem evolution. 
To this end, we draw upon the literature on Dialectics (Benson, 1977; Carlo et al., 2012; Lewis, 2000; Seo and 
Creed, 2002; Smith and Lewis, 2011) and combine it with key insights from the platform literature to develop 
a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution. As such, our study aims to demonstrate how the 
emerging tensions within a digital platform ecosystem and the actions taken to address them shape its 
evolution. Specifically, we argue that the actors involved in the evolutionary process need to consider different 
aspects of the ecosystem simultaneously as contradictions appear across them. Furthermore, they need to 
combine different responses to address tensions without necessarily giving priority to one opposing force over 
another.  
2. The Dialectics of Digital Platform Ecosystems  
Digital Platform Ecosystems are ripe with tensions occurring both within and outside their boundaries 
(Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Eaton et al., 2015; Wareham et al., 2014; Tiwana, 2014). Tensions within an 
ecosystem, for example, can occur among heterogeneous actors, whose interests clash (Boudreau and Hagiu, 
2009), or between the platform owner and certain types of actors (e.g., third-party developers) in relation to 
access and use of the underlying IT architecture (Gawer, 2014; Wareham et a., 2014) or in relation to revenue 
sharing, intellectual property rights and more (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2017). A digital platform 
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ecosystem can also encounter tensions from actors outside its boundaries, such as rivals (Armstrong, 2006; 
Eisenmann et al., 2009) and regulators (Evans, 2012; Evans and Schmalensee, 2010).  
The emergence and resolution of tensions can play an important role for driving the evolution of a digital 
platform ecosystem. Wareham et al. (2014), for example, outline contradictions related to the IT architecture 
within the digital platform ecosystem to understand how these tensions impact ecosystem’s evolution. Eaton 
et al. (2015) further demonstrate empirically how tensions emerging between the platform owner and third-
party developers result in a process of “distributed tuning”, consisting of resistance and accommodation, which 
altogether drive the evolution of the ecosystem’s boundary resources (APIs and SDKs).  
Despite the merits of these studies, they do not provide a comprehensive overview and theoretical anchoring 
of the tensions related to digital platform ecosystem. While Wareham et al. (2014), for example, focus on the 
tensions related to the architecture and Eaton et al. (2015) focus on evolution of boundary resources, none of 
them offers comprehensive theoretical insights into why and how various emerging tensions shape the digital 
platform ecosystem evolution. To understand and explain the variety of tensions within digital platform 
ecosystems and how their emergence and resolution drive ecosystem evolution, we build upon extant literature 
on design, use and governance of digital platform ecosystems and on key principles of dialectics (Benson, 
1977) to propose a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 1).  
Dialectics is a process theory, which scholars can apply to study ongoing transformation of complex 
phenomenon (Benson, 1977; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Dialectics presupposes that contradictory opposites 
exist and drive the process through emergence of struggles between the opposites and attempts at resolution 
(Ven de Ven and Poole, 1995). To theorize about digital platform ecosystem evolution from dialectical 
perspective, we adopt the foundational framework proposed by Benson (1977) as it is comprehensive and at 
the same time informative (Seo and Creed, 2002). Benson’s dialectical framework consists of four overarching 
concepts—social construction, totality, contradictions and praxis (Benson, 1977)—which we build upon to 
guide our analysis and synthesis of extant literature. 
Building upon Benson’s conceptualization of Dialectics (1977), we propose a Dialectical theory of digital 
platform ecosystem evolution. As summarized in Figure 1, the theory draws on Benson’s four foundational 
concepts (outer circle) to articulate the inherent contractions, salient tensions and managerial responses that 
drive the evolution of digital platform ecosystems (inner circle). Hence, we present the digital platform 
ecosystem as a socially constructed totality (Benson, 1977; Carlo et al., 2012; Seo and Creed, 2012) consisting 
of actors, architecture and governance. The existing configuration of actors, architecture and governance 
(totality) contains inherent, latent contradictions (Smith and Lewis, 2011) related to performance, architecture, 
governance and development. When triggered by contextual factors of plurality, change and scarcity (Smith 
and Lewis, 2011), these contradictions manifest as salient tensions that actors experience (Seo and Creed, 
2002). To address them, the platform owner and other actors engage in managerial responses as part of their 
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praxis (Benson, 1977; Smith and Lewis, 2011), thereby re-constructing the existing ecosystem configuration 
of actors, architecture and governance. In the following, we explain these constitutive elements of the proposed 
Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 1) by drawing upon Dialectics (Benson, 
1977; Seo and Creed, 2002; Smith and Lewis, 2011) and an extensive review on the relevant digital platform 
literature (see Appendix).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. A Dialectical Theory of Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
3. The Social Construction of Digital Platform Ecosystems as Interconnected Totality  
Digital platform ecosystems are evolving socio-technical arrangements that orchestrate interactions between 
multiple actors (Parker et al., 2016) through the provision of digital platform architecture (Constantinides et 
al., 2018; Tiwana, 2014) and emerging governance regimes (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Huber et al., 2017). 
As such, they comprise of various actors, an IT architecture and a set of governance rules as constructive 
elements, which intertwine and build on one another in shaping the evolution of the ecosystem (Eaton et al., 
2015; Tiwana, 2014). The key components of digital platform ecosystems are summarized in Table 1.  
The actors within a digital platform ecosystem play different roles. Platform owners retain the intellectual 
property rights and provide access to the platform either on their own or through other platform providers, who 
act as distribution partners (Constantinides et al., 2018; Eisenmann et al., 2011; Ondrus et al., 2015; Parker et 
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al., 2016). Importantly, the platform facilitates interactions between supply-side users, who provide services 
through the platform, and demand-side users, who use services provided by the platform owner or supply-side 
users (Eisenman et al., 2009; Evans, 2012; Hagiu, 2006; Ondrus et al., 2015).  
The ecosystem architecture consists of platform core, periphery and boundary resources (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2009; Gawer, 2014; Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014). The 
platform core contains a set of main functionalities provided by the platform owner, which supply-side users, 
such as third-party developers, can access and use through boundary resources (APIs and SDKs) (Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana, 2014). The complements offered by third-party contributors then form the 
platform periphery around the platform core (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana, 2014).  
To regulate access, interactions and value appropriation among the various actors, the platform owner 
implements, monitors and enforces a wide set of rules (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Evans, 2009; Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana, 2014). The enforcement of these rules relies on combinations of legal, 
technical, pricing and informational tools (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Evans, 2012).  
Table 1. Concepts of Digital Platform Ecosystems 
Concept Definition References 
Actors 
The heterogeneous actors (platform owner(s), 
platform provider(s), supply-side users, demand-
side users) involved in the social construction 
and reconstruction of a digital platform 
ecosystem 
Eisenmann et al., 2009; Evans, 
2012; Gawer and Cusumano, 
2014; Hagiu, 2016; Ondrus et 
al., 2015 
Architecture The structuring of a digital platform’s core, 
periphery and boundary resources  
Baldwin and Woddward, 
2009; Eaton et al., 2015; 
Gawer and Cusumano, 2014; 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 
2013; Tiwana, 2014  
Governance 
The rules that regulate access, participation and 
value appropriation in a digital platform 
ecosystem 
Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; 
Evans and Schmalensee, 2016; 
Parker et al., 2016; Tiwana, 
2014 
 
While some researchers study specific components of digital platform ecosystems, such as actors (Evans, 
2009) and governance (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Huber et al., 2017), most scholars consider them 
interconnected. For example, as platform owners extend the platform core through the provision of boundary 
resources, they nurture the development of an ecosystem of third-party complementors as supply-side actors, 
who use the boundary resources to offer new functionalities (Boudreau and Jeppersen, 2015; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2014; Gawer, 2014; Hagiu, 2006). As the architecture becomes more open, platform owners need 
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to establish rules for compatibility between external service modules and the platform core (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2009; Gawer, 2014) and they need to consider new rules or modify existing ones to retain control 
over the ecosystem (Eaton et al., 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). As new ecosystem participants 
join, platform owners also need to adjust the rules in connection to a number of issues such as ownership, 
revenue sharing, interactions with existing participants, and more (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Hagiu, 
2014; Parker et al., 2016; Tiwana, 2014). Thus, while actors, architecture and governance can be considered 
separately, they interlock to mutually constitute the digital platform ecosystem as an interconnected totality 
(Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 2002). 
As ecosystem actors engage in regulated interactions with one another and with the underlying architecture, 
they continuously construct and reconstruct the structure of the digital platform ecosystem (Benson, 1977; 
Eaton et al., 2015). In these interactions, they draw upon their power, interests, resources, and environmental 
constraints and opportunities (Benson, 1977; Carlo et al., 2012; Seo and Creed, 2002). For example, platform 
owners may encourage collaboration with third-party complementors by providing them with boundary 
resources to access the architecture because they lack resources to enter all possible markets on their own 
(Gawer and Henderson, 2007). Platform owners can also restrict the access to the boundary resources of the 
platform, if they believe that their control over them weakens (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). Because 
of the high level of uncertainty in the ecosystem environment, platform owners are generally, at the initial 
stages of evolution, cautious about opening for external complementors and therefore limit access to the 
platform’s boundary resources (Dattee et al., 2017).  
Ecosystem actors are heterogeneous (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Eaton et al., 2015) and they interact to construct 
and reconstruct the ecosystem based on a plurality of interests and power positions (Eaton et al., 2015; 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; de Rond and Bouchikhi, 2004). Specifically, platform owners as 
ecosystem creators and orchestrators exert asymmetric level of power over the other ecosystem actors by 
encouraging fruitful interactions and sanctioning harmful exchanges (Boudreau, 2017; Boudreau and Hagiu, 
2009; Evans, 2012). As a result of this power imbalance, third-party complementors, for example, can have 
difficulties defending their interests (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Eaton et al., 2015; Gawer and Henfridsson, 
2007; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; Tiwana, 2015). In its role, the platform owner exercises regulatory 
power (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009) and relies on its ability to command communal resources (Tan et al., 2015) 
to institutionalize certain interaction patterns (Benson, 1977; Carlo et al., 2012; Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; 
Seo and Creed, 2002).  
At the same time, the established structure of a digital platform ecosystem enables and constrains its ongoing 
construction and re-construction (Benson, 1977; McQuire, 1988; Seo and Creed, 2002). For example, the 
presence of many demand-side users attracts supply-side users due to strong cross-side network effects (Hagiu, 
2006; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Evans, 2009; Casey and Toyli, 2012; Ruutu et al., 2017). Further, by initially 
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narrowing down the possible uses of the platform, the platform owner determines the subsequent interactions 
with third-party complementors (Datee et al., 2017; Tan et al., 2015).  
The existing structure of a digital platform ecosystem is of temporal order and subject to change (Benson, 
1977; McQuire, 1988). As ecosystem actors interact with one another and with the architecture provided by 
the platform owner to construct and reconstruct the digital platform ecosystem, they modify the existing 
structure as new interaction patterns emerge (Benson, 1977). For example, tensions can occur between actors 
(e.g., demand-side users and supply-side users), which require the owner to modify the existing governance 
regime (Evans, 2012; Parker et al., 2016). Similarly, the introduction of new types of actors, such as new 
platform providers, can change the existing architecture (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Olleros, 2008; Ondrus et al., 
2015; Tiwana, 2014). Hence, during the ongoing construction of a digital platform ecosystem as an 
interconnected totality, its constitutive elements (actors, architecture and governance) interlock as changes in 
one element often lead to changes in the other two (Benson, 1977; Hagiu, 2014; Tiwana, 2014). 
4. The Contradictions Inherent in the Totality of Digital Platform Ecosystem 
Although a digital platform ecosystem may seem as an orderly structure, its ongoing construction through the 
regulated interactions between ecosystem actors and architecture produces a myriad of tensions (Benson, 1977; 
Carlo et al., 2012; Cho et al., 2007; Seo and Creed, 2002; Smith and Lewis, 2011). These tensions are by-
products of the construction process and, as such they are manifestations of inherent contradictions embedded 
into the digital platform ecosystem (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017; Lewis, 2000; Seo and Creed, 2002; Smith 
and Lewis, 2011). As the ecosystem constitutes an interconnected totality, these inherent contradictions may 
manifest as specific salient tensions across the whole ecosystem and interact with other tensions (Benson, 
1977; Carlo et al., 2012; Seo and Creed, 2002).  
Contradictions consist of two conflicting, yet connected and mutually dependent opposites, which form a unity 
(Cho et al., 2007; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017; Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011). A contradiction has 
two characteristics—identity and the fight between its two opposite forces (Cho et al., 2007). The identity of 
a contradiction captures the occurring juxtaposition between its two co-existing opposites, while the fight refers 
to the dynamic, disharmonious relationship between them, which changes over time by giving a prevalence of 
one opposite over the other (Bjerknes, 1991; Cho et al., 2007; Lewis, 2000).  
We identify four inherent contradictions in digital platform ecosystems, namely performance, architecture, 
governance related to the constituting elements of a digital platform ecosystem, and development related to 
the evolution of the ecosystem (Table 2). During the ongoing construction of the ecosystem, these 
contradictions may manifest as multiple, coexisting salient tensions that actors then experience and respond to 
in various ways (Cho et al., 2007; Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2017).  
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Performance Contradiction. To achieve long-term sustainability of a digital platform ecosystem, the 
platform owner must ensure its stable and appropriate performance over time by resolving tensions between 
growth and efficiency. This performance contradiction refers to the accumulated tensions between the growth 
of actors and the need to maintain efficiency in the digital platform ecosystem (Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; 
Hagiu, 2006, 2014; Halaburda and Piskorski, 2010). As the two opposites co-exist, forming a unity, the 
platform owner must direct resources to ensure appropriate contributions to the actors within the digital 
platform ecosystem. 
To ensure that a digital platform ecosystem ignites after its launch, the platform owner needs to attract 
sufficient number of actors (Evans and Schmalensee, 2010; Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2006; Parker et al., 2016; 
Ruutu et al., 2017). After reaching a critical mass of actors, which is necessary, but not sufficient condition for 
sustainability (Ondrus et al., 2015), the platform owner seeks to further improve the performance of the 
ecosystem by attracting more actors both in terms of volume (e.g., more demand-side users) and type (e.g., 
inclusion of platform providers in addition to the platform owner) (Hagiu, 2006; 2014). The addition of more 
actors increases the number of interactions between existing and new actors and strengthens the network effects 
between them (Parker et al., 2016). The continuous growth improves the overall performance of the ecosystems 
as actors increasingly interact with other actors (Evans, 2009; Parker et al., 2016).  
While the growth of actors may ensure the sustainability of the digital platform ecosystem over time, it can 
also create inefficiencies that challenge the overall performance of the ecosystem (Evans and Schmalensee 
2010; Evans, 2012; Inoue and Tsujimoto 2017; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016; Tiwana, 2014; van Alstyne et al. 
2016). To improve performance, the platform owner seeks to foster efficiency through fine-tuning of the 
existing ecosystem structure.  
Architecture Contradiction. The platform owner should design and maintain the architecture of the 
ecosystem to serve current and future needs of the participating actors. To this end, the owner needs to address 
ongoing tensions stemming from the inherent contradiction between reliability and evolvability of the 
architecture (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Wareham et al., 2014; Tiwana, 2014). While platform reliability 
ensures platform evolvability, the development of the platform ecosystem also challenges its ongoing 
reliability (Tilson et al. 2010, Tiwana et al. 2010; Wareham et al., 2014). For example, although the architecture 
typically consists of lean platform core during the early stages of development (Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014), 
the architecture tends to evolve over time in complexity by adding and expanding its periphery (de Reuver et 
al., 2017), which can undermine its reliability to existing actors due to accumulated technology debt (Rolland 
et al., 2018).  
To support reliably the ongoing interactions within the digital platform ecosystem, the platform owner must 
design a scalable and resilient architecture (Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). When the architecture is scalable, 
its performance is independent from the number of participating demand-side and supply-side users (Kohler, 
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2018; Tiwana, 2014). Thus, even as the number of actors increases over time, the architecture can reliably 
support growth without leading to failures. Subsequently, the architecture also needs to be resilient to avoid or 
minimize adverse effects failure (Tiwana, 2014). Thus, reliability forces seek to improve the capability of the 
architecture to serve the current needs of ecosystem actors.  
At the same time, the architecture must remain evolvable to address changes within the ecosystem (Wareham 
et al., 2014) and its surrounding environment (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009). Due to digital capabilities, such 
as edibility, re-programmability and integration (Kallinikos et al. 2013; Yoo et al., 2012) and the initially lean 
design of its core (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Olleros, 2008), the platform core, boundary resources and 
periphery evolve over time. The platform owners, for example, evolve the core by incorporating new 
functionalities and removing irrelevant ones from it (Tiwana, 2014). Similarly, to enable further platform 
evolvability, owners provide boundary resources, which allow third-party complementors to access and 
contribute to the platform core (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Gawer, 2014; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 
2013; Tiwana, 2014). These external complements form the platform periphery, which evolves through 
fluctuation of external complements, which either increase with the introduction of more boundary resources 
and complementors (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002) or decrease as a result of 
competitive selection by demand-side users and platform owners (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Inoue and 
Tsujimoto, 2017). Thus, evolvability forces seek to improve the capability of the architecture to serve the 
future needs of existing and new ecosystem actors.  
Governance Contradiction. To ensure optimal functioning of the digital platform ecosystem, the platform 
owner should encourage access to the ecosystem on different levels, while also ensuring that existing and new 
actors do not diverge significantly from established practices (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson, 2013; Parker and van Alstyne, 2008; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014). As a result, two 
opposing forces, namely openness and control, co-exist and interact to constitute the governance contradiction 
inherent within a digital platform ecosystem.  
The platform owner can open the digital platform ecosystem on two levels—actors (owner, provider, user) and 
architecture (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Ondrus et al., 2015). To spur adoption, for example, the platform owner 
can open the access to the ecosystem for both demand-side and supply-side users (Ondrus et al., 2015). To 
encourage further innovation, the platform owner can also open the architecture to external contributors 
(supply-side users) instead of innovating solely in-house (e.g., innovation from external complementors or 
technology from platform providers) (Eisenmann et al., 2011; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). Third-party 
complementors then decide whether to join the ecosystem depending on the size of the demand-side users 
(Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2006), the return on partnerships (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer and Hendersson, 
2007; Parker et al, 2017), and the level of autonomy (Wareham et al., 2017). The introduction of new actors 
and the opening of the architecture to varying degrees (Eisenmann et al., 2009; West, 2003) leads to new 
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interactions within the ecosystem, which can conform or deviate from the existing ones (Boudreau and Hagiu, 
2009; Tiwana, 2014). As such, openness forces introduce mechanisms that drive platform ecosystem renewal 
by encouraging increased variety of actors and emerging practices.  
While an increase in openness supports adoption and innovation within a digital platform ecosystem, it also 
challenges and, in some cases, decreases the control of the platform owner over it (Eaton et al., 2015; Evans, 
2012; Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014; West, 2003). Due to their desire to 
act autonomously, some new actors engage in practices, which challenge the control of the platform owner 
over the ecosystem (Eaton et al., 2015; Wareham et al., 2014). For example, third-party complementors can 
resist the efforts of the platform owner to control access to and use of boundary resources (Eaton et al., 2015; 
Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). Similarly, the inclusion of supply-side users may lead to unregulated 
practices where certain ecosystem actors engage in harmful behaviour towards other actors (e.g., non-delivery 
of purchased goods) (Hagiu, 2006). Thus, to ensure appropriate functioning of the ecosystem, control forces 
seek to introduce mechanisms that drive alignment of platform ecosystem actors and their practices.  
Development Contradiction. Throughout the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem, the platform owner 
struggles to consolidate the existing structure of actors, architecture and governance, while at the same time 
adapting to emerging internal and external challenges. Thus, the development contradiction encompasses 
consolidation and adaptation as two opposites, which intertwine to shape the development trajectory of the 
ecosystem. While consolidation forces seek to respond to internal and external challenges by reinforcing the 
current development trajectory of the ecosystem, adaptation forces seek to respond by transforming the 
trajectory.  
This development contradiction, which refers to the overall evolutionary process, relates closely to the above 
contradictions in performance, architecture, and governance (Table 2). Consolidation of the existing path 
presupposes an emphasis on the efficiency of interactions (performance), reliability of the architecture and 
ensuring an appropriate level of control over the digital platform ecosystem (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; 
Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014). Thus, rather than seeking new developments, the platform owner 
consolidates the previously introduced changes to the existing structure of actors, architecture and governance. 
Some of the occurring internal and external events, however, challenge the existing trajectory and require 
adaptation of the ecosystem structure by emphasizing growth in ecosystem actors, evolvability of the 
architecture and the ability of the ecosystem to open further (Gawer, 2015; Parker et al., 2017). 
Table 2. Inherent Contradictions in Digital Platform Ecosystems 
Contradiction Identity Opposites 
Performance A digital platform ecosystem must 
direct resources to ensure 
Opposite: Efficiency forces seek to 
improve performance through fine 
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appropriate contributions to its 
participants 
tuning of the existing ecosystem 
configuration 
Opposite: Growth forces seek to 
improve performance through 
strengthening network effects from 
new ecosystem participants 
Architecture 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
design and maintain the platform to 
serve current and future needs of its 
participants 
Opposite: Reliability forces seek to 
improve the capability of the 
platform architecture to serve the 
current needs of ecosystem 
participants 
Opposite: Evolvability forces seek to 
improve the capability of the 
platform architecture to serve the 
future needs of existing and new 
ecosystem participants 
Governance 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
enable the access and support the 
practices of its participants 
Opposite: Control forces seek to 
introduce mechanisms that drive 
alignment of platform ecosystem 
participants and their practices  
Opposite: Openness forces seek to 
introduce mechanisms that drive 
platform ecosystem renewal 
through new participants and 
emerging practices 
Development 
A digital platform ecosystem must 
respond to internal and external 
events that challenge its status quo 
Opposite: Consolidation forces seek to 
respond by reinforcing the current 
trajectory of the digital platform 
ecosystem 
Opposite: Adaptation forces seek to 
respond by transforming the current 
trajectory of the digital platform 
ecosystem 
5. The Salient Tensions in the Contradictory Praxis of Digital Platform Ecosystems  
While contradictions are inherent and enduring within the existing structure of digital platform ecosystems, 
they remain latent or dormant if ecosystem actors are unaware of them (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Seo and Creed, 
2002; Smith and Lewis, 2011). When triggered, however, inherent contradictions manifest as salient tensions 
(Table 2) that draw the attention of the platform owner and other ecosystem actors during ecosystem evolution 
(Lewis, 2000). 
Plurality, change and scarcity in the digital platform ecosystem can transform the inherent contradictions into 
salient (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Plurality refers to the presence of multiple heterogeneous interests among 
ecosystem actors, which may be incompatible. Internal and external changes (Gawer, 2015) can create 
inconsistency between existing and new arrangements and may require ecosystem actors to reconsider their 
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roles and actions. Further, due to scarcity of resources, the platform owner may have to decide how to allocate 
them between several competing alternatives (Smith and Lewis, 2011).  
Salient Tensions from Performance Contradiction. The performance contradiction, which constitutes a 
struggle between stimulating ecosystem growth and maintaining ecosystem efficiency, can manifest in salient 
tensions, such as decrease in the quality of offerings that leads to inefficient interactions, architecture and 
governance that misfit growth, and collaborations that turn into competition over resources (Table 3).  
Change in type of ecosystem actors (e.g., the introduction of third-party developers; Tan et al., 2016) and 
change in volume of actors (e.g., more demand-side and supply-side users join; Evans and Schmalensee 2010) 
may lead to congestion as too many actors join the ecosystem at the same time. Increase in supply-side users 
(e.g., third-party developers (Boudreau, 2012) or fundraising backers (Wessel et al., 2017)) often results in 
decrease in the quality of their offerings (Halaburda and Piskorski, 2010; Kohler, 2018; Wessel et al., 2017). 
Boudreau (2012), for example, found that third-party developers, who joined the ecosystem early, offer more 
innovative complements in comparison to late comers, who often offer complements similar to the already 
existing ones. The increased intra-competition between supply-side users can also lead to the exit of some of 
them (Tiwana, 2015; Wessel et al., 2017), which can result in both demand-side and supply-side users leaving 
the platform ecosystem (Inoue and Tsujimoto, 2017) or multi-homing to rival ecosystems (Eisenmann et al., 
2006), which undermines the overall performance. 
Apart from decrease in quality, growth of ecosystem actors can lead to high search and coordination costs 
between demand-side and supply-side users, which reduce the number of efficient interactions between them 
(Evans and Schmalensee 2010; Inoue and Tsujimoto 2017; Tiwana, 2015; van Alstyne et al. 2016). For 
example, the variety of innovative offerings attracts numerous demand-side users, but the increased 
diversification may lead to less commitment from them (that is lack of adoption) due to inability to comprehend 
which of the offerings suit their needs best (Hagiu, 2006). As the main purpose of digital platform ecosystems 
is to enable interactions between the affiliated to them actors (Hagiu and Wright, 2011; Parker et al., 2016), a 
decrease in such interactions stalls the performance of the ecosystem.  
Increased growth of actors also creates tension with an ecosystem’s existing architecture and governance. For 
example, the existing architecture may not be able to support the growing number of interactions between 
demand-side and supply-side users (Kohler, 2018; Parker et al., 2016), leading to slow down and 
irresponsiveness when actors engage (Tiwana, 2014). While the growing number of actors unlocks new 
revenue streams, it also imposes additional governance costs (costs for coordination, support, monitoring, and 
more) on the platform owner, which limits the overall profitability and future investments (Evans, 2012; Huber 
et al., 2017; Parker and van Alstyne, 2008; Svahn et al., 2017; Wareham et al., 2014; West, 2003). 
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New actors allow platform owners to establish new collaborations (Parker et al., 2017). However, increased 
heterogeneity of interests between the platform owner and third-party complementors can often turn 
collaborators into competitors (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; Hagiu, 2014; Hagiu and Spulber, 2013; Parker 
and van Alstyne, 2008; Wareham et al., 2014). Due to diverging interests, platform owners can enter into 
markets dominated by some of their complementors (Gawer and Hendersson, 2007). Similarly, third-party 
complementors may decide to join the ecosystem and subsequently create similar offerings to those provided 
by the platform owner, in attempts to disintermediate the owner (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009).  
The inclusion of heterogeneous actors also intensifies competition for access to the platform owner’s assets 
(e.g., development and maintenance resources). Due to the scarcity of these resources, the owner may therefore 
face challenges distributing resources to ecosystem actors (Eaton et al., 2015), leading to dissatisfied actors 
that may choose to leave the ecosystem.  
Salient Tensions from Architecture Contradiction. The architecture of digital platform ecosystems consists 
of platform core, boundary resources and periphery, all of which evolve over time (Boudreau, 2012; Eaton et 
al., 2015; Tiwana, 2014). Over the course of ecosystem evolution, the inherent contradiction between reliability 
and evolvability of the architecture strengthens and when triggered, manifests into several salient tensions, 
including partitioning that requires integration, provisioning of stable, yet versatile boundary resources, and 
growing complexity that challenges reliability (Table 3).  
When designing and developing the architecture of a digital platform ecosystem, the platform owner has to 
decide how much to innovate based on own efforts and how much to rely on third-party complementors 
(Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). While evolving the platform core based on own efforts prevents the disruption 
of the ecosystem by lowering the risk of competitive imitation (Eisenmann et al., 2009), it also challenges 
platform maintenance and the speed, with which the owner can deliver innovation (Eisenmann et al., 2009; 
Tiwana, 2014). Similarly, while developing platform periphery with external complementors fosters 
innovation, it also increases the risk of platform disintermediation (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Eisenmann 
et al., 2009; Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). 
This choice entails that the platform owner partitions the ecosystem architecture between a stable, lean 
platform core, provided by the platform owner, and a periphery of complements, provided by third-party 
developers (Baldwin and Woddward, 2009; Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). Such partitioning allows for 
division of labour between platform owner and complementors, with each of them building upon their strengths 
to innovate (Tiwana, 2014). While their autonomy is encouraged, third-party complements also need to 
integrate properly into the platform core to ensure the stability of the ecosystem (ibid). At the same time, if 
integration is cumbersome, the evolvability of the platform core may come under threat with third-party 
complementors abandoning the ecosystem for rival ones (Tiwana et al., 2010). 
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Finding the balance between integration and partitioning is challenging (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; 
Tiwana et al., 2010; Tiwana, 2014; Yoo et al., 2012; Wareham et al., 2014). Tight coupling between core and 
periphery, for example, promotes reliability and optimizes performance (i.e., stability), but restricts variety and 
innovation (i.e., evolvability) (Baldiwn and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana, 2014; Yoo et al., 2012). Loose 
coupling, on the other hand, spurs innovation (evolvability), but, while it also ensures resilience due to the low 
interdependencies (Tiwana et al., 2010), it also leads to fragmentation and high coordination costs (stability) 
(Boudreau, 2010; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014). Furthermore, the level of integration (or degree of 
coupling) alters over time with internal or external changes in the ecosystem (Yoo et al., 2012). For example, 
an internal change in the platform core or periphery may challenge the existing level of integration as well as 
the established partitioning (Tiwana et al., 2010). Thus, changes in the architecture due to its evolvability can 
trigger tensions between the existing arrangements around the ecosystem architecture when it comes to 
integration and partitioning.  
The platform core and the periphery around it connect through boundary resources, also referred to as 
interfaces and design rules (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 
2013; Eaton et al., 2015). To ensure proper connectivity, on one hand, boundary resources need to be stable to 
enable interoperability between complements and platform core, and, on the other, they must be versatile to 
incorporate subsequent innovative complements (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010). By 
providing standardized boundary resources, the platform owner ensures that third-party complementors follow 
uniform rules about access to and integration with the platform core (Tiwana et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2012). 
High degree of standardization, which implies strict rules, however, decreases the flexibility of the architecture, 
which can subsequently constrain the innovative efforts of third-party complementors (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2009; Tiwana et al., 2010; Wareham et al., 2014). On the other hand, too versatile boundary 
resources support new innovative complements, but lead to fragmentation among them (Tiwana, 2014; 
Wareham et al., 2014).  
While the platform owner should encourage the evolvability of the architecture to benefit from external 
innovation, the growing variety of complements results in increased complexity, which, if unaddressed, can 
impede future ability to evolve (Tiwana, 2014). The plurality of heterogeneous complements, often facilitated 
by versatile boundary resources, makes interconnections between complements and platform core, on one 
hand, and among complements themselves, on the other, difficult to comprehend due to the high degree of 
interdependencies (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014). If not reduced in due time, these 
interdependencies can magnify the detrimental effects of a failure within one part of the architecture by 
spreading the damage to other parts (also called “ripple effect”; see Tiwana, 2014), thus destabilizing the 
overall architecture.  
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Salient Tensions from Governance Contradictions. Inherent contradictions between control and openness 
within the digital platform ecosystem manifest in three main salient tensions, namely centralization that 
restricts decentralization, divergence that requires conformity, and aggregation that balances sharing (Table 
3).  
Digital platform ecosystems usually evolve from relatively closed to open and back to being closed (Eisenmann 
et al., 2009; Gawer, 2009, 2015; Parker et al., 2017; Ondrus et al., 2015; West, 2003). Thus, upon the initial 
formation of the ecosystem, the platform owner often exercises tight control over the ecosystem actors and 
architecture (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). With the increase in the degree of openness, however, the high 
level of control retained by the platform owner may clash with the demand from ecosystem actors (e.g., third-
party complementors, platform providers, platform owners; see Ondrus et al., 2015) for making decentralized 
decisions over their participation in the ecosystem (Cusumano and Gawer, 2002; Eaton et al., 2015; Tiwana et 
al., 2010; Svahn et al., 2017). When seeking to foster variety of complements (Tiwana, 2014) or to spur 
adoption (Ondrus et al., 2015), the owner can accommodate their request and grant them autonomy (Parker 
and van Altyne, 2008). 
While high level of centralization discourages third-party complementors from joining a platform ecosystem 
(Ceccagnoli et al., 2012), increased decentralization, however, magnifies the heterogeneity among ecosystem 
actors, who often have conflicting interests. Because of the increased plurality of interests, which ecosystem 
actors can pursue freely in an autonomous governance regime, the instances of actors misbehaving also may 
surge (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Evans, 2012). Such bad behaviour (e.g., such as non-delivery of goods 
(eBay), damaging property (Airbnb)) diverges from the existing governance rules, which promote efficiency, 
and as a result, the platform owner can require the ecosystem actors to conform to existing rules, or, often to 
newly introduced, which curb the level of autonomy (Evans, 2012; Parker et al., 2016). 
The increased level of openness within the ecosystem also leads to tensions between the desire of the platform 
owner to aggregate and control resources (e.g., intellectual property rights (IPR), revenue, access to demand-
side users) with the need to allocate them in fair manner in order to keep other actors part of the ecosystem 
(Gawer and Henfridsson, 2009; Parker et al., 2017; Svahn et al., 2017; West, 2003). For example, while by 
opening the ecosystem, the owner can accumulate additional resources (e.g., revenue, IPRs, innovation, etc.), 
the continuous flow of resources is dependent upon its ability to share them with other ecosystem actors, which, 
in fact, reduces the accumulated resources for the platform owner (Gawer and Henderson, 2007; West, 2003).  
Salient Tensions from Development Contradiction. The development contradiction refers to the struggle 
between consolidating the existing ecosystem trajectory and the need to adapt it to emerging challenges and 
opportunities. When triggered, this contradiction renders into three salient tensions, namely, ensuring growth 
that requires adoption, expansion that fosters inter-platform competition, and innovation that challenges 
legitimation (Table 3). 
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While digital platform ecosystems evolve constantly (Gawer, 2015), the platform owner needs to ensure that 
changes within the existing structure of actors, architecture and governance are absorbed within the ecosystem. 
As a result, the owner redirects some efforts to consolidate the existing evolutionary trajectory. For example, 
the growth of the ecosystem in terms of attracting new types of actors and offering new functionalities increases 
the value of the platform to existing participants, but if a platform owner directs all resources to further 
development by investing in attracting new types of actors and neglects ensuring continuous adoption, actors 
may abandon the platform ecosystem (Hagiu, 2006).  
While consolidation forces seek to reinforce the existing structure of an ecosystem’s actors, architecture and 
governance, internal and external events can challenge its existing development trajectory, leading to its 
adaptation. The emergence of new competitors may require the platform owner to shift the existing 
evolutionary path by, for example, entering into new markets (Eisenmann et al., 2011). This expansion, 
however, increases further the inter-platform competition, creating tensions with existing and new competitors 
alike (Armstrong, 2006; Eisenmann et al., 2011).  
The novelty of the services offered by a digital platform ecosystem (e.g., Uber and Airbnb) can create a misfit 
with existing regulation, which challenges the overall legitimacy of the ecosystem and requires further 
adaptation (Evans, 2012; Hagiu and Rothmans, 2016). For example, the value creation within the digital 
platform ecosystem, which orchestrates the interactions between affiliated to it actors (Hagiu and Wright, 
2011), may diminish the welfare of certain actors outside the ecosystem (e.g., Uber and Airbnb) (Hagiu, 2006). 
Further, regulators can interpret measures implemented by the platform owner to maintain the value creation 
in the ecosystem (such as restricting access or appropriating external complements) as anti-competitive 
behaviour (Parker et al., 2017). Collaborating with external contributors in the form of mergers or in the form 
of agreements preventing participants to partner with other ecosystem actors can also constitute a restriction 
to competition (Evans, 2012). As a result, regulators may require changes in the digital platform ecosystem, 
which alter its existing development trajectory.  
In addition, internal challenges, such as lack of resources, can propel a platform owner to open the ecosystem 
so that third-party actors can access and use it (e.g., supply-side users and platform providers) (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014), thus changing the existing development trajectory. The inclusion of new 
actors, however, may require changes in ownership, which can also impact the future development of the 
evolutionary path (Eisenmann et al., 2009; Ondrus et al., 2015). 
Table 3. Inherent Contradictions and Corresponding Salient Tensions 
Contradiction Opposites Salient Tensions 
Performance 
 Growth 
 Efficiency 
 Decrease in quality of offerings that leads 
to inefficient interactions 
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 Architecture and governance that misfit 
growth  
 Collaborations that turn into competition 
over resources 
Architecture 
 Reliability 
 Evolvability 
 Partitioning that requires integration 
 Stable, yet versatile boundary resources, 
 Growing complexity, which challenges 
reliability 
Governance 
 Control 
 Openness 
 Centralization that restricts 
decentralization 
 Divergence that requires conformity 
 Aggregation that balances sharing 
Development  
 Consolidation 
 Adaptation 
 Growth that requires adoption 
 Expansion that fosters inter-platform 
competition 
 Innovation that challenges legitimation 
 
6. Responses to Tensions in the Praxis of Reconstructing Digital Platform Ecosystems  
Once an inherent contradiction escalates and becomes salient (Benson, 1977; Smith and Lewis, 2011), it draws 
the attention of the platform owner and other ecosystem actors (Smith and Lewis, 2011), who then can reject 
or accept it (Smith and Lewis, 2011). By not addressing the tension, the ecosystem enters a vicious cycle, 
which can be detrimental to its future evolution (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). Some 
tensions, however, are of such intensity that they do not allow the platform owner and other ecosystem actors 
to ignore them (Benson, 1977; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). When attending to a salient tension, platform 
owners and other ecosystem actors engage in activities (praxis), spanning from the moment a tension becomes 
salient until its resolution (Seo and Creed, 2002; Smith and Lewis, 2011). When actors become aware of a 
tension (Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 2002), they may mobilize resources and interact to reconstruct the 
existing structure, which does not fit their interests any longer (Benson, 1977; Carlo et al., 2012; Van de Ven 
and Poole, 1995). 
By assuming the role of an orchestrator with responsibility to maintain and develop the digital platform 
ecosystem, platform owners seek to resolve salient tensions to ensure the sustainability of the ecosystem. While 
platform owners may rely on three responses, namely accommodating, splitting and synthetizing (Poole and 
Van de Ven, 1989; Smith and Lewis, 2011) to manage salient tensions, other ecosystem actors may participate 
in this process depending on their resources, interests and support from other actors (Eaton et al., 2015).  
Accommodating a salient tension involves providing opportunity for the two constituting opposites of an 
inherent contradiction to develop towards a joint outcome through emergent or deliberate actions (Poole and 
Van de Ven, 1989). Splitting involves seeking to prevent the opposites from interacting by separating them in 
191 
 
time or space (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Transforming involves negotiation and 
innovation by synthetizing the two opposites into a response, typically in situations when the two opposites 
cannot co-exist (Benson, 1977; Poole and Van de Ven, 1989). 
Managerial Responses to Performance Tensions. Attending to the salient tensions between growth and 
efficiency as manifestation of the performance contradiction, the owner engages in splitting when it comes to 
managing plurality of conflicting interests, accommodating for addressing the inefficiency stemming from 
congestion, and synthesis for resolving the misfit between architecture and growth.  
To solve the salient tensions between growth and efficiency, the platform owner usually relies on splitting 
strategy by separating the two opposites in time. For example, during the initial formation of the platform 
ecosystem, the owner focuses on achieving sustainable growth (critical mass of users; see Evans, 2009; Ondrus 
et al., 2015; Ruutu et al., 2017) rather than on investing in efficiency. With the growth of actors, which 
challenges the ecosystem performance (see above), the owner shifts its attention towards ensuring efficiency, 
thus slowing down the growth rate (Hagiu, 2006; Parker et al., 2017; Rolland et al., 2018). 
The platform owner also relies on splitting to solve the tensions among heterogeneous actors who compete for 
limited resources. For example, the owner can maintain differentiation between the distinct types of ecosystem 
actors (e.g., demand-side and supply-side users) (Hagiu, 2006; 2014) and make sequential investments in them 
(Bakos and Katsamakas, 2008). Furthermore, it can altogether avoid including too many distinct types of actors 
(Hagiu, 2014), which decreases the plurality of interests, and puts emphasis on efficiency over growth. 
When addressing the decrease in the quality of offerings, which leads to inefficient interactions as a 
manifestation of the performance contradiction, the platform owner accommodates the tension between growth 
and efficiency. To foster growth, while also ensuring efficiency, the owner adjusts the existing governance 
regime by, for example, installing curation mechanisms to cultivate desired behaviour (e.g., ratings, insurance 
policy, dispute resolution mechanisms) (Evans, 2012; Hagiu and Rothman, 2016; Kohler, 2018; Parker et al., 
2016). It can further penalize or exclude actors who engage in an inappropriate behaviour (Casadesus-Masanell 
and Halaburda, 2011; Evans, 2013; van Alstyne et al., 2016). In some cases, the owner can engage in splitting, 
giving temporal preference to efficiency over growth by reducing the number of actors to improve quality of 
interactions (Casadesus-Masanell and Halaburda, 2011; Halaburda and Piskorski, 2010). 
The growth of actors also creates misfit with the existing architecture, thus prompting the platform owner to 
improve its capabilities (Kohler, 2018; Tiwana, 2014). For example, to improve scalability, the platform owner 
can enhance the technical quality of the architecture (Hartigh et al., 2016). Such architectural innovation 
constitutes a synthesis response as the owner transforms the existing architecture to support the growth of 
actors.  
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Managerial Responses to Architecture Tensions. To resolve the inherent contradiction between reliability 
of the architecture and its evolvability, the platform owner adopts accommodating, splitting and synthesis 
responses. The owner engages in splitting and synthesis when dealing with tensions around partitioning and 
integration between the platform core and platform periphery, in accommodating when offering stable and 
versatile boundary resources and, in synthesis when managing the growing complexity as to ensure reliability 
of the architecture.  
When addressing the tension between partitioning of the innovative efforts between itself and external 
complementors, the owner usually relies on synthesis. In cases where there is no conflict, the owner and 
external developers collaborate (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014). When tensions between them 
become salient (see above), the owner can absorb competing and crucial complements, thus transforming the 
platform core and closing partially the access to it (Boudreau, 2017; Eisenmann et al., 2009; Parker et al., 
2017).  
However, to encourage collaboration rather than competition, platform owners can close down their own 
complements that compete directly with third-party complements (Gawer and Cusumano, 2007). Then, 
tensions arise between partition and integration (see above) as external complements needs to integrate to the 
platform core through loose or tight coupling (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 
2014). As discussed above, the level of integration (tight or loose) varies over time as the platform owner tries 
to encourage variety of complements or decrease it (see Wareham et al., 2014).  
Throughout the course of the ecosystem evolution, the platform owner adopts a splitting response to manage 
the tension between tight and loose coupling as manifestation of the reliability and evolvability opposites of 
the architecture contradiction. Initially, the owner may give prevalence to loose coupling, which encourages 
external complements to join the ecosystem easily, thus fostering evolvability (Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 
2014). Subsequently, seeking to reduce competition and securing profitability (Parker et al., 2017), the 
platform owner may adopt a tight coupling, which ensures reliability, but also restricts evolvability as it reduces 
the number of external complements (see also, variety decreasing mechanism; Wareham et al., 2014). Thus, 
by giving prevalence to tight or loose coupling over time, the owner relies on a splitting strategy to manage 
the tensions between partitioning and integration.  
To ensure connectivity between platform core and platform periphery, the boundary resources, which connect 
them, need to be stable and versatile at the same time (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Tiwana, 2014). Solving 
this tension, the platform owner tends to accommodate stability and versatility of the boundary resources by 
offering, in most cases, general rules, which, while ensuring a sufficient level of standardization, also support 
newly emerging innovative complements (Tiwana, 2014).  
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Finally, when managing the growing complexity, resulting from the evolvability of the architecture, which 
also challenges its reliability, the owner engages in synthesis. To decrease the overall complexity, the owner 
aims at increasing the modularity of the architecture, which allows for reducing the interdependencies across 
its various sub-systems (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Olleros, 2008; Tiwana, 2014). At the same time, the 
increased modularity strengthens the overall evolvability of the architecture (Tiwana, 2014).  
Managerial Responses to Governance Tensions. When addressing the contradiction between control and 
openness, which manifests in several salient tensions (Table 3), the platform owner adopts accommodating 
and splitting responses.  
To address the tensions between centralization and decentralization, where actors struggle for control and 
autonomy respectively, the owner relies on splitting. As a result, the level of control and autonomy within the 
ecosystem changes over time depending on the salience of the tension. Initially, the platform owner enjoys 
high level of control, as the ecosystem tends to be relatively closed (Eisenmann et al., 2009). With the opening 
of the ecosystem to incorporate more actors, such as third-party developers, platform providers, and more, the 
tight grip of the owner over the ecosystem comes under threat by some of the newly introduced actors, leading 
to tensions becoming salient in some cases (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). As a result, the owner can try to 
relax the strict rules and increase their transparency, granting more autonomy to developers (Eaton et al., 2015).  
The balance between decentralization and centralization, however, can also alter over time (Eisenmann et al., 
2009). For example, a platform owner can attempt to increase its level of control over new and existing 
boundary resources, which curbs the autonomy of third-party developers (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013; 
Wareham et al., 2014). Furthermore, the owner can close the access to the platform to reinforce control again, 
leading to exclusion of certain actors (Parker et al., 2016). Thus, by engaging in splitting, throughout the course 
of the ecosystem evolution, the platform owner manages the tension between centralization and 
decentralization by giving prevalence to one over the other at certain points in time.  
Managing the tension between divergence interests and the need to ensure conformity requires the adoption of 
accommodating. For example, Eaton et al. (2015) investigate how third-party developers, part of the Apple 
ecosystem, tried to circumvent the strict rules for access to the Apple iPhone by engaging in jailbreaking, 
which creates tensions with the platform owner. As a result, Apple introduced new boundary resources to 
increase the control over the architecture, thus restricting the autonomy of third-party developers (Eaton et al., 
2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson, 2013). This led to third-party developers resisting the change and entering 
into a new conflict with the platform owner, who then tried to adjust the control level to satisfy the demands 
of the former (Eaton et al., 2015). 
The platform owner also tends to accommodate the tension between actors with diverse interests who need to 
conform to established rules by allowing for flexible governance regime. For example, Huber et al. (2017), 
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when investigating the governance of third-party developers found that platform owner engages in both high 
level of governance regime consisting of general rules, to which all actors need to conform to, while also 
allowing for the emergence of specific rules tailored towards different collaborators.  
To resolve the tension between aggregation of resources and the need to allocate them proportionally, the 
owner engages in accommodating. For example, when tensions between the owner and external contributors 
appear as result of low return on partnership (see Gawer and Henderson, 2007), the owner should engage in 
fair, proportionate distribution of the accumulated resources (e.g., revenue, IPRs, and more) (Ceccagnoli et al., 
2012; Gawer and Henderson, 2007; Eisenmann et al., 2006; Kohler, 2018; van Alstyne et al., 2016). 
Managerial Responses to Development Tensions. Throughout the evolution of the digital platform 
ecosystem, platform owners face the contradiction between reinforcing the current development trajectory, 
while also transforming it when faced with internal and external challenges. To manage this general 
contradiction, the owner engages in splitting by emphasizing on either one of the two opposites in sequential 
manner over time (Evans, 2009; Gawer, 2009; Hagiu, 2006; Kohler, 2018). Further, to address the specific 
salient tensions, stemming from this inherent contradiction, the owner relies on accommodating, splitting and 
synthesis.  
To manage the tension between growth and subsequent adoption, the owner engages in a splitting strategy. 
While growth of actors spurs the evolution of the ecosystems and transforms it with the introduction of new 
actors (Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 2006), it also requires dedicated efforts in securing the continuous adoption of the 
introduced actors (Hagiu, 2006). Researchers recommend owners to first focus on achieving depth that is to 
ensure that the newly introduced actors have adopted the provided services, before the inclusion of other types 
of actors (breadth) (Hagiu, 2006), thus splitting the two opposites in time. 
When expanding the digital platform ecosystem, the inter-platform competition intensifies (Eisenman et al., 
2011; Gawer, 2009). To resolve this tension, the owner engages in accommodating by trying to manage the 
growing competition while continuing expanding. In particular, the owner can engage in entry deterrence 
practices (Eisenmann et al., 2009) through scaling of the ecosystem (Kohler, 2018) or through requiring 
exclusivity, such as exclusive dealing, tying, bundling, from ecosystem actors (Evans, 2012). In addition, it 
can also increase switching costs (Bakos, 1991), invest in R&D (Eisenmann et al., 2006), decrease prices 
(Eisenmann et al., 2006) and increase product differentiation (Evans, 2012). In some cases, the owner can also 
exclude competitors’ services from own channels (e.g., Apple excluded Google Voice app in its App Store) 
(Eaton et al., 2015). To accommodate the competition, the owner can also increase the level of cooperation by 
allowing co-ownership of the platform (Eisenmann et al., 2009), licensing platform technology to competitors 
(Gawer and Cusumano, 2007) and ensuring interoperability to competing ecosystems (Eisenmann et al., 2009). 
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Due to the innovativeness of their offerings, digital platform ecosystems often challenge existing regulatory 
regimes leading to tensions with regulators and other interested parties, such as trade unions (e.g., Uber, 
Airbnb). To resolve this tension, the owner usually adopts a synthesis response by entering into a dialogue 
with the regulators to develop a mutually acceptable solution (Hagiu and Rothman, 2016), which allows the 
digital platform ecosystem to continue operating while meeting regulatory requirements. In addition, the owner 
can also change investigated practices before the regulators required such actions (Eaton et al., 2015; Evans, 
2012), which also constitutes a form of synthesis.  
By actively attending and solving the salient tensions occurring with regards to performance, architecture, 
governance and development contradictions within the digital platform ecosystem, the owner, in combination 
with the actions (praxis) performed by other ecosystem actors, reconstructs the digital platform ecosystems as 
interconnected totality. Depending on the introduced changes as result of the adopted managerial responses, 
the reconstruction can constitute either incremental changes, which reinforce the existing ecosystem structure, 
or significant changes, which transform the structure. Although salient tensions can be resolved through 
engaging in accommodating, splitting and synthesis, their resolution can serve as a source of additional 
inherent contradictions (Benson, 1977; Seo and Creed, 2002), which become part of the reconstructed 
ecosystem configuration of actors, architecture and governance. Thus, while some tensions disappear, others 
appear over time, underlying the dialectical nature of digital platform ecosystems.  
7. Summary, Limitations and Future Research 
Although digital platform ecosystems are ripe with contradictions (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2009; Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002; Tiwana, 2014), researchers have paid limited attention to tensions as drivers of ecosystem 
evolution (see Eaton et al., 2015; Tiwana, 2014; Wareham et al., 2014 as exceptions). To address this gap, we 
embark on Review and Theory Development study, which allows us to theorize about digital platform 
ecosystem evolution. Specifically, we combine Dialectics as a theoretical framework (Benson, 1977) with 
insights from extant platform literature to conceptualize the inherent contradictions, their manifestation into 
salient tensions, and the responses adopted for their resolution as part of the evolutionary process of digital 
platform ecosystems. 
As a result, we propose a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution (Figure 1), which presents 
digital platform ecosystems as socially constructed interconnected totality, characterized by four inherent 
contradictions with regards to performance, architecture, governance and development. Contextual factors of 
plurality, change, and scarcity can render these latent contradictions salient and prompt ecosystem actors to 
react. By adopting three response strategies, accommodating, splitting and synthesis, the platform owner, 
together with other ecosystems actors, resolves the tensions and subsequently reconstructs the digital platform 
ecosystem.  
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Our efforts are not without limitations. First, while we propose a Dialectical theory of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution building upon empirical insights from various dispersed studies, we do not demonstrate 
the utility of this model on a single case where we can investigate how the emergence and resolution of 
conflicts drive the evolution from end to end. Second, although we aim to provide a detailed summary of the 
relevant literature, due to the adopted sampling strategy (see Appendix), we might have omitted relevant 
studies, which point to relevant contradictions or managerial responses.  
To overcome these limitations, we urge researchers to adopt the Dialectical theory of digital platform 
ecosystem evolution and apply it to investigate empirical cases in order to extend and improve our propositions. 
In addition, as context appears to be an important factor in determining the nature and operation of inherent 
contradictions (see Section 4), we welcome studies investigating this particular aspect of the evolutionary 
process in order to determine with more accuracy when salient tensions are more likely to appear. We further 
advocate for studies investigating digital platform ecosystem evolution from other theoretical perspectives. 
Thus, for example, researchers can combine insights about the ecosystem evolution from dialectical 
perspective with the insights from studies providing other theoretical perspectives of the evolutionary process 
(e.g., competition (Ojala and Lyytinen, 2018); Information System capabilities (Tan et al., 2015); strategy 
(Gawer, 2009)). 
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Appendix: Research Method 
To develop a Dialectical theory of digital platform ecosystem evolution, we conduct a Review and Theory 
Development study. Our goal was to provide an overview of the relevant literature to inspire and support 
subsequent theorizing (Krogh et al., 2012; Leidner, 2018; Wiener et al., 2016). We first identified a research 
gap within the existing platform literature (the lack of theories on tensions in digital platform ecosystem 
evolution) and selected a theoretical framework (Dialectics) to address it. Subsequently, we reviewed relevant 
studies within the platform literature and synthetized them based on the selected theoretical framework to 
theorize about the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem from a dialectical perspective. As a result, we 
propose a theory, which fills the identified research gap (Leidner, 2018). 
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To review the relevant literature, we first identified relevant studies on digital platform ecosystems by relying 
on snowballing sampling strategy, which prescribes the selection of a key article whose references are then 
used to identify additional relevant studies (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). We selected the article by Gawer (2014) 
on bridging the economic and engineering streams in the platform literature, as a starting point of the search 
process. We choose this article as it provides an overview of key studies from the two main streams in the 
platform literature, which have developed separately.  
Out of the 91 references included in the article by Gawer (2014), we selected 29 studies, which refer to tensions 
or conflicts in relation to digital platform ecosystems, based on reading their abstracts. Subsequently, to 
identify relevant articles after 2014, we identified studies citing Gawer (2014) in their references through 
Scopus. The initial list consisted of 90 articles as of January 2018, when we performed the search. After 
reviewing their abstracts, we ended up with 9 relevant articles after excluding studies, which do not refer to 
the main phenomenon of investigation and which are not published in journals. Thus, the initial sampling pool 
consisted of 38 articles. Next, we went through the references of the 38 articles, identified during the first 
search round, to discover additional relevant articles for the final sampling. We further analysed their 
respective references until we could not identify any new relevant articles. As a result, our final sampling 
consists of 65 articles from across various research domains. 
To analyse the articles, we developed a coding scheme incorporating the main concepts from Dialectics 
theory—contradiction, salient tension, triggers and managerial responses. Thus, for each article, we identified 
the tensions authors referred to, how they became salient (trigger), and how the platform owner and other 
actors addressed them (responses). We then looked for commonalities between the identified tensions and, as 
a result, grouped them in four different categories. Reflecting upon their similarities, we then abstracted the 
four different types of inherent contradictions and identified their identity and opposites. For each of these 
contradictions, we then drew on the reviewed literature to identify related salient tensions and responses. 
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Abstract 
Numerous mobile payment solutions, which rely on new disruptive technologies, have been launched on the 
payment market in recent years. Despite the growing number of mobile payment apps, very few solutions have 
turned to be successful as the majority fail to gain a critical mass of users. This paper investigates successful 
platform adoption strategies by using the Reach and Range Framework for Multi-Sided Platforms as a 
strategic tool to which mobile payment providers can adhere in order to tackle some of the main challenges 
they face throughout the evolution of their platforms. The analysis indicates that successful mobile payment 
solutions tend to be launched as one-sided platforms and then gradually expand into being two-sided. Our 
study showcases that the success of mobile payment platforms lies with the ability of the platform to balance 
the reach (number of participants) and the range (features and functionalities) of the platform. 
 
Keywords: Mobile payments, Multi-sided platforms, Platform adoption, Platform Strategy, Case studies 
Introduction 
 
The rapid proliferation of Ubiquitous Information Systems has tremendous potential to transform our day-to-
day activities due to the ability of such systems to interact with their surrounding environment [46]. The 
smartphone, which is heralded as the ‘first pervasive computer’ [5] p.1, is an example of such a ubiquitous 
information system. Smartphone’s portability, high degree of connectivity and its capability of incorporating 
numerous functionalities offered by device manufacturers and third-party developers alike significantly 
enhance the smartphone’s use anytime, anywhere and in any context. Consider that the smartphone is in the 
midst of absorbing navigation devices (GPS), mp3 players and cameras, not only as separate physical objects, 
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but also as separate business sectors [23]. The annexation quest of this digital device is advancing and it has 
already set its target on payments [23]. While the smartphone has managed to triumph over the portable camera 
as the preferred method to record memorable occasions under the form of photos and videos [37], the adoption 
rates of mobile payments continue to remain low in spite of the fact that the first mobile payment having been 
executed more than 20 years ago [29]. 
 
Despite the rapid spread and adoption of smartphones and the emergence of a huge array of mobile payment 
solutions, the much proclaimed mobile payment revolution still has not taken place as most consumers still 
prefer to pay with plastic cards and cash [14]. Indeed, the majority of the launched mobile payment apps have 
failed to gain a sufficient number of users as consumers are hesitant to adopt digital payment services [29]. 
Most of these solutions try to attract both users and merchants on board simultaneously, which proves to be a 
cumbersome task. In reality, the adoption of mobile payments is a complex process characterized by numerous 
strategic challenges which a payment provider needs to address [23], [35]. In this paper, we investigate mobile 
payments as digital multi-sided platforms that facilitate the recurring interactions between various 
constituencies [20]. We argue that instead of just focusing on reaching a critical mass of users, a mobile 
payment provider should pay more attention to nurturing platform interactions in order to spur the adoption of 
mobile payment platforms. Thus, we formulate the following research question: 
 
What strategies can a mobile payment platform provider adhere to in order to drive the adoption of its 
solution? 
 
The main obective of this paper is to outline the strategies to which mobile payment platforms can adhere to 
in order to ensure their adoption. In order to do so, we further investigate and expand the Reach and Range 
framework for multi-sided platforms (MSPs) which we initially introduced in a paper presented at the 14th 
International Conference on Mobile Business. We then demonstrate the usefulness of the Reach and Range 
framework for MSPs as a strategic tool for tackling some of the main challenges a mobile payment platform 
faces throughout its evolution. To this end, we apply the Reach and Range framework to three selected cases 
and use the findings of our case analysis to prescribe several strategic approaches to which mobile payment 
providers can adhere in order to spur the adoption of their solutions. Our analysis reveals that the success of 
digital payment platforms is determined by the ability of the platform owner to balance the reach and range 
of each of the affiliated with the platform sides and to manage the interside reach and range which 
characterizes the interaction across the platform sides.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows: First, we outline the theoretical foundations of this paper. We, then, present 
the Reach and Range Framework for MSPs as a mechanism that can be used to address the most pressing 
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strategic issues a platform faces. As a next step we briefly introduce the three investigated cases and analyze 
them using the Reach and Range Framework for MSPs. In the final sections of the paper, we discuss our 
findings, offer some conclusions and suggest promising areas for further research. 
 
Mobile Payments as Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
We draw on the literature on multi-sided platforms, which is rooted in the field of industrial economics, as 
theoretical lens to investigate mobile payment solutions. Despite the growing literature on MSPs, there is often 
confusion as to the exact difference between one-sided, two-sided and multi-sided platforms. The problem 
stems from the lack of a clear definition [20], which leads to an overlapping in the way that two-sided and 
multi-sided platforms are defined [12], [20]. In this paper, we view platforms as systems that create and 
facilitate interactions between one or multiple customer groups connected to them [20]. We also adopt a clear 
distinction between one-sided (enabling interactions between participants of one distinct group), two-sided 
(enabling interactions between participants of two distinct groups) and multi-sided (interactions between 
participants of more than two distinct groups) platforms [36].  
 
Mobile payment solutions function as digital platforms that facilitate the direct interaction between various 
customers affiliated to them [11], [20], [23], [28], [35]. More often than not they are launched as one-sided 
platforms and gradually evolve to being two-sided, and eventually, multi-sided [36]. This is in contrast to 
payment cards which are traditionally launched and function as two-sided platforms that enable the interaction 
between merchants and consumers and remain two-sided so far [12]. Unlike traditional payment platforms, 
such as credit and debit cards, digital payment platforms are extremely scalable with high development costs 
and low marginal costs. As costs remain fixed throughout the platform’s evolution, the extensive adoption of 
a platform affects positively the value of the platform to all affiliated constituencies [8]. This means that once 
the payment platform is developed, it costs very little to add and service additional users. Thus, payment 
platforms exhibit significant economies of scale as the initial development costs remain fixed and are gradually 
distributed across the growing number of platform participants. This observation, however, is valid only when 
the mobile payment solutions are software-based, that is they function as payment apps enabling P2P 
transactions. When such solutions are used to execute consumer-to-business (C2B) transactions, they require 
a merchant to be equipped with a compatible hardware (e.g., dongles).  
  
The research on digital payment platforms mainly encompasses studies on payment platform design [23], 
business models [7], factors leading to platform failure [16], transformation of the digital payment ecosystem 
[21], and payment platforms’ evolutionary models [36]. Significantly less emphasis, however, is placed on 
investigating strategies for successful entry into and expansion of digital payment platforms [35]. We address 
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this research gap by determing the strategies that platform providers can adopt in order to address the strategic 
challenges they face during entry, as well as subsequent expansion of their platforms. 
 
MSPs value generation ability lies in the platform’s capability to enable multiple interactions that occur with 
high frequency among the affiliated to the platform participants [20]. In order to do so, platform providers 
need to create and manage network effects that occur when users perceive an increase in the value of a product 
or a service as a result of the groiwng number of participants [33]. The concept of same-side network effects 
presupposes that consumers may find a product or a service more useful if similar consumers use that product 
as well. An example of this is the fax machine which has no value of its own, as it requires the presence of 
other fax machines. At the same time, the usefulness of the fax machine for a user grows as the number of fax 
machines increases, since the user can communicate with a larger number of other users. Cross-side network 
effects exist when users value the presence of other distinct groups of platform participants. For example, most 
credit cards function as two-sided platforms because they facilitate the interaction between two distinct groups 
of participants – buyers and merchants [11]. As the number of payment card holders increases, more merchants 
begin to accept this form of payment in order to attract buyers to their shops and vice versa. Platforms are also 
characterized by homing costs, which are related to the adoption and/or any form of affiliation with the 
platform [3], and by switching costs, or the costs which consumers incur when shifting platforms [33]. 
 
Digital platforms prove to be complex systems that evolve gradually over time [42]. Platform’s evolvability, 
however, has remained an elusive topic in the research on MSPs, with only few models and prescriptions 
guiding the platform throughout its evolution. Evans [11], for example, proposes a two-stage model to explain 
a platform’s market entry and growth, anchored around platform’s ability to achieve a critical mass of users. 
A key threshold for every platform is swiftly gaining a critical mass of users, which is defined as a sufficient 
number of users who have joined the platform and are transacting within the platform with high frequency 
[17], [33]. Evan’s model presupposes that during the first ignition stage, customers are affiliated with the 
platform in order to evaluate its main value proposition [11]. In the second “growth” phase, after the platform 
has managed to attract a substantial number of participants, the platform can rely on the already achieved 
network effects to spur further growth and to ensure its endurance. In order to achieve critical mass, Evans 
[11] recommends a zig-zag strategy where a platform owner gradually attracts and facilitate simultaneously 
the participation on both sides of the platform. The platform usually launches with a limited number of 
participants on both sides and grows over time. Another model, which provides an insights into the platform’s 
evolvability, is proposed by Hagiu [19], who emphasises on the platform’s gradual transition from being one-
sided to two - (or multiple) sided platform. Before a platform can embark on an expansion quest, it should first 
achieve platform depth by designing and deploying value-creating functionalities that will bring benefits to the 
tjose affiliated with the platform participants [19]. The achievement of platform depth serves as a prerequisite 
206 
 
for the subsequent platform expansion when new constituencies join the platform, thus extending the 
platform’s breadth. Tiwana [42] points out that a platform’s evolution requires constant adjustment of the 
platform’s architecture and governance as the platform matures over time. Tiwana [42] p.162 also proposes 
various “evolutionary metrics”, which measure platform performance over the span of its evolution. In 
particular, he states that in the short term, platform owners should focus on measuring platform resilience, 
scalability, and composability, and then move on to tracking platform stickiness, synergy, and plasticity; and 
concentrating on envelopment, durability, and duration in the long term. While Evans [11] and Hagiu [19] 
discuss stage models in order to structure platform evolvability, Tiwana [42] focuses on concrete 
measurements to estimate the speed and effectiveness of platform evolution (that is evolutionary metrics). 
There is, however, a lack of an analytical model that brings the three views together (a stage model with 
concrete strategic thresholds for each stage) serving as a strategic tool to guide platform evolution by helping 
a platform solve some of its main strategic challenges. 
 
The Reach and Range Framework for Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
In this section, we briefly identify some of the most pressing strategic issues which platform providers face 
throughput the evolution of their platforms. Most of the research literature on multi-sided platforms focuses 
on pinpointing some of the strategic issues as well as prescribing certain rules that need to be taken into 
consideration when a platform owner designs and launches its offerings (e.g., pricing mechanisms, governance 
rules and design rules). There is, however, a lack of an overall principle or framework to guide the platform 
owner when addressing successfully and in a holistic manner the main strategic challenges throughout the 
platform’s evolutionary path. To address this gap in the literature on MSPs, we develop the Reach and Range 
Framework for MSPs as a strategic tool that platform owners can use when designing their launch and 
expansion strategies.  
 
Strategic Issues of Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
As multi-sided platforms are characterized as being highly evolvable systems, they tend to evolve over time 
by introducing various modifications to their initial platform design (i.e. additional features, or more 
participants) [42]. As platforms pass through different stages throughout their evolutionary path, however, they 
face new strategic challenges and considerations that need to be addressed in a prompt and timely manner [35]. 
In this paper, we argue that the challenges which a platform owner faces are pre-determined by the specific 
design of the platform upon its launch. Thus, the challenges that a one-sided platform needs to solve differ to 
a certain degree from the challenges which the platform needs to tackle as it transforms into being two-sided 
[42]. This evolutionary approach allows for a platform owner not having to face all the strategic challenges at 
once, but instead can address them step by step [19].    
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Although the strategic challenges, which a platform faces, have been rightfully identified in the existing 
literature on multi-sided platforms, we try to identify some of the main specific strategic considerations 
associated with the separate stages of a platform’s evolutionary path. We use the overview of these challenges 
as a useful vehicle for guiding the application of the Reach and Range Framework for multi-sided platforms 
for solving some of these considerations. We will address this issue more thoroughly in the Discussion section. 
In order to synthesize the existing strategic considerations, we adopt a two-step approach. First, we summarize 
the existing literature on MSPs in order to single out the existing strategic challenges and strategic goals, which 
need to be attained. In the second stage, we consult the data we gathered from conducting interviews with 
various payment experts over the span of two years in order to pinpoint the challenges that payment platforms 
tackle during the different stages of their evolution.  
 
The main strategic challenge of a one-sided platform is to gain a critical mass of users after its launch; hence, 
the platform owner has only one distinct group of participants to cater to at this stage. However, a platform 
owner should be aware that one-sided platforms tend to offer a limited number of functionalities [35]. Thus, 
due to their relatively weak value proposition, one-sided platforms can easily be attacked by other players, 
who can easily imitate their offerings. This poses a significant threat to the durability of one-sided platforms, 
as the platform cannot generate enough lock-in effects in order to ensure that its platform’s users will not multi-
home to other platforms or even switch entirely to other solutions. In order to address this shortcoming, which 
is intrinsic to the design of the one-sided platforms, a platform has to strengthen its value proposition by adding 
a second distinct group of participants, thus transforming into being two-sided. As a one-sided platform 
achieves a critical mass of users, it becomes attractive to other actors wanting to gain access to the participants 
already affiliated to the platform [11]. 
 
As the complexity of the platform design increases, a platform faces several strategic challenges [41]. The 
platform owner thus needs to develop and deploy various mechanisms so as to ensure that the size of the second 
group of participants grows continuously. Another critical issue is achieving platform stickiness by creating 
strong lock-in effects for the first affiliated group of participants [33]. Apart from catering to each of those 
affiliated to the platform group of participants, a platform also needs to put efforts into creating and sustaining 
platform recurrence, which we define as the ability of the platform to achieve significant cross-side network 
effects by stimulating high volumes of transactions between the affiliated sides [30]. The presence of a second 
group of participants allows a platform owner to try to devise a viable business model by determining a 
platform’s subsidy and revenue side [19]. The next step of the platform’s evolutionary path is to achieve a 
platform variety of offerings in order to ensure even greater platform stickiness and strengthening of the 
platform’s value proposition [42]. To do so, a platform can benefit from the innovative potential of numerous 
external complementors who can become affiliated to the platform, thus transforming it into being multi-sided 
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[19]. A key issue at this stage of the platform’s evolution is for a platform owner to bolster the platform’s 
defence, thus preventing a possible envelopment attack [9].  
 
Reach and Range Framework for Multi-Sided Platforms 
 
The Reach and Range Framework for MSPs is based on Keen’s Reach and Range Framework for IT platforms 
[24] where he introduces the concepts of reach and range to study the business features of an IT platform. For 
Keen [24] reach determines the IT platform’s ability to connect people, while range, as defined by Weil and 
Broadbent [44] who extend Keen’s initial definition of range, detects the different functionalities of certain 
business activities on the IT platform. The Reach and Range Framework as proposed by Keen [24], [25] 
constitutes a useful tool for planning and guiding the expansion of an IT platform. As we are seeking to 
investigate the entry and expansion strategies of MSPs, we view Keen’s framework as a useful theoretical 
underpinning to develop an analytical tool in order to study further the MSPs expansion. To this end, we adapt 
Keen’s Reach and Range framework to reflect the main characteristics of MSPs in an attempt to map out the 
participants affiliated to the platform and the various functionalities in which they can take part.  
 
There are several differences between Keen’s framework and the Reach and Range framework for MSPs. First, 
the domain of application of the two frameworks is different. Keen’s framework is anchored around the IT 
infrastructure of a firm, while the MSP framework is applied to digital platforms. Second, while we borrow 
Keen’s terminology of reach and range, we provide new definitions of these terms in order to reflect the logic 
of MSPs. For example, Keen’s definition of reach comprises business units, suppliers, geographical locations, 
customers etc. While, we adopt the main assumption behind the term reach (people connected through 
infrastructure, or platform in our case) [24], [25], we do not identify platform reach with business units or 
geographical locations (see below). Finally, by applying the MSPs logic to Keen’s Reach and Range 
framework, we introduce a new conceptual layer to the initial framework (e.g. network effects, multi-homing, 
direct interaction between affiliated platform sides etc.). 
 
The main purpose of MSPs is to enable cross-side interactions between distinct groups of participants affiliated 
to a platform in order to create, capture and distribute value [18]. Thus, the main goal of a platform is to 
increase not only the frequency of the interactions among the different participants affiliated to the platform 
but also the type of interactions within each of the platform sides and across several sides. In order to achieve 
this, a platform provider faces a number of strategic challenges, which require that certain strategic choices 
need to be made regarding the affiliation of the different sides to the platform as well as the features and 
functionalities offered on the platform throughout its evolutionary path. In this paper, we argue that the Reach 
and Range framework for MSPs can serve as a useful strategic tool to guide platform owners in tackling the 
key strategic challenges, indentified above (see section 3.1.). 
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At the core of the Reach and Range framework for MSPs is the assumption that every platform side can be 
characterized by its reach and range. When reach refers to a platform’s side, it represents the number of 
participants of one distinct group affiliated to the platform. Reach can also refer to the overall platform’s reach, 
which is a sum of the reach of each distinct group of participants affiliated to the platform. Range, on the other 
hand, encompasses the features and functionalities associated with a particular side or several sides. Thus, by 
combining all the features offered by the various sides and across the sides, we can estimate the overall 
platform’s range. The concepts of reach and range are interconnected and the success of both depends on the 
right timing within which they are executed. A platform provider usually designs and offers a specific set of 
features (range) in order to attract more participants (reach) or to lock-in existing customers. In this way, a 
platform expands its range in order to increase its reach. On the other hand, if the number of participants 
increases (reach), but the platform has a limited number of features (range), a platform provider needs to 
guarantee further entrenchment of the already joined participants by offering new features and functionalities 
(range), resulting in more reoccurring interactions. Thus, a platform provider needs to strike a balance between 
the reach and range in order to create and manage multiple reoccurring interactions, which are the main 
generators of value for the platform.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of Reach and Range for One-Sided Platforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Upon their launch one-sided platforms (Figure 1), cater to one distinct group of participants (I), exhibiting 
same-side network effects (1). Initially, a one-sided platform offer a limited number of features (i.e., it is 
characterized by a limited platform range) in order to attract potential users. As a platform needs to gain a 
critical mass of users or a certain number of participants in order to become viable, a platform provider adds 
features that will attract more users, thus expanding the platform’s range in order to increase the platform’s 
reach (see Figure 1). As a one-sided platform gains a critical mass of participants, it comes to a point of 
saturation, which slows down the growth of a platform. A platform provider may then decide to stay in such a 
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position, as the one-sided platform has already become viable in terms of achieving same-side network effects 
(but not necessarily being economically viable) after it reaches critical mass. However, as one-sided platforms 
are particularly vulnerable (see section 3.1.), a platform provider may decide to expand the platform by adding 
a new distinct group of participants to its early value proposition, thus transforming the platform into two-
sided one. 
 
Two-sided platforms (see Figure 2) facilitate the interactions between two distinct group of participants (I and 
II) [16], which are characterized by cross-side network effects (3+4) [33]. Just as for the first group of 
participants (I), the second distinct group of participants (II) is also characterized by its own reach and range. 
Each of the platform sides is also characterized by same-side network effects (1+2). A platform provider needs 
to manage the reach and range of each side in order to increase the number of participants and functionalities 
associated with a particular platform constituency. The transformation from a one-sided to two-sided platform 
also implies that the overall reach and range of the platform now consists of the reach and range of both sides 
of the platform (I+II) (see Figure 2). 
 
At the same time as a two-sided platform creates and nurtures cross-side interactions, a platform provider also 
needs to balance the reach and range across the different distinct groups of participants (Interside reach and 
range, see Figure 2). For example, the more credit card holders that join a payment platform, the more 
merchants will participate. Thus, the change in the reach in one of the platform’s sides results in expansion of 
the reach on the other side and vice versa. A platform’s interside reach is associated with the functionalities 
and features which enable cross-side interactions (e.g., functionalities to execute C2B transactions – QR code 
scanner, receipts, loyalty, etc.). A platform may also expand its interside reach by launching a platform 
envelopment attack, that is a platform can imitate functionalities offered by other platforms and add them to 
its existing offering [9], [10].  
 
The leveraging of the platform’s reach and range can also indirectly help determine the platform pricing 
strategy (i.e. platform’s subsidy and revenue side, see [12], [13], [18]). One-sided platforms usually do not 
possess a viable business model (e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn and Youtube struggled initially to generate revenue 
before expanding their services) as platform providers aim to stimulate users’ adoption by making the 
platform’s value proposition optimally attractive. As part of its evolutionary path, a one-sided platform adds a 
second distinct group of participants that values the access to the already established platform’s user base, thus 
constituting a potential source of revenue for the platform. In order to provide such access, a platform owner 
needs to design features that support interactions between the two affiliated groups of participants [18]. By 
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designing new features that enable the execution of such cross-side interactions, the platform extends its 
interside range.   
 
 
Figure 2: Overview of Reach and Range for Two-Sided Platforms 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though a two-sided platform manages to optimally balance its reach and range, and eventually succeeding 
in defining a viable business model, it should further reconsider its current design in order to prevent potential 
envelopment attacks from other players [9], [23]. A platform can find itself under the threat of being enveloped 
by rival platforms if it cannot achieve platform stickiness and fails to ensure significant platform reach (enough 
number of participants affiliated to the platform). This can be attributed to the mismanagement of platform 
reach if a platform owner has designed functionalities that are not recurring with high frequency. To prevent 
the threat, a platform owner needs to reinforce its defence by further diversifying its value proposition. Such a 
diversification can be achieved through attracting numerous external complementors [42] who can offer 
innovative services to the platform’s users, thus expanding the platform’s reach (number of affiliated distinct 
group of participants) and range (the platform’s functionalities). At this stage of its evolution, a platform 
consists of multiple sides, each of which has its own reach and range, thus making the management of the 
platform extremely complex. 
 
Method 
 
In order to provide an answer to our research question, we use a qualitative research method utilizing case 
study analysis. Thus, our study adopts an explorative research approach of digital payment platforms with 
three cases of successful mobile payment solutions. Case studies aim at providing in-depth understanding of 
complex phenomena by allowing researchers to analyze them within their context of emergence and existence 
[6], based on collection and detailed analysis of various data sources [45].  
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Case Selection 
 
In this paper, we aim to define strategies that platforms can use in order to spur their adoption. To this end, we 
investigate the usefulness of our framework to address the main challenges that platforms face throughout their 
evolution. Thus, we concentrate on studying mature digital payment platforms with a well-established 
evolutionary path. The platform’s ability to advance successfully on its evolutionary path is a vital indicator 
for the platform’s endurance, which ultimately is what distinguishes successful from non-successful digital 
payment platforms. Selecting such successful digital payment platforms for the purposes of our study, 
however, proves to be a challenging task, as most of the launched mobile payment apps have failed to reach 
critical mass of users and, as a result of this, have been discarded. Nonetheless, in the last few years, a few 
solutions have been successfully launched and have managed to establish a clear-cut evolutionary path. Digital 
payment platforms, such as Pingit offered by Barclays bank in UK and MobilePay offered by Danske Bank in 
Denmark, have acquired a large number of participants and have continued to evolve at a stable pace, 
diversifying their functionality portfolio and affiliating more constituencies. Thus, we choose to investigate 
them as examples of mature digital payment platforms.  
 
Pettigrew [31] does not recommend relying exclusively on similar cases to investigate a phenomenon, and we 
also include a unique case study – Swish, a solution jointly developed by some of the largest financial 
institutions in Sweden, which is dissimilar to the initially selected Pingit and MobilePay. As Swish has 
different design from the two other solutions, as it is offered jointly by several banks in Sweden, which all 
need to achieve consensus about the entry and expansion design of the solution, it is an interesting case to 
investigate as it is in contrast to the other selected cases. We undertake this approach in order to test the 
robustness of our framework by investigating whether the model can be replicated across various types of 
cases (different characteristics of the solutions across three different markets) and to study whether the 
framework can be expanded further by incorporating new insights. In the Discussion section, we briefly present 
two unsuccessful solutions, Paii in Denmark and Bart in Sweden, which no longer exist. The two solutions 
serve as further illustration of the explanatory power of the framework and are not part of the analysis, which 
leads to the formulation of the different strategies in the Discussion section.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 
The research in question in this paper is of a process nature, as it focuses on understanding the evolution of 
various concepts over time [26]. Thus, the data we gathered are comprised primarily of separate stories which 
describe events ocurring over a span of time [43]. The data we gathered took place in the span of eight months 
and were coded in order to identify the specific evolutionary path of the three selected platforms.  
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Our research is informed by both primary and secondary data. We collected primary data for MobilePay by 
conducting interviews with senior managers in the period April – May 2014. One of the senior managers was 
in charge of the initial launch of MobilePay and its future development. The second senior manager was 
responsible for consulting the future development of the mobile payment solution in terms of overcoming 
strategic challenges and taking into account existing strategic opportunities. The duration of each of the 
interviews was one hour. The interviews were conducted based on semi-structured questionnaire and contain 
insights about the rationale behind the specific design choice of MobilePay upon launch and during its 
subsequent evolution as well as insights about some of the strategic challenges that the solution needed to 
overcome over time. It was possible to collect primary data only about MobilePay as we managed to get access 
to senior managers only in this case. In order to construct the exact evolution of MobilePay, we further 
consulted secondary data, such as press releases and news articles. 
 
A significant amount of secondary data was also collected. The data we gathered for Pingit and Swish were 
exclusively secondary. We consulted publicly available sources: press releases, annual reports, online news 
and interviews. The collected data contained information about the launch of both solutions as well as 
information about their subsequent evolution, namely introduction of new features, user base, promotional 
campaigns and business models. The gathered data allow us to map out the evolution of each of the solutions. 
Two of the apps (MobilePay and Pingit) were also installed on the researchers’ phones so that better insights 
into the apps’ functionalities could be obtained.  
 
To analyse the gathered data about the three selected cases (MobilePay, Pingit, and Swish), we applied a 
qualitative content analysis based on developing coding schemes and analysing the gathered text [22]. The 
coding scheme we developed is informed by previously defined theory, namely the Reach and Range 
Framework for MSPs. The coding scheme consists of two main codes (one-sided and two-sided platforms) 
and three sub-codes reach, range and interside reach and range. We coded the data by first identifying the 
stage of the platform evolution (one-sided or two-sided) and then we identified the reach and range for each 
of the identified platform sides as well as the interside reach and range. Reach encompases all the information 
with regards to user base on each side of the platforms as well as the overall number of users on the platform. 
Reach was also identified as different types of platform participants (e.g., different types of merchants). Range 
was coded as features and functionalities introduced to the platform’s initial value proposition. Small app 
releases, introducing security updates or bug fixes, were omitted from the coding as they refer to app 
maintainance and do not reflect the platform evolution (see [42]). Thus, any change in the platform was coded 
as reach or range if it was part of the evolutionary path of a platform.  
MobilePay 
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Danske Bank’s MobilePay app is a bank-operated, card-based mobile payment solution allowing users to 
transfer money from a card to a bank account via a mobile phone number and a PIN code. The app was 
launched in May 2013 and has proved to be extremely popular among the Danes as more than 50 per cent of 
the adult population has downloaded it since its launch. Currently the app has three million registered users. 
Initially, the solution was launched as a one-sided platform catering to the needs of one distinct group of 
participants (that is, users). After MobilePay managed to attract a critical mass of users, it added a second 
group of participants by opening up to small merchants in October 2013. 
 
MobilePay as One-Sided Platform  
 
MobilePay was launched as an one-sided platform facilitating the interaction between a sender and a receiver, 
thus forming one distinctive group of users with interchangeable roles (user A can send money to receiver B; 
the next day B becomes the sender by sending money to A). 
 
Range 
 
The MobilePay app allows a user to transfer money to another user by relying only on the recipient’s phone 
number, thus eliminating the need to exchange complicated bank details. Initially, users could send no more 
than 201 EUR per day to other users (Site 1). A new version of the app was released in September 2013, just 
five months after the initial launch. The updated app introduced new features such as ‘split the bill’ and allowed 
for higher amounts per transaction. The introduction of these new features is a concrete step to increase the 
range of the app in order to increase the frequency of the interactions (i.e. by enabling the new use of ‘split the 
bill’) and achieve lock-in effects. The increase of the range is also aimed at attracting more users, thus 
strengthening the same-side effects. 
 
Reach 
 
The app targets both Danske bank customers and non-Danske bank customers that contributed to its high 
adoption rate, with almost 300.000 people installing the app on their devices during the first two months after 
launch. The non-Danske Bank customers, who use the solution, constitute approximately 70 % of the overall 
user base of MobilePay. Danske Bank put considerable effort into attracting new consumers and growing its 
user base. The app was initially developed only for iPhone and Android devices. Users were also able to send 
money to receivers who initially had not downloaded the app, and, who in order to claim the money, had to 
sign up for the app. Getting a critical mass upon launch and reaching as many users as possible were critical 
for the success of the solution. Thus, during the first few months after the launch of the solution, efforts were 
focused on gaining a significant user base with strong same-sided network effects.  
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MobilePay as Two-Sided Platform 
 
As MobilePay managed to attract a significant number of users by expanding its range, it gradually became 
attractive to small businesses that form another distinctive group of participants who wanted access to the large 
user base of the app. Thus, by adding first small merchants and later big retail chains, MobilePay transformed 
from being a one-sided platform to being a two-sided platform, thereby creating cross-side effects.  
 
Interside Reach and Range 
 
In October 2013, Danske Bank started a trial period with selected small merchants (coffee shop owners, hot 
dog stand owners, and taxis) that could accept payments from customers. Small merchants had already been 
using MobilePay to execute transactions at flea markets, as the solution was perceived to be cheaper and easier 
to use as opposite to existing payment options. After the successful pilot, MobilePay solution for businesses 
was launched in February 2014. As most of the MobilePay users used the service to transfer small amounts, it 
was considered logical to first test low-value consumer-to-business (C2B) payments. The solution uses the 
businesses’ phone number to execute the transaction with shop owners being equipped with a smartphone with 
a MobilePay app. After the money is transferred from the consumer’s bank account, he or she gets a receipt 
with the company’s name, logo and time of payment on it (Site 1). At the same time businesses can easily 
verify the transactions and the overall amount of money sent to them, display their logo on the receipt, export 
transaction data, and point out to consumers the location of their shops. Thus, with the introduction of new 
platform interactions (between users and business), a platform needs to design features that support these 
interactions on both sides (interside range). 
 
In June 2014, a coffee shop in Denmark incorporated MobilePay as a payment method in its own app [1], thus 
expanding MobilePay’s range by enabling new ways of using the app. In July 2014, MobilePay entered the e-
commerce sphere by partnering with five online stores which now use MobilePay as a payment method. 
Danske Bank continued to bring more merchants to the solution by enabling online shops to use MobilePay as 
a payment method. The expansion of the MobilePay’s range was further reinforced in July 2015 when large 
retail chains introduced MobilePay in their stores, thus further expanding the range of the second platform 
side. Unlike the solutions for small merchants and online shops, payment transactions with MobilePay in large 
retail shops can be executed much faster and more conveniently with the help of Near Field Comminication 
(NFC) and Bluetooth technology. Thus, MobilePay’s platform interchange range is supported by various 
solutions. In 2015, MobilePay also launched a pilot of a loyalty concept called Bonus, allowing users to collect 
and redeem loyalty points with selected merchants, thus enhancing a platform’s interside range. Platform’s 
interchange reach is determined by the adoption rate of C2B transactions (i.e. the number of users paying 
merchants with MobilePay). We could not obtain such numbers for MobilePay. 
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Merchant’s Reach and Range 
 
MobilePay gradually extended the reach of the second distinct group that was added to its initial value 
proposition. Initially, the solution for businesses targeted only small merchants and consisted of an app that 
needed to be installed on the merchant’s smartphone. As of September 2014, approximately 1,975 small 
business places, such as coffee shops, clothing companies, hairdressers, bike repair shops, doctors etc., had 
adopted the solution. Later, MobilePay was incorporated as a method of payment on the websites of various 
online shops, and thus the reach of the business side was extended to encompass Internet retailers. Initially, 
big retailers were reluctant to use MobilePay in the same way that small merchants do mainly due to the high 
volume of transactions a larger retailer has to process in a quick and efficient way. Thus, MobilePay had to 
design different functionalities if it wanted to bring large retailers on board. After a few months of trial, the 
large retail chains in Denmark launched MobilePay. Thus, MobilePay’s reach on the business side was 
gradually extended to encompass small merchants, online traders and large retail chains. The extension of the 
reach was facilitated by the introduction of new features for each of the business types, thus expanding the 
range of the platform’s business side (see above). 
 
Users’ Reach and Range 
 
As merchants were attracted to the sheer size of the MobilePay’s installed user base, the platform owner needed 
to continue growing the number of active users (i.e. expanding the reach of the first platform constituency), 
while also focusing on growing the platform participants which form the second constituency. Although 
MobilePay put significant effort into attracting merchants to join its platform, it also continued growing its 
installed user base by managing both the reach and range of the user side (see Table 1). To cater to its user 
base, MobilePay increased on several occasions the daily payment limits, introduced photos and personal 
messages when users sent money, added profile photos (range) and also launched a MobilePay app for 
Windows Phones (reach) (see Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1: Overview of MobilePay’s Reach and Range 
 
  MobilePay 
 
 
 
One-
Sided 
Platform 
 
 
 
 
Side 1 
(Users) 
 
Range 
P2P payments 
Increase payment per transaction limit 
Split the bill 
 
 
Reach 
 
All banks customers 
15-years old 
iOS, Android 
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Two-
Sided 
Platform 
 
Side 1 
(Users) 
 
Range 
Increase daily payment limit 
Photos to receipts 
Messages to receipts 
Profile Pics 
Reach Windows Phones 
 
 
 
Side 2 
(Merchants) 
Range Mobile Business App with functionalities for 
merchants 
MobilePay Button in third-party apps 
NFC/Bluetooth device at check out 
Reach Small merchants 
Online retailers 
Large Retailers 
 
Interside 
    Range C2B transactions 
Bonus 
    Reach Number of C2B transactions (non-
disclosed) 
 
 
Pingit  
 
In 2012, the UK-based Barclays bank launched its peer-to-peer transactions (P2P) app Pingit which allows one 
user to send money to another user fast, easily and efficient. The service is available for Barclays’ customers 
and non-customers as long as they have a UK current bank account and a UK mobile phone number. 
Approximately 4.2 million people have signed-up for the service since its launch. Pingit has also managed to 
attract 67 000 businesses so far [27]. Initially, Pingit was launched as a one-sided platform and later expanded 
to become two-sided in May 2012. 
 
Pingit as One-Sided Platform  
 
Pingit was first launched as a payment app enabling P2P transactions between a receiver and a sender who are 
subject to same-side network effects. The more people use the app, the more valuable it becomes. As the sender 
and receiver of P2P payments can change their roles easily, they form one distinct group of users. Thus, upon 
its launch Pingit functioned as one-sided platform.  
 
Range 
 
Upon its launch, Pingit’s main functionality was to enable P2P payments among Barclays’ bank account 
holders who can select the recipient’s phone number, enter the amount they wish to transfer and press the send 
button (Site 2). The app allowed users to split the bill, send a personal message and receive a SMS confirmation 
for each transaction. App users could also set up and customize their profile by adding a photo. In May 2012, 
Barclays extended its value proposition by introducing features which allow for better user account 
management (e.g., integration with current accounts, operation of joint accounts, adding several phone 
numbers to one user profile), thus expanding the reach of the platform. By increasing the number of features 
offered by the app, Barclays aimed at creating more interactions on the platform, thereby driving value for the 
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app users. At the same time, the introduction of new features is directed not only towards more interactions 
within current app users, but also towards attracting more users. Thus, by increasing the range of the app, 
Barclays also tried to increase its reach. 
 
Reach 
 
Upon its launch, Pingit was available only to Barclays’ bank account holders who can use the app to send P2P 
payments. Payments, however, could be received by both Barclays and non-Barclays customers, with the latter 
having to log-in to a website to claim the transferred Money (Site 2). Initially, the app was available only to 
Barclays’ customers over 18 years old who had iOS, Android or Blackberry devices. Just a week after its 
launch, approximately 120 000 people signed for the payment app [34]. Following the successful launch, with 
two subsequent updates in February and April 2012, the app was expanded beyond Barclays’ customers and 
was made available to anyone in Britain over the age of 16 years with a current UK bank account. Furthermore, 
in July 2014, Pingit became available for Windows Phones devices. Thus, Barclays had extended the 
platform’s reach by changing the rules of access to the platform and by making the app available across 
multiple devices.  
 
Pingit as Two-Sided Platform 
 
By adding new functionalities and easing the rules for platform access, Pingit’s user base grew significantly 
and reached 1,8 million users within a year and a half. As Pingit’s user base grew in size, it became attractive 
to small businesses that form a second distinctive group of users who paid to get access to the installed user 
base. As Barclays started to add various small and large businesses, the app was transformed from being one-
sided to being two-sided. Thus, Pingit still needed to design strategies for managing two sides (users and sole 
traders) each of which would have its own reach and range.  
 
Interside Reach and Range  
 
In May 2012, Pingit enabled its users to pay to sole traders such as carpenters, plumbers and beauticians by 
scanning a QR code on their bills, thereby eliminating the need for exchange of bank account details. With the 
introduction of the “Pay Now with Pingit” button to third-party apps and the “Buy it” button in the Pingit app 
in September 2013, the app allowed users to connect to merchants, thus enabling the possibility for more types 
of platform interactions. In November 2013, Barclays retooled its Pingit app to enable large firms to send funds 
for insurance claims, utility refunds and other corporate payments directly to consumers. Even though Pingit 
was extended to cover B2C payments, the app still functions as a two-sided platform, as it facilitates the 
interactions between two platform constituencies (users and merchants). 
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Merchant’s Reach and Range 
 
By bringing sole traders on board and enabling the interactions between users and small businesses, Pingit 
became a two-sided platform and started building the reach of its second side. The management of the reach 
and range for businesses required strategies for attracting more business owners (reach) and introducing 
features that would attract various types of businesses to the platform (range). In 2013, Barclays announced 
that Pingit could be used for paying utilities bills, thus adding utility providers to its reach and enabling new 
uses. A few months later, in September 2013, when Pingit had 1,8 million users, the app enabled functionalities 
that extended the reach to encompass small and large merchants. In this way, Pingit expanded the reach of its 
second side by gradually absorbing different types of businesses. Pingit introduced different features (range) 
in order to affiliate particular business types (sole traders vs. merchants) such as QR codes, in-app switch, buy 
button, etc. Thus, Pingit partitioned the second (business) side of the platform by designing different features 
for each of the different business types.  
 
User’s Reach and Range 
 
Despite adopting strategies to grow the number and types of the affiliated to the solution businesses, Pingit 
also continued to grow the size of its installed user base. In August 2012, Pingit enabled the possibility for 
users to send money outside UK free of charge, thereby broadening the range of the platform. This new feature 
also expanded the reach of the platform with new types of users, that is remittance senders and receivers. Pingit 
continued to introduce various new features (range), such as Twitter payments, easier homepage navigation, 
simplified registration process, as indicated by the last released app version of Pingit. Pingit also increased its 
reach on the user side by providing the solution to Windows Phone users (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Overview of Pingit’s Reach and Range 
 
  Pingit 
 
 
 
One-
Sided 
Platform 
 
 
 
 
Side 1 
(Users) 
 
Range 
P2P payments 
Joint accounts 
Multiple phone numbers 
Send money abroad 
 
 
Reach 
All banks customers 
16-years old 
iOS, Android 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Side 1 
(Users) 
Range Twitter payments 
Money remittance 
Reach Windows Phones 
Remittance receivers 
 
 
 
Range 
QR Codes on bills/increase 
Payment transaction limit 
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Two-
Sided 
Platform 
 
 
Side 2 
(Merchants) 
Pay now with Pingit button in 
third-party apps 
Buy it button in Pingit 
Send payment button 
 
Reach 
Sole Traders 
Utility companies 
Small merchants 
Insurance companies 
 
Interside 
Range C2B transactions 
B2C transactions 
Reach Number of C2B and B2C 
transactions (non-disclosed) 
 
 
Swish 
 
Swish is a mobile payment application jointly developed by some of the largest financial institutions in Sweden 
(Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Länsförsäkringar Bank, Nordea, Sparbankerna, Swedbank and SEB). The 
solution was introduced in 2012 and quickly became popular. Approximately every third Swede uses the 
mobile payment app, as the solution has more than 3,7 million registered users as of the end of 2015 [40]. 
Unlike the previous two payment platforms (MobilePay and Pingit), Swish has a different set up, which makes 
the solution an interesting case to study due to the dissimilarities between the selected solutions. Although 
Swish functions as one app, users need to register for the solution through their respective online banking apps 
offered by the participating banks. Each of the participating banks has a discretion to determine its own rules 
with regards to fees, payment limits, customer and merchant onboarding, age limit of customers. Despite these 
variations, the design and the features within the Swish app are identical to all users regardless of which bank 
they are customers.  
 
Swish as One-Sided Platform 
 
Swish, which was launched in December 2012, allows its users to execute P2P transfers in real-time by using 
the sender and receiver’s phone numbers which are connected to their respective bank accounts [32]. Thus, 
Swish initially functioned as a one-sided platform, which facilitates the interactions between one distinct group 
of participants, namely senders and receivers of P2P payment transfers.  
 
Range 
 
Upon its launch, Swish allowed its users to send money to peers, split the bill with friends, buy second hand 
goods at flea markets (see Table 3). To execute a P2P transaction, a user needs to enter the phone number of 
the recipient, and the due amount, after which the user must enter a PIN code to finalize the transaction. In the 
following years, the app was improved with a couple of new releases which addressed minor user requests. In 
April 2013, Swish allowed non-smartphone users to receive money on their phones even though they did not 
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have the Swish app installed. Such users, however, could not send money to their peers. Even though the 
functionality was limited, it allowed Swish to incorporate more constituencies to its platform, namely non-
smartphone users.  
 
Although users need to use their respective bank credentials to register for the app and the participating banks 
have a large discretion to determine the rules of platform affiliation, the features and functionalities are 
identical for all Swish users, regardless of which bank they are customers. Thus, Swish functionalities are 
negotiated and agreed upon by all participating banks and are released simultaneously to all users. The need 
for coordination among many actors makes the process of introducing new features (that is, expanding the 
platform’s reach) more cumbersome and time-consuming. This may also pose various restrictions in the 
platform’s ability to introduce new services on a frequent basis.  
 
Reach   
 
Swish is available only for customers of the banks participating in this payment initiative as they need to log-
in through the online banking app of their respective bank. Initially, the solution was launched by the six of 
the largest financial institutions in Sweden, which limits the potential reach of the solution to the customers of 
the participating banks. In the following two years two other Swedish banks, Skandiabanken and ICA Bank, 
joined the Swish initiative by making the solution available to their customers. Thus, Swish’s potential reach 
was expanded to the customer base of two other banks.  
 
Swish users can send and receive money from all participants affiliated to the platform, regardless of their 
bank. This set up of the solution not only stimulates the creation and maintenance of same-side network effects 
between receivers and senders, which form one distinct group of participants, but also drives the adoption of 
the service. Swish managed to attract  420 000 active users in the first six months after its launch with the 
number of users amounting to 700 000 at the end of the first year after the app release (Site 3). Initially, Swish 
was available on iOS and Android devices. In October 2013, Swish app for Windows Phone was released (Site 
3), which enabled users with such devices to gain access to the full range of Swish services. Apart from 
allowing users with different smart phones to join the solution, Swish’s reach also expanded as to encompass 
non-smart phone users, to be able to receive P2P transfers.  
 
Swish as Two-Sided Platform 
 
After Swish managed to attract more than 1 million users, it enabled its users to send money to companies and 
organizations in June 2014. As Swish’s user base was growing at a stable pace, it became attractive to another 
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group of constituencies that wanted to have access to the sheer size of Swish’s users. Thus, by adding a second 
group of participants, Swish was transformed from being a one-sided to a two-sided platform.  
 
Interside Reach and Range 
 
Approximately two years after the initial release of the Swish app, the solution enabled the execution of C2B 
transactions (interside range) by allowing users to pay for products and services at various small- and médium-
sized merchants and to donate money to selected charities and not-for-profit organizations. To send money to 
merchants, users enter the merchant’s number, the due amount and enter their PIN to confirm the transaction. 
In January 2016, Swish was enabled as a payment method in various webshops and third-party apps. To use 
Swish as a payment method in online check-out, users enter their phone number and the web store then sends 
a payment request to the users’ Swish app. The users can then see the payment request with the details of the 
payment and enter their PIN to execute the transaction. Although each of the participating banks enable all 
these cross-side interactions simultaneously, each bank can design its own specific rules according to which 
these interactions can take place (e.g., pricing per transaction, etc.).  
 
Merchants’ Reach and Range 
 
By enabling C2B transactions, Swish affiliated a second distinct group of participants to its platform. To be 
able to accept Swish payments, businesses need to get a Swish number, which is directly linked to the 
businesses’ bank account (range). Users send money to merchants by using the merchants’ phone number. 
This set-up of the solution allows for small and medium-sized businesses (reach) to accept payments. However, 
it is not currently possible to pay with Swish at large merchants such as supermarkets. In July 2015, 
approximately one year after the launch of C2B transaction functionality, 24 700 businesses were affiliated to 
the solution, while the number of users amounted to three million people [39]. By the end of 2015, the number 
of participating businesses (merchants and charities) increased to 45 000 [40], which indicates for a strong 
adoption rate of the solution among merchants and charity organizations. Since January 2016, Swish users can 
use the solution as a payment method in online stores (reach) as well as for in-app purchases in selected third 
party apps that can integrate the solution by using Swish’ Application Programming Interface (API) (range) 
[38]. As with the set up of cross-side interactions and defining the access rules of the first platform constituency 
(users), each of the participating banks can determine the rules for platform affiliation of the second 
constituency (i.e. who can access, how the process is conducted, pricing model). 
 
User’s Reach and Range 
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The sheer size of Swish’s user base helped the solution to attract businesses that wanted to gain access to new 
potential customers. As the size of the Swish’s installed user base is key competitive advantage for the solution, 
Swish also focused on attracting new users and locking-in its existing users. Swish has launched new versions 
of the app with incremental improvements. In July 2015, a new design of the Swish payment app was released, 
but it did not introduce new features and functionalities. Swish also aimed at expanding the reach on its user 
side by releasing an app version for Windows Phone’ users.  
 
Table 3. Overview of Swish’s Reach and Range 
 
Swish 
 
 
 
One-
Sided 
Platform 
 
  
 
     Side 1 
(Users) 
 
Range 
P2P payments 
Split the bill 
 
 
    Reach 
Customers of participating banks 
iOS, Android 
Non-smartphone users 
 
 
 
 
Two-
Sided 
Platform 
 
Side 1 
(Users) 
Range Minor app releases 
Reach Windows Phones 
 
 
 
Side 2 
(Merchants) 
 
Range 
 
Swish Merchants Number 
Swish API 
Reach Small and medium companies 
Online shops 
Charities 
 
Interside 
Range C2B transactions 
Reach Number of C2B transactions 
(non-disclosed) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
This paper proposes the Reach and Range Framework for multi-sided platforms as an analytical tool to address 
some of the main challenges that platform owners face. To this end, we have adapted Keen’s Reach and Range 
Framework to study MSPs and synthesize some of the main strategic considerations that platform owners need 
to tackle at the different stages of the platform’s evolution. We select three case studies (two similar and one 
dissimilar) to demonstrate the usefulness of the framework to guide platform owners when addressing and 
designing strategies for overcoming various hurdles. 
 
We found that the key to successfully launch and manage digital payment platforms is to balance the reach 
and range on each of the platform’s sides and across sides. Thus, a platform provider needs to design and 
execute strategies to grow the number of participants as well as the types and volumes of interactions on each 
side. It also needs to have in place a strategy that nurtures the interactions across sides. To do so, a platform 
provider leverages the reach and range of each of the affiliated to the platform distinct group of participants. 
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Furthermore, as platforms evolve over time, they face various strategic challenges throughout the different 
stages of their evolutionary path, which necessitates that platform owners adopt specific strategies to manage 
the reach and range of the platform (see Table 4).  
 
Table 4. The use of Reach and Range Framework for multi-sided platforms for strategic challenges 
 
 
 
Platform 
Type 
 
Strategic 
Challenge 
 
Reach and Range 
Framework 
                                Examples of Mechanisms 
 
MobilePay 
 
Pingit 
 
Swish 
 
One-Sided 
 
Achieve critical 
mass of users 
 
Build Reach 
All banks’ 
customers 
All above 16- years 
old 
All 
participating 
banks’ 
customers 
Limit Range P2P P2P P2P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two-Sided 
 
 
Adoption on 
the second 
group of 
participants 
 
Build Reach 
 
SMEs 
Large merchants 
Webshops 
Sole traders 
Large merchants 
SMEs 
Charities 
Webshops 
 
Diversify Range 
NFC 
Bluetooth 
Business Online 
Buy It button 
Pay now with Pingit 
button 
Swish number 
for merchants 
Swish API 
 
User Stickiness 
(lock-in effects 
on the user 
base) 
 
 
Strengthen User 
Range 
 
 
Increased daily 
payment limit 
 
 
Twitter 
payments 
 
 
New app 
design 
 
Grow User Reach 
 
 
Windows Phone 
app 
 
Windows Phone app 
 
Windows 
Phone app 
  Enable Interside 
Range 
C2B transactions C2B transactions 
B2C transactions 
C2B 
transactions 
Recurrence 
(high volume 
of cross-side 
transactions 
between the 
affiliated sides) 
Manage Interside 
Range 
Bonus Buy It button Pay with 
Swish button 
Scale Reach on 
second group of 
participants 
Third-party apps Insurance 
companies 
Third-party 
apps 
 
 
One-Sided Platforms – Building Reach, Limiting Range 
 
The key challenges that one-sided platforms have to solve is swiftly gaining a critical mass of participants in 
order for a platform to secure its endurance. We argue that in order for a platform to succeed in this task, the 
platform owner needs to focus on the platform’s reach and limit its efforts with regards to expanding the 
platform’s range. This strategy recommendation calls for a platform owner to initially offer a limited number 
of features that target one distinct group of platform participants. For example, all of the three analyzed cases 
(MobilePay, Pingit and Swish) offered identical functionality (P2P) upon their launch that specifically targeted 
one distinct group, namely users. Thus, initially a platform owner should focus on achieving a sheer number 
of users within one main functionality and should abstain from introducing too many features that target the 
platform’s user base (i.e., a platform should not offer too many functionalities to too many users).  
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The suggestion to limit the platform’s range, which we define as the platform’s ability to introduce new 
functionalities, however, does not imply that a platform owner should not leverage the platform’s reach. We 
stress that platform owners should focus on introducing limited number of functionalities that can further 
facilitate and speed up the platform adoption. For example, MobilePay modified the amount limits for daily 
payment transactions on several occasions, while Pingit lowered the age of its users (see Table 1 and Table 2). 
Thus, the two solutions concentrated on making already introduced functionalities more appealing to both 
existing and potential users. Platform owners can also choose to introduce features in order to extend the main 
functionality of the one-sided platform that constitutes its value proposition. The main value proposition of the 
three investigated digital payment platforms is built around executing fast and easy P2P money transfers. In 
order to enhance this functionality, all of the solutions introduced ‘split the bill’ functionality, which allows 
for executing P2P transaction within a specific context (e.g., restaurant visit with friends). In addition to this, 
Pingit enabled its user to conduct international money remittances, which is another form of P2P money 
transfers taking place when users want to send money across borders. Thus, by enhancing and expanding the 
main functionality of the one-sided platform (range), the platform owner indirectly targets new potential users, 
thus expanding the reach on the first distinct group of participants affiliated to the platform. The key strategy 
which a platform owner should adopt during the first stage of platform evolution is offering limited 
functionalities to an increasing number of users forming one distinct group of platform participants (i.e., 
offering little to many).  
 
It is interesting to note that although Swish also leveraged its platform range as described above, it adopted a 
slightly different approach to managing its platform reach due to its specific set up as a collaboration between 
various financial institutions. Swish’s platform reach expanded after two more Swedish banks joined the 
solution when they enabled their customers to gain access to the payment solution. Thus, Swish managed to 
extend its platform reach without leveraging its platform range. This, however, is due to the unique platform 
design of the solution and it does not impact the importance of balancing both platform reach and range 
throughout the first phase of platform’s evolution. 
 
Two-Sided Platforms – Adopt Multiple Strategies to tackle Multiple Challenges 
 
As the platform affiliates with a second distinct group of participants, it becomes two-sided. This presupposes 
that the platform increases its complexity as it has to cater to two constituencies (the first constituency is the 
first affiliated group of participants, while the second constituency represents the newly affiliated second 
distinct group of participants) and to nurture the interactions between them. Thus, a platform owner has to 
tackle a series of strategic challenges.  
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Build Initial Reach, Diversify Range to spur adoption of the second platform constituency 
 
One of the main challenges which a platform owner faces at this stage is to ensure that enough participants of 
the newly added second constituency join and transact on the platform. Initially attracted by the size of the 
installed platform base, the participants of the second distinct group affiliated to the platform tend to be eager 
to join the platform. Regardless of this initial enthusiasm, platform owners often find that they have to further 
design and adopt strategies in order to increase the number of participants that form the second distinct group 
affiliated to the platform. Thus, when a new constituency is added, the overall reach of the platform expands, 
but while the reach of the first group of participants is ensured, the reach of the second constituency has to be 
built from scratch. To solve this conundrum and build the reach of the second platform side, a platform owner 
needs to diversify the range associated with this platform side.  
 
None of the investigated solutions (MobilePay, Pingit and Swish) added a second platform constituency (i.e., 
businesses) as one homogenous group (or one uniform constituency). Instead, they gradually added different 
types of businesses as a second distinct group of participants starting by first offering solutions to small 
merchants, and then expanding to online retailers, large retail chains, insurance companies (see Table 1, Table 
2 and Table 3). Thus, the platform reach of the second constituency scales up gradually. The three solutions 
also deploy separate mechanisms to target the different business types, thus diversifying the range of the second 
distinct group of participants. MobilePay users, for example, rely on NFC or Bluetooth technology to pay in-
store to large merchants, while they use a merchant’s mobile number when shopping in small retail shops. The 
rationale behind this set-up is based on the differences in the payment needs of large retailers that process a 
large volume of transactions and require fast solution at check-out. Thus, different payment options (range) 
have to be offered to address more appropriately the needs of the different merchant types (SMEs, large 
retailers, online stores, apps) (reach). Subsequently, by partitioning the business side, the digital payment 
platforms take into account the heterogeneity of the different actors and design specific solutions in order to 
get them on board.  
 
Strengthen Initial Range, Grow Initial Reach and Enable Interside Range to ensure User Stickiness  
 
Even though a platform has managed to increase its reach (i.e., it has attracted a significant number of users, 
it also needs to deepen its value proposition in order to lock-in the existing participants that form the first 
distinct group of platform participants. In order to so do, platform providers can deploy three different 
mechanisms. A platform can strengthen the initial range of the first constituency by introducing new 
functionalities, and thus creating new types of same-side interactions that will drive user engagement. An 
example of this is Pingit which enabled Twitter payments to grow the reach of its first group of participants 
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after it added its second constituency, i. e. businesses. It is also interesting to note that a platform owner can 
introduce different types of features as part of its efforts to leverage its range. While features such as Twitter 
payments and money remittances focus on accommodating various payment scenarios, features, such as adding 
a profile photos and photos to receipts aim at improving the user payment experience. 
 
Platform providers should also focus on growing further the initial reach of the first platform constituency by 
increasing the number of the affiliated participants. As more users join the platform, the existing users will 
benefit from strengthening the same-side network effects as they can now transact with a larger user base, 
which ultimately bolsters the platform’s stickiness. For example, MobilePay, Pingit and Swish launched 
versions of their apps for Windows Phones, thus extending the reach of their first constituency (i.e. users). 
Despite the growing user base and increased same-side interactions, affiliated users exhibit low levels of 
engagement as P2P payment transactions usually occur on a sporadic basis (e.g., most people do not transfer 
money to their friends on a daily basis, but just on a couple of occasions). To solve this, MobilePay, Pingit and 
Swish enabled C2B interactions by allowing people to use their apps in various other contexts, thus enabling 
new uses and increasing the value of the platform to the first platform constituency.  
 
Manage Interside Range and Scale Reach on Second Side to create Platform Recurrence  
 
Apart from tackling issues with regards to the adoption of the second platform constituency and ensuring 
stickiness of the initial user base, a platform owner needs to design and enable reoccurring interactions between 
the two distinct groups of participants that are now affiliated to the platform. A platform owner needs to 
introduce new functionalities which enable the interaction between the platform sides, thus creating platform 
interside range. For example, MobilePay, Pingit and Swish allowed its users to execute C2B transactions. By 
enabling cross-side functionality, a platform could unlock new uses for its app and expand its overall reach. 
The establishment of Interside range increases the complexity of the overall platform’s range as the platform 
owner needs to maintain and drive the adoption all of the existing functionalities, while at the same time 
spurring the adoption of the new features. The successful introduction of new functionalities requires the 
platform owner to gain a critical mass of users who adopt such cross-side interactions. Thus, platform interside 
reach indicates the number of users who actively use the new feature (in our cases, the number of users who 
adopt C2B transactions (Interside range), which differs from the adoption of P2P transactions, which refer to 
platform initial range of the first constituency. Platform Recurrence, which we define as the achievement of 
high volume of transactions between the two affiliated to the platform distinct group of participants, is also 
dependent upon the ability of the platform owner to scale the reach of the second constituency. As more 
merchants adopt Swish and the solution becomes widely accepted, more users are likely to use it in order to 
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pay for their goods. Thus, the expansion of the reach of a platform’s side can also facilitate the adoption of the 
interside platform reach. 
 
As all of the three analyzed cases (MobilePay, Pingit and Swish) function as two-sided platforms, we are not 
able to investigate the usefulness of the Reach and Range framework for solving some of the strategic 
challenges that multi-sided platforms face. In section 3.1, we identified platform variety and platform defence 
as the main issues that multi-sided platforms have to tackle, but we are not able to test these assumptions 
further due to lack of data.  
 
To further demonstrate the usefulness of the Reach and Range Framework as a tool to overcome the main 
strategic challenges that a platform faces throughout its evolution, we applied the framework to explain the 
failure of two solutions that are considered to be competitors to two of our selected cases.  
 
Approximately nine months after the release of MobilePay in Denmark, the online payment solution, Paii, was 
launched by 4T, a joint venture between all four major telecommunication operators in the Danish market [35]. 
The account-based solution enables users to make web and app purchases, transfer money to other Paii user’s 
or pay via SMS without it showing up on their phone bill. Less than a year after its launch, Paii was 
discontinued and sold out to one of its competitors on the Danish digital payment market, Swipp. Paii was 
launched as a two-sided platform as it was trying to attract both users and merchants on board simultaneously. 
As a result of its initial platform design, Paii had to tackle multiple challenges. The solution had to achieve 
reach on both platform constituencies (users and merchants), while trying to create and manage interside reach 
and range (C2B transactions) (see Table 4). Paii also started by designing and offering wide platform range on 
the user side (one of the two platform constituencies), as it enabled its users to execute both P2P and C2B 
transactions (unlike the first strategy we have identified (see Table 4)). This presupposes that a platform owner 
has to achieve reach for both features, thus creating sufficient same-side network effects for the adoption of 
P2P functionality (platform’s reach on one distinct group of participants, namely, users (see Figure 1)) and 
cross-side network effects for the adoption of the C2B functionality (platform’s interside reach (see Figure 2)). 
Another major hurdle was that Paii managed to ensure only limited reach on the merchant side, which limited 
the number of potential cross-side interactions and reflected negatively on the platform interside reach. At the 
same time Paii, whose main target were online merchants, failed to diversify the range on the merchant side 
(i.e. offering different functionalities for different merchants), which impacted on the number of merchants 
joining the platform (reach). The merchant’s reach was also hindered by the limited reach of the other distinct 
group of participants on the Paii platform, namely the users. Thus, one of the main mistakes that Paii made 
was trying to offer a wide variety of functionalities to more than one group of platform participants at an early 
stage of the platform’s evolutionary path (i.e., being too much to too many too soon).  
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The same analysis can be applied to investigating the reasons behind the failure of Bart, a Swedish mobile 
payment solution offered by Swedbank, which was discarded in 2014 [15]. Bart is another example of a two-
sided platform which tried to get two distinct groups of participants on board simultaneously. The account-
based solution made use of QR codes to execute C2B in-store transactions and required merchants to be 
equipped with QR-readers. Bart managed to sign on one big retailer chain (Axfood) to use the service [4]. 
However, it failed to attract other major retailers, as its fees, which were the same as paying with cards, were 
higher than the fees offered by other payment services in Sweden. The interest from the consumer side was 
also very low with just 20 000 users signing up for the service [2]. As a result, the service was scrapped and 
Swedbank joined the Swish initiative. Bart failed to achieve a sufficient number of participants on both of its 
sides, as it mismanaged the platform’s reach and range. The solution was available only to the customers of 
Swedbank, significantly limiting the platform’s reach on the user side. Bart’s platform reach on the user side 
was low, as the solution did not support any features that spurred users’ adoption of the payment app such as 
P2P transactions. The platform’s reach on the user side depended directly on the platform’s reach on the 
merchants’ side (that is, the number of merchants joining the platform). Thus, Bart was focusing on creating 
and managing interside platform reach by stimulating cross-side interactions. However, the platform’s reach 
on the merchant side, which constituted the second platform constituency, was inhibited due to the lack of 
critical mass of users. Bart also tried to attract merchants by offering only one type of solution to businesses 
(QR code scanning). Thus, the solution failed to diversify its platform reach in order to appeal to wider types 
of merchants (see Table 4). Under the Reach and Range Framework for MSPs Bart’s failure can be attributed 
to offering limited cross-side functionality such as C2B transactions (interside range) the adoption of which is 
subjected to the presence of strong platform’s reach on each of the platform constituencies between which the 
cross-side interactions take place (i.e. being too little to too few as Bart could not manage to attract enough 
users and merchants). 
 
The findings of this research further expand the literature on entry and expansion strategies for MSPs. As 
discussed in Secton 2, a couple of researchers have proposed stage models to guide the launch and subsequent 
evolution of MSPs. The models, however, only partially address some of the challenges which platform owners 
face throughout the platform’s evolution, and thus they do not prescribe in-depth strategic recommendations 
in order to guarantee the platform’s success.  
 
Evans [11], for example, proposes a two-stage model to explain the market entry and growth of MSPs (ignition-
growth model). According to him, the success of a platform depends on the ability of the MSPs to reach critical 
mass, that is, the number of users on both sides has to reach to a certain point. To this end, Evans [11] 
recommends a zig-zag strategy, where a platform launches with a limited number of participants on both sides 
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and grows over time. Evans’ model, which presupposes that a platform is launched and managed as two-sided, 
does not take into account the different platform design possibilities upon entry (one-sided or two-sided) and 
the fact that different platform designs require different strategies. The platform evolution under Evans [11] is 
solely associated with changes in the number of platform participants and does not take into account other 
important elements of platform evolution such as the introduction of new features. Furthermore, the zig-zag 
strategy proposed by Evans only gives recommendations with regards to managing the number of participants 
on both sides affiliated to the platform. Thus, the model does not address one-sided platforms and how they 
can be transformed into being two-sided. In contrast to Evans’ model [11], the Reach and Range framework 
for MSPs helps us view the platform evolution as a complex process that includes not only the attraction of a 
huge number of users (reach), but also the introduction of new features and functionalities (range) that serve a 
double purpose: first, to attract more users (reach), and second, to increase the platform stickiness in order to 
lock-in the already attracted users. Thus, we argue that there is an inderdependency between reach and range, 
and in particular that the increase in platform range can lead to the increase of platform reach. Unlike Evans’ 
model, we also recognize that a platform faces various strategic challenges throughout the different stages of 
its evolution (see section 3.1.). 
 
Hagiu’s model [19] recognizes the gradual transition of a platform from one-sided to being two-sided and 
prescribes mechanisms (platform’s breadth and depth) that a platform owner can leverage during this process. 
The Reach and Range framework for MSPs is anchored around the concepts of reach and range, which have 
some similarities and dissimilarities with the notions of breadth and depth. Although both sets of concepts 
focus on the number of participants as well as on the features and functionalities offered by a platform owner, 
Hagiu’s depth and breadth are applied on a general platform level and do not address in details the interplay 
between the two concepts. For example, the notion of breadth implies adding separate constituencies (that is 
separate platform sides) and does not take into account the fact that the size of a particular platform side also 
grows over time (its reach). Hagiu’s platform breadth comprises the number of the affiliated to the platform 
groups of participants (sides), while our notion of platform reach is associated with the size of a particular 
platform side and also with the interside reach, which measures the size of the interactions across platform 
sides. Although Hagiu’s concepts of breadth and depth are important for the platform’s evolution, we further 
extend these concepts by applying them on a more detailed level, which allows us to pinpoint the various 
interdependencies between the platform’s reach and range. Furthermore, Hagiu’s model [19] is based on a 
single strategy which a platform owner can adopt in its expansion quest. Hagiu recommends that before a 
platform adds an additional platform constituency (that is, it expands its breadth), a platform owner should 
offer new functionalities so to increase the platform depth. This is a valid strategy that is also part of the 
strategies we prescribe for successful platform expansion (see Discussion). The adoption of the Reach and 
Range framework for MSPs, however, allows us to deduct multiple strategies and strategic recommendations 
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for how to leverage the platform’s reach and range (see Table 4), which can guide more precisely the platform 
owners’ efforts to spur the platform adoption.  
 
The Reach and Range framework for MSPs differs from the already existing models in the MSPs literature, as 
it recognizes the different strategic challenges that a platform owner needs to tackle throughout the platform 
evolution. Further, it provides the needed mechanisms (leveraging the reach and range) in order to address 
them (see Table 4). Such considerations are absent from Hagui’s model [19], and while Evans [11] recognizes 
the importance of achieving critical mass of users, he does not provide more examples of present or future 
strategic challenges and how his model can help overcome them. Although Tiwana [42] recognizes the fact 
that platforms face different strategic challenges throughout the different stages of platform evolution, his work 
lists only some of them in the form of evolutionary metrics and does not offer a model that contains 
prescriptions of how to tackle them. 
 
Although we recognize that the above mentioned models present important and relevant findings, we argue 
that they address only partial issues and do not provide coherent strategic recommendations to guide platform 
owners. Nonetheless, we draw upon some of the main assumptions of the three models (Evans’ notion of 
critical mass as important threshold for platform’s evolution [11], Hagiu’s concept of depth and breadth as 
mechanisms for leveraging the platform’s adoption [19] and Tiwana’s notion of evolutionary metrics as 
foundation for determining some of the strategic challenges faced by platforms [42]) in order to apply MSPs 
logic to the Keen’s Reach and Range Framework. Thus, we design the Reach and Range framework for MSP 
as an analytical tool that provides in-depth understanding of the platform’s key mechanisms (reach and range) 
and how they can be leveraged to address the main strategic challenges that a platform owner faces during 
platform evolution. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper is to identify successful strategies to which mobile payment platforms can adhere in 
order to ensure their initial and subsequent adoption. To this end, we investigate the applicability of the Reach 
and Range Framework for MPSs for overcoming some of the main challenges associated with platform 
adoption and use this analysis to deduct strategies for successful platform entry and expansion. In order to do 
so, we first apply the framework to study three successful mobile payment platforms. After analyzing the 
selected cases, we prescribe several strategic recommendations that can assist platform owners in their quest 
to spur platform adoption. We further prove the explanatory power of the framework by illustrating its 
usefulness for explaining the failure of two mobile payment solutions. Our main finding is that successful 
mobile payment platforms tend to follow a particular evolutionary path that ensures a high adoption rate among 
the platform participants. We, thus, recommend that a mobile payment solution should be launched as a one-
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sided platform in order to attract a sufficient number of users, and then gradually expand into being two (milti)- 
sided by adding more platform constituencies. The key to successfully managing this transformation is 
determined by the platform owner’s ability to leverage a platform’s reach (number of participants) and range 
(features and functionalities). 
 
The contributions of this paper are several. First, we conceptualize a framework that can serve as a useful 
vehicle for understanding and mapping out a platform’s evolution. Second, we demonstrate the usefulness of 
the Reach and Range Framework for MPSs to address key issues with regards to platform adoption. Third, we 
indentify several strategic recommendations for leveraging the platform’s reach and range that a platform 
owner can consult when tackling the various strategic hurdles at different stages of platform evolution. Fourth, 
although we apply the framework to the cases of digital payment platforms, we demonstrate that the Reach 
and Range Framework can be used to guide the strategic planning of every business functioning as a platform. 
Finally, the proposed framework as well as the identified strategies that a platform owner can adopt in 
leveraging the platform’s reach and range can serve as a useful guide for practitioners when designing and 
executing platform entry and expansion strategies.   
 
We limit our analysis to investigating only a few strategic considerations that platform owners face. In reality, 
a platform owner has to address strategic issues such as platform governance, platform pricing and designing 
a viable business model, developing a platform-based ecosystem, etc. In our analysis, we also rely 
predominantly on secondary data (with the exception of MobilePay where we had access to primary data), 
which constitutes another limitation of this paper. Although the gathered data is representative enough, the 
analysis could be further extended by delving into further details, which can come from primary data. Future 
research may pinpoint how the Reach and Range Framework relates to broader topics such as platform 
governance, platform pricing and platform-based ecosystems. The framework can also be applied to MSPs 
other than digital payments.  
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Abstract 
(a) Situation faced: The traditionally stable and conservative financial service industry is undergoing a process 
of transformation where contenders utiliz-ing new technologies and relying on novel business models 
challenge the role of incumbent financial organizations. The changing preferences of cus-tomers, who demand 
customized services at convenient for them time, and the shifting regulatory environment, which encourages 
the entry of fintech start-ups, threaten the dominant position of these traditional actors.  
(b) Action taken: Instead of observing passively this ongoing trend, Danske Bank, one of the leading banks 
in Northern Europe, took a proactive ap-proach to digitalization by launching pre-emptively a number of 
disruptive digital initiatives in order to protect itself from disruption. Danske Bank cor-rectly read the market 
dynamics in Denmark in connection to consumer readiness, technology maturity and competitors’ actions and 
decided to ven-ture into the mobile payment area in order to position itself as first mover. By launching its 
solution MobilePay, which functions as digital payment platform, Danske Bank also adopted a platform 
business model, which differs from the traditional banking products.  
(c) Results achieved: Leveraging its first mover advantage, MobilePay gained momentum and has 
successfully defended its dominant position in the Dan-ish market, which other local and international mobile 
payment solutions tried to threaten. Four years after its launch, MobilePay is currently being used by more 
than 90 % of the Danes, has established a growing ecosystem of partners, and has expanded to other Nordic 
markets. MobilePay’s success has helped Danske Bank improve its brand image and reduce customer churn. 
It has also demonstrated Danske Bank’s ability to be at the forefront of digital innovation by proving the bank’s 
capability to address the chang-ing preferences of its private customers and to deliver on the digitalization 
agenda of its corporate customers.  
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(d) Lessons learned: This case demonstrates how an incumbent financial organization can successfully protect 
its core services by venturing into disruptive digital initiatives, such as the launch of platform business model, 
which requires the adoption of different business thinking. The success of such initiative depends upon the 
timely launch of a customer-centric solution with focus on simplicity, ease of use and strong value proposition. 
Despite the short-term gains, the long-term sustainability and profitability of such a solution operating in 
constantly changing environment requires its continuous development. Its success also depends on achieving 
a certain level of organizational autonomy from the traditional business, while at the same time establishing 
synergy to it in order to gain access to the incumbents’ core resources.  
1. Introduction  
In the recent years, the rapid advancement of digital technologies has led to the disruption of a number of 
traditional industries, such as music (e.g., iTunes), print media (e.g., Guardian), and transportation (e.g., Uber) 
(see, e.g., Karimi and Walter 2015). Similarly, the emergence of new actors who offer disruptive financial ser-
vices by utilizing novel digital technologies (e.g., TransferWise, Square, LevelUP, Zopa, etc.) have recently 
challenged the traditionally stable and conservative finan-cial industry.  
Observing closely this ongoing trend, Danske Bank, the leading bank in Denmark and one of the largest banks 
in Northern Europe, was contemplating the long-term consequences of this shift. Headquartered in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, Danske Bank operates in 16 markets and serves more than 2,7 million private 
customers, app. 240,000 small and medium-sized business customers and around 1,800 corpo-rate and 
institutional customers. With its history tracing back to late 19th century, Danske Bank has always been at the 
forefront of financial service innovation. For example, in 1881 the bank introduced for the first time in Europe 
safe deposits. It was also among the first in Europe to incorporate payment cards and online banking to its 
portfolio of financial products. In 1999, the bank launched the first mobile banking service in the world by 
utilizing the new Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) technology, which allowed its Finnish private 
customers to connect to their online banking accounts via mobile phone devices.  
The present situation, however, was different. Novel digital technologies, such as smartphones, which had 
absorbed services offered previously by multiple phys-ical devices (e.g., camera, mP3 players, navigation 
devices), were rapidly adopted by significant part of the population in Northern Europe (e.g., 59 % of the 
Danes had a smartphone in 2013 (Statista 2016)). This led to a change in consumer pref-erences, with 
customers requiring on-demand services tailored to their individual needs. The traditionally strict regulatory 
environment was also altering as an after-math of the 2008 financial crisis with regulators demanding a 
transformation of the financial sector. Thus, Danske Bank, similarly to other incumbent banks, found it-self in 
a fast-paced changing environment, with its competitive advantages eroding significantly.  
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Instead of awaiting disruption, Danske Bank adopted a proactive approach to-wards digitalization by pursuing 
disruptive initiatives within its own business units, which challenged the current modus operandi of the bank. 
The venturing into a plat-form business model, which facilitate the interaction between distinct types of ac-
tors in a process of value creation and exchange (Hagiu and Wright 2011; Parker et al. 2016), constituted one 
of the most successful digital disruption initiatives. In particular, Danske Bank launched a mobile payment 
platform, MobilePay, around which an ecosystem of actors formed over time. MobilePay proved to be a huge 
success immediately after its release in May 2013. Four years after its launch, app. 90 % of the Danish 
population and app. 75 000 merchants use the platform, which facilitates peer-to-peer (P2P) and consumer-to-
business (C2B) payment transac-tions. MobilePay also has a growing customer base in Finland and, until 
recently, in Norway.  
Although Danske Bank managed to launch successfully a disruptive payment platform, it had to overcome 
various external and internal challenges, such as es-tablishing viable business model, improving platform 
resilience and scalability, and addressing increased competitive pressure, in order to ensure the long-term 
sustain-ability of the solution. As a result, MobilePay had to evolve constantly by adding new types of 
participants and by increasing its value proposition towards them. Thus, based on the evolutionary journey of 
MobilePay, we argue that the success of a digital payment platform requires not only identifying and launching 
appealing functionalities, but it also evokes its continuous managing and optimization.  
In this case, we investigate how a traditional company can successfully launch and manage a digital platform 
business model and how such a disruptive initiative can help the incumbent protect itself from disruption. To 
this end, we draw upon first-hand observations, semi-structured interviews and archival documents, which we 
have collected since the launch of MobilePay – first, by acting as consultants on key strategic decisions, and 
later, by conducting a two-year fieldwork on site. We use an inductive approach to analyze the gathered data, 
based on which we synthe-tize several key learning points for practitioners and academics alike.  
2. Situation faced  
As an incumbent financial institution operating in rapidly changing environment, Danske Bank faced many 
uncertainties in 2012. The regulatory environment, in which financial institutions operated, altered as an 
aftermath of the financial crisis in 2008. The already strictly regulated financial industry was subjected to more 
reg-ulatory requirements in a bid to mitigate the consequences of the financial crisis (Danske Bank 2013). At 
the same time, the provisions of the new Payment Service Directive 2 (PSD2), with which the European Union 
(EU) aimed at transforming the payment area in the Single Market, required incumbent banks to open their in-
frastructures in order to give non-discriminatory access to new actors (European Union 2013). Even though 
the PDS 2 is about to come into effect in late 2018, it already became a central topic for Danske Bank when it 
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was first proposed in 2013 mainly due to the uncertainty of the consequences, stemming from its implementa-
tion for the bank’s business model.  
The 2008 financial crisis also significantly eroded the consumers’ trust in the financial institutions around the 
world. At the same time, the altering consumer preferences towards easy to use, innovative and real-time 
solutions also led to banks’ customers substituting traditional financial products and services for novel, 
customer-centered offerings of fintech start-ups. In 2012, these new players, some of whom had managed to 
achieve significant global user base (e.g., Mint, Zopa, etc.), were about to enter the Danish market as well. For 
example, iZettle, which delivered innovative Point-of-Sale solutions to small and medium-sized businesses, 
announced its plans to enter the Danish market in 2012.  
In 2012, Danske Bank also faced customer backlash due to the implementation of its new strategy “New 
Normal-New Standards”, which, although emphasizing on introducing new standards for financial services by 
providing state-of-the-art digital solutions (Danske Bank 2012), failed to deliver optimal results. As result of 
an ill-planned new customer program, part of the new strategy, and the fiasco of the cor-responding marketing 
campaign, Danske Bank was rapidly losing its private cus-tomers, who decided to switch to other financial 
institutions.  
Thus, Danske Bank found itself into a state of flux facing changing consumer preferences, new competitors, 
rapid spread of emerging technologies (e.g. NFC, dongles, real-time analytics, etc.) and stricter regulatory 
environment. To tackle these challenges, the financial institution had to undertake a new approach in order to 
protect its core services, restore its tainted image and remain relevant to the needs of its customers.  
3. Action taken  
Observing closely these ongoing trends, in 2012, Danske Bank decided to put focus on customer-centric 
solutions, digitalization, and increased transparency and trust (Danske Bank 2012). Although top managers 
perceived digitalization as an ongoing and overarching effort in the bank, they concluded that to protect Danske 
Bank from disruption, they should also focus on radical digital initiatives, which deviated from the traditional 
approaches towards innovation. Thus, Danske Bank adopted a dual-track strategy to digitalization – being a 
classical bank, which em-braces digitalization incrementally, while, at the same time, experimenting with dis-
ruptive initiatives. Radical, consumer-centric, utilizing novel technologies and re-lying on agile innovation 
processes, these disruptive digital initiatives aimed at turning upside down the modus operandi of the bank. To 
fulfil this vision, Danske Bank was on a quest to identify projects, which would disrupt the bank from within.  
Developing and offering a mobile payment platform around which an ecosystem of actors emerges constituted 
one of these digital disruptive initiatives. Venturing into this new type of digital business models, however, 
required the adoption of different capabilities and thinking. Thus, instead of relying on traditional business 
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processes and strategies, building a digital platform business model called for the adoption of platform logic 
(Parker et al. 2016).  
3.1 Launch of MobilePay  
Situation  
In 2013, mobile payments were gaining momentum. Due to increased consumer demand from its private 
customers, Danske Bank had already been exploring the opportunity to launch a joint sector solution for mobile 
payments together with other Danish banks. The assumption was that payments via smartphone were to 
become a fast growing financial channel with significant long-term opportunities for both private and business 
customers. The common efforts, however, progressed slowly due to various technical issues. In 2013, the 
major Danish telecom operators openly announced their intention to enter jointly the mobile payment area. At 
the same time, fintech start-ups (e.g., iZettle) also revealed their plans to enter the Danish market. Thus, with 
the shift in the competitive dynamics, various actors engaged in a race to dominate the untapped mobile 
payment market in Denmark.  
Actions Taken  
As the competitive environment changed and the talks for joint bank sector so-lution stalled, Danske Bank 
decided to leave the common initiative in order to en-sure that it launched the first mobile payment solution in 
the Danish market. Danske Bank’s solo venture in this area begun with the set-up of a small, dedicated team 
of employees, whose task was to develop and launch a mobile payment solution within six months. The team 
had the freedom to explore different innovation methods than the ones usually applied in Danske Bank. 
Adopting agile principles, business ana-lysts worked closely together with IT specialists in conceptualizing, 
prototyping and testing the solution. During the development phase, the team considered multiple technologies 
enabling mobile payments – from Near Field Communication (NFC), QR codes and dongles to solutions 
utilizing the existing bank infrastructure through pre-paid accounts and even integration to the existing Danske 
Bank’s mobile bank-ing app.  
After six months of work, in May 2013, Danske Bank launched its mobile pay-ment app, MobilePay, which 
allowed users to transfer money to their friends and split the bill in various situations. The solution functioned 
as one-sided platform, enabling the interactions among one distinct group of platform participants, namely 
private customers, who wanted to send one another money (Hagiu and Wright 2011; Parker et al. 2016). 
Designing MobilePay as easy to use, simple and intuitive solu-tion, while still maintaining high level of 
security, reflected Danske Bank’s new strategy, which focused on consumer centricity. Instead of developing 
a complex solution with multiple offerings, the team decided to solve one particular problem, which private 
customers faced, namely exchanging money with peers. The mobile payment platform utilized the existing 
card-based infrastructure by allowing users to add their cards to the app and transfer money to their friends via 
241 
 
mobile phone numbers. Thus, instead of adopting complex technology, which would have re-quired significant 
investment and longer development time, MobilePay took ad-vantage of the existing payment infrastructure 
by leveraging Danske Bank’s key assets and expertise.  
Results achieved  
The initial strategy estimated that app. 250 000 users would adopt MobilePay within a year after its launch, 
but the digital payment platform proved to be hugely popular with the Danes. In just nine months, app. one 
million users (1/5 of the Dan-ish population), both Danske Bank and non-Danske Bank customers, used the 
plat-form, with the number of transactions amounting to more than 134 million EUR (MobilePay 2014). In 
fact, non-Danske bank customers accounted for app. 70 % of the total user base of MobilePay. Thus, instead 
of designing a bank-specific solu-tion, Danske Bank offered open to all users mobile payment platform in 
order to solidify its position in Denmark. The openness on user level strengthened Mo-bilePay’s same-side 
network effects (that is, the value of MobilePay for existing users increased with the inclusion of new users 
and vice versa, see, Shapiro and Varian, 1999).  
Due to the fast market entry, Danske Bank managed to secure a first mover ad-vantage by acquiring large 
number of private customers within a relatively short time span. This put the bank in advantageous position in 
comparison to its compet-itors (that is, other Danish banks, telecom operators and fintech start-ups) as the 
large and growing user base constituted a significant barrier to entry.  
Key Learning Points from MobilePay’s Launch Phase  
Being a first-mover in a new and not yet defined market, such as mobile pay-ments, is important for ensuring 
the long-term success of a digital disruptive solu-tion. To share the risks and manage uncertainties, 
collaborating with other relevant actors is preferable, but in case, there is high consumer demand, intensified 
com-petitive environment and various coordination issues associated with a multi-part-ner initiative arise, 
developing and launching solo such a solution is advisable.  
Instead of offering a complex digital payment platform targeting various partic-ipants (e.g., private customers, 
merchants, etc.) and offering multiple functionali-ties, managers should focus on initially addressing the needs 
of one distinct group of participants (e.g., private customers). This allows them to speed the entry to mar-ket 
as it reduces development time and to focus on solving efficiently an existing customer pain point. For 
example, instead of relying on complex technological set-up, managers can build upon existing technology, 
thus leveraging the key assets and strengths of an incumbent when developing disruptive solutions. 
MobilePay’s dis-ruptive potential, for example, stems from offering a novel service, allowing private users to 
execute P2P transfers more efficiently than existing solutions (such as online banking) rather than adopting 
new technologies. The simplicity (in terms of design and functionalities), easiness of use and high level of 
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security of this digital payment platform, designed with a customer-centric mindset, are the main reasons for 
the fast adoption of the solution.  
Instead of only focusing on catering to its own customer base, an incumbent launching a novel digital platform 
with disruptive potential should also try to incor-porate a large number of users outside its traditional customer 
base. Both Danske Bank and non-Danske Bank customers have free access to MobilePay, which al-lowed the 
incumbent bank to start building relationships with customers outside its own scope.  
3.2. MobilePay Expansion  
Situation  
Despite its initial success in terms of rapid user adoption, MobilePay’s first mover advantage could easily 
come under threat as other players also launched competitive mobile payment platforms in response to Danske 
Bank’s move. Just few months after the launch of MobilePay, 81 Danish banks launched a common banking 
sector solution, Swipp, which functioned as an account-based P2P platform incorporated as a separate feature 
in the mobile banking apps of the participating banks. Approximately half a year after the launch of MobilePay, 
the four major telecom operators in Denmark introduced their own competing solution, Paii, which allowed 
users to execute web and app purchases and transfer money to their peers. The payment platforms developed 
by Swipp and Paii were similar to MobilePay’s offerings, but differed significantly in terms of ease of use and 
simplicity. Thus, as the competitive environment continued to change, Danske Bank needed to solidify further 
MobilePay’s dominant market position.  
Apart from the challenges posed by other competitive solutions, MobilePay also faced a number of internal 
issues, which jeopardized the long-term sustainability of the solution. Despite its growing user base, the 
payment platform had not identified a viable business model as private customers used the solution free of 
charge. In addition, as it utilized the existing card payment infrastructure, MobilePay incurred cost per 
transaction, which Danske Bank decided to subsidize. As this initial deci-sion was not sustainable in long term, 
Danske Bank needed to identify stable reve-nue streams. In addition, MobilePay faced internal inefficiency 
with regards to the resilience of its own IT systems. Although the digital payment platform relied on the 
existing payment infrastructure in order to shorten time to market, the legacy of the bank’s existing IT systems, 
built largely in silos, posed threats to the scalability and agility of the solution as well as to the speed with 
which MobilePay could in-novate.  
Actions taken  
The threat posed by competitive solutions prompted MobilePay to evolve further by incorporating novel 
functionalities in order to increase the value proposition to-wards its private customers (e.g., increased daily 
payment limits, introduced photos and personal messages when users sent money, etc.). MobilePay also 
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evolved by incorporating merchants through the launch of business version of the MobilePay app, which 
allowed small merchants, such as street vendors and coffee shop owners, to receive mobile payments from 
private customers (Danske Bank 2014a). Thus, by adding merchants as second distinct group of platform 
participants, MobilePay transformed into being a two-sided platform (that is, facilitating the interactions be-
tween two distinct groups of participants, namely users and merchants).  
The opening to business customers proved to be successful move and MobilePay continued to launch novel 
functionalities with the aim to expand its base of mer-chants. To this end, MobilePay introduced a number of 
different payment methods (e.g., in-app payments, online payments, in-store payments) in order to address the 
various payment contexts, in which the different merchants operated. For example, unlike the solutions for 
small merchants and online shops, MobilePay transactions in large retail shops needed to be executed faster 
due to the specificity of this pay-ment context. To this end, MobilePay upgraded the platform architecture by 
intro-ducing NFC and Bluetooth technology. Apart from offering solely mobile pay-ments, MobilePay also 
included value-added services such as loyalty cards, discount-based loyalty programme, receipts, etc. Thus, 
by enabling the interactions between private and business customers and by introducing novel functionalities 
to both of them, MobilePay increased their level of engagement. Consequently, MobilePay managed to defend 
its dominant market position from the aspiration of new competitors.  
The introduction of merchants as second distinct group of platform participants allowed MobilePay to establish 
stable revenue stream. Attracted by the large num-ber of private customers using MobilePay, business 
customers also wanted to gain access to the platform ecosystem and were willing to pay a fee for acquiring it. 
Thus, the fees, which merchants paid to participate in the platform ecosystem, constituted a stable revenue 
source for MobilePay.  
With the growth of the platform ecosystem, the speed with which innovative of-ferings were released to various 
heterogeneous participants became of paramount importance for MobilePay. In order to guarantee the rapid 
launch of new function-alities, a business unit within Danske Bank was set up, with the sole purpose to guide 
the future development of MobilePay. The team could adopt significant level of independence from the bank’s 
strategy, processes and approaches towards inno-vation. At the same time, the MobilePay team had access to 
key Danske Bank’s resources such as IT development, customer support and marketing, which it uti-lized to 
develop and provide new offerings in the fastest and the most efficient manner.  
The increasing number of functionalities incorporated in the platform architec-ture required the optimization 
and further development of the underlying IT archi-tecture. For this purpose, a special IT unit within Danske 
Bank was set up to support solely MobilePay. The new team also focused on ensuring the platform architec-
ture’s resilience and scalability and on supporting the development and maintenance of various platform 
functionalities. For example, a stand-in procedure, which al-lowed for reducing the downtime for processing 
a payment transaction, was intro-duced in order to allow the efficient execution of MobilePay transactions. 
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The op-timization of the platform architecture also included the gradual migration towards a more cost-
efficient account-to-account infrastructure.  
Results achieved  
Less than a year after opening for business customers, app. 4000 small busi-nesses, such as coffee shops, 
clothing companies, hairdressers, bike repair shops, etc., had adopted MobilePay’s business solution (Danske 
Bank, 2014b). With the release of more functionalities towards various types of merchants, MobilePay’s base 
of business customers grew rapidly. By the end of 2015, 17 500 merchants enabled the use of MobilePay in 
their shops (MobilePay, 2015). In May 2016, app. three years since the launch of MobilePay, more than 25 
000 small and medium-sized merchants and app. 3, 7000 online shops adopted the solution (Danske Bank 
2016). In fact, the usage of MobilePay for C2B transactions continued to grow with double-digits since 2016. 
The incorporation of various merchants corresponded to the continuous growth of the private customers, which 
was influenced by the pres-ence of strong cross-side network effects (that is, the more merchants join Mo-
bilePay, the more value private customers have from the solution and vice versa (see, Shapiro and Varian 
1999)). In May 2016, app. 85 % of the Danish population used MobilePay to execute app 738,000 transactions 
on daily basis (Danske Bank 2016).  
Learning Points from the MobilePay’s Expansion Phase  
In a rapidly shifting competitive environment, contenders can easily challenge the initial success of a digital 
platform. To prevent the erosion of the previously gained competitive advantages (e.g., huge user base) and to 
stay ahead of competi-tors, managers should constantly evolve the digital platform by incorporating new types 
of participants (e.g., business customers) and functionalities. However, as business customers, for example, 
operate in different contexts; managers should ca-ter to their specific needs by providing customized solutions 
instead of delivering one-size-fits-all functionality.  
The inclusion of additional platform participants, who wish to gain access to the already existing user base on 
the platform, allows managers to identify a revenue source in order to cover operational and innovation costs 
(see also, e.g., Evans and Schmalensee 2016). However, the quest for identifying a viable business model is 
far from being over as more often than not the revenue streams are not enough to ensure profitability.  
The openness of the digital platform leads to the establishment of a vibrant eco-system of multiple actors that 
challenge the optimal functioning of the digital plat-form. To amend for this, managers should invest in IT 
resilience and scalability. The explosive growth also calls for the establishment of different organizational set-
up to better support the performance and future development of a digital platform.  
3.3. Building a Nordic vision  
Situation  
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Due to the rapid adoption from both private and business customers, MobilePay gained significant advantage 
over its competitors - the common bank sector solu-tion, Swipp, and Paii, operated by the major Danish 
telecom operators. Swipp, which was the biggest MobilePay’s competitor in the Danish market, did not man-
age to acquire significant customer base. In 2016, Swipp had only 900 000 regis-tered private customers and 
app. 16 000 business customers (Finans 2016; Skjær-lund 2016). Swipp could not erode significantly the 
competitive advantage of MobilePay due to its complicated sign-up process, consumer unawareness of the 
solution, and lack of coordinated actions between the participating banks as each of them set their own 
strategies, including different prices towards merchants for using Swipp. The other contender, Paii, operated 
as two-sided platform and aimed at get-ting both users and merchants on board simultaneously – a task, which 
proved to be challenging. After Paii struggled to ignite, Swipp acquired the solution in November 2014 in 
order to boost its online payment capabilities.  
The competitive environment, however, shifted significantly since the launch of MobilePay. In particular, the 
team behind Swipp had been preparing new design of the solution and of its organizational set-up. Depending 
on their scale and nature, the planned changes could threaten MobilePay’s leading position. At the same time, 
the global, regional and domestic competition from both financial and non-financial actors continued to build 
up. For example, on a regional level, Nets, a Nordic-based payment service provider, launched white-label 
wallet in Norway. On international level, tech giants such as Apple and Samsung introduced their own mobile 
payment platforms, Apple Pay and Samsung Pay, while the card company Visa collaborated with Facebook to 
enable P2P transactions. Thus, MobilePay needed to defend once again its position from new potential 
contenders with different business models and global reach.  
Action taken  
In order to solidify further its position, MobilePay expanded its reach by ventur-ing into several Nordic 
markets. The strong presence of Danske Bank in the region and the similarity between the consumer 
preferences across the Nordic countries, combined with the possibility to gain first mover advantage due to 
weak competi-tion, provided good foundation for the successful export of MobilePay to selected Nordic 
markets.  
In December 2013, MobilePay entered the Finish market by launching a P2P mobile payment platform, which 
mimicked fully the design of the Danish version. The expectation was that the smooth registration flow, ease 
of use and overall sim-plicity of the solution would lead to its fast adoption among users. The initial uptake of 
MobilePay, however, proved to be not as expected as a key factor for the success of MobilePay in Denmark 
was not present in Finland. In particular, the easiness with which users could sign-up for MobilePay was not 
feasible in Finland, which resulted in cumbersome registration process. In Denmark, MobilePay’s sign-up pro-
cess required the input of bank account number, which is indicated on the users’ payment cards. In Finland, 
however, this was not the case; thus, users needed first to find their bank account details, usually by accessing 
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their online banking, and then entered them as part of the MobilePay’s registration flow. To mitigate this, 
MobilePay improved the registration process, but, despite these efforts, the adoption rate remained relative 
low (e.g., in 2015, MobilePay had 148 000 registered users in Finland). Despite the slow adoption rate, 
MobilePay became the leading mobile payment platform in the country as other competitors also struggled to 
ignite.  
In Sweden, a banking sector solution, Swish, which launched in 2012, had al-ready earned a significant market 
share. Launching a standalone competitive solu-tion in this market was not considered a viable strategy, and 
thus, Danske Bank decided to join the other banks in the Swish initiative (note: Danske Bank was not part of 
common banking solution Swipp in Denmark).  
The Norwegian market constituted the next potential option for expansion. Var-ious legal and technical 
constraints postponed the launch of MobilePay in Norway. One of the impeding issues turned out to be the 
rather low payment limit for receiv-ing payments, which, when reached, prevented users from receiving money 
unless they authenticated themselves with an ID. The integration of such ID authentication process slowed 
down the launch of the solution in the Norwegian market. While MobilePay contemplated on the different 
options and the potential risks associated with each of them, the largest Norwegian bank, DBN, launched a 
P2P mobile pay-ment platform, Vipps, in May 2015; thus, changing significantly the competitive environment 
in Norway. Although other mobile payment platforms had existed in Norway prior to the launch of Vipps, 
such as Valyou and mCash, their user adoption rates had been low due to their limited value propositions. 
Vipps, which is similar to MobilePay’s design, however, managed to attract one million users in just five 
months after its launch. In response, MobilePay entered the Norwegian market in August 2015. Even though 
MobilePay supported both P2P and C2B transactions (Vipps initially enabled only P2P transactions), it could 
not overcome the strong first mover advantage, which Vipps had acquired. Thus, MobilePay needed to adopt 
a different strategy for conquering the Norwegian market.  
In order to gain ground in Finland and Norway, individual country teams were established, which worked in 
close cooperation with the MobilePay team in Den-mark. While these local teams focused on designing and 
executing marketing cam-paigns and forging strong relations with local customers and partners, the team in 
Denmark was responsible for providing innovative features and rolling them out to all relevant markets.  
Results achieved  
MobilePay’s fast adoption rate in Denmark could not be replicated in other Nor-dic markets. In 2016, 210 000 
private consumers had MobilePay in Norway, while 180 000 private consumers utilized the digital payment 
platform in Finland (Mo-bilePay 2016). The initial struggles led to re-formulation of the strategies for each 
market, and even though the growth rates improved, there was strong competition from local players. In 
Finland, for example, Pivo, a mobile wallet operated by the largest Finnish bank OP-Pohjola, amassed more 
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that 500 000 users as of 2015 (OP-Pohjola, 2015). MobilePay’s user base, however, is growing with 40 % in 
the sec-ond half of 2016 (MobilePay 2017) and it is largely expected to gain a market dom-inance. In Norway, 
the dominance of Vipps, which reported over 2,1 million private customers in 2016 (Vipps 2016), seemed to 
be difficult to overcome.  
Learning Points from Building a Nordic Vision Phase  
Despite the dominance of MobilePay in the Danish market, Danske Bank could not easily replicate this success 
story in other markets even if there are a number of similarities across the Nordics. In particular, when entering 
new geographical mar-kets, managers need to start building the platform’s user base from scratch. Apply-ing 
similar adoption strategies across different markets, however, do not lead to replication of the initial success. 
At the same time, due to local characteristics, the technological set-up and customer journey of the Danish 
version of MobilePay, which largely contributed to the success of the solution, could not be replicated to all 
markets (e.g., MobilePay in the Finnish market), and instead, required adapta-tions. Furthermore, the lack of 
interoperability between the MobilePay-branded dig-ital payment platforms in the three markets (in Denmark, 
Finland and Norway) pre-vent any network effects between the three solutions, which could constitute a driver 
for further adoption. To govern successfully the entry and subsequent development of a digital payment 
platform in different markets, local teams should be set up with focus on distribution and marketing, while the 
innovation efforts remained in the central team.  
3.4. Building an Ecosystem of Partners  
Situation  
In 2016, MobilePay continued to grow in size and scope by attracting more than 3,2 million private users and 
approximately 35 000 business customers (MobilePay 2016). To keep this large customer base active, 
MobilePay needed to increase their engagement rate by continuously launching novel functionalities, which 
required resources and the ability to read quickly the ever-changing consumer preferences and competitive 
environment. In addition, MobilePay had to balance the heteroge-neous interests of multiple stakeholders - 
from private customers to different types of business customers (e.g., small and medium sized to large retail 
groups), who also operated in different payment contexts – online, in-store, in-app, etc. As a result, the 
MobilePay team faced constant demands for delivering various functional-ities addressing the needs of specific 
merchants, which they needed to balance against the demand for innovative features by private customers.  
MobilePay also struggled to ignite in Finland and Norway due to lack of clear vision how to win these markets 
and shortage of necessary resources to ensure rapid expansion. In 2016, MobilePay yet again operated in an 
increasingly disruptive pay-ment landscape with new international competitors closing in the Nordic markets 
(e.g, Apple Pay’s indications to launch in the Nordics). As a result, MobilePay con-templated how to build up 
its capabilities in order to outpace the innovation speed of its main competitors. Ultimately, the team faced the 
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decision whether to continue MobilePay’s journey as a sole quest or to establish a collaboration with other re-
gional or international players in order to conquer the Nordics.  
Action taken  
As the Nordic expansion as standalone payment platform proved to be a difficult and fruitless endeavor, the 
MobilePay team decided to join forces with other incumbent banks across the Nordic region. Nordea was the 
first bank to join the new initiative, which led to its exit from the common sector solution Swipp. The majority 
of the other Danish banks also followed and left Swipp in order to enter into agree-ment with MobilePay. A 
number of banks in Finland and Norway also decided to participate in the new venture.  
Under the terms of the collaboration, partner banks were to act as local distribu-tors of MobilePay towards 
their business customers. Danske Bank retained full ownership of MobilePay, but the existing business unit 
was to be carved out into a separate company operating under an E-Money license. Partner banks also agreed 
to invest in MobilePay in order to spur continuous innovation, which would be at MobilePay’s discretion.  
Apart from forging alliances with banks, MobilePay also entered in dialogue with numerous local and regional 
partners, most of which, such as the PoS vendor Veri-fone, operated across the Nordics and aimed at 
solidifying their market positions. Perceiving MobilePay as the most advanced and innovative mobile payment 
plat-form in the Nordics, various actors view potential partnership as a driver for their own digitalization 
agenda. For example, one of the largest retail groups in the Nor-dics, Rema 1000, cooperated with MobilePay 
on launching on-demand delivery app, Vigo, which utilized MobilePay as sole payment method.  
Results achieved  
The opening of MobilePay to external partners resulted in solidifying the posi-tion of the digital payment 
platform in the Danish market. Currently, more than 70 banks have joined MobilePay as distribution partners, 
which allowed MobilePay to expand its ecosystem by acquiring new business customers. The opening to 
external banks have also implications for the platform’s architecture as this allows for mov-ing from the 
existing card-based infrastructure to more efficient and cheaper ac-count-to-account set-up. The stable revenue 
stream also gave MobilePay the oppor-tunity to innovate at increased speed. Multiple technology providers, 
independent app developers, and businesses from various sectors and industries also approached MobilePay 
seeking a potential collaboration.  
Learning Points from the Building an Ecosystem of Partners Phase  
As the dynamic competitive environment requires the continuous delivery of high quality innovative 
functionalities, this can puts serious constraints on the innovative capabilities of a digital platform. To secure 
more resources for development, a dig-ital platform should open up to various types of partners, who can boost 
its capabil-ities (e.g., distribution partners (banks); technology providers (Verifone as terminal provider), etc.) 
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(see also, Parker et al., 2016). Such co-innovation in particular with incumbent actors in industries, which also 
face digital disruption (e.g., retail, trans-portation, etc.), for example, helped MobilePay explore multiple 
innovation paths simultaneously and thus, increase its innovation potential. Working with various types of 
partners, however, requires the set-up of dedicated governance regimes for each type of platform partners (e.g., 
vendors, other banks, technology providers), which regulate issues with regards to revenue sharing, intellectual 
property rights protection, data ownership, etc. and serve as mechanisms for preventing and resolv-ing any 
potential conflicts (see also, Evans and Schmalensee, 2016).  
4. Results achieved  
In 2017, four years after its launch, MobilePay continues to dominate the Danish market, while also expanding 
its reach to selected Nordic markets. The user base of MobilePay continued to grow rapidly and by end of 
2017, it amounted to 3,7 million users (more than 90 % of the Danish population) and more than 75 000 
physical stores and app. 8000 Danish online shops (see Table 1 below for overview of the growth of 
MobilePay’s private and business customers in Denmark). The total sum of the executed daily transactions via 
MobilePay amounts to app. 18 000 EUR. The collaboration between MobilePay and various business 
customers also turned to be successful. For example, 74 % of the tickets sold in the Danish State’s railway app 
are purchased through MobilePay. As of beginning of 2018, more than 70 partner banks also have joined 
MobilePay as distribution partners. Despite this development and the presence of stable revenue streams, 
MobilePay is still in search of a viable business model. 
 
Table 1. Overview of MobilePay’s private and business customers in Denmark 
Phase 
Number of private 
customers (app.) 
Number of business 
customers (app.) 
Launch of MobilePay 870 000 (2013) Solution not offered 
MobilePay Expansion 1,8 million (2014) 4000 (2014) 
Nordic Expansion 2,7 million (2015) 17 500 (2015) 
Building an ecosystem 
of partners 
3,2 million  (2016) 35 000 (2016) 
 
MobilePay’s popularity led to the closure of its main competitor in the Danish market, Swipp. New contenders, 
both local and international, however, have emerged, prompting MobilePay to continue evolving in order to 
stay ahead. In 2017, the Nordic payment service provider Nets, for example, launched its own mobile wallet 
in selected Danish stores in direct competition with MobilePay. Ap-plePay also entered the Danish market in 
2017, but due to its technical set-up, merchants have to pay higher fees when using it in comparison to using 
MobilePay.  
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Across the Nordics, MobilePay is still trying to gain traction. In Finland, the popularity of MobilePay across 
both private and business customers increases, (e.g., 40 % user growth in Finland). Despite all the efforts to 
establish MobilePay in the Norwegian market, the digital payment platform was shut down in January 2018 as 
the competitor Vipps managed to attract the majority of the Norwegian banks as distribution partners. As a 
result, MobilePay’s strategy for Norway changed from going solo to seeking collaboration with Vipps. 
The success of MobilePay has helped Danske Bank achieve a number of non-financial benefits. In particular, 
the success of MobilePay contributed to Danske Bank’s efforts to protect itself from disruption by gaining a 
first mover advantage in the mobile payment area, improving its brand image and reducing the churn among 
its customers. MobilePay is also a proof case demonstrating the innova-tion capabilities of Danske Bank, which 
various business and corporate customers of the bank can utilize in order to deliver on their own digitalization 
agenda. The success of Mobile Pay has also led to the emergence of several other disruptive initiatives within 
Danske Bank, which also adopt new approaches to innovation.  
5. Lessons learned 
Facing the possibility of disruption by the entry of various contenders (both fintech start-ups and established 
companies (e.g., Apple, Samsung) operating at local and global level), Danske Bank, an incumbent financial 
organization, decided to embrace digitalization. While digitalization is an ongoing and incremental process 
within the bank and permeates throughout all its business units and projects, Danske Bank also adopted a 
radical approach towards digitalization by launching initiatives with high disruptive potential. In particular, 
Danske Bank aimed at revolutionizing the way people pay by offering a mobile payment platform, MobilePay, 
which quickly gained dominance in Denmark and expanded to other Nordic markets.  
In this case, we investigate how an incumbent financial institution succeeded at developing a digital payment 
platform - an endeavor, which required the adoption of platform thinking and different approach to innovation. 
Below, we summarize the main findings, which practitioners need to take into account when launching and 
further developing a digital platform.   
Pursuing a platform business model deviates significantly from the business logic associated with traditional 
banking products (e.g., managing the interactions among various distinct groups of participants (see e.g. Hagiu 
and Wright, 2011; Parker et al., 2016, etc.)), identifying a subsidy and revenue side (Evans and Schmalensee, 
2016), creating a robust ecosystem of external partners (Parker et al., 2016)). To succeed with this disruptive 
initiative, Danske Bank relied on different from usual approach when it comes to organizational set-up and 
innovation processes. In particular, a small, agile and cross-functional team of employees (e.g., IT developers, 
business analysts, legal experts, etc.) carried out the initial development of MobilePay as a six-month project. 
To ensure the continuous de-velopment of the digital payment platform in a fast, innovative and agile manner, 
Danske Bank established a separate business unit, characterized by high degree of autonomy in terms of 
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innovation processes, strategies and business models. In addition, an IT unit dedicated solely to the 
development and maintenance of MobilePay was established. 
While the new organizational set-up fostered autonomy, MobilePay also established close synergies with other 
units in Danske Bank in order to benefit from bank’s key resources (e.g., access to payment infrastructure, 
legal and technical expertise in the payment area, IT and marketing resources, etc.). The challenge, however, 
is to leverage the benefits stemming from being associated with an incumbent, while trying at the same time 
to reduce those dependencies, which can create inefficiencies and stifle innovation (e.g., slow decision-making 
process, being risk-averse, etc.). Thus, the development of MobilePay required a careful balance between 
autonomy and synergy when it comes to the relations with Danske Bank. The evolutionary journey of 
MobilePay also demonstrated that as the digital platform matures and its ecosystem grows, it bolsters higher 
degree of autonomy (e.g., the carving out of MobilePay as separate company in 2017) and less synergy due to 
the need to pursue new opportunities and establish collaborations with various heterogeneous actors. 
The timing of digital platform’s market entry is of importance as indicated by MobilePay’s launch in Denmark 
and by the subsequent entries in Finland and Norway. Observing closely the market dynamics, Danske Bank 
decided to speed up its venturing into the area of mobile payments due to increased demand from private 
customers and the preparations from various contenders, both incumbents and fintech start-ups, to launch their 
own solutions. By identifying the window of opportunity for market entry, Danske Bank managed to attain a 
first mover advantage, which led to MobilePay’s dominance in the Danish market and constituted high barriers 
to entry, which various contenders (e.g., Swipp, Paii, etc.) could not overcome. This Danish success story, 
however, could not be easily repli-cated to other markets, as the factors determining the popularity of 
MobilePay in Denmark were not present there.   
MobilePay’s strategy included first the launch of a customer-centric state-of-the-art digital payment platform, 
followed by efforts to build critical mass of private customers and later of various types of merchants and only 
then, seeking to make the solution financially sustainable for the bank. As part of its evolutionary journey, 
MobilePay also expanded its services from payment transactions to include value-added services such as 
receipts, loyalty cards and programs, and established a vast network of partners, which contributed to its 
expansion into selected Nordic markets. Thus, despite the initial high adoption rate, attributed to the simplicity, 
ease of use and strong value proposition of MobilePay, its continu-ous success and long-term sustainability 
remained elusive as the digital platform ecosystem faced many challenges (e.g., technology trends, consumer 
preferences, regulations, competitors, etc.). To address them, MobilePay needed to evolve constantly in search 
of new opportunities. This indicates that the success of a digital platform requires ongoing efforts, which 
stretch beyond the launch phase and consist of casting multiple bets on various innovation efforts. We 
recommend adopting an incremental approach to evolution, where the digital platform ecosystem starts small 
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(in terms of types of platform participants and value proposition) and scales later. The quest for finding a viable 
business model can take place at a later stage. 
In this case, we trace Danske Bank’s endeavors to develop and evolve MobilePay over time. As a result, we 
provide a number of practical recommendations how incumbent organizations can successfully venture into a 
digital platform business. By doing so, we contribute to the literature on Multi-Sided Platforms and on 
digitalization. In particular, we shed light into the execution of a dual-track strategy towards digitalization and 
prove its suitability for incumbent organizations. We also offer a number of advancements in the platform 
literature. First, we outline how a traditional business can adopt a digital platform business. Although 
researchers has previously dealt with this issue (see, Gawer and Cusumano 2014), they have mainly studied 
the transformation of physical products into digital platforms. In this case, we account for an incumbent 
launching and managing a digital platform from scratch. Second, we study the success of digital platform 
ecosystems beyond the initial launch phase. Third, we offer rare insights into the organizational set-up of 
successful digital platform, which is currently under re-searched area (Altman and Tripsas 2014). Finally, we 
also outline the endeavors of a digital platform to expand in geographic markets, of which currently few studies 
exists (see, e.g., Watanabe et al. 2017). 
While Danske Bank aims to be at the forefront of digitalization, its core belief is that digital innovation should 
be first consumer-centric, even if this means slow-paced digitalization. 30 % of the private customers of 
Danske Bank, for example, have not yet used the bank’s digital products, but as Jesper Nilsen, Head of Personal 
Banking in Danske Bank, states it is “ok not to be super digital” (Børsen 2017). Instead, the digitalization of 
these customers could be slow-paced and should occur when they found a strong value proposition for 
themselves to adopt digital solutions. 
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Abstract 
Digital platform ecosystems evolve rapidly in an attempt to address both internal 
inefficiencies and turbulent environment, where new opportunities and threats arise on 
ongoing basis. However, rather than being well planned and predictable, the evolution of a 
digital platform ecosystem resembles an uncharted path with frequent shifts in strategic 
direction. While recent studies have enriched our understanding about digital platform 
ecosystem evolution, researchers are yet to propose a comprehensive understanding of how 
platform owners manage the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem. Adopting emergence 
perspective, this research argues that platform owners manage the evolutionary process 
through engaging in multiple micro-strategies and microstructures, instead of relying on a 
long-term strategy and fixed organizational structure. Utilizing a longitudinal case study of 
a digital payment platform ecosystem, this study seeks to propose a process model for 
managing digital platform ecosystem evolution and a set of micro-strategies and 
microstructures, which practitioners can choose from when addressing various strategic 
challenges.  
Keywords:  Digital Platform Ecosystem; Platform Evolution; Strategy-as-Practice;  
                Strategizing 
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Introduction 
Today, some of the most successful companies, in terms of number of users, brand value and profitability, 
function as digital platform ecosystems (e.g., Airbnb, Alibaba, eBay, Uber, WeChat) (Hagiu, 2014; Parker et 
al., 2016). Despite their significant economic importance and rapid proliferation across various industries, 
successful digital platform ecosystems remain difficult to build and sustain over time (Evans, 2009; Hagiu, 
2014). Operating in environment characterized by uncertainty, rapid shifts and unpredictability due to the 
innovative nature of their services, entry of new competitors and unstable revenue streams, digital platform 
ecosystems need to evolve constantly in order to ensure their long-term survival (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009; 
Hagiu 2014; Gawer 2014).  
Their evolutionary path, however, does not constitute a stable and planned process; rather it meanders through 
a myriad of obstacles and new opportunities. Not surprisingly, there are far more examples of failed digital 
platform ecosystems rather than successful ones (Hagiu 2014; Parker et al. 2016). The lack of predictability 
and stability, which gives rise to unexpected threats and missed chances, challenges the ability of digital 
platform ecosystems to evolve over time. As a result, they often lag behind competitors, become irrelevant to 
its participants, or fail to become profitable (see e.g., Parker et al. 2016), all of which can jeopardize their 
sustainability.  
To ensure the success of a digital platform ecosystem over time, platform owner(s) need to manage efficiently 
its evolution by identifying on time the potential pitfalls and opportunities and by designing relevant strategies 
and organizational structures in order to address them. In a dynamic, ever-changing and uncertain environment, 
however, traditionally fixed and macro level strategies and organizational structures are hardly suitable to deal 
with unexpected turbulences and emerging opportunities (see Tsoukas and Chia 2002). Instead, researchers 
advocate for moving towards micro processes of strategizing and organizational structuring (e.g. Tsoukas and 
Chia 2002).  
Building upon this view, this research argues that platform owners can manage the process of ecosystem 
evolution through developing and implementing micro-strategies and corresponding microstructures rather 
than relying solely on macro strategies and macro organizational structures. For example, instead of designing 
a long-term, deliberate strategy around openness, which requires macro approach (Wan et al., 2017), platform 
owners can engage in short-term micro-strategies, such as resourcing (provision of boundary resources), 
securing (strengthening control) and monetizing (unlocking new revenue sources) , deployed as immediate 
response to emerging threats and opportunities(Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2011). Further, instead of relying 
on rigid organizational structures, with hierarchical distribution of power and fixed division of labour, to 
execute micro-strategies, platform owners need to adopt flexible and fluid temporal organizational structures 
(Tsoukas and Chia 2002). For example, PayPal, which functions as a digital payment platform ecosystem 
facilitating the interactions between private users and merchants, (Evans and Schamalensee 2016), moved from 
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traditional organizational structure designed based on separation of functionalities (business development vs 
IT development) to flexible organizational structure by creating solely two dedicated teams to support private 
users and merchants respectively (Schulman 2016). 
While researchers have started to investigate the evolution of digital platform ecosystems (see Gawer 2014; 
Tan et al. 2015), there is a lack of research analyzing how platform owners can manage the evolution of their 
ecosystems from micro perspective, with no deliberate, long-term strategy designed prior. Existing studies also 
black box the process of designing, implementing and modifying a platform strategy as they focus on its 
content rather than on the process of its emergence. Furthermore,  while the focus of most studies is on platform 
owner(s) as designers, managers and owners of a digital platform ecosystem, researchers treat them as 
collective and faceless actor, without mentioning the organizational structure, which supports the work of the 
owner (e.g., units, division of labor, control systems, etc.). To address these research gaps, we formulate the 
following research question: 
How do platform owners manage the process of digital platform ecosystem evolution from micro 
perspective? 
Utilizing a longitudinal case study of a successful digital payment platform ecosystem, this research traces the 
daily activities of practitioners, who engage in various forms of strategizing and structuring. As a result, this 
study aims at identifying a number of micro-strategies and microstructures, which emerge from the activities 
of practitioners (that is, platform employees) in their attempt to ensure the survival of the ecosystem. An 
additional goal is to offer a model, which captures the process of managing the digital platform ecosystem 
evolution. Drawing upon first-hand observations, this research also seeks to provide a rare, inside glimpse into 
the organizational structuring, which supports the work of the platform owner(s). 
Theoretical Background 
Digital platform ecosystems function as complex socio-technical systems that enable and regulate the 
interactions between various affiliated actors through developing and managing an underlying technical 
architecture and a governance regime (Boudreau and Hagiu 2009; Hagiu 2014). One or several platform 
owners exercise ownership over the digital platform ecosystem and coordinate the activities of a myriad of 
participants, who encompass various actors such as platform providers (e.g., technology providers), demand-
side users (or end-users) and supply-side users (e.g., third-party developers) (Eisenmann et al. 2009). Despite 
that the majority of the studies within the platform literature adopt a platform owner(s) perspective, the owner 
is often presented as a faceless, collective actor in contrast to the other actors participating in the ecosystem 
(e.g., third-party developers, end users, etc.). 
The role of the platform owner(s) is to develop, manage and grow a robust ecosystem of actors around a stable 
and reliable digital platform (Parker et al. 2016; Tiwana 2014). To do so, a platform owner designs and 
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implements various strategies (see Wan et al. 2017). Although digital platform ecosystems evolve constantly 
(Gawer 2014; Tiwana 2014), few scholars investigate how a platform owner manages the evolutionary process. 
Evans (2009), for example, investigates the strategies, which platform owners can use to obtain a critical mass 
of users after the launch of their platforms. Similarly, Gawer and Cusumano (2007) discuss strategies for 
designing platforms upon market entry (coring) and for winning market dominance against other platform 
ecosystem (tipping). Hagiu (2006) also investigates design and expansion strategies and argues that platform 
owners need to focus first on managing platform depth (that is, the initial functionalities offered to actors) 
before expanding the platform breadth by including other distinct types of actors.  
As platform ecosystem matures, however, it faces slow growth and potential stalemate, which platform owner 
needs to address accordingly by, for example, unlocking new sources of innovation through evolving its 
boundary resources (Eaton et al. 2015; Eisenmann et al. 2009) or by entering into other markets through 
envelopment attack (Eisenmann et al. 2011). To ensure the survival of the ecosystem, platform owners also 
need to develop the capabilities of the underlying IT architecture along with the overall ecosystem governance 
regime (Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2011; Tiwana 2014). Tan et al. (2015), for example, propose a model, 
which traces the evolution of a platform ecosystem in terms of its Information System capabilities, and put 
forward relevant strategies for developing such capabilities in each evolutionary phase. 
The majority of the studies outlined above, however, adopt a strategy as content perspective (e.g., what strategy 
contains) (see Wan et al. (2017) for overview of platform strategies). Thus, there is lack of research, which 
looks at strategy as process (with the exception of Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2011), that is how platform 
owner(s) and other relevant practitioners strategize when faced with strategic challenges. In particular, most 
researchers assume that platform strategy is crafted by the platform owner (in terms of top management), but 
there is lack of research investigating how particular strategies emerge over time, who participates in the 
process of strategy making and whether there is internal consensus about them. Furthermore, there is lack of 
in-depth studies, which analyze how platform owner changes strategy over time to drive the further evolution 
of its digital platform ecosystem. 
A number of researchers point out that the successful execution of platform strategies requires the presence of 
efficient organizational structure. Gawer and Cusumano (2007), for example, argue that in order to foster 
external collaborations, a platform owner needs to introduce an organizational structure that supports this goal 
by, for example, setting a separate unit, whose sole task is to grow the platform ecosystem. Gawer and 
Hendfridson (2007) further state that, in case of competition between a platform owner and complementors, 
the owner should create two separate units (one advancing the interests of the platform owner and one 
promoting the interests of the whole ecosystem) and limit the interactions between them. When discussing the 
success of an envelopment, Eisenmamm et al. (2011) argue that a platform owner needs to foster cross-unit 
cooperation in order for such strategy to succeed. Aiming to advance the overall development of the platform 
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ecosystem, Wan et al. (2017) advice that a platform owner should have two dedicated units to pursue 
exploration and exploitation respectively. Research investigating the organizational structure of digital 
platform ecosystems (in terms of division of labor, hierarchical structures, power distribution, etc.), however, 
remains scant and fragmented. In particular, there is lack of studies that provide comprehensive account of 
such organizational structure and how it changes over time in connection to the rapid alterations in the platform 
strategy. 
Analytical Framing   
This paper investigates how platform owner(s) manage the dynamic and unpredictable process of digital 
platform ecosystem evolution. To this end, this study builds upon the strategy-structure interplay as presented 
in the field of organization studies. In addition, it adopts a micro-perspective by arguing that rather than 
designed and imposed by the top management, strategies and the relevant organizational structures emerge 
from the micro-activities of various platform employees, especially when interacting with other ecosystem 
actors. Consequently, this research relies on Strategy-as-Practice perspective (e.g. Whittington 2006) and on 
micro approach to organizational structuring (e.g. Puranam 2014) as analytical lenses, and combines them in 
a preliminary research process model (see Figure 1). 
Strategy-Structure Interplay 
To survive turbulent times, an organization needs to ensure a fit between its strategy and structure, which 
guarantees its successful evolution over time (Simon 1993; Tushman et al. 1986). In particular, Miles et al. 
(1978) point out that managers have to adjust continuously their strategy to remain relevant in the market and, 
as a result, to re-evaluate and alter on ongoing basis the mechanisms, which support the strategy execution. 
Strategy and organizational structure are interdependent and develop in parallel. While strategy determines 
structure, which supports its execution, structure also affects the strategy itself (Chandler 1962; Hall and Sais 
1980). The execution of specific strategy, for example, imprints on the overall organizational structure and 
leads to “structural evolution” (Chandler 1962). Organizational structure, however, also influences the 
introduction and further development of strategy (Hall and Sais 1980).  
Adopting an Emergence Lens: From Macro to Micro Focus 
The macro perspective for studying organizations, which puts emphasis on collectivism and discards 
individualism, has dominated the social science field (Barney and Felin 2013). Recognizing its limitations, a 
number of researchers have proposed the adoption of micro approach for studying various organizational issues 
(see, Tsoukas and Chia 2002). While this approach does not reject the importance of macro level, it gives 
prevalence to micro level in order to explain how social phenomena (at macro level) “emerge because of 
individual choices and social interaction” (Barney and Felin 2013, p. 144). In particular, micro-foundations 
put emphasis on the “unforeseen, surprising, and emergent” (ibid) outcomes as result of dynamic interactions 
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between individuals. Thus, emergence constitutes an important concept in the micro approach (Barney and 
Felin 2013). Rooted in the process philosophy of becoming, emergence is “being in continual process, never 
arriving, but always in transition” (Damsgaard and Truex 2000, p. 5) and presupposes that flux, change, 
unpredictability and ambiguity are inherent characteristics of reality (Tsoukas and Chia 2002). Thus, change 
is constant state for organizations, where its every aspect (e.g., business relations, strategy, organizational 
form, IT, etc.) co-evolve and emerge together, following no pre-established plan (Damsgaard and Truex 2000). 
Emergence of Micro-Strategies and Microstructures  
In opposition to deliberate and planned strategy, emergent strategy presents a pattern of unintended, context-
specific strategic outcomes undertaken in reaction to changing environment dynamics (Mintzberg and Waters 
1985). Thus, instead of relying on a fixed, long-term strategy, an organization tests various alternatives in order 
to establish which strategic approaches to retain and reinforce, and which to discard through a process of 
constant learning (Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Brown and Eisenhardt (1997), for example, found that 
successful managers do not elaborate on complicated plans for the future, but instead rely on low-cost probing 
techniques to sense the future and predict success.   
The emergent patterns of strategic outcomes, which bring the organization closer to reality, are rooted in the 
praxis and practices of various actors who participate in the strategy making and execution (Mintzberg and 
Waters 1985). Thus, this study adopts a Strategy-as-Practice lens, which provides the necessary apparatus to 
investigate how the specific activities of practitioners on micro level lead to various strategic outcomes 
(Johnson et al. 2003; Whittington 2006). To understand this process of strategizing, Whittington (2006) 
proposes to study three concepts - praxis, practices and practitioners. Praxis encompasses diverse activities 
(e.g., formal meetings, informal conversations, etc.), related to the process of strategy design and realization 
performed by strategic practitioners from all organizational levels (Whittington 2006). Thus, practitioners 
engaged in strategizing need not to be top managers; in fact, they can assume either core strategic roles or 
auxiliary roles (Whittington 2006). Practices, which present common set of rules and understanding, guide the 
day-to-day activities of practitioners (ibid). As Whittington (2014) points out “in their praxis, practitioners 
enact practices in ways that affect outcomes” (p. 3). As result of this process, micro-strategies, which reflect 
the preferred strategic approach to tackling specific internal and external challenges, emerge (Ghazawneh and 
Henfridsson 2011; Johnson et al. 2003).  
The successful execution of strategy emergence depends upon the existence of efficient organizational 
structure (see above). Reflecting an environment with increased dynamics and uncertainty, where managers 
need to sense their way (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997), organizations move from rigid structures towards a 
micro-approach to organizational design (Brown and Eisenhard 1997; Orlikowski and Yates 2002; Puranam 
2014). This approach states that instead of being fixed, organization design emerges as a pattern of flexible 
and fluid temporal structures (Orlikowski and Yates 2002; Tsoukas and Chia 2002). Thus, microstructures, 
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who present “common patterns of interaction between members of an organization” (Puranam 2014, p. 2), 
form over time through the daily activities of various actors, who coordinate for the achievement of a common 
goal (Orlikowski and Yates 2002). Examples of such temporal structuring are semi-structures and “links in 
time” (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Semi-structures, which combine rigidity and flexibility, emerge during 
the duration of various projects and allow for fixed requirements (e.g., responsibilities, time frames, 
deliverables, etc.) to co-exist along with requirements, which are open and non-determined. “Links in time” 
allow managers to establish continuity and direction by connecting their work over time through 
“choreographed transition” (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, p. 29).  
Based on the above two theoretical lenses, this study proceeds with the development of a preliminary process 
model to guide the empirical analysis (see Figure 1). The model conceptualizes the emergence of overall 
platform strategy as a series of micro-strategies stemming from the micro-activities (praxis) of strategic 
practitioners (identified as A, B, C, D; see Figure 1), which are regulated by specific practices. Ghazawneh 
and Henfridsson (2011) argue that “platform strategy emerges through the enactment of different micro-
strategies as the platform owner discover new opportunities or react as a response to strategic moves by 
ecosystem members” (p. 16). Thus, instead of relying on one deliberate strategy, a platform owner often 
implements multiple micro-strategies to address the unpredictability of the digital platform ecosystem 
evolution.  
 
Figure 1. Model for Managing Digital Platform Ecosystem Evolution 
In parallel with the emergence of micro-strategies, relevant microstructures also emerge from the praxis of the 
strategic practitioners (see, Figure 1). Thus, rather than relying on traditional organizational design set by top 
managers, platform employees create temporal micro-structures (e.g., working process, coordination 
mechanisms, division of labor) to support the execution of context-specific micro-strategies (Puranam 2014). 
Similar to micro-strategies, these microstructures form a certain pattern over time, which shapes the emergence 
of the organizational structure supporting the functioning of digital platform ecosystem.  
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The emergent micro-strategies and microstructures form a pattern over time. The proposed model 
conceptualizes that based on learning loops, practitioners can evaluate whether given micro-strategy and its 
corresponding microstructure address adequately and efficiently certain strategic challenge (see, Figure 1; see 
also Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Based on this evaluation, they can decide to create new micro-strategies and 
microstructures, which fit better the new strategic challenge, or to keep some of the existing ones (see e.g. last 
feedback loop in Figure 1, where the microstructure from the first episode is preserved). Thus, because of the 
learning process, practitioners can decide to keep, modify or altogether reject existing micro-strategies and 
microstructures or to introduce new ones. Consequently, as suggested by Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2011), 
practitioners may compile a portfolio of micro-strategies and microstructures from which to choose when 
facing certain strategic challenge later on. 
Research Design 
As this study seeks to provide a process model tracing the emergence of micro-strategies and microstructures 
as part of the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem, qualitative longitudinal study constitutes a suitable 
research method (Plourde 2013). Since such studies provide temporal and holistic accounts, researchers select 
this approach when they need to study dynamic phenomena taking place across a certain span of time and in 
specific context (Yin 2003). In particular, this research relies on a single longitudinal case study in order to 
provide in-depth account of the studied phenomenon. 
Case Selection and Empirical Context 
This research investigates the evolution of a digital payment platform ecosystem based in Northern Europe 
from its formation back in 2013 until it gained market dominance in late 2017. Offered by an incumbent 
financial institution, the digital payment platform, which initially enabled peer-to-peer transfers and later 
consumer-to-business payments, grew rapidly in a short span of time. As a result, the platform owner managed 
to attract a significant number of demand-side users (e.g., private users), technology providers, external 
innovators and other supply-side users, thus forming a robust ecosystem of platform actors. Presently, the 
digital payment platform has become the dominant solution in the Danish market, with approximately 90 % of 
the Danes using it on daily basis, and has achieved a stable presence in the Finish market.  
The four-year case study is set in unique context, which makes it suitable for the purposes of this research. 
Due to the nascence of the digital payment industry, the case company operates in a dynamic environment 
with rapid strategic shifts. Facing changing consumer preferences, strict regulation, the entry of new 
competitors (e.g., fintechs) and adoption of new technology, the evolution of this platform ecosystem does not 
follow a stable and predictable pattern of events and does not rely on explicit strategy. Throughout its 
evolutionary path, for example, the digital payment platform ecosystem went through a number of strategic 
shifts - launch of private app, expansion to include commercial customers, openness to third-party 
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complementors, inclusion of additional platform technology providers, expansion to Nordic markets, 
collaborating up with financial providers. In addition, this case is comprehensible as the researcher can achieve 
a relatively full overview of the emergence of micro-strategies and microstructures. In particular, while the 
case encompasses a myriad of ecosystem actors, the number of employees, who develop, manage and 
strategize around the ecosystem, remains relatively small (approximately 30-40 employees), which makes it 
easy to track activities. Lastly, the selection of this specific case study is also opportunity-driven due to the 
extensive level of access granted to the researcher (see below).  
Data Collection 
The collected data for this study comes from three different sources, which the researcher gathered during two-
year fieldwork in the case company (October 2015-September 2017). During this time, the researcher had the 
chance to observe at first hand a wide range of activities, to discuss and record accounts of events, which 
occurred in the period before and during the fieldwork, and to examine all the relevant documentation kept in 
the company. As a result, the researcher collected a rich and detailed account of the evolution of this digital 
payment platform ecosystem, spanning over almost four and a half years (May 2013-September 2017).  
When adopting a process perspective, researchers recommend immersing in the daily life of the organization 
(Whittington 2014) in order to “uncover strategic activities in their real rather than just their reported form” 
(Johnson et al. 2003, p. 17). Thus, the preferred approach for data collection is participant observation as “a 
process enabling researchers to learn about the activities of the people under study in the natural setting through 
observing and participating in those activities” (Kawulich 2005, p. 1). During the participant observation, the 
researcher observed a wide variety of activities – from weekly briefings, bi-weekly team meetings and 
department meetings to workshops, breakout sessions and multiple informal conversations. To record the 
findings, the researcher noted down all the observations under the form of research diary and minutes from 
meetings.  
In addition, the researcher also conducted twelve interviews with various employees in order to obtain a 
retrospective account of events, which occurred prior to the fieldwork. To re-construct this initial period of the 
platform ecosystem evolution, the researcher also collected a number of archival documents such as 
presentations, reports, emails, minutes from meetings, contracts, press releases, etc.  
Data Analysis 
To analyze the data, the researcher is following a four-step procedure. Plourde (2013) states that at the end of 
the data collection, a researcher should have “long chronologies reporting every single action made by the 
organization in relation to its strategy, structure and processes, and divided into key strategic areas” (p. 99). 
Thus, the first step in the data analysis is to identify distinct periods of evolution during which micro-strategies 
and microstructures have emerged. To do so, this study engages in temporal bracketing to outline episodes, 
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which do not stem from any theory, but rather serve as a means of “structuring the description of events” 
(Langley 1999, p. 703). To distinct between periods, Langley (1999) recommends looking into certain 
discontinuities in the observed activities. Thus, the researcher seeks to outline distinct evolutionary episodes 
by identifying strategic outcomes, which signal for change in the previously established strategy (e.g., launch 
of new products, new partnerships, change in governance regime, etc. (see, Plourde 2013)). These strategic 
outcomes mark the beginning and end of each evolutionary episode. 
The next step is to focus on each of the established evolutionary episodes and to trace the emergence of the 
micro-strategies and their microstructures in relation to the specific strategic outcome. To this end, within each 
identified episode, the researcher investigates the strategic challenges, which practitioners face, the strategic 
activities they use to address them (e.g., analyses, workshops, investigations, etc.), the practices, which they 
rely on to strategize, and the organizational structures which support their activities.  
The following step is to label the relevant micro-strategies and microstructures, which emerge within each 
evolutionary period. To distinguish between strategic outcomes and micro-strategies, this study uses the 
terminology proposed by Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2011). In their work, they, for example, present the 
launch of an API (from its launch to testing and modification) as a number of strategic moves, giving rise to 
certain micro-strategy, which they label resourcing and define as “provision of platform boundary resources 
for enriching a platform with new capabilities” (ibid, p. 15). Building upon this, for the purposes of this 
research, strategic outcome presents observable events (launch of new products, etc.), while micro-strategies 
refer to the act of strategizing which manifests in these observable strategic outcomes. To identify a correct 
label, Plourde (2013) advises researchers to write a short summary of the period and compare it with the period 
before and after in order to outline any distinct characteristics. By focusing on these distinct characteristics, 
the researcher can identify appropriate labels.  
Lastly, the researcher compares the micro-strategies and microstructures within a given period with those, 
which characterize the period before and after. The purpose is to establish whether practitioners retain, reject 
or modify specific micro-strategies and microstructures as result of a learning process. In particular, of interest 
is to investigate whether practitioners develop a repository of micro-strategies and microstructures, as 
suggested by Ghazawneh and Henfridsson (2011), which they can use when faced with specific strategic 
challenges.  
Initial Observations, Expected Findings and Future Work 
Although the data analysis is still undergoing, few observations emerged in connection to the proposed model 
(see Figure 1). In particular, the initial conceptualization of strategizing as emergent on constant basis rather 
than deliberately planned found significant empirical support. For example, in the words of the CEO of the 
case company:  
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“The work in our company is work of uncertainty. There is no explicit strategy as the landscape is constantly 
changing. (…) Competition is changing. There’s also changing regulation. Because of this uncertainty, it is 
difficult to have explicit strategy”.  
As result of this uncertainty, top managers and employees in the case company often rely on bottom up 
approaches to strategizing, where employees propose key strategic initiatives such as feature launch, 
partnerships, adoption of new technology, rather than these initiatives coming from top managers. At the same 
time, their practical execution followed different patterns of organizational structuring. For example, although 
employees belong to specific teams, they do not necessarily have clear job descriptions and instead can perform 
various activities across teams. Furthermore, the teams working on concrete strategic initiatives often emerge 
spontaneously initiated by the employees themselves, adopt ad hoc tools and last solely for the duration of the 
specific initiative. As noted by the CEO of the case company: 
“We had a journey of flexibility. We started as a small team. If you have a job profile, in the end of the day, 
you most likely end up doing things which were not part of your job description”. 
Reflecting the expanding ecosystem of actors around the platform, the owner had to engage in active 
partnerships with a myriad of actors, which affected the strategy-making process as it revealed new 
opportunities for strategic initiatives:  
“As (case company) strengthens its user base, we have increasingly and continuously been presented with 
companies seeking cooperation, joint development, marketing, etc. “(Strategy Document, 2015). 
While these initial observations testify for the validity of the preliminary conceptualization, which adopts a 
micro and emergent perspective towards strategizing and organizational structuring, the next step is to conduct 
the empirical analysis and to adjust the initially proposed model based on the data analysis. The expected 
findings of this study is to propose a process model for managing the evolution of a digital platform ecosystem 
and to outline a number of micro-strategies and microstructures, which practitioners can rely on.  
Conclusion 
When completed, this research aims at contributing to the burgeoning literature on digital platform ecosystems 
in two ways. First, it offers a process model conceptualizing the management of digital platform ecosystem 
evolution through the emergence of a pattern of micro-strategies and microstructures. Thus, this study adopts 
a micro perspective towards platform strategizing and organizational structuring, which is currently absent 
from platform research. Second, it provides insights into the various practitioners (that is, employees), who 
support the work of the platform owner, and their activities; thus, moving away from treating the platform 
owner as collective, faceless actor. The goal of the study is also to provide practitioners from all organizational 
levels with a set of micro-strategies and their corresponding microstructures, from which they can select when 
addressing internal and external challenges as part of the evolution of their digital platform ecosystems. 
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